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This thesis analyses the industrialisation of Singapore with special focus on the 
roles of the state and international capital. The interest in Singapore is due to its 
status as a newly-industrialising country (NIC) which has been successfully 
incorporated into a new international division of labour. This new structure has 
emerged in the last two decades, opening up opportunities for manufacturing 
production in the Third World. Since both Singapore and NICs in general have 
been promoted as models for other developing countries wishing to industrialise, it 
is essential we clarify the reasons for such success. 
The argument of this thesis is that Singapore's rapid industrialisation through 
incorporation into this new international division of labour has been facilitated by 
the state assuming a pervasive and decisive role, intervening at the social, 
economic and political levels. This intervention has helped shape Singapore's 
comparative advantage as well as establish the necessary pre-conditions for the 
attraction of international capital. The capacity of the state to perform such 
functions should not be taken for granted: it derives from a convenient juncture of 
historical and social structural conditions. 
To argue that the state has played a role in NIC, and in this case Singapore's, 
industrialisation is not novel. Certainly there are accounts which ignore the 
state's role. More commonly, however, neo-classical economists have 
acknowledged state intervention in the economic sphere but have emphasised 
market forces in explaining rapid industrialisation. Such an approach generally 
misrepresents the relationship between market and state. The relationship 
between the two is presented as dialectical in this thesis, and one which 
encompasses social and political, and not just economic, factors. Nevertheless, 
this thesis is not just at odds with such neo-classical analysis, it also challenges 
the voluntarism of rational-choice approaches and the determinism of dependency 
theory. So, not only does this thesis examine the various ways in which the state 
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influences the pattern of industrialisation, especially the pattern of investment by 
international capital, it also examines the reasons for the stEi.�_e's behaviour. It is 
here that we see the state's complexion is contingent upon a complex set of 
domestic and international relationships. In Singapore's case, domestic class 
formations have combined with fortuitous tendencies in international capital 
accumulation: in short, a relatively autonomous political state has emerged with 
sufficient need and will to exploit and contribute to this new international division 
of labour. 
Divided into four parts, this thesis provides a chronological account of 
Singapore's industrialisation. After an introduction to the theoretical concerns of 
the study, Part I outlines the historical developments of colonial Singapore 
affecting the island's long-term economic and social structure. Part II looks at 
how historical and political developments after World War II gave rise to the 
People's Action Party (PAP) which, in turn, came to assume the status of a virtual 
'state party'. In Part III we see how extensive state power was of primary 
importance not just to the implementation of the export-oriented industrialisation 
(EOD programme which incorporated Singapore into the new international division 
of labour, but also to the ongoing management and modification of this 
relationship. This culminates in the late 1970s in various economic and social 
contradictions. Part IV examines the so-called 'Second Industrial Revolution', the 
government's policy response to these contradictions. This was designed to affect 
an accelerated transition to a more sophisticated technological base and 
represents the boldest attempt by any NIC government to test the objective limits 
to the state's ability to influence the pattern of private capital investment in 
industry. 
In essence, this thesis attempts to redress the lack of serious analysis of the 
state's role in the industrialisation of Singapore and other NICs. 
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PART I: TllEORETICAL AND IDSTORICAL CONTEXT 
The two chapters comprising this section provide an essential background to the 
main body of discussion in this thesis. The central theoretical issues and debates 
largely implicit throughout the thesis are clarified here. Fundamental 
observations are also made about Singapore's early development which assist in 
understanding both the significance of the industrialisation programme to modern 
Singapore and the conditions helping to shape its form. We see here that the 
pres§_l!re for a high state profile in Singapore's industrialisation has its roots in 




The Scope of the Study 
The inspiration for this thesis can be traced to an interest in a number of broad 
but related questions: the study of economic development and problems thereof in 
the Third World; the changing nature of the international division of labour in 
manufacturing production and the associated industrialisation of a select group of 
East Asian developing countries; the impact of international capital investment in 
the Third World; and the role of the state in the process of development. 
In more specific terms, the thesis is a study of the industrialisation of 
Singapore. The aim is to describe and explain the pattern of industrialisation with 
particular focus on the role of, and relationship between, international capital and 
state policy. In less simple terms, the thesis aims to draw out the implications of 
Singapore's experience for the anlaysis of Third World development generally and 
question the popular view of Singapore, and indeed Taiwan, South Korea and Hong 
Kong, as development models which can and should be adopted elsewhere. 
Close analysis of the state in the industrialisation of Singapore leads the 
thesis to directly challenge several important tenets of neo-classical economics 
and rational choice theory. Whereas these approaches tend to minimise the state's 
importance and stress the correctness of the policies adopted by the East Asian 
industrialisers, this thesis argues that Singapore's rapid industrialisation can only 
be understood in terms of broad socio-political as well as economic relations 
involving the state. (rt is these relations, it will be argued, that have made J'.'t 
"-
possible the implementaion of the policies emphasised by both neo-classical 
economists and rational choice theorists-�: Without comparable relations, it is 
questionable whether a general adoption of the East Asian models is feasible. 
V 
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As will be explained the Singapore state has played a central role in the 
industrialisation process. In the economic sphere it has not only undertaken direct 
investment but has intervened to shape the cost, supply and quality of labour and 
infrastructure. It has also provided fiscal incentives and subsidies in 
discriminatory fashion to promote particular ,forms of industrial activity. Apart 
from specifying and explaining this intervention, the thesis explores the many 
extra-economic activities of the state which provide a social and political 
environment conducive to Singapore's particular form of industrialisation. The 
capacity to implement these policies and the consequent success of them, 
however, is the product of a fortuitous co-incidence of factors. Not the least 
important of these is the peculiar domestic class structure which made it both 
possible and likely that the state would adopt a high profile in any effort to 
accelerate industrialisation. Without comparable circumstances, or rather 
circumstances producing a comparable effect, it would be utopian to expect 
industrial programmes of this type to have similar effects elsewhere. 
The selection of Singapore as a case study is not intended to suggest that its 
experience is wholly representative of all East Asian industrialisers. As a city 
state without an agricultural hinterland, it is obviously in some respects different 
from all other cases but Hong Kong. This point notwithstanding, the methodology 
appropriate to understanding the pervasive state in Singapore is no less relevant to 
other NICs. In each case it is necessary to identify and explain the various 
historical, social strucutral and economic contingencies upon which such a state 
and its capacity to exploit external opportunities is reliant. Yet the selection of 
Singapore in this study was not random. Singapore's policy-makers have adopted 
the most conscious attempt, of any of these countries, to exploit the apparatus of 
the state in order to influence the pattern of industrialisation in general and 
international capital investment in particular. Hence, the analysis of the 
Singapore experience may offer some insight into the potential and limitations of 
similar industrial strategies where circumstances permit and encourage the 
adoption of such a model. 
- - - - - - ----- - -- - -- - - -----------,--�--=�--,,--------
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The thesis is structured chronologically, starting with pre-colonial Singapore 
and culminating in the analysis of the post-1979 period in which the Singapore 
government adopted an ambitious new industrial strategy, the 'Second Industrial 
Revolution'. Throughout, however, a number of questions will be pursued 
systematically: What form does industrialisation take and � -�y? What industrial 
policies are pursued by the state and why? What is the n�ture of involvement by 
international capital in this industrialisation and what determines this 
involvement? 
In addressing these questions, the thesis is obviously informed by existing 
theoretical literature which has attempted to develop suitable frameworks for 
such analysis. Much of the foregoing discussion examines this literature, the 
purpose being to clarify the points of divergence and convergence with this 
thesis. In short, I will be asking how helpful these different approaches are to an 
understanding of the sorts of analytical problems embodied in Singapore's rapid 
industrialisation. 
Emergence of the NICs 
Traditionally, the economies of the developing countries, the so-called Third 
World, have tended to play a specific and limited role in the international division 
of labour. Principally they have exported raw materials and agricultural 
products. Over recent decades this pattern has undergone significant change, so 
much so that it is widely contended that the emergence of a new international 
division of labour has begun.1 Unlike the old structure, this new division involves
the developing countries in manufacturing production, although predominantly in 
those aspects of production which are labour-intensive and relatively unskilled. 
Such a specialisation has become possible with technological advances which allow 
for the decomposition of the production process. This has facilitated a global 
optimisation in the exploitation and allocation of the factors of production, that 
is, 'worldwide sourcing'. A consequent relocation of some manufacturing 
--- - -- -- - - - - -- --- --------,--�-�=--
---,-------
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processes to developing countries is, and has been for some time, in train. The 
emerging new international division of labour has thus been affected by an 
unprecedented degree of mobility by international capital.2
The significance of this emerging structure for developing countries is, as 
will be elaborated below, the subject of some controversy. What must be 
emphasised at this point however is that a new pattern in international capital 
investment has begun, one which has prompted an expansion of manufactured 
exports from developing countries. Although the new international division of 
labour has opened up the way for manufactured exports from developing countries, 
the performance and degree of participation by developing countries in export 
production is remarkably uneven. For developing countries as a whole 
manufactured exports grew by 13.8% between 1960 and 1973 and by a further 
11.0% up until 1980.3 This compared with 10.7% and 5.8% for the world as a
whole. The bulk of the export expansion of developing countries is, however, 
accounted for by a handful of 'super exporters'. These are the so-called newly­
industrialising countries (NICs) whose governments have, to differing degrees, 
adopted explicit strategies designed to facilitate incorporation into the new 
international division of labour. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Brazil and Mexico are the countries generally subsumed under this category. It is, 
however, the four Asian developing countries, those most completely committed 
to export-oriented industrialisation (EOD strategies, which have been the most 
outstanding. Collectively they accounted for 60% of the total manufactured 
exports of developing countries in 1976. In per capita terms the value of 
manufactured exports from the 'Gang of Four', as they are often referred to, was 
in excess of US$400 as against an average of US$8 for the remaining developing 
countries.4 Annual average growth rates in real GDP of approximately 9% were
achieved in each of these four countries in the 1960s and, in all but Hong Kong, 
these rates were either improved or sustained in the 1970s while the reverse trend 
was occuring in the developed countries. 5
6 
In essence then, although this new international division of labour is still
embryonic, a select group of economies most comprehensively incorporated into
its structure have achieved impressive rates of industrial and economic growth.
This raises a number of important and interesting questions, two of which are
central to this thesis. First, what is the nature of this new international division
of labour and what are the consequent opportunities and limits for developing
countries? Second, what determines incorporation into the new international
division of labour and what, to date, has been the ensuing rapid industrialisation?
Both of these questions essentially ask how is it that the NICs have been able to
achieve such rapid industrialisation whilst other developing countries continue to
experience only modest, if not negligible, industrial growth?
Explanations of the contrasting experiences of developing countries and the
significance of the new international division of labour can be grouped, for
heuristic purposes, into two broad theoretical categories: neo-classical/rational
choice and statist. These two categories are not discrete entities but a
convenient division for our purposes here. As explained below, however, there are
important distinctions to be made within both the neo-classicial/rational choice
and statist categories themselves.
Neo-Classical/Rational Choice Approaches 
Neo-classical economists prescriptively embrace the emerging new international
division of labour though they may not recognise it by this name. They welcome
the increased specialisation of production and trade as a rational shift towards
increased efficiency in the allocation of factors of production. The change in the
division of labour in manufacturing has enabled individual economies to expolit
more fully their comparative advantages? The industrial successes of the NICs
are thus explained by the adoption of astute, but quite specific, public policies by
governments. [rhese policies primarily involve trade liberalisation, and a general
reliance on market forces to determine factor prices, but invariably also include
7 
exchange rate reform and export-incentives.8 Having got factor prices 'right',
integration into the world economy through the adoption of EOI strategies is seen 
to have facilitated the realisation of comparative advantage and, consequently, 
extremely rapid industrialisation. For these theorists, a general adoption of this 
more rational division of labour would bring mutual benefits for developing and 
developed countries. 9
In the analysis of NICs, neo-classical theorists have underlined the 
correlation between rapid industrialisation and external orientation in 
manufacturing production. Indeed, there is a tendency to see this as a causal 
relationship. As early as 1967, Keesing argued the case for a general adoption of 
EOI strategies in the Third World after comparing such economies with those 
oriented primarily towards the domestic market.10 In addition, Krueger asserted,
on the basis of a comparison of the industrial performances of developing 
countries, that the successes of the NICs demonstrated that "export promotion 
out-performs import substitution" .11 Likewise, Little concluded from his study of
Asia's four NI Cs that: 
The major lesson is that labour-intensive, export-oriented policies, 
which amounted to almost free trade conditions for exporters, were 
the prime cause of an extremely rapid and labour-intensive 
industrialisation ... 12 
The currency of this view gained considerably over time, and was quintessentially 
reflected in the revised position of the World Bank. In the early 1980s the 
previous basic needs approach was aband�ned in favour of trade-led growth.13
The World Development Report 1981 called on developing countries to follow the 
model of South Korea in manufacturing.14 Of course, the World Bank has been in
a position to make its loans conditional upon the adoption of an EOI strategy and 
the associated trade liberalisation and structural adjustment policies appropriate 
to such a strategy .15
Although the neo-classical position maintains that an external orientation in 
production and trade, together with measures facilitating the realisation of 
comparative advantage, is the basis of NIC successes, how and why such 
8 
programmes have been adopted is explained in terms of policy-makers exercising 
rational choices. Those economies, to have experienced rapid industrialisation, 
are those in which policy-makers have chosen technically correct policies; other 
developing countries languish because policy-makers adopt technically incorrect 
or unsound policies. This interpretation explains the strong prescriptive 
component of the neo-classical position. Little epitomises this voluntaristic 
depiction of EOI strategy implementation when he contends that " ... the success 
[of Asia's NICs] is almost entirely due to good policies and the ability of the 
people ... 1116 As is pointed out by Evans and Alizadeh, however, the major
problem with this sort of analysis is that it plays down the social, political and 
historical factors which condition the opportunity and ability of policy-makers to 
adopt an EOI strategy and measures conducive to the realisation of comparative 
advantage.17 In particular, it steers attention away from the important role of
the state in the industrialisation of the NICs. 
Neo-classical economists have not, however, totally ignored the state. In 
fundamental terms, the state here refers to the agencies of administration, force 
and law which co-exist with, but are separate from, civil society. As will be 
explained later in this chapter and demonstrated in the course of this thesis, 
however, such apparatus serves to maintain a particular system of production and 
circulation of goods. Ohlin, Kindleberger and Krueger have all attempted to 
accommodate the fact of state intervention in their respective theories of trade 
and comparative advantage.18 In all cases, however, the authors concentrate
their analysis on economic intervention and fail to take into account the crucial 
social and political, indeed ideological, functions performed by the state. Thus, 
although Krueger, for example, has developed a sophisticated model for 
quantifying the effects of state-imposed rents on the pattern of international 
trade, 19 she does not generally emphasise the interventionist nature of the NIC
states.20 State intervention, however, can be extra-economic in form yet have
important economic effects. Social and political control of labour, for example, 
9 
has certainly influenced the cost of labour and, consequently, the comparative 
advantage of NICs. 
Aside from the lack of analysis of the state's extra-economic activities, neo­
classical economists have not adequately addressed the question of why 'rational' 
EOI strategies have been successfully introduced by some developing countries but 
not others. Riding on the back of neo-classical economics, a range of rational 
choice and public choice theorists have, however, attempted to fill part of this 
void. These studies have focused on the decisions and decision-making processes 
of politicians and bureaucrats in an endeavour to identify problems with policy and 
its implementation.21 Rothchild's and Curry's study of political decision-making
in Central Africa represented one of the most influential of these analyses.22 The
authors develop an elaborate model for decision-making which they claim is 
"usable in the sense that it provides a conceptual basis for analysing institutional 
structures and processes that a community might develop in order to decide on 
what to produce, how to produce, and for whom to produce".23 As Staniland
points out, however, this approach leads to the consideration of policy choice in 
isolation from political constraints and even to the rationalisation of repressive 
political forms on the grounds of their utility to economic development.24 The
naive apolitical aspect of this approach is highlighted by the assertion that there 
are five factors which condition governmental decision-making in Africa: 
information, values, beliefs, analytical capacity and bureaucratic organisation. 
There is no recognition of the influence of powerful interest and lobby groups and 
the internal political processes of government. Political processes are not seen as 
inherent to decision-making but rather as an obstacle to it. For the authors, the 
point of studying decision-making structures is, in effect, to ensure that technical 
rationality prevails over politics. 
One rational-choice theorist who gives greater attention to the complexity 
of the decision-making process, and thus tries to minimise the above problems, is 
Bates who studies the failures of agricultural policies in post-colonial Africa.25
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He argues that there is both a political and economic rationality, the former 
exerting an influence over the latter. The market interventions of politicians, the 
deployment of patronage and the exercise of repression all shape the choices open 
to individual actors in the market place, in this case peasant farmers. The net 
result is that short-term political incentives operate as long-term disincentives 
for individual producers to invest in the much-needed food crops and exported 
cash-crops. The value of Bates's analysis is that he demonstrates how the rational 
choice of any individual peasant is circumscribed by the institution of politics.26
Having drawn attention to these instititional influences, however, is not 
necessarily to have explained them and this approach is still therefore inadequate. 
More recent public policy studies of the Third World have gone further in 
developing observations about the -relationship between the nature and degree of 
political power at the disposal of politicians and bureaucrats and the prospects of 
'good' policy. Both Migdal and Grindle, for example, have examined policy 
implementation in various Third World countries and concluded that more 
effective policies would be enhanced by a concentration of public power with 
central authorities.27 In their own ways both authors have at least underlined the
importance of the political context within which policies are implemented, that is, 
the constraints upon political actors in implementing policy. The analysis of this 
political context is, however, confined to the immediate problems of bureaucratic 
decision-making and overlooks the broader political constraints on actors. So 
whilst Grindle is justified in contending that "implementors need to be skilled in 
the art of politics and must understand well the environment in which they seek to 
realise public policies and programmes", 28 it must also be emphasised that politics
is not simply a technical process or an art to be mastered. Conflict is often 
unavoidable, no matter how skilful or astute the politician or bureaucrat.29
In essence, then, nee-classical economists and those rational choice theorists 
who have looked more closely at the context of decision-making in developing 
countries have tended to emphasise the rationality of decision-makers or the 
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decision-making process in explaining the successful incorporation of NICs into 
the new international division of labour. It is this understanding which has led not 
just to the advocacy of a general adoption of the East Asian model of EOI by 
developing countries, but also the optimism that such a redirection is possible.30
One objection which has been raised to this is that there are structural limits to 
how many exports can be absorbed by the markets of the developed countries.31
For the purposes of this study, however, the fatal flaw of the neo­
classical/rational choice position is that it attempts to disembody policy decisions 
from their social and political environments. Consequently, greater attention will 
be given to the question of whether social and political constraints render the EOI 
project viable. In particular, close analysis of the nature of the state and forms of 
state intervention affecting industrialisation will be pursued. The question of 
what inclines and enables Singapore's policy-makers to adopt the policies lauded 
by the advocates of a general adoption of the East Asian EOI model is addressed. 
To answer this we must look beyond the economic policies themselves and to the 
broad socio-political and ideological relationships which are linked to them. 
Another weakness of the nee-classical and rational choice approaches which 
renders them less than suitable for this study is that they fail to specify the 
contribution of the state to comparative advantage itself. Indeed, comparative 
advantage takes on an existence outside the realms of the concrete; it is a 
condition or a law independent of actors themselves. According to this approach, 
actors can distort comparative advantage or help realise it, but they cannot 
actually create or define it. This position is rejected in this thesis. Rather it is 
argued that the state can and does play a major role in shaping comparative 
advantage - not just by including the cost of factors of production but also by 
conditioning the socio-political environment in which these costs are realised. 
Comparative advantage is not a neutral, exclusively abstract condition but a 
position in the market determined by a variety of empirical factors, some of 




Accounts of how the state influences the pattern of industrialisation vary 
considerably in focus. Some writers attribute analytical primacy to the nature of 
the political regime whilst others emphasise the sociological characteristics of the 
state's decision-makers. Some writers pay special attention to the specific forms 
of intervention in the economy by the state, either to critically examine the 
notion of comparative advantage or to examine the influence of state regulation 
and manag�ment of foreign direct investment. In each case, however, these 
writers operate on the assumption that, at the very least, the state is a major 
actor in the industrialisation process. The intention of the discussion below is not 
to provide a representative survey of all these different theories but rather to 
selectively examine those which raise questions of special relevance to this thesis. 
Corporatism and the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State 
Theories which examine the relationship between political processes of the state 
and industrialisation have attracted widespread interest in the study of 
development in the Third World. To a significant extent this interest has been 
prompted by curiosity with the correlation between repressive political regimes 
which intervene extensively in the social and political realms and integration with 
the new international division of labour. As would be expected, then, much of this 
literature is informed by corporatist theory. Though this debt is not always 
formally acknowledged, it is nonetheless quite real and deserved of elaboration. 
There are many working definitions of corporatism but that by Schmitter is 
possibly the most commonly employed and detailed: 
... a system of interest representation in which the constituent units 
are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by 
the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within 
their respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands 
and supports. 32
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However, Schmitter draws a distinction between 'societal' and 'state' 
corporatism. The former is associated with "the post liberal, advanced capitalist, 
organized democratic welfare state" while the latter is a "defining element of, if 
not structural necessity for, the antiliberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian, neo­
mercantilist state" .33 The form that corporatism takes, whether societal or
state, is considered by Schmitter to be a function of the "basic imperatives or 
needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually 
to accumulate further resources" .34 State corporatism, argues Schmitter,
develops where these basic imperatives cannot be met by co-opting and 
incorporating, but instead by repression and the exclusion of representation of 
subordinate classes. This tends to occur where the domestic bourgeoisie is either 
externally-dependent and/or too weak and divided to meet these basic imperatives 
legitimately, that is, within a liberal framework. In essence state corporatism is 
seen as a structurally-imposed condition generated by "delayed, dependent 
capitalist development and nonhegemonic class relations" .35
Schmitter pursued this corporatist model in his analysis of authoritarian rule 
in post-1964 Brazil and similar sorts of analyses were formulated in the early 
1970s by Cotter and Malloy in the case of Peru, Linz in the cases of Spain and 
Brazil and, later on, by Drake in the study of Chile and Stauffer on the 
Philippines. 36 
Probably the most explicit and influential refinement of corporatist theory 
in the study of Third World industrialisation has been by O'Donnell.37 He was
particularly concerned about the rise of military regimes in Latin America and 
how this might be linked to industrialisation. Based primarily on his studies of 
Brazil and Argentina, O'Donnell generalised his observations to contend that the 
emergence of repressive political regimes in Latin America is causally linked with 
a new stage of industrialisation. He identifies three separate development stages 
in the history of these societies, each characterised by a distinct form of political 
process. 
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In the first stage, during which the primary export sector predominates, 
there is an 'oligarchic' state which affords only elite representation from this 
sector. The second stage, the 'populist' stage, involves the early and relatively 
easy stage of import substitution industrialisation of the 1940s and 1950s in which 
a new industrial elite, involving the national bourgeoisie, enters into a political 
alliance with the urban proletariat which provides the market for manufactured 
goods. A coalition of urban workers and the national bourgeoisie thus provides the 
basis for the rise of various populist regimes: Vargas in Brazil, the Popular Front 
in Chile and Peron in Argentina, for example. The third stage is characterised by 
a 'bureaucratic authoritarian' state.38 This is reached where the opportunities
for small-scale investment in light industry have diminished. To solve this crisis 
of accumulation large-scale investment in intermediate and capitalist goods is 
required. This 'deepening' or vertical integration necessitates a relaxation of 
industry protection, the promotion of exports and the attraction of international 
capital. The size of the new investments, the gestation periods involved, and the 
technological and marketing requirements of this production is beyond the 
capacity of most nationally-based companies. Thus, not only is the national 
bourgeoisie edged out of the commanding heights of the economy, but a host of 
unpopular fiscal austerity and labour disciplinary measures are introduced to 
finance the new programme and attract capital. In these circumstances, the basis 
of political populism is undermined and a new alliance is formed between the 
military, civilian technocrats and the 'upper bourgeoisie', a highly oligopolised and 
transnationally-oriented fraction of capital. All three are committed to carrying 
forward their increased integration of the economy with the international division 
of labour.39 The political pre-eminence of the military is justified in terms of its
utility for this new stage of industrialisation. Technical efficiency supercedes the 
consent of the governed as the basis of elite legitimacy. According to O'Donnell, 
however, the inherently exclusive nature of this regime, barring all popular 
representation, means that repression necessarily replaces legitimacy as the 
means of its survivai.40
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The importance of O'Donnell's thesis lay in the attempt to show that a 
specific form of industrialisation implied a specific role for the state in La tin 
America. In so doing, O'Donnell specified a particular pattern of political 
alliances necessary for industrialisation. The relationship O'Donnell was exploring 
certainly demanded explanation, but his thesis contained various flaws. 
A number of critical but sympathetic studies were subsequently conducted 
to test O'Donnell's bureaucratic authoritarian model. A compilation edited by 
Collier entitled The New Authoritarianism in Latin America,41 including a revised
statement by O'Donnell,42 contains such studies in which O'Donnell's thesis is
challenged though not totally rejected. Kaufman argues, for example, that 
populist regimes are not as neatly associated with the easy stage of import-
substitution industrialisation as claimed by O'Donnen.43 He also questions
whether the necessity of industrial deepening or vertical integration accounts for 
the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism. Serra's examination of the 
Brazilian case emphasises that during the first decade of the military regime, it 
was not deepening so much as the 'undeepening' of the economy which was 
characteristic.44 Kaufman also contends that there were alternative strategies to
deepening, including the export of manufactured goods or primary products or 
income redistribution to generate stronger internal demand for consumer goods, 
which could have been pursued. There was, according to Kaufman, no structural 
necessity about deepening. Moreover, none of the possible strategies themselves 
necessitate repression. Just the same, though, he argues that the transition 
among different phases of industrialisation has facilitated a "narrowing of the 
coalitional choices and institutional alternatives to political and economic 
elites'\45 Hirschman also rejects as "unpromising" the pursuit of a "single,
specific structural economic difficulty underlying the mix of authoritarianism in 
Latin America".46 He suggests that O'Donnell's project should not be abandoned
but widened to include an analysis of the ideological influences shaping the 
policies of the regime. This is intended to add to the specification of the 
differences between the pluralist and authoritarian regimes of Latin America. 
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Hirschman's point is a good one. Ideological influences are particularly 
important in explaining policy formation in Singapore, especially in view of the 
degree of relative political autonomy enjoyed by state actors. Relating concrete 
policy stances to ideological perspectives is, however, always difficult. The 
problem is compounded in the case of Singapore where it is extremely rare for a 
researcher to have access to such materials as cabinet papers, party records or 
the private correspondence of ministers. 
In so many different ways, the contributors to The New Authoritarianism in 
Latin America implicitly criticise the bureaucratic authoritarian state model for 
its economic determinism. In short, Hirschman, Serra, and Kaufman all maintain 
that O'Donnell's original thesis presents the structural constraints on political 
behaviour in too rigid a manner.47 Cardoso goes so far as to insist that
bureaucratic authoritarianism refers "not to a form of state as such, but to a type 
of political regime" .48 Cardoso points out that the dependent captialist state,
even in circumstances of global economic crisis and consequent difficulties with 
import-substitution industrialisation, has successfully coexisted with a variety of 
political regimes; he specifies such examples as nonmilitary corporatist (Mexico), 
inclusionary military (Peru), exclusionary military (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Uruguary) and democratic (Venezuala, or Brazil for the term of Kubitschek).49
O'Donnell's critics alerted us to the complexity and variety of social formations in 
the Third World. This is not to suggest that the relationship between political 
repression and the pattern of industrialisation does not warrant close attention. It 
does suggest, however, that other factors may be responsible for mediating this 
relationship. It is towards an appreciation of these other factors that we must 
look to more fully understand the political interventions of the state in the 
industrialisation process. 
Dependency Theory 
Although the observation applies with differing degrees of accuracy, the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian model, and the subsequent attempts to modify it, bear 
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a close relationship to dependency theory.50 This body of theory which sees the
lack of economic and political autonomy as the root cause of Third World 
economic problems was first popularised in the English-speaking world by Frank. 
He argued that the incorporation of Latin America into the global economy was 
characterised by structural dependency and grossly unfavourable exchange 
relations. This has, according to Frank, resulted in the expropriation of surplus­
value created by Latin American producers. Indeed, the world is seen as a 
successive chain of exploitative exchange relations, expressed internationally in 
surplus exteraction by the 'metropoles' (advanced capitalist countries) at the 
expense of the 'satellites' or 'periphery' (the developing countries). 51 For Frank,
then, development of the periphery was not possible in the context of the 
international capitalist economy - the process was a zero sum game in which the 
metropoles developed by 'underdeveloping' the periphery. Only through 
withdrawal from the global economy and the establishment of an economy 
responsive to internal and not external needs could development occur. 
Frank's emphasis on the conditioning influence of metropolitan capital on 
the Third World was of course picked up by advocates of the bureaucratic 
authoritarian model. They linked the emergence of this state to the nature of 
integration with metropolitan capital. However, the nature and significance of 
this integration (especially for the analysis of the peripheral state) has been the 
subject of considerable controversy within the dependency school itself, as well as 
the focus of considerable criticism from outside the ·school.52
Although Frank's emphasis on the externally-imposed constraints on the 
Third World was theoretically insightful, the conclusions he drew from this were 
rather crude and in time required modification. Frank had discounted 
industrialisation in the periphery but, belatedly, he had to concede the reality of 
the NICs.53 Other dependency theorists were less stubborn. Cardoso, for
instance, acknowledged the possibility of development in the periphery, but made 
important qualifications about its form: 
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The idea that there occurs a kind of development of 
underdevelopment, apart from a play on words, is not helpful. In 
fact, dependency, monopoly capitalism and development are not 
contradictory terms: there occurs a kind of dependent capitalist 
development in the sectors of the Third World integrated into the 
new forms of monopolistic expansion. 54
Cardoso was to later refer to this as 'associated dependent development' when 
elaborating on the Brazilian case, arguing that the manufacturing sector was still 
dependent upon the technology provided by corporations from the advanced 
capitalist countries and, hence, the pattern of capital accumulation remained 
externally conditioned.55 Cardoso also argued that political repression was a
function of this sort of development and clearly it is this relationship which 
O'Donnell and others were exploring. 
Aside from Frank's reluctance to recognise Third World industrialisation, he 
paid little attention to internal political developments in the periphery. The 
reason for this is that Frank viewed such developments as largely derivative of 
external forces. In particular, the actions of the peripheral state were, for Frank, 
determined primarily by the imperialist bourgeoisie of the metropolis and not 
indigenous classes: 
Indeed, this dependent, and in this sense weak, character of state in 
the Third World dependent financially, technologically, 
institutionally, ideologically, militarily, in a word politically, on the 
international bourgeoisie(s) and their metropoliltan states - may be 
regarded as the fundamental characteristic of the Third World 
state.56
It is this sort of reasoning which inspired charges of economic determinism.57 In
fairness to the dependency school, however, not all its adherents have been quite 
so dismissive of the significance of indigenous class developments to an 
understanding of either the state or the form of industrialisation which prevails. 
To demonstrate the point let us examine briefly the work of Cardoso and 
Faletto. Their work, particularly Cardoso's, represents the earliest and possibly 
the most influential attempt to reconcile the analytical primacy of external 




Cardoso's and Faletto's intentions in Dependency and Development in Latin 
America are quite clearly to provide a more sophisticated account of peripheral 
class formations than Frank. Their project is to specify the alliances of domestic 
classes and groups which are produced by the interaction of foreign and domestic 
capital and to explain how such alliances endeavour to obtain and exercise state 
power to secure their interests. They see these class relationships as more 
differentiated and complex than Frank. 
We conceive the relationship between external and internal forces as 
forming a complex whole whose structural links are not based on 
more external forms of exploitation and coercion, but are rooted in 
coincidences of interests between local dominant classes and 
international ones, and, on the other side, are challenged by local 
dominated groups and classes.58
What Cardoso and Faletto argue is that the internal histories of each individual 
peripheral society contain their own particular class struggles. Hence, the 
development of capitalism and the consequence of this development have not been 
identical in different societies. There is a variety of 'dependency situations' in 
the periphery rather than a uniform pattern of dependent capital accumulation. 
Such differences are, according to the authors, understood as the product of 
different historical junctures when "local classes allied or clashed with foreign 
interest, organized different forms of state, sustained distinct ideologies, or tried 
to implement various policies or defined alternative strategies to cope with 
imperialist challenges".59 In the course of their concrete comparative study of 
the histories of different Latin American countries, Cardoso and Faletto make a 
distinction between societies in which the export sector was in the hands of 
international capital and those in which the national bourgeoisie was in command 
of this sector. The different responses to external pressures are attributed to 
these different alliances which shape the actions of the individual peripheral 
states. What this sort of analysis attempts to do then is counter Frank's 
instrumentalist view of the peripheral state in the explanation of Latin American 
development. This attempt, however, has attracted criticisms. 
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In spite of the sincere attempt to transcend the determinism of Frank, 
Cardoso and Faletto lapse into the same error. As Smith points out, the Hegelian 
assumption that the whole is more than the sum of its parts is the root cause of 
structural determination in their analysis. 60 This exonerates the authors from
specifying in any genuinely dialetical way the dynamism between internal and 
external factors in the periphery. So, even in the Preface to Dependency and 
Development in Latin America, Cardoso and Faletto assert that "it seems 
senseless to search for 'laws of movement' specific to situations that are
dependent, that is, that have their main features determined by the phases and 
trends of expansion of capitalism on a world scale". 61 Analytically, then, the
separate histories of the different peripheral societies are still secondary to 
international captialism. This leads Smith to view the distinction between 
Cardoso and Faletto and Frank as less significant than the similarity. 
In short, while Cardoso and Faletto repeatedly insist that different 
countries will have different reactions to capitalist imperialism ... 
they maintain the central assumption of all dependency theory, that 
economic forces generated by captialist imperialism emanating from 
the United States, Western Europe, and Ja�an remain the primum
mobile of historical change in the periphery. 2 
Carnoy points out that the implications of this for the comprehension of the local 
state are quite serious: local hegemony of this state is tied to metropolitan capital 
and "crises in the metropole capital-directed world economic system".63 This
takes us back towards the Frankian notion of the state in the periphery as an 
instrument of the metropole-based international bourgeoisie and denies the 
autonomy of local classes and, hence, the local state. This is not helpful in 
explaining the various forms of state in the Third World nor the special features of 
the NIC states in particular. 
Evans provides another dependency attempt to link internal and external 
factors.64 Like Cardoso and Faletto, Evans acknowledges the emergence of the
NICs and tries to explain how such countries can be simultaneously dependent and 
developing. Brazil, he argues, has moved out of 'classic dependency' into 
'deperident development', a transition he also argues is now affecting Nigeria and 
-- - ------ - - - - --------,--------��-�=�-----,-----
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Mexico.65 Also like Cardoso and Faletto, Evans's study of Brazil attributes an
important role to local classes and the state in the development process. He 
focuses on the relations between multinationals, the local state and the domestic 
bourgeoisie, arguing that all three form an alliance which establishes the social 
structural conditions appropriate for industrialisation. He argues that 
multinationals have not simply been able to takeover domestic capital but have 
had, to some extent, to accommodate the structures it has created and creates. 
Nevertheless this does not, by any means, imply that foreign capital is restricted 
to complementing local capital. Evans argues rather that "the relation between 
foreign and local capital has encompassed both denationalization and 
'simultaneous and differentiated expansion"' .66 Indeed, there are conflicts of
interest and differences in the relative power and location of domestic and foreign 
capital. 
Evans points out that local capital is strongest in small industries with low 
rates of growth while successful large Brazilian-based corporations are engaged 
primarily in commercial and marketing aspects rather than the higher value-added 
areas of product development, innovation and research. So even where Brazilian­
based. corporations are successful in breaking into the oligopolistic, high­
technology, high-profit areas, the highest value-added areas remain under the 
control of multinational firms based in the centre.67 The basic message is that
the presence of foreign capital constrains the activities of local actors and, 
furthermore, despite some conflicts of interest between domestic and foreign 
(international) capital, these are overshadowed by the more fundamental 
structural necessity of co-operation - hence the tripartite alliance. 
Like Cardoso and Faletto, Evans too has been criticised for unwittingly 
underestimating the significance of domestic politics.68 Despite the importance
attached to the local state and bourgeoisie, ultimately this is explained in terms 
of the functions and needs of capital in the advanced capitalist countries. The 
rise of the NICs is thus attributed to the "centripetal logic of strategies for 
growth coming out of multinational headquarters".69
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Although at one level Evans's study did certainly re-affirm the primacy of 
external constraints on the periphery, he did introduce a new element to the 
dependency analysis of the peripheral state and the dynamics of it. For Evans, the 
bargaining power of the peripheral state, whilst still constrained, had been 
enhanced by the tendency towards a greater geographical spread of investment 
resulting from the internationalisation of production and a tendency towards the 
dispersion of origins of direct foreign investment in the periphery. These changes 
have, according to Evans, given the Brazilian state and NICs in general "increased 
manouvring room" .70 This is reinforced by a weakening of relations between
multinationals and home states which results from the internationalisation of 
production and consequent transfer of capital from the metropolitan centre which 
undermines the national identity of capital. 71 
New Dependency Theory 
It has been argued thus far that the early dependency theory of Frank suffered 
from a structural determinism which negated any need to analyse the specific 
domestic social structures of the periphery. A more sophisticated and less 
deterministic form of dependency theory was, however, forwarded by Cardoso and 
Faletto who not only acknowledged the reality of development in the periphery, 
notably the emergence of the Latin American NICs, but also stressed the 
importance of specific domestic social structures in defining the forms and nature 
of industrial development. Despite their efforts, these authors still failed to 
clarify the precise link between domestic and international forces. Evans also 
failed in this respect, but he did further break with Frank's determinism in 
suggesting a new degree of bargaining power by the peripheral state vis-a-vis 
international capital. In a gradual but nontheless real sense, this shift in focus had 
at least raised the question, hitherto alien to dependency theory, of just how much 
autonomy the peripheral state enjoyed from international capital. Though Evans 
concludes that this autonomy is only marginal, his work did set in train a number 
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of studies pursuing this question. Haggard refers to these studies as a "' new wave' 
of theorizing on dependent development". 72 Such authors as Gereffi, Newfarmer,
and Bennett and Sharpe have joined Evans as the most significant of this 'new 
wave'.73 Looking at specific industries, they have attempted to clarify just how
far the peripheral state can affect industrialisation through its management and 
regulation of foreign (international) capital. These authors ask: what is the power 
of the peripheral state and how is this power derived? Clearly this is quite 
different from Frank's supposition that the peripheral state has little or no power 
at all vis-a-vis international capital. This question opens up the theoretical 
possibility of distinguishing the states of NICs like Singapore from those of other 
developing countries. 
Gereffi's major study is of the pharmaceutical industry in Mexico. He 
analyses the state's unsuccessful attempt to generate a fully integrated steroid 
hormone industry in spite of justified optimism in the 1950s that this could be 
achieved. 7 4 Instead of forward integration and the harnessing of the industry to
meet national development objectives, Gereffi argues that transnational 
corporations increased their control of Mexico's steroid hormone industry, 
resulting in serious domestic policy constraints. The expanded role of the Mexican 
state, through the state instrumentality Proquivemex, 75 inadvertently served to
increase reliance on international markets and the marketing channels of the 
.transnationals. 
Gereffi offers two major explanations for the policy failure. One relates to 
the internal conflicts of the Mexican state which eroded the commitment to 
clearly-defined national priorities, a problem further compounded by a deficient 
administrative capacity to regulate the activities of transnational corporations. 
The lack of support for Proquivemex's initiatives at the top levels of the 
administration highlights the endogenous political factors. The second explanation 
relates to heightened technological dependence associated with the industry's 
development. During the period in which the Mexican state attempted to shape 
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the industry's development, reliances upon innovation for growth afforded greater 
control to those firms engaged in research and development as well as 
marketing. The emphasis on such knowledge-based activities favoured larger 
firms, invariably transnational in character, and based in the centre.76
Consequently, efforts to promote the higher value-added forms of production only 
resulted in a displacement of local manufacturers by international capital, a 
'denationalization'. 77
Although Gereffi's main observation is that the organisational and 
technological characteristics of the industry weakened the bargaining power of 
the state vis-a-vis local and, in particular, international capital, he does maintain 
that, in contrast to the earlier work of Stepan, 78 the power of the state over
international capital is likely to be greatest at the beginning of an investment in 
import-substitution industrialisation when it is able to determine the conditions of 
access to the local market. Thereafter, as seen in the hormone steroid case, the 
power of the transnational is enhanced by the mobilisation of domestic allies in 
the elite, the deployment of advertising and, of course, the growing technological 
dependence of the host country.79
Certainly Gereffi's observation that the technological features of a 
particular industry help explain the capacity of the state to bargain with firms is 
deserved of serious examination and promises to contribute to the understanding 
of the nature of 'dependence'. However, as Haggard seems to suggest, to extend 
observations about a sector of industry to the country per se, as a case of 
'dependent development', is a gigantic theoretical step.8° Furthermore, though
Gereffi does identify domestic class reason·s in accounting for the Mexican state's 
weakened bargaining position, his comparative study of the pharmaceutical 
industry in fourteen Third World countries sees him lapse into the tendency to 
deduce 'state strength' from the- individual countries' position in the international 
system.81
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The primary study by Newfarmer is of the Brazilian electrical industry.82
He analyses the consequences and implications of the international oligopoly in 
this industry for Brazil's development. The policy prescriptions and conclusions he 
draws are founded on the observation that the market behaviour of multinationals 
differs significantly from that of national Brazilian-based firms, notably in ways 
counter-productive for Brazilian development priorities. They tend towards a 
higher level of industrial concentration, have greater capital intensity and are 
more tightly bound to the international trading system owing to a heavier import 
reliance. Profit is the result of industrial concentration, product differentiation 
and vertical integration and not necessarily increased efficiency. According to 
Newfarmer these concentrations shape the structure and performance of the 
industry. 
For Newfarmer, the only way this control by multinationals can be addressed 
is by the state, .and even then only within certain limitations. He categorises the 
policies which might increase the scope for Brazilian gains from foreign 
investment as follows: countervailing programmes, regulatory policies, and those 
policies which chip away at the power base of multinationals.83
Newfarmer's guarded optimism that the state has the potential to shape 
industry structure is based on the understanding of the electrical industry's 
development as contradictory. On the one hand, economic dependence is 
unaltered when compared with the 1960s; the most advanced products are still 
imported from outside and local production of them requires the continued 
direction, management and supply of imports from the advanced capitalist 
countries. On the other hand, the physical transformation of the industry has been 
such that most products are now manufactured in Brazil with locally-mastered 
technology, Brazilian labour and inputs, under the supervision of Brazilians. 
Hence, the expansion of Brazilian industry, under foreign leadership, creates the 
potential to dispense with that leadership.84
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The ability to exploit this contradiction, however, derives largely from the 
state's direct and indirect controls over demand which affect perceived profit 
opportunities. In attempting to influence the market behaviour of multinationals 
this ability is highly conditional since foreign investors are not compelled to 
respond to perceived market opportunities. The degree of market competition is, 
according to Newfarmer, a key variable in determining the response of foreign 
firms: "At an industry level, the absence of intense international competition 
strengthens their collective position in confronting a demanding host government 
or in co-ordinating responses to a common economic situation 11 •85 The bargaining
power of the state therefore is enhanced by the playing of one oligopoly against 
another.86
In the final analysis, Newfarmer does, despite pointing to various forms of 
successful state intervention by the Brazilian state, emphasise the superiority of 
multinationals and confirms the dependency thesis. Multinational control of the 
international and internal Brazilian market affords these corporations a power 
which substantially constrains policy options. State policy operates within 
externally-imposed parameters, parameters defined by the nature of the linkage 
of the dependent economy to the international system.87
Another study to conclude that the bargaining power of multinationals 
prevails over developing country states is that by Bennett and Sharpe of the 
Mexican automobile industry.88 The Mexican automobile industry was targeted
for special promotion in the early 1960s as part of an import-substititon 
industrialisation growth strategy. The Lopez Mateos government thus intervened 
and sought to compel the local manufacture of a substantial portion of each 
vehicle and the reduction in the number of firms to achieve economies of scale. 
Negotiations involved the state in a complex bargaining struggle with 
multinational firms. Bennett and Sharpe point out that whilst the state did 
succeed on some issues, for example on the stipulation that 60% of each vehicle 
be manufactured in Mexico, 89 proposals for the rationalisation of the industry
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were unsuccessful in such important areas as the number of firms, the ownership 
of the terminal industry and product differentiation.90 Indeed, they argue that
the multinationals actually improved their bargaining position over time so that, 
ultimately, they came out of negotiations better than before they began. Bennett 
and Sharpe therefore posed a challenge to the Stepan thesis even before 
Gereffi.91
The explanation by Bennett and Sharpe for the failure of the Mexican state's 
policy attempts rests on two points: the mobilisation of corporate power and the 
organisational constraints on the exercise of state power. The first point refers to 
the ability of multinationals to form effective political ties with local Mexican 
actors (suppliers, distributors, labour and consumers) who were used against the 
government as well as pressure on behalf of the multinationals by developed 
country governments. The second point refers to reasons internal to the Mexican 
state which prevented 'political power' from being realised as 'actual power'. 
There was a lack of unity in pursuing government policy.92 The primary cause of
the state's impotence vis-a-vis the multinationals was, however, the fact of 
integration with, and dependence on, international capital. This is, according to 
Bennett and Sharpe, unavoidable in a high technology, consumer goods 
manufacturing sector such as the automobile industry. 
Because such manufacturing enterprises are integrated into the local 
economy to a far higher degree than resource extractors, they 
establish relationships within the host country which significantly 
enhance their bargaining power, both by reinforcing the host 
country's needs for their kind of production and products and by 
being able to mobilize domestic allies. And so long as the industry is 
dependent upon external sources of technology, the possibility of 
nationalization by the host country is not a credible threat.93
The bargaining power of the state was thus undermined by the political and 
economic relations associated with dependent development. 
We have seen above, then, in the industry studies of Gereffi, Newfarmer and 
Bennett and Sharpe, that the 'new wave' dependency theorists see multinationals 
enjoying decided bargaining advantages over Third World states. They do not 
discount some bargaining power on the part of the Third World state to influence 
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the pattern of industrialisation, but this relates to secondary issues. The major 
decisions which affect the nature and direction of industrialisation are still made 
by multinationals. Hence, the degree and character of industrialisation remains 
essentially a question decided in the headquarters of multinationals outside the 
developing countries themselves. Even where growth occurs, the basic lack of 
autonomy in the Third World prevails. 
So despite the apparent refinement to dependency theory, the fundamental 
determinism remains. We are still left wondering why some developing countries, 
like Singapore, have proved a far more attractive site for the location of 
production facilities. Even if such peripheral states may not have achieved ideal 
results in their bargaining with multinationals, they have certainly achieved 
significant results. 
Bargaining School and Critics of New Dependency Theory 
In developing their thesis, the 'new wave' dependency theorists have thrown out a 
challenge to a quite subst�ntial and influential body of liberal theory, the 
bargaining school. 94 According to this school's understanding of relations between
the states of. developing countries and multinationals, the balance of power shifts 
in favour of the host country over time as the government learns how to 
effectively harness contact with the multinational for local development.95 Not
surprisingly, then, in the wake of the 'new wave' of dependency theory a direct 
response was forth co ming from the bargaining school. 
Grieco's study of the Indian computer industry represents one major such 
response. He points out that by the mid-1960s, the Indian government had 
identified three important objectives relating to the computer industry. It wanted 
Indian participation in the ownership and control of foreign computer subsidiaries 
in the country. It wanted wholly Indian producers to provide for the bulk of the 
country's computer needs by the late 1960s. Finally, it was the aim that India 
have access to and participation in the manufacture of the most technologically 
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sophisticated systems available.96 According to Grieco, by the 1970s a number of 
developments favoured the realisation of such objectives. First, the emergence of 
mini-computers and microcomputers brought down the cost of systems. Second, 
the components for these systems became more readily available. Third, the 
range of alternative foreign firms increased greatly, thereby making it possible 
for the selective continuation of linkages with the international computer industry 
at the same time as a national industry was being created. These opportunities 
were exploited by the adoption of astute policies, starting wit� the strategy to 
encourage the use and manufacture of small systems. The government also 
provided funds for the wholly Indian-controlled Electronics Corporation of India 
Limited (ECIL), made foreign systems less available, attracted Burroughs to India 
in a joint venture with the local Tata Enterprise and, through equity demands, 
successfully pressured IBM to leave India. Key personnel changes in the 
bureaucracies also secured commitment to the policies. The result was, according 
to Grieco, that over time the government and wholly indigenous enterprises were 
able to improve bargaining power and, at the end of the 1970s, locally-owned 
manufacturing operations of small systems were thriving. The conclusion Grieco 
draws is that such an 'assertive' strategy demonstrates that developing countries 
are not faced with an extreme choice between autonomy and domination. Rather 
it is possible to achieve "national self-direction and economic development within 
the context of active participation in the international economy" .97 
Clearly Grieco's case study represents a serious challenge to the 'new wave' 
dependency position. What is left unexplained by Grieco, however, is just why the 
Indian state was so 'assertive'. In his conclusion he compares this model with the 
'relatively accommodating regimes' of East Asia. He claims that "assertive upper 
tier developing countries" (India, Brazil and Mexico at present and Colombia, 
Indonesia, Nigeria and Venezuala in the future possibly) could gain much from a 
study of India.98 So long as he is not implying the possibility of.emulation without 
account of indigenous social structural considerations this observation has merit. 
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We should not forget the criticisms levelled earlier, however, at the voluntarism 
of the rational choice approach. 
Grieco's thesis has recently found support from Adler who examined the 
computer industry in Brazil.99 He too argues that state intervention has resulted
in reduced industrial and technological dependence.100 Above all else, however, 
Adler attributes the success of the domestic computer industry to the efforts of a 
group of ideologically motivated scientists, technologists and technocrats who 
persistently and successfully pushed ideas about technological autonomy within 
the bureaucracy. He refers to these actors as 'pragmatic antidependency 
guerrillas'. Adler argues that the internalisation of this subversive elite's ideology 
by the bureaucracy and the country's leaders explains the assertive institutional 
action in support of the domestic computer industry. Again, though, as important 
as ideological influences no doubt are, they too do not develop in a social and 
political vacuum. Although Adler acknowledges this he provides no account of 
such circumstances. 
In sum, then, the bargaining school has provided an important empirical 
critique of the 'new wave' dependency work, but it lacks the theoretical 
sophistication necessary for an understanding of the complexity and 
differentiation of Third World societies. 
Whilst 'new wave' dependency theory represents one nee-Marxist reaction to 
the crude determinism of Frank, it is not the only one. There are nee-Marxists 
such as Becker who remain uneasy about the way in which even the more refined 
dependency theory analyses classes in the Third World.101 Becker's objections to 
dependency theory include the failure to locate the ' taproot of dependency' in the 
class practices of Thrid World societies and the persistent and uncritical 
association of autarchy with development and vice versa. For Becker: 
The real test of dependency can only be the existence of a 
'dominant' class which exercises proximate control over the society 
and profits from the political and economic decisions adopted by the 
local state, but which has minimal real influence over the externally 
imposed choice of development strate;ies and cannot control morethan details of their implementation.10 
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Becker believes these shortcomings of dependency theory have been 
obviated by changes in the 'international capitalist order', notably the 
internationalisation of production and associated changes in class interests and 
relations. In his case study of Peru he identifies the emergence of a new 
bourgeois class, the 'corporate national bourgeoisie', which he claims to be 
generally but exclusi \ ely emerging in the Third World. In contrast with the 
comprador bourgeoisii:i, this 'dominant class strata' has an interesi in national 
development which is compatible with playing the junior partner to the 
international bourgeoisie. Integration with the metropolitan C(:;i.ltre is, according 
to Becker, imposed indirectly through the diffusion of transnational ideology 
which occurs in the process of the pursuit of self-interest by local elites. The 
corporate national bourgeoisie therefore, whilst being both nationalist and 
developmentalist, is also professional and organisational in character and espouses 
universalistic values of technocracy and managerialism. It is, argues Becker, the 
most international of all Third World classes.103
Becker's observations about the simultaneous nationalist and internationalist 
character of the dominant bourgeoisie allows him to explain the documented cases 
of the Peruvian state imposing controls on international mining companies as an 
exercise in furthering the economic interests of the corporate national bourgeoisie 
promoted by technocrats recruited from this very class. This he refers to as 
'state-guided bonanza development'.104 At the same time, he points out that
organised labour has also been integrated into the state and this imposes some 
limits on the state's promotion of private capital. In short, he argues that, in 
contrast with dependency theory, 'the new Peruvian state · is relatively 
autonomous in the Marxian meaning'.105 This dominance of the corporate
national bourgeoisie derives not from control of the state as such but from the 
universality of its values and the ideology of national developmentalism. 
However, whilst this state-guided bonanza development model avoids the 
authoritarianism that O'Donnell sees as consequent to integration with the 
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international system, its survival is reliant upon management of the contradiction 
between the popular economic claims it arouses and the absence of ideological 
means for restraining these within objective limits.106
Like Grieco and Adler, then, Becker challenges the notion that incorporation 
into the international system automatically imposes dependency. Clearly his work 
introduces a new degree of sophistication to the analysis of relations between 
Third World states and international capital, notably through recognition of 
domesitc lcass factors and ideological influences on local actors. The problem, 
however, is that Becker is a bit hasty in depicting the emergence of corporate 
national bourgeoisies generally in the Third World as if domestic factors in one 
Third World country neatly mirror those of another. He is correct to point out, 
however, that the internationalisation of production has required specific class 
relations in the periphery, a point which will be more fully considered below. 
The Significance of Global Capitalism 
A thematic criticism made of dependency theory above is that it tends to pay 
inadequate attention to endogenous factors, explaining the role of the state in 
terms of externally-imposed pressures associated with incorporation into the 
international economy. Before exploring where such criticism leads us, however, 
it should be recognised that some writers inspired by this approach have provided 
illuminating analyses of the exogenous factors shaping industrialisation in the 
Third World. Indeed, their contribution to the understanding of how and why the 
new international division of labour has begun to emerge, whilst incomplete, is 
fundamental. They have pointed to the new historical conditions of international 
capital accumulation characterising the rapid industrialisation of Third World 
economies and the emergence of a new international division of labour. 
Of these radical scholars, the first writer to emphasise that the rapid 
industrialisation of certain Third World countries was part of a broader process 
involving the re-organisation of international capital investment was Adam.107
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He pointed out that since the late 1960s there had been a substantial and growing 
trend towards the establishment of subsidiaries by international companies abroad 
with the intention of exporting production back to the home country of the parent 
company. Adam explained the rationale behind this process which was most 
extensive in Asia: the international corporation contributes the capital, technical 
knowledge, global commercial intelligence and marketing expertise; the 
developing country contributes low cost and 'teachable' labour.108 Those
industries in which labour comprised a sizeable component of production costs, 
such as textiles, clothing, leather products, electrical parts and assemblies, 
obviously lent themselves to this process. Significantly, production did not always 
involve the complete manufactured product, often only the most labour-intensive 
aspect. Though this process had been initiated largely by US-based companies, 
Adam pointed out that many European and Japanese-based firms had by the early 
1970s begun relocating production to the Third World.109 For their part, the
Asian governments were actively encouraging this with the establishment of 
export processing zones, or free trade zones, special industrial areas affording 
various privileges and incentives to foreign-owned companies engaging in export 
production.110
Adam's prediction of an inevitable escalation of worldwide sourcing proved 
correct. Just two years after Adam's contribution, Turner further documented the 
flight of 'runaway industries' .111 Subsequently writers of various theoretical
perspectives detailed the forms and mechanisms associated with international 
subcontracting and sourcing, with special emphasis on the role of international 
capital in the rapid expansion of manufactured exports from the Third World.112
It was, however, the work of Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye which provided the most 
comprehensive and influential study of the internationalisation of production.113
It was also the first work to make some endeavour to ascertain the extent of this 
process or clarify how this process was facilitating a new international division of 
labour. 
34 
Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye provided detailed case studies of the German 
textile and garment industry and its flight to lower cost production sites, relating 
such developments to the broader international pattern within the industry. They 
also outlined the attractive investment conditions available in the free trade 
zones and other sites of relocation, emphasising not only the considerable savings 
to capital in labour and other costs, but the additional atraction of a politically 
repressed and subjugated labour force. The emergence of the new international 
division of labour, however, is explained by the authors as the realisation of three 
preconditions. These have given rise to a qualitatively new phase in international 
,---
capital accumulation.\ The preconditions include: the development of a world-wide 
reservoir of potential labour power, or reserve army of labour, made possible by 
the introduction of capitalist agricultural production techniques in the periphery; 
the decomposition of complex production processes into separate and simple units 
of production, leading to the deskilling of the labour process; and the 
technological development of transport and communications systems which freed 
industrial production from constraints on geographical location. It was, therefore, 
not the desire to maximise profits alone which accounted for this new 
international division of labour but the existence of certain historically 
unprecedented objective conditions.114
Although Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye quite importantly brought into much 
sharper focus the social and technical organisation of production and the impact 
of it on the Third World, they tended to see the dynamics of this new international 
division of labour as primarily external to the Third World and, thereby, opened 
themselves up to the sorts of criticisms of dependency theory already examined. 
As Jenkins points out, policies in the Third World to promote exports or attract 
international capital investment are interpreted as outcomes of the imposed 
'needs' of capital at the centre, not outcomes of local class struggles.115 Frobel,
Heinrichs and Kreye put it thus: 
- -- --- - --- --- --------� 
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This new international . division of labour is an 'institutional' 
innovation of capital itself, necessitated by changed conditions, and 
not the result of changed development strategies by individual 
countries or options freely decided upon by so-called multinational 
companies. It is a consequence and not a cause of these new 
conditions that various countries and companies have to tailor their 
policies and profit-maximising strategies to these new conditions 
(that is, to the requirements of the world market for industrial 
sites).116
The specific historical juncture of global capital accumulation warrants 
close consideration. This point has been fruitfully pursued by Caporoso who 
contends that the historical context within which NICs have industrialised has 
involved a more competitive environment and, as a result, more limited niches 
available in the international division of labour. This, he argues, has placed 
considerable pressure on Third World states to intervene.117 It remains, however,
that some states are able to do this whilst others are not. This differentiation in 
response to the objective conditions of the international system continues to be a 
thorn in the side of dependency theory. It is, as has been suggested in earlier 
criticisms, towards a more sophisticated and less deterministic comprehension of 
the endogenous factors of the NI Cs that we must look if we are to explain their 
successful incorporation into the new international division of labour and make 
best use of the work of people such as Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye. In particular, 
this involves an understanding of the indigenous classes and the nature and extent 
of the local state's relative autonomy from classes in general. 
Indigenous Classes and State Autonomy 
Attempts to account for the incorporation of specific Third World countries (the 
NICs) into the new international division of labour which examine domestic class 
formations and the character of the state owe a theoretical debt to earlier 
Marxist critiques of dependency theory by such writers as Leys, Cowan and 
Swainson.118 Like the bargaining school theorists, these writers document cases
of peripheral states adopting aggressive and successful policy measures to 
promote capital accumulation and industrialisation by the domestic bourgeoisie. 
However, they explained this in less voluntaristic terms, relating such 
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developments to internal class struggles and social and political structures in 
general. This insight has been instructive in a number of recent studies of Asian 
NICs. 
Hamilton's comparative study of the four Asian NICs represents the most 
concerted attempt so far to isolate the domestic class factors facilitating 
incorporation into the new international division of labour.119 He points out that
the process by which class structures were transformed to enable industrial 
capital to emerge as the dominant economic force was unique to each society. In 
each case, however, the state was required to take measures to secure this 
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transformation. / In Korea and Taiwan, for example, the state encouraged rural 
migration and provided cheap food for city workers. This generated the 
availability of low cost wage labour which was subject to tight controls. This and 
other forms of 1ntervention led Hamilton to maintain that: "The state - in the 
shape of the government, its individual members, its statutory bodies and public 
corporations was intimately involved at all levels of :grimative 
accumulation" .120 In the 1950s, the foundation for the subsequent EOI strategy
was laid by this transformation of capital into industrial form. US aid funds also 
assisted the process of industrial capital accumulation in this period. 
Hamilton argues that the British colonial purpose and affect in Hong Kong 
and Singapore differed from that of the Japanese in Taiwan and Korea. Here the 
British colonialists did not deliberately constrain the development of local capital 
but, rather, tended to encourage investment complementary to British trading 
interests. Hong Kong also benefitted from the exodus of capital from China after 
the communist and popular forces took control in 1949. However, whereas local 
capital was primarily based in entrepot trade in Singapore, in Hong Kong 
circumstances forced a far greater degree of domestic manufacturing. The 
closing of trade with China was the major factor for this. Whereas local finance 
capital was supportive of this form of economic activity in Hong Kong, this was 
not so in Singapore where indigenous capital never gained any serious foothold in 
manufacturing .121
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These various class developments were to have important implications. 
When the opportunities of the new international division of labour availed 
themselves, indigenous capital was poised to enter the stage in all societies but 
Singapore. World markets provided an excellent opportunity for expanded capital 
accumulation for indigenous industrial capital and this, argues Hamilton, was 
fundamental to the adoption of EOI strategies. The Singapore case was different 
in this respect but the pressure to industrialise was such that the state still 
supported such a strategy but through the virtually exclusive agency of 
international capitai.122
Hamilton emphasises that the spaces in the new international division of 
labour which local capital could fill were conditioned by its size. Lacking the 
technological and organisational capacity of larger, international capital, it was 
confined to specific industries in the new international division of labour, notably 
textiles, clothing, leather, footwear and to a much lesser extent electronics. He 
claims that, with the exception of Singapore, it was not foreign capital which 
initiated incorporation into the new international division of labour but indigenous 
capital. Certainly substantial international capital has flowed into South Korea, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, but only after and not before the EOI strategy was under 
wa:y.123 Significantly, the bulk of this foreign investment has tended to be in
electronic and electrical assembly, certain areas of engineering and (in Singapore) 
petroleum refining. These are areas involving greater capital-intensity but still 
reliant upon low-cost labour. Foreign investment in the industries favoured by 
local capital also took place, but characteristically by smaller capitals from the 
developed countries. Hamilton expresses reservations about the potential for 
indigenous capital in these countries to diversify into the traditional domain of 
international capital, not so much for lack· of technology as the difficulty of 
forcing international captial out of a relatively fixed space in the new 
international division of labour.124
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Hamil ton therefore directly challenges the idea that the incorporation of the 
Asian NICs into the new international division of labour was primarily determined 
by external forces. Certainly the expansion in world trade and the reorganisation 
of production made possible by technological changes created opportunities for 
domestic classes. However, the motivation for incorporation and the provision of 
conditions conducive to incorporation must be understood in terms of the 
historical class developments peculiar to each society. At the same time, he sees 
limitations in the position occupied by local classes in this new international 
division of labour which are, in part, a consequence of indigenous historical 
developments which constrain the accumulation of industrial capital but which are 
also a consequence of the nature of this division of labour itself. 
Barone's study of South Korea lends support to the general position of 
Hamilton.125 He too emphasises the emergence of a domestic industrial
bourgeoisie but elaborates more fully on the role of the state in this 
development. He makes the point that after World War II and the end of Japanese 
occupation in 1946, Korea was left with both a collapsed economic system and no 
clear ruling class. In the struggle that followed, right wing conservative, liberal 
moderate and left wing radical forces contested for power. Given the long history 
of a highly centralised superstructure in Korea, however, even the conservatives 
were not opposed in principal to public enterprises. With not a little help from the 
United States, argues Barone, the right wing Rhee government triumphed. This 
government employed terrorism and repression in attempting to liquidate the 
left. It was, however, unsuccessful in providing the basis of expanded 
reproduction of capital. The reasons for this were many. Attempts to foster 
private enterprise failed, including the distribution and sale of government 
enterprises inherited from the Japanese. The absence of a dynamic and capable 
bourgeoisie combined with corrupt and inefficient management of public and 
semi-public enterprises, the heavy costs of financing war with the North and the 
inadequate provision of infrastructure for capital accumulation all contributed to 
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the inability of the Rhee government to provide the conditions for expanded 
reproduction of_ capital.126 It was not until the Third Republic under the
leadership of Park that these conditions were provided. 
The capacity of the Park regime to preside over a far greater development 
of the forces of production is explained by Barone as the consequence of the state 
providing considerable economic direction and an efficient and ruthless 
centralised political leadership. In the absence of an effective bourgeoisie, the 
Park regime 'force fed' the development of South Korean capitalism. Through 
state planning, state monopoly of financial institutions, state enterprises in 
infrastructure as well as industry, and the patronage of private enterprise, a new 
domestic industrial bourgeoisie did emerge. It was one which has remained, 
however, subservient to the state bureaucratic elite.127 Barone concurs with
Hamilton that this development took place prior to the influx of substantial 
foreign investment.128
The pervasive state has not waned either. Apart from the continued 
repression of labour and the student movement, the state retains substantial 
control over the major economic institutions, including: a monopoly of banking and 
therefore control over interest rates, credit and the allocation of financial 
capital; control over foreign exchange; centralised planning and supportive 
administrative apparatus; public enterprises in both general infrastructure and 
advanced sectors of industry earmarked for development.129
Barone concedes that foreign dependency, especially vis-a-vis the United 
States, has influenced South Korean development but it has not, he argues, 
prevented successful capitalism. He contends that "South Korea is not unduly 
dependent on foreign trade, that production is both diversified and linked to 
domestic consumption, and that although dependent on foreign capital and 
technology Korea has been able to control and direct both to its advantage".130
As we have seen, this success is related to historically-specific domestic class 
formations and the associated political relationships which evolved - most 
especially the form of state.131
- - - - - - - -- - - - -- - --,----,---,------------�=---�
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Staying with the South Korean case, Haggard and Moon add to the analyses 
of Hamilton and Barone by elaborating on the way in which the state promoted 
EOI and incorporation into the new iternational division of labour.132 Their
central thesis is that the South Korean state is neither liberal nor dependent but 
might instead be understood more as mercantilist, such has been the centrality of 
the state to South Korea's development. It is precisely because this state enjoys a 
significant degree of relative autonomy from either domestic or international 
forces that it has been able to provide the political and economic conditions 
responsible for the success of the EOI strategy. 
The state's role in providing the political pre-requisites for the EOI strategy 
has been, and remains, fundamental according to Haggard and Moon. Following 
the military coup of 1961 and on the eve of the EOI strategy measures were taken 
to further weaken the labour movement, through a government-directed 
reorganisation of unions, and political opposition, through the creation of the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency. This gave the state an added capacity to 
insulate itself from the unpopular policies of the EOI strategy which, although 
produced economic results, neglected agriculture, generated a large class of urban 
squatters who had migrated to the cities and imposed repression on labour. This 
disaffection with the government reflected in the narrow and controversial 
presidential victory to Park in 1971 and heightened student and labour opposition 
thereafter. However, the state's effective if repressive measures to quell 
opposition ensured that the unpopular policies were never threatened and 
prevented any serious debate of alternative, more inward-looking development 
strategies.133
At the same time, the implementation of the EOI strategy involved 
considerable institutional support and direction at the economic level. Policies 
such as exchange rate reform and the removal of import restrictions went hand in 
hand with substantial state intervention in other areas of the economy. The 
government promoted exports by indirect subsidies channelled through the 
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financial system by way of differential interest rates. Military control over the 
Bank of Korea also gave the state an important influence, particularly after 1964 
when the Bank was granted the authority to give preferential treatment to 
designated sectors. Haggard and Moon argue that control over credits afforded 
the state three mutually supportive functions: a tool of microeconomic control; 
the subsidisation of initial entry by firms into foreign markets; and the building of 
political support from domestic business. The third of these functions has been 
skilfully manipulated by the South Korean state to foster a degree of 
complementarity between foreign and domestic firms.134 In the process the state
has been instrumental in nurturing the domestic industrial bourgeoisie.135
In explaining the state's nurturing of the domestic bourgeoisie, Haggard and 
Moon emphasise this as an unintended consequence rather than a reflection of the 
state's political subordinance to capital. Decision-making, they argue, has been in 
the hands of 'managerial' forces of the military centralised in the executive and 
cabinet who have formed an alliance with younger technocrats to whom Park 
became heavily reliant upon for advice. The support for domestic capital was for 
these people a technical rather than political consideration. At the same time, 
the government's liberalisation policies did serve to politically strengthen the 
government domestically and, indeed, internationally. So the temptation to view 
the liberalisation reforms as a reflection of the subservience of the South Korean 
state to the whims of US capital and its political representatives clamouring for 
such reforms should be resisted. The possibility that these reforms would bring 
sustained growth and foreign exchange to supplant US aid dependence was 
important to considerations of national security and development by the South 
Korean government.136 They also argue that attepts to restructure certain heavy
and chemical industries in the 1970s demonstrated that, even where technological 
reliance on private capital exists, "the state can develop a significant range of 
maneuver from both domestic and international forces" .137 Where domestic firms
were found to be inefficient, the government sought foreign investors, using the 
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level of market access as a bargaining tool.138 The relative autonomy of the
state to stand above any class interest has, then, been a feature of the South 
Korean state. Again, though, Haggard and Moon echo the point that such a state 
"may not be easily transferable".139 The reasons for this have to do with the
points already made by Hamilton and Barone. 
The challenge to both the neo-classical and dependency position posed by 
Barone and Haggard and Moon in the case of Sou th Korea is developed by Wynn 
and Amsden in the case of Taiwan.140 Wynn debunks popular myths of Taiwan's
industrial development. The idea that development has been generated in a 
climate of minimal state involvement is rejected, Wynn arguing that "a battery of 
micro- and macro- economic policies is designed to reduce private (and public) 
investment into selected brands of production and into exports" .141 Furthermore,
these exports are also subject to cartelisation, marketing arrangements and other 
forms of interference. Wynn also argues that whilst foreign investment is very 
· important in Taiwan, it does not control the economy. Key manufacturing sectors
remain under state control and others, such as food processing, are retained by the
indigenous bourgeoisie. Third, Wynn opposes the notion that Taiwan's
industrialisation remains superficial because it is limited to light
manufactures.142
Similarly, Amsden explains Taiwan's ability to exploit the international 
market as "the forceful manipulation of Taiwan's political economy by the 
state".143 She also turns her attention though to the apparent contradictions of a
security-conscious military regime pursuing economic policies which render 
Taiwan vulnerable to foreign supply and demand and more dependent on foreign-
owned firms. The complex answer touches on the dynamic and dialetic 
relationship between the state apparatus and the economic structure. The 
thinking of the military has been influenced by the expanded opportunities offered 
through increased reliance on international markets and capital. This compared 
favourably with the declining growth potential offered by "a continued fixation on 
geopolitical struggle".144
- - · . .- - - -----:-.,--------,-------==�-�� 
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In short, Wynn and Amsden reiterate the point that successful incorporation 
into the new international division of labour has been contingent upon domestic 
social and political factors belonging to a unique historical juncture. As Hamilton 
has argued, it happens that the respective histories of the Asian NICs have 
precipitated political states which have played dominant roles in facilitating this 
incorporation. 
All of the above studies illucidate the historical, social and political 
contexts within which the state has intervened to facilitate integration into the 
evolving new international division of labour. However, studies which examine 
these contexts in explaining why other states have not been so facilitative are 
equally instructive. Recent work by Hewison and Robison makes an especially 
important contribution in this respect. 
Hewison's study of capitalist development and the state in Thailand contends 
that an economically and politically powerful domestic capitalist class has been a 
feature of the modern Thai political economy.145 He traces the emergence of
this class to the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932 and the rise of an 
interventionist state committed to economic growth. This state has proved 
particularly responsive to the needs of the domestic bourgeoisie, playing a vital 
role in opening up opportunities to expand its accumulative base. Hewison shows 
how banking capital has especially benefited from state intervention and explains 
how this powerful fraction of capital has been a major force accounting for the 
emergence of Thai corporate capitalism.146 In this case, the interventionist
state, whilst certainly attempting to attract foreign capital, has done so 
selectively and generally with a view to accommodating the domestic political 
pressures upon it. Since the opportunities for expansion by the domestic 
bourgeoisie remain mainly in the domestic market, the Thai state has not 
embraced the new international division of labour in the way that NIC states have. 
Robison's considerable and theoretically sophisticated work on state/capital 
relationships in Indonesia cannot possibly be summarised here.147 Thematic to his
- - - - - -- - - ---- - - - -------,,-,---------------�------� 
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analyses, however, is the argument that Indonesia's persistence with an ISI 
strategy must be understood in terms of the interests of state politico-bureaucrats 
and the major domestic corporate groups on the one hand, and the ideological 
strength of economic nationalism on the other. The fusion of political, 
bureaucratic and economic power is, Robison argues, the definitive feature of the 
Indonesian political economy. Indeed, Indonesia's major public and private 
corporate conglomerates owe their emergence to the interventionist policies of 
these poli tico-burea ucra ts. 
The point that Robison emphasises in his recent work is that much of this 
intervention, involving the state in sizeable outlays and concessions, has been 
underwritten by the revenue gained by the state from oil exports.148 The collapse
of oil prices in 1981/82 and then, more substantially, in 1986 has, however, posed 
serious challenges for the existing power structure and re-opened the question of 
Indonesia's position in the international division of labour. Since the World Bank 
Report on Indonesia published in 1981, the Indonesian government has been under 
growing international pressure to abandon its plans for an integrated national 
industrial base in favour of 'allocative efficiency' and 'comparative advantage', 
that is, to adopt an EOI strategy and wind back the state's involvement in the 
economy. As Robison points out, the Indonesian government is to some extent 
attracted by the EOI model, but only in so far as it is consistent with the planned 
development of backward and forward linkages which will provide- a basis for 
expanded reproduction by domestic interests.149 So far talk of the virtues of the
free market has struck no accord with Indonesian officials, and not surprisingly. 
Promises of long-term, abstract benefits, which the IBRD 
economists suggest will flow from a freeing of the market, are no 
consolation to those groups which have attained their present 
position precisely through the imposition of political constraints 
upon the market. l50 
Robison's point, however, is that, as a result of the state's diminished capacity to 
finance and subsidise a domestic-oriented strategy, the state is now less capable 
of resisting pressures to increase Indonesia's integration into the new international 
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division of labour. To succumb to such pressure, of course, would threaten the 
basis of the relationship which merges the state, domestic private capital and the 
politico-bureaucrats. To avoid such integration, the state must extract more 
investment and revenue from private domestic capital. Either way, major changes 
in Indonesia's political economy are likely. 
At the risk of simplification, Robison's analysis highlights the inseparability 
of economic policy and industrial strategy from political power. As his work 
explains, neither the persistence with ISI nor the possible move towards EOI and 
greater integration with the new international division of labour have been or will 
be dealt with on the basis of technical considerations about comparative 
advantage. 
Implications for this Thesis: Central Propositions 
Having �ngaged in a survey of_tb.e different theoretical appl"oflqhes to the analysis 
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It should be clear from the above that approaches which play down or 
obscure the role of the state are limited in their capacity to provide adequate 
theoretical frameworks for the analysis of industrialisation. As we saw above, the 
nee-classical and rational choice approaches both fail to take seriously the task of 
clarifying the social and political conditions within which industrial policy is 
developed. This omission allows nee-classical economists to conceptualise 
comparative advantage as an immutable law rather than a concrete process which 
encompasses state activity. The political controls and restrictions on organised 
labour, and indeed capital too, are no_ less significant than the economic 
intervention of the state in shaping comparative advantage. It was in search of a 
greater appreciation of the state's influence over industrialisation, and the factors 
accounting for that capacity and inclination to shape the pattern of 
industralisation, that the above discussion turned to other theories. 
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As was explained, the attempts by writers belonging to the corporatist and 
dependency schools to explain the state's role in industrialisation have tended to 
be deterministic. Political repression is seen as a functional necessity for rapid 
industrialisation by some writers whilst others see the state's behaviour as largely 
prescribed by the needs of international capital. As the various critiques 
highlighted however, such approaches have the effect of reducing the considerable 
complexity of the industrialisation process to a single fundamental relationship. 
The diversity of responses from the various Third World societies to similar 
international circumstances is never adequately explained. 
What work then from the literature review is instructive? In the first place, 
and despite the dependency theory roots of such authors, theories pertaining to 
the internationalisation of production and the emergence of a new international 
division of labour are helpful. Here I refer particularly to the work of Frobel, 
Heinrichs and Kreye. They provide a broad framework enabling us to comprehend 
historically new potentialities for Third World industralisation. We really do need 
to take into account the changing motivations and enhanced global mobility of 
international capital, and industrial capital in particular, if we are to understand 
the successful industrialisation of the NICs. Without the changes identified by 
Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye, this rapid EOI would not have been possible. 
Although radical theories of the new international division of labour provide 
a much more sophisticated analysis of the logic of international capital 
accumulation than that provided by earlier dependency writers, they are similarly 
deterministic in accounting for incorporation into this emerging structure. As we 
saw, they grossly under-rate the significance of circumstances prevailing in an 
individual peripheral society and their contribution to successful incorporation 
into the new international division of labour. Analyses which pay far greater 
attention to the configurations of class and power relationshps in the individual 
peripheral society have much to offer in the way of guidance for this thesis. 
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Analyses which belong to this category include those works by Robison, 
Hewison, Hamilton, Barone, Haggard and Moon, Wynn and Amsden. To differing 
degrees they have attempted to show how the social and political relationships 
peculiar to specific Third World societies have determined or shaped shifts in 
economic policy. They have also examined how such relationships have served to 
define the state's ability to exercise a degree of relative political autonomy from 
vested interests. Further, they have endeavoured to explain the process by which 
certain Third World states have been able to secure the necessary resources to 
play a significant, if not decisive, role in terms of economic intervention, whether 
through the extensive provision of infrastructure or direct investment. In short, 
they have not only attempted to specify the ways in which the state influences the 
pattern of industrialisation and incorporation into the new international division of 
labour, they have also tried to specify the historically specific socio-political 
circumstances facilitating this role by the state. This sort of analysis is the 
necessary complement to the study of changing patterns in international capital 
accumulation. The point is that potentialities opened up by the emergence of a 
new international division of labour have not been universally realised throughout 
the Third. World - only where conducive socio-political conditions have prevailed. 
Developing the above observations in more precise form, this thesis is 
informed by the following theoretical propositions which will be demonstrated in 
the course of the study of Singapore's industrialisation: 
(i) The opportunity to industrialise rapidly was presented to Singapore by
fundamental changes in the pattern of international capital accumulation.
It was fortuitous for Singapore's policy-makers that this co-incided with the
failure of merger with Malaysia and the desparate need for a new economic
strategy.
(ii) The ability and inclination to exploit this opportunity was governed by
✓/ 
various factors. At the general level, the nature of the colonial experience
which had already tied Singapore into networks of international capital and
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generated a suitable workforce, coupled with Singapore's general strategic 
location, were contributing factors. At the more specific level though, 
successful incorporation into the new international division of labour was 
governed by domestic class factors, notably the absence of an economically 
or politically powerful domestic industrial bourgeoisie capable of 
frustrating a shift to EOI, and a peculiar political state which enjoyed a 
substantial degree of relative political autonomy from both capital and 
labour. This latter condition was skilfully exploited by the PAP which 
successfully legitimised its corporatist behaviour on the basis of a 
technocratic ideology. 
(iii) This relatively autonomous PAP state has played a decisive role in ensuring
a social and political context appropriate to the specific and changing
needs of international capital which has largely defined the structure and
pace of Singapore's industralisation. Not only has the PAP destroyed the
independent labour movement and replaced it with its own institutionalised
control, it has also systematically restricted the possibility of effective
constitutional or non-constitutional opposition to PAP rule. This has
ensured political stability and investor confidence as well as a labour force
which is responsive to government policy directives. Given the dynamics of
the new international division of labour, this flexibility open to government
has proved important.
(iv) Singapore's comparative advantage in the new international division of
labour has been shaped in part by the intervention of the PAP state. As
will be seen this influence is the product of the social and political
environment ref erred to above. After all, the freedom of labour (as a
factor of production) to operate in the market has been deliberately
conditioned and curtailed by the PAP, thereby affecting labour's bargaining
power. More conspiciously, however, the PAP has directly intervened in
the labour market to determine wage levels and the supply of labour
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(immigration policy). In addition, the PAP state has provided capital with 
various forms of direct and indirect subsidisation in the areas of social and 
physical infrastructure and generous fiscal incentives and below market 
rate finance. In short, the PAP has consistently cushioned the costs of 
certain forms of production to facilitate incorporation into the the new 
international division of labour. At times too, the PAP has imposed special 
burdens on forms of production it considers inconsistent with official 
development objectives. 
(v) Though the high profile of the state has been fundamental to Singapore's
successful industrialisation, in the period of the 'Second Industrial
Revolution', it has also begun to pose political problems. The priority
afforded development expenditure has resulted in the government initiating
moves to minimise its welfare responsibilities. Thus, in trying to avoid
fiscal difficulties, the PAP risks a loss in electoral popularity.
(vi) Although the PAP state has intervened to help define Singapore's
comparative advantage, it has confronted objective limits in this process.
First, even though there have been some significant increases in the
sophistication of the technology employed by international capital in 
Singapore since 1979, Singapore's distance from markets and its small size
renders it an unattractive site for many forms of sophisticated production,
notably that involving research and development (R & D) work. Second,
though we can point to a general increase in higher value added production,
the involvement by international capitals in this has been quite
differentiated. Japanese-based capital has been far more reticent to move
into higher value added production than US-based capital. The strong
Japanese trading position in the international economy has sparked fears of 
protectionism amongst Japanese investors who have thus shown a tendency
to make investments in higher value added production in the countries
constituting the major markets. This alerts us to the complexity and
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diversity of concrete conditions of investors, no less than host countries, in 
the international division of labour. 
The Singapore Literature 
There is already in existence a body of literature on the subject of industralisation 
in Singapore. The question therefore emerges: why yet another study? The 
problem, to be explained in the following pages, is that existing studies are 
primarily descriptive and embody, often unconsciously, theoretical assumpj:,1Q11s 
which I have argued are fundamentally inadequate. As will be detailed below, the 
dominant features of this literature are a general indifference or ignorance of the 
bulk of the theoretical literature outlined above and a strong preference for 
descriptive rather than analytical accounts of Singapore's industrialisation. There 
are some exceptions to this, but for the most part the propositions mentioned 
above either lie outside the dominant frameworks or outrightly contradict the 
more widely accepted wisdom on Singapore. 
A major reason for the above-cited pattern is that most accounts of 
Singapore's industrialisation have come from positivist economists. Few of these 
authors have consciously expounded an explicit theoretical statement about the 
process of industrialisation, but their implicit theoretical sympathies nonetheless 
rest clearly with the nee-classical and rational choice approaches identified 
earlier. This is not to suggest that they ignore the role of the state for it is 
universally recognised by Singapore scholars, if not by others, 151 that state
intervention has been sizeable in Singapore. However, citicisms similar to those 
levelled above at nee-classical and rational choice theory apply to most of these 
accounts. 
In particular, these authors have tended to interpret government 
intervention only in terms of facilitation or distortion of the market .. --The 
assumption is that comparative advantage is something which, though dynamic, 
exists and awaits realisation. It is not something which governments can actively 
help define. This leads to•'.�ome interesting attempts at reconciliation. 
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In Lim Chong Yah's introduction to the edited collection entitled Singapore: 
Twenty-five Years of Development, 152 he goes so far as to make the contradict­
ory claim that Singapore's economic success is a function of a free enterprise 
system which has been moulded by state intervention: 
Singapore has been able to grow so spectacularly in the economic 
field throughout the period because it has allowed a free enterprise 
system to flourish with government support and intervention where 
necessary.153
In their treatment of Singapore in Export-Oriented Industrialisation: The ASEAN 
Experience,154 Ariff and Hill submit a similar interpretation but they do not
idealise the situation by referring to 'free' enterprise (rather than private 
enterprise). They argue that state intervention has been non-distortionary in that 
. it has provided incentives and inducements to assist the market rather than 
confront it. So whilst intervention has been extensive it has been consistent with 
a comparative advantage determined independently of this intervention. Ariff and 
Hill are of course in a no-lose position with such a formulation: if intervention co­
incides with positive results then it must be market-facilitative; if it co-incides 
with negative results it must be market-distortionary. The possibility of market 
intervention co-inciding with positive results cannot be investigated within this 
framework. An earlier empiricist study by Nyaw Mee-kau, Industrial Growth and 
Export Expansion in Singapore, 155 concluded that Singapore's resources were
allocated in line with its changing comparative advantage, but here also the above 
consideration is theoretically discounted. So whilst he claims "Singapore's 
successful industrialisation was achieved through active management of the 
economy while at the same time relying on decentralised private (both local and 
foreign) initiatives",156 he does not really evaluate 'active management' in its
various forms. 
In conjunction with the dominance of the nee-classical interpretation, there 
l 
is a very strong subscription to the assumptions of iaa tional choice theory in the 
published work on Singapore. Not only economists and other scholars, but 
commentators in general underline the judicious policies of the PAP and its 
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rational rather than political approach to development. Little or no account is 
taken of the socio-political and historical content within which the PAP's 
character and capacity to implement policy has been determined. This view of 
policy formation as essentially a technical process is reflected in the contributions 
of Lim Chong Yah and Peter Chen in the latter's edited work Singapore 
:Development Policies and Trends.157 Lim refers to a "correct development
policy" whilst Chen attributes great importance to "an effective government". 
Without any account of circumstances generating "effective government 11 ,158
Chen can claim that "the experience of Singapore's growth strategies provide a 
useful model for rapid growth for both developing and developed countries".159
This emphasis on institutional efficiency and 'good government' to the exclusion 
of any analysis of class or social structure is also found in earlier studies by Lee 
Soo Ann in 1973, 160 and in 1977 by Goh Keng Swee, the architect of much official
policy.161 John Drysdale's recent book, Singapore: Struggle for Success,162 also
isolates the quality of the PAP leadership as the single-most important factor 
behind Singapore's industrialisation but provides no serious analysis of the factors 
making such a leadership possible. 
The above-cited studies of Singapore's industrialisation are of course at odds 
with most of the propositions thematic to this thesis. There are, however, some 
studies which, whilst not very detailed, have elements of consistency with these 
propositions. Pang Eng Fong and Linda Lim have devoted particular attention to 
emphasising the interventionist nature of the PAP state and its influence on the 
allocation of the factors of production. For them the state's role has been 
central, and not secondary, as is stated or implied by other economists. For them, 
" ... initial advantages and fortuitous market opportunities would have come to. 
little without an explicit and appropriate government development strategy" .163
Elsewhere, however, the same authors express reservations about the value of 
such a high state profile in a modernised economy and advocate greater 
institutional flexibility to enable rapid responses to market changes.164 Here
- - - - - - --- -- - - --------,-----------�-�---- - -
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these authors seem to revert to neo-classical-prescriptions and their position vis­
a-vis state intervention becomes unclear. For Lim, however, the matter is 
subsequently clarified in an article attacking Milton Friedman's attribution of 
Singaproe's success to economic liberalism and the free market.165 She argues
that "state interventions have given Singapore a comparative advantage in export 
manufacturing which it would not have if free market forces alone 
prevailed" .166 She sees little prospect of the state's presence and influence being
wound down, although it may be expressed differently in the future: 
While the forms of state intervention in Singapore may change, their 
essence remains: the manipualtion of polity, society, and economy to 
build and maintain a pecufo�1:t and peculiarly successful, brand of
state-dependent capitalism.1 
In keeping with the argument of this thesis then, Lim contends that comparative 
advantage has been shaped by the Singapore state. This argument has also been 
forwarded by Rodan who focuses on the case of Singapore as part of a more 
general critique of comparative advantage trade theory.168
Certainly the study to most directly address the political economy of 
Singapore's incorporation into the new international division of labour is that by 
Frederic Deyo. As the title of this book suggests, Dependent Development and 
Industrial Order is atuned to the theoretical debates outlined earlier and 
sympathetic to the bureaucratic authoritarian model and the dependency 
approach.169 Deyo emphasises the corporatist nature of the Singapore state and
the centrality of this to incorporation into the new international division of labour 
(or what he refers to as 'world market oriented industrialisation'). The 
institutionalised subordination and co-option of labour is detailed by Deyo and 
explained as a necessary pre-requisite for this incorporation. However, for Deyo, 
the PAP state's facilitation of international capital is not a function of 
m ul tina tional pressure, as in classical dependency analysis, but based on relatively 
autonomous public policy considerations. Indeed, he sees a dimunition of 
multinational influence over time, due to growing competition and diversification 
in the nationalities of capital.170 He also sees increased economic gains to the
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working class and reduced economic inequalities in Singapore. Just the same, 
Deyo sees a number of less attractive consequences to engagement in world 
market industrialisation. 
It has undercut the vitality and economic independence of local 
business classes which in other societies have tended to challenge 
authoritarian political rule, and it has disrupted local community 
structures which might have provided the leadership and social 
support for challenges to corporatist control of unions. Finally, it 
has led to the emergence of a highly atomistic industrial labor force 
that lacks the solidarity and commitment to organize against union 
and government domination.171 
In short, world market-oriented industrialisation is seen to consolidate political 
authoritarianism. So whilst Deyo revises the classical dependency interpretaiton 
in the case of Singapore, he still sees important external impositions on 
Singapore's political economy. 
The value of Deyo's contribution to the study of Singapore's industrialisation 
is two-fold. First, he has introduced a new level of theoretical sophistication to 
the area by pursuing various questions about the nature of the Singapore state and 
its relationship to a specific form of industrialisation. His observations about the 
pattern of foreign investment are particularly stimulating when ranked alongside 
the earlier, descriptive work of Yoshihara and Lee Soo Ann, and more recently 
Chia Siow Yue.172 Second, and more precisely, he has specified various socio­
political relationships which enabled the PAP to successfully pursue such 
industrialisation, notably in the area of labour control. These quesitons have 
recently received attention from Heyzer too.173 The fundamentality of these
relationships is confirmed and elaborated in this thesis which, as already stated, 
maintains that the peculiar corporatist nature of the PAP is definitive of the so­
called Singapore model. 
Conclusion 
Essentially then, this thesis addresses the prob1em __ o! _hQ_y,_ -vve explain the 
emergence of the N!Cs, in this particular instance Singapore. Though Singapore is 
not in any sense presented here as representative of NICs in general, it does 
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provide an opportunity to critically examine competing approaches to the study of 
this question. At the same time, there is a conspicious lack of detailed studies of 
Singapore's industrialisation which detail the role of the state in its various social, 
political and economic dimensions. These are the respects in which this thesis 
makes a contribution. 
- --- - - - - - - - - - - - ---------�-�----� 
56 
FOOTNOTES 
1. See Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye, The New International
Division of Labour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Bela
Balassa, "Trade in Manufactured Goods: Patterns of Change", World
Development, 9(3), 1981a, pp.263-275; Bela Balassa, The Newly
Industrializing Countries in the World Economy, New York: Pergamon
Press, 1981b. 
2. See Gyorgy Adam, "New Trends in International Business: Worldwide
Sourcing and Dedomiciling", Acta Oeconomica, 7(3-4), 1971, pp.349-367;
Gyorgy Adam, "Some Implications and Concommitants of Worldwide
Sourcing", Acta Oeconomica, 8(2-3), 1972, pp.309-323; G.K. Helleiner,
"Manufactured Exports from Less Developed Countries and Multinational
Firms", The Economic Journal, 83(329), 1973, pp.21-47; G.K. Helleiner,
"The Role of Multinational Corporations in the Less Developed Countries'
Trade in Technology", World Development, 3(4), 1975, pp.161-189; G.K.
Helleiner, "Transnational Enterprises and the New Political Economy of
U.S. Trade Policy", Oxford Economic Papers, 29(1), 1977, pp.102-116;
Michael Sharpston, "International Subcontracting", Oxford Economic
Papers, 27(1), 1975, pp.94-135; Henrik Plaschke, "International
_ Subcontracting: On the Migration of Labor-Intensive Processing From the
Center to the Periphery of Capitalism", Instant Research on Peace and 
Violence, V(l), 1975, pp.87-97; J.M. Finger, "Tariff Provisions for Offshore 
Assembly and the Exports of Developing Countries", The Economic Journal, 
June 1975, pp.365-371; Depak Nayyar, "Transnational Corporations and 
Manufactured Exports from Poor Countries\ The Economic Journal, 
88(349), 1978, pp.59-84. 
3. World Bank, World Development Report 1985, New York: Oxford University
Press, Table 4.8, p.152.
4. Eddy Lee, ''Export-Led Industrialisation in Asia: An Overview", in Eddy Lee
(editor), Export-Led Industrialisation and Development, Geneva:
International Labour Organisation, 1981, p.2.
5. As cited in Clive Hamilton, "Capitalist Industrialisation in Asia's Four
Little Tigers", Journal of Contemporary Asia, 13(1), 1983, p.56.
6. See Ho Kwonping, "The Implications of Export-Oriented Industrialisation
for South East Asia", Paper Presented at Conference, "Trade: To Whose
Advantage?" Australian National University, Canberra, February 1980.
7. Balassa 1981a; Balassa 1981b; Bela Balassa, Development Strategies in
Semi-Industrial Economies, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1982a; Holis Chenery and Donald Keesing, The Changing Composition of
Developing Country Exports, World Bank Staff Working Paper Number 314,
Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1979; Helen Hughes, "Achievements and
Objectives of Industrialization", in J. Cody, H. Hughes and D. Wall
(editors), Policies for Industrial Progress in Developing Countries, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp.11-37.
8. Bela Balassa, "Export Incentives and Export Performance in Developing
Countries: A Comparative Analysis", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 114(1),
1978, pp.24-61; Bela Balassa, "The Newly-Industrializing Countries after
the Oil Crisis", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 117(1), 1981c, pp.142-194; J.N.
Bhagwati, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Anatomy
and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes, Cambridge,
-- ------------------- --- - -- - ------,----�-------:--
57 
Massachusetts: Ballinger Press, 1978; J.B. Donges, "A Comparative Survey 
of Industrialization Policies in Fifteen Semi-Industrial Countries", 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 112(4), 1976, pp.626-659; Anne 0. Krueger, 
Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Liberalization 
Attempts and Consequences, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Press, 
1978 
9. The theoretical roots of this approach can be traced to Smith's work on 
specialisation, Ricardo's comparative cost theory and, more recently, to
the factor-proportion theory of Heckscher and Ohlin.
10. Donald B. Keesing, "Outward-Looking Policies and Economic 
Development", The Economic Journal, 77(306), 1967, pp.303-320.
11. Anne 0. Krueger, "Export-Led Industrial Growth Reconsidered", in W. Hong
and L.B. Krause (editors), Trade and Growth of the Advanced Developed
Countries in the Pacific Basin, Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1981,
p.5. Also see Anne 0. Krueger, "Regional and Global Approaches to Trade
and Development Strategy", in Ross Garnaut (editor), ASEAN in a Changing
Pacific and World Economy, Canberra: Australian National University
Press, 1980, pp.21-52. 
12. I.M.D. Little, "The Experience and Causes of Rapid Labour-Intensive
Development in Korea, Taiwan Province, Hong Kong and Singapore; and the
Possibilities of Emulation", in Lee (editor), 1981, p.42.
13. For a discussion of the basic needs approach see International Labour
Organisation, Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem,
Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1976.
14. World Bank, World Development Report 1981, New York: Oxford University
Press.
15. For discussions of structural adjustment policies see Bela Balassa,
"Structural Adjustment Policies in Developing Countries", World
Development, 10(1), 1982b, pp.23-38; Hollis Chenery, Structural Change
and Development Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979; Helen
Hughes and Goran Ohlin, "Adjustment to the Changing International
Structure of Production", Finance and Development, June 1980, pp.21-24;
Parvez Hasan, Growth and Structural Adjustment in East Asia, World Bank
Staff Working Papers, Number 529, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1982.
16. I.M.D. Little in Lee (editor), 1981, p.25.
17. For critiques of the neo-classical position which focus on these questions
see Garry Rodan, "Industrialisation and the Singapore State in the Context
of the New International Division of Labour" in R. Riggott and R. Robison
(editors), Southeast Asia: Essays in the Political Economy of Structural
Change, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, pp.172-194; David Evans
and Parvin Alizadeh, "Trade, Industrialisation and the Visible Hand",
Journal of Development Studies, 21(1), 1984, pp.22-46; Hubert Schmitz,
"Industrialisation Strategies in Less Developed Countries: Some Lessons of
Historical Experience", Journal of Development Studies, 21(4), 1984, pp.1-
21.
18. B. Ohlin, Interregional and International Trade, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1932; C.P. Kindleberger, Foreign Trade and the














Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society", American 
Economic Review, LXIV, June 1974, pp.291-303. 
Krueger's analysis of state intervention is criticised by Evans and Alizadeh, 
1984, p.39, on the grounds that the only forms of intervention analysed are 
those at the level of the circulation of capital (import quotas, regulation of 
taxes, minimum wage legisation, interest rate ceilings, and capital gains 
taxes). No account of the role of the state in facilitating capitalist 
relations of production is provided by Krueger. State controls in this area 
of conflict is considered by Evans and Alizadeh to be important to the 
general analysis of state intervention and, hence, comparative advantage 
and the pattern of trade. 
See Anne 0. Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: 
Liberalization Attempts and Consequences, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Ballinger, 1978, 
For a general discussion and critique of this literature, and its theoretical 
roots, see Richard Higgott, Political Development Theory, London: Croom 
Helm, 1983, pp.26-44. 
Donald Rothchild and Robert L. Curry, Scarcity, Choice and Public Policy 
in Middle Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Other 
studies include: R. Gurevich, "Teachers, Rural Development, and the Civil 
Service in Thailand", Asian Survey, 15(10), 1975, pp.870-881; S. 
Heginbotham, Cultures in Conflict: The Four Faces of Indian Bureaucracy, 
New York: Colombia University Press, 1975; J. Honey, Toward Strategies 
for Public Administration Development in Latin America, Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1968; M. Kriesberg, Public Administration in 
Developing Countries, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1965. 
Rothchild and Curry, 1978, pp.33-34. 
Martin Staniland, What is Political Economy?, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1985, pp.65-66. 
Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis 
of Agricultural Policies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. 
Staniland, 1985, p.61. 
Joel A. Migdal, "Policy and Power: a Framework for the Study of 
Comparative Policy Contexts in Third World Countries", Public Policy, 
25(2), 1977, pp.241-260; Merilee A. Grindle (editor), Politics and Policy 
Implementation in the Third World, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980. 
Grindle, 1980, p.13. 
An interesting study of Brazilian public policy has been conducted by Denis 
Goulet in which he argues that development requires compatability 
between three different rationalities: technological, political and ethical. 
Though Goulet heightenes an awareness of the complexity of the public 
policy process, his analysis is based on the assumption that conflict can be 
avoided if decision-makers are sufficiently aware of the relationship 
between these different 'rationalities'. See Denis Goulet, "Three 
Rationalities in Development Decision-Making", World Development, 14(2), 
1986, pp.301-317. 
59 
30. See Helen Hughes and Jean Waelbroeck, "Can Developing-Country Exports
Keep Growing in the 1980s?", The World Economy, June 1981, pp.127-147.
31. See . William R. Cline, "Can the East Asian Model of Development Be
Generalized?", World Development, 10(2), 1982, pp.81-90. For a response
to this see Gustav Ranis, "Can the East Asian Model of Development Be
Generalized? A Comment", World Development, 13(4), 1985, pp.543-545
and Cline's "Reply" in the same edition, pp.547-548.
32. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in Philippe C.
Schmitter and Gerhard Lehrabruch (editors), Trends Towards Corporatist
Mediation, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979, p.13. This article was
originally published in The Review of Politics, 36, January 1974, pp.52-84.
33. Schmitter, 1979, p.22.
34. ibid., p.24.
35. ibid., p.25.
36. Julio Cotler, "Bases Del Corporativano en el Peru", Sociedad y Politica, 1,
October 1972, pp.3-12; James M. Malloy, "Authoritarianism, Corporatism
and Mobilisation in Peru", The Review of Politics, 36, January 1974, pp.52-
84; Juan Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain", in Erik Allardt and Stein
Rokkan (editors), Mass Politics, New York: Free Press, 1970, pp.251-283;
Juan Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the
Institutionalisation of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil", in
Alfred Stepan (editor), Authoritarian· Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, pp.233-254; P. Drake,
"Corporatism and Functionalism in Modern Chilean Politics", Journal of
Latin American Studies, 10(1), 1978, pp.83-116; Robert Stauffer,
"Philippine Authoritarianism: Framework for Peripheral 'Development"' ,
Pacific Affairs, Fall 1977, pp.365-385. Also see the collection of studies in
James M. Malloy (editor), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin
America, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977.
37. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and
the Question of Democracy" in David Collier (editor), The New
Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1979, pp.285-318; Guillermo A. O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question
of the State" in James M. Malloy (editor), 1977, pp.47-88; Guillermo
O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic
. Authoritarian State", Latin American Research Review, 12(1), 1978, pp.3-
38; Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic
Authoritarianism, Politics of Modernization Series, Number 9, Institute of
International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1973.
38. O'Donnell identifies eight principal characteristics of the bureaucratic­
authoritarian state: its social base is provided by the upper bourgeoisie;
specialists in coercion and technocrats enjoy institutional dominance; it is a
system of political exclusion of the popular sector; this exclusion involves
the elimination of the institions of political democracy and a denial of 'lo
popular'; it is also a system which excludes the popular sector from the
economy in that capital accumulation heavily favours large oligopolistic
units of private capital and some state enterprises; it promotes
transnationalisation of the economy; it endeavours to 'depoliticize' social
issues by employing a technical rationality; political representation is
limited to large private and public organisations, notably the armed forces
and large obligopolistic enterprises. See O'Donnell, 1979, pp.292-293.
-------- - -�- - ---------,--- - ---,----�=---� 
60 
39. The high profile of the technocrats, both civilian and military, is intended
to transcend the social and political divisions in society. Though this
involves intervention in social, political and economic spheres by the
technocrats, their actions are justified in terms of necessary
depoliticisation which is a prerequisite for economic growth. See
O'Donnell, 1973, p.154.
40. O'Donnell, 1979, pp.300-302.
41. Collier (editor), 1979.
42. O'Donnell argues that political society is traditionally comprised of the
forces of domination and consensus but that the bureaucratic-authoritarian
state excludes consensus, this largely being the consequence of efforts to
attract foreign capital. However, the neglect and erosion of the symbols
associated with consensus politics leads to tensions and contradictions
which ultimately can only be resolved through a return to democracy. This
article thus develops a political theory addressing the dynamics of
authoritarian rule not evident in O'Donnell's earlier work.
43. Robert R. Kaufman, "Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin
America: A Concrete Review of the Bureaucratic Authoritarian Model" in
Collier (editor), 1979, pp.165-254.
44. Jose Sera, "Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the Connection between
Industrialization and Authoritarian Regimes" in Collier (editor), 1979,
p.118.
45. Kaufman, 1979, p.248. In addition to these criticisms, Alfred Stepan in The
State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective, Princeton: Princeton
Unviersity Press, 1978, also argues that urgent political necessity, notably
the challenge to elite hegemony by popular movements, is the factor which
accounts for the exclusive nature of corporatist regimes and not the crisis
of import-substitution. William Crowther also leands support to Kaufman's
argument in his study of the Philippines in which he contends that "the
composition of both the import-substituting and the authoritarian coalitions
depends more on the timing of import substitution and on pre-existing
national political conditions than the original version of the bureaucratic­
authoritarian model would imply". See William Crowther, "Philippine
Authoritarianism and the International Economy", Comparative Politics,
18(3), 1986, p.354.
46. Albert Hirschman, "The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the
Search for Its Economic Determinants" in Collier (editor), 1979, pp.81-82.
47. Douglas C. Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Capitalism, Bureaucratic
Authoritarianism, and Prospects for Democracy in the United States",
International Organization, 36(3), 1982, p.646.
48. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "On the Chracterization of Authoritarian
Regimes in Latin America" in Collier (editor), 1979, p.40.
49. ibid., p.51.
50. The list of such publications is quite phenomenal and, therefore, an
appreciation of the various dependency theories is most readily available
through the reviews. See, for example, Gabriel di Palma, "Dependency: A





Concrete Situations?" World Development, 6, 1978, pp.811-924 and, for a 
review which situates dependency literature in the broader development 
debate, Richard Higgott, "Beyond the Sociology of Underdevelopment: An 
Historiographical Analysis of Marxist and Dependency Theories of 
Development and Underdevelopment", Social Analysis, 7, April 1981, pp. 72-
98. Dependency theory is often discussed in conjunction with 'World
System' theory, a close theoretical derivative. The two major proponents
of this analysis are Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin. See, for
example, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World Economy, New York:
Academic Press, 1974 and Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale,
London: Monthly Review Press, 1974.
Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, 
London: Monthly Review Press, 1969. Also see Frank's other works: On 
Capitalist Underdevelopment, Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1975; 
Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevelopemnt, London: Monthly Review Press, 
1972; Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1970. More recently Frank has extended his analysis of the 
global process of capital accumulation to include an account of how Asia 
and Africa became incorporated into this single process. See World 
Accumulation 1492-1789, London: Macmillan, 1978. 
Dependency theorists have come under special fire from Marxists. See 
Ernesto Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America", New Left 
Review, 67, May-June 1971, pp.19-38; Robert Brenner, "The Origins of 
Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism", New Left 
Review, 104, July-August 1977, pp.25-92; Geoffrey Kay, Development and 
Underdevelopment, London: Macmillan, 1975; Colin Leys, 
"Underdevelopment and Dependency: Some Critical Notes", Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 7(1), 1977, pp.92-107; Colin Leys, "Capital 
Accumulation, Class Formation and Dependency - The Significance of the 
Kenyan Case", in R. Miliband and J. Saville (editors), The Socialist Register 
1978, London: Merlin Press, pp.241-266; Bill Warren, "Imperialism and 
Capitalist Industrialization", New Left Review, 81, September-October 
1973, pp.3-44; John Browett, "Out of the Dependency Perspective", Journal 
of Contemporary Asia, 12(2), 1982, pp.145-157; Tony Smith, "The 
Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency 
Theory", World Politics, XXXI(2), 1979, pp.247-288; Tony Smith, "Requiem 
or New Agenda for Third World Studies?" World Politics, XXXVII(4), 1985, 
pp.532-561; Richard Leaver, "The Debate on Underdevelopment: On 
Situating Gunder Frank", Journal of Contemporary Asia, 7(1), 1977, pp.108-
115. For Frank's response to the Marxist critique see "An Answer to
Critics", in Andre Gunder Frank, Critique and Anti-Critique, London:
Macmillan, 1984, pp.245-278. For a discussion of the also extensive non­
Marxist critiques of dependency theory see Staniland, 1985, pp.117-148.
Andre Gunder Frank, "Third World Manufacturing Export Production", The 
Southeast Asian Economic Review, 1(2), 1980, pp.83-105; Andre Gunder 
Frank, "Global Crisis and Transformation", Development and Change, 
Number 14, 1983, pp.323-346. 
54. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Dependency and Development in Latin
America", New Left Review, 74, July-August 1972, p.89.
55. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development:
Theoretical and Practical Implications", in Alfred E. Stepan (editor),
Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future, New Haven: Yale




















Frank, as quoted in Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p.189. 
See Staniland, 1985, pp.121-123. 
Cardoso and Faletto, 1979, p.xvi. 
Ibid., p.xv. 
Tony Smith, "The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited", International 
Organization, 35(4), 1981, pp. 755-761. 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and DeveloP:: 
ment in Latin America, Berkeley, Calfifornia: University of California 
Press, 1979, p.xxiii. 
Smith, 1981, p. 760. 
Carnoy, 1984, p.205. 
Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, 
and Local Capital in Brazil, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. 
Ibid., pp.297-314. 
Ibid., p.103. 
James A. Caporaso, "Dependency Theory: Continuities and Discontinuities 
in Development Studies", International Organization, 34(4), 1980, p.618. 
See Smith, 1981 and 1985. 
Evans, 1979, p.12. 
Ibid., p.83. 
Ibid. 
Stephan Haggard, "The Newly Industrializing Countries in the International 
System", World Politics, XXXV1Il(2), 1986, p.363. 
Gary Gereffi, "The Global Pharmaceutical Industry and its Impact in Latin 
America", in Richard S. Newfarmer (editor), Profits, Progress and Poverty: 
Case Studies of International Industries in Latin America, Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985, pp.259-298; Gary Gereffi, 
The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third World, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983; Gary Gereffi, "Drug Firms and 
Dependency in Mexico: The Case of the Steroid Hormone Industry", 
International Organization, 32(2), 1978, pp.237-286; Richard S. Newfarmer, 
"International Oligopoly in the Electrical Industry", in Richard S. 
Newfarmer (editor), 1985, pp.151-192; Richard S. Newfarmer, 
Transnational Conglomerates and the Economics of Dependent 
Development, Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 1980; Douglas C. 
Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "The Worldwide Automobile Industry and 
its Implications", in Newfarmer (editor), 1985, pp.193-226; Douglas C. 
Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Transnational Corporations and the 
Political Economy of Export Promotion: The Case of the Mexican 
Automobile Industry", International Organization, 33(2), 1979a, pp.177-201; 
63 
Douglas C. Bennett and Kenneth K Sharpe, "Agenda Setting and Bargaining 
Power: The Mexican State versus Transnational Automobile Corporations", 
World Politics, XXXII(l), 1979b pp.57-89. 
74. At this time, argues Gereffi, 1983, p.154, the Brazilian industry enjoyed
such advantages as: exclusive access to barbasco, the most efficient and
versatile raw material of the industry; Syntex, a local firm, led the world in
both the output and technology of the steroid industry; and the Mexican
state had adopted a supportive role towards local producers.
75. This instrumentality was established in January 1975. See Gereffi, 1983,
p.132.
76. Gereffi, 1983, p.246.
77. See ibid., pp.95-131.
78. Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
79. Gereffi, 1983, p.48.
80. Haggard, 1986, p.366.
81. ibid.
82. Newfarmer, 1980.
83. Countervailing government policies refer to such measures as financing
debt and risk capital for Brazilian firms, encouraging local technological
development and the use of public enterprises. Regulatory policy options
involve stipulations at the point of entry of foreign investment,
intervention to merge domestic firms, closer checking of restrictive trade
practices, improvement in accounting practices, strengthening price
control mechanisms, and the adoption of tighter import controls. Policies
to reduce the power bases of multinationals include the encouragement of
competition, 'renationalisation', and seeking co-operation from such




86. Newfarmer, 1985, p.147.
87. Newfarmer, 1980, p.355.
88. See footnote 73.
89. In addition, approved foreign firms were to be limited to the machining of
the motor and the final assembly of vehicles.
90. Bennett and Sharpe, 1979b, p.83.
91. ibid., p.87.
92. This was reflected in three respects: the two ministries centrally concerned
with industrial policy failed to co-ordinate policy and were even at
64 
loggerheads for much of the planning period; there were also serious 
divisions internal to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce; and the 
President himself failed to provide the degree of strong leadership required 
to carry the programme through. See ibid., pp.80-86. 
93. ibid., p.87.
94. For examples of literature from this school see works by Raymond Vernon
which include Storm Over the Multinationals: The Real Issues, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1977, pp.139-74, 194-199; "The Power of
Multinational Enterprises in Developing Countries", in Carl Madden
(editor), The Case for the Multinational Corporation, New York: Praeger,
1975, pp.151-183; Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S.
Enterprises, New York: Basic Books, 1971, pp.46-59, 105-6, 256-257;
"Foreign-Owned Enterprises in the Developing Countries", Public Policy,
Number 15, 1966, pp.361-380. Important discussions by Theodore Moran
include "M ul tina tional Corporations and Dependency: A Dialogue for
Dependentistas and Non-Dependentistas", in James A. Caporaso (editor),
Dependence and Dependency in the Global System, special issue of
International Organization, 32, Winter 1978, pp.170-200; and Multinational
. Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1974. See also Charles Kindleberger, American 
Business Abroad: Six Lectures on Direct Investment, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1969, pp.147-59; and C. Fred Bergsten, Thomas Horst and 
Theodore Moran, American Multinationals and American Interests, 
Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1978, pp.369-381. 
95. Joseph M. Grieco, Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's Experience
with the International Computer Industry, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984; and "Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's
Experience with the International Computer Industry", International
Organization, 36(3), 1982, pp.609-610.
96. Grieco, 1982, p.612.
97. ibid., p.632.
98. ibid.
99. Emmanuel Adler, "Ideological 'Guerrilas' and the Quest for Technological
Autonomy: Brazil's Domestic Computer Industry", International
Organization, 40(3), 1986, pp.673-705.
100. ibid., p. 704.














107. Adam, 1971, 1972.
108. Adam, 1972, p.352.
109. ibid., pp.356-362.
110. ibid., pp.354-356.
111. Louis Turner, Multinational Corporations and the Third World, New York:
Hill and Wang, 1973.
112. For other works on the role of international capital in subcontracting see
footnote 2.
113. Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye, The New International
Division of Labour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
114. ibid., pp.2-15.
115. Rhys Jenkins, "Divisions over the International Division of Labour", Capital
and Class, 22, Spring 1984, p.34. A similar argument about the neglect of
indigenous historical circumstances is found in John Browett, "The Newly
Industrializing Countries and Radical Theories of Development", World
Development, 13(7), 1985, pp. 789-803.
116. Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye, 1981, p.46.
117. James A. Caporaso, "The State's Role in Third World Economic Growth",
Anaals AAPSS, 459, January 1982, pp.103-111.
118. Leys, 1978 and 1977; M.P. Cowen, "Patterns of Cattle Ownership and Dairy
Production: 1900-1965", mimeo, 1974; Nicola Swainson, The Development
of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya: 1918-1977, London: Heinemann, 1980.
For an excellent discussion of this debate see P.F. Chapman, The
Development Debate: Some Theoretical Implications of the Kenyan Case,
Master's Thesis, Graduate School of Arts and Social Studies, University of
Sussex, August 1980.






125. Charles A. Barone, "Dependency, Marxist Theory and Salvaging the Idea of








131. The extent to which this contribution challenges radical anlaysis can be
guaged by the exchanges between Barone and Martin Hart-Landsberg. See
Martin Hart-Landsberg, 11 Capitalism and Third World Economic
Development: A Critical Look at the South Korean 'Miracle' 11 , Review of
Radical Political Economies, 16(2/3), 1984, pp.181-193 and Barone's reply in
pp.195-197 of the same source.
132. Stephan Haggard and Chung-In Moon, "The South Korean State in the
International Economy: Liberal, Dependent or Mercantile?", in John
Gerrard Ruggie (editor), The Antinomies of Interdependence, New York:








140. It should be noted that Sam Wynn is a pseudonym for 11an economist who
lives in the United States
11
• Wynn's analysis closely resembles that of 
Amsden who, possibly not coincidentally, is also an economist who lives in 
the United States. See Sam Wynn, 11The -Taiwanese Economic Miracle", 
Monthly Review, 34(1), 1982, pp.30-40; Alice Amsden, "The State and 
Taiwan's Economic Development", in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (editors), Bringing the State Back In, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.78-106. For another work on 
Taiwan which examines domestic factors see Stephan Haggard, "The 
Politics of Industrialization in Korea and Taiwan\ Paper prepared for 
conference, '1 Explaining the Success of Industrialization in East Asia", 
School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 9-12 September 
1985. 
141. Wynn, 1982, pp.36-37.
142. ibid., pp.36-38.
143. Amsden, 1985, p.99.
144. ibid., p.101.
145. Kevin J. Hewison, The Development of Capital, Public Policy and the Role
of the State in Thailand, Ph.D. Dissertation, Murdoch University, 1983.
Also see "The State and Capitalist Development in Thailand", in Riggott
and Robison (editors), 1985, pp.266-294.
--------- ----- - -- ----------c - -----------��---� 
67 
146. See Kevin J. Hewison, "The Financial Bourgeoisie in Thailand", Journal of
Contemporary Asia, 11(4), 1981, pp.395-412.
147. Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986a; "Class,
Capital and State in New Order Indonesia", in Riggott and Robison
(editors), 1985, pp.295-335; "The Transformation of the State in Indonesia",
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 14(1), 1982, pp.48-60; "Culture,
Politics, and Economy in the Political History of the New Order",
Indonesia, 31, 1981, pp.1-29; "Towards a Class Analysis of the Indonesian
Military Bureaucratic State", Indonesia, 25, 1978, pp.17-39.
148. See "After the Global Rush: The Politics of Economic Restructuring in
Indonesia in the Mid 1980s", in Kevin Hewison, Richard Higgott and Richard
Robison (editors), The Politics of Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia, Allen
and Unwin (forthcoming); "Industrialization and the Economic and Political
Development of Domestic Capital: The Case of Indonesia", Paper for
"Industrializing Elites in Southeast Asia II Conference, organised by Social
Science Research Council (United States), Sukothai, Thailand, 9-12
December 1986b; "Resisting Structural Adjustment: Conflict Over
Industrial Policy in Indonesia", in J. Carlsson and T. Shaw (editors),
Industrialising Countries in Comparative Perspective, London: Macmillan,
1986c. 
149. Robison, 1986a, p.387.
150. ibid., p.388.
151. See, for example, Milton Friedman, The Invisible Hand in Economics and
Politics, Inaugural Singapore Lecture, Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 1981. Friedman was addressing a disbelieving audience of
business people in Singapore on how the free market had produced
Singapore's success. A similar message was given by President Ronald
Reagan when he welcomed Lee Kuan Yew to the White House in October
1985 as the champion of free enterprise. See "Singapore's Lee Is Well
Received by Reagan During Visit to U.S. 11, Asian Wall Street Journal, 17
October 1985.
152. You Poh Seng and Lim Chong Yah (editors), Singapore: Twenty-five Years
of Development, Singapore: Nan Yang Xing Zhou Lianhe Zaobao, 1984.
153. ibid., p.6
154. Mohammed Ariff and Hal Hill, Export-Oriented Industrialisation: The
ASEAN Experience, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985.
155. Nyaw Mee-kau, Industrial Growth and Export Expansion in Singapore, Hong
Kong: Kingsway International, 1979.
156. ibid., p.152.
157. Peter S.J. Chen, "Singapore's Development Strategies: A Model for Rapid
Growth", and Lim Chong Yah, "Singapore's Economic Development:
Retrospect and Prospect", in Peter S.J. Chen (editor), Singapore
Development Policies and Trends, Singapore: Oxford University Press,
1983, pp.3-26 and 89-104. 
158. Lim Chong Yah, 1983, p.101 and Chen, 1983, p.24.
68 
159. Chen, 1983, p.24. It should bE? noted that Nyaw contests this view. See
Nyaw, 1979, p.152.
160. Industrialisation in Singapore, Camberwell, Longman, 1973.
161. The Practice of Economic Growth, Singapore: Federal Publications, 1977.
162. Singapore: Struggle for Success, Singapore: Times Books International,
1984. 
163. "Rapid Growth and Relative Price Stability in a Small Open Economy: The
Experience of Singapore", Paper prepared for the "Conference on
Experiences and Lessons of Small Open Economies", organised by the 
Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences of the Catholic
University of Chile, Santiago, 11-13 November 1981.
164. "Political Economy of a City-State", Singapore Business Yearbook 1982,
pp.7-33.
165. Linda Lim, "Singapore's Success: The Myth of the Free Market Economy",
Asian Survey, XXIII(6), 1983, pp. 752-764.
166. ibid., p. 757.
167. ibid., p. 762.
168. Rodan in Riggott and Robison, 1985.
169. Dependent Development and Industrial Order, New York: Praeger, 1981.
170. ibid., p.115.
171. ibid., pp.115-116.
172. Kunio Yoshihara, Foreign Investment and Domestic Response, Singapore:
Eastern Universities Press, 1976; Chia Siow Yue, "Foreign Direct
Investment in Manufacturing in Developing Countries: The Case of
Singapore", in F.E.I. Hamilton and G.J.R. Linge, Spatial Analysis, Industry
and the Industrial Environment, Volume II International Industrial Systems,
John Wiley and Sons, 1981, pp.439-464; Lee Soo Ann, Singapore Goes
Transnational, Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1977.
173. Noeleen Heyzer, "International Production and Social Change: An Analysis
of the State, Employment, and Trade Unions in Singapore", in Chen (editor),
1983, pp.105-128.
---- - ------- - --- ---------:--------,----=�-----:;---
69 
CHAPTER 2 
PRE-INDUSTRIAL SINGAPORE: GENERAL STRUCTURAL DEVEWPMENTS 
UP UNTIL 1959 
Economic Foundations and Colonisation 
The long delay in the development of manufacturing industry in Singapore was no 
historic accident. On the contrary, the incorporation of this island into the British 
colonial umbrella arose out of a very specific historical struggle between imperial 
powers for access to and control over Oriental trade. This had very definite 
implications for the structure of the economy which developed in Singapore. In 
view of the considerable strategic advantages Singapore offered in the contest for 
commercial superiority, from the outset the British intended specific economic 
functions to be performed there. Though there were some modifications over 
time in the nature of Singapore's trading role, these were invariably linked to the 
logic and dynamism of British colonialism and capital. The various other 
economic activities of any significance which developed in Singapore also derived 
in one way or another from the trade which passed through its port. This trade­
based economy soon became intricately related with the commerce of the region 
in such a way that opportunities for capital accumulation perpetuated the basic 
economic structure imposed by British colonialism. 
The earliest history of Singapore is not altogether clear. According to 
Turnbull, the first indisputable evidence of a settlement on the island dates from 
the fourteenth century.1 This settlement, known as Temasek, probably
represented the most significant inhabitation of Singapore prior to Raffles. Even 
so, Turnbull contends that this settlement was at the most only a small outpost of 
the Malay empire of Srivijaya, with its people dependent upon the sea for their 
livelihood. Certainly reports from travellers passing the island around that time 
emphasised the dangers of piracy. In any case, the settlement suffered a brief and 
violent history, culminating in its near-obliteration in 1398 after being attacked 
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by Thais. Subsequently, Singapore became a Thai vassal state in the early 
fifteenth century and, in turn, passed into the control of a Malacca sultanate. 
When the Portuguese gained Malacca in 1511, Singapore was briefly employed as 
an outpost for the Malay sultan's new capital of Johor Lama. Johor Lama was 
itself destroyed in 1587 by the Portuguese and, according to Turnbull, from about 
1613 Singapore's significance as a settlement was minimal.2
The next major settlement at Singapore did not come until 1811 when about 
one hundred Malays from Johore were led by their Temenggong (chief) to the 
mouth of the Singapore River.3 The Temenggong established an overlord
structure whereby ' tribes' of the surrounding Riau-Lingga archipelago were 
afforded protection in return for duties to Malay overlords. A division of labour 
developed under which some tribes acted as private armadas and others as 
boatpeople and suppliers of fish to the Temenggong.4 Other inhabitants of the
island at that time included the Orang Seletar and the Biduanda Orang Kellang 
who were indigenous to the island. These people were essentially boat dwellers 
who relied on fish and jungle produce for their existence. They were not engaged 
in agriculture. The only agriculture carried out was by a small group of Chinese 
who had planted gambier and pepper.5 Thus, when Sir Stamford Raffles founded
Singapore in 1819, the island comprised a small group of about one thousand 
inhabitants whose notoriety derived more from piracy than agriculture or 
extensive trading activities.6 Following Raffles, however, drastic change was to
come. 
The British interest in Singapore stemmed from a number of 
considerations. The primary concern was that the Dutch presence in Malacca 
represented a potential threat to the security of passage through the Straits of 
Malacca and Sunda, and thus the East India Company's trade with China. The 
Company was heavily dependent upon this trade for its profits. Britain thus 
needed, according to the Governor-General of India, Lord Hastings, "the 
establishment of a station beyond Malacca, such as may command the southern 
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entrance of those straits".7 Raffles, who was at the time an officer of the East
India Company, had been commissioned to find just such a station. On January 29, 
1819 Singapore, being strategically placed astride the sea routes from Europe and 
India to China and Japan, was occupied for this purpose. 
Owing to the priority the British government placed on securing more 
satisfactory Anglo-Dutch relations in the East, no immediate decision was made 
by London over the Singapore discovery. Soon enough, however, the full 
commercial implications of Singapore were being grasped and the political 
pressure upon the government from commercial interests intensified. Raffles' 
vision of Singapore as a counter to Dutch monopolisation of the Malay Archipelago 
trade had been embraced by private traders, manufacturers and shipping interests 
in Britain who all anticipated a substantial boost to commercial activity with the 
Archipelago and surrounding areas. This outward-looking stance was undoubtedly 
fueled by the economic depression in Britain at the time and the effects of rising 
protectionism in Europe. Private mercantile, shipping and manufacturing 
interests increasingly demanded an end to the East India Company's monopoly and 
the right to trade in smaller vessels east of the Cape.8 These considerations
aside, it had simply become very expensive for the British government to conduct 
trade with the Archipelago through Batavia because of high differential duties 
imposed by the Dutch. 9
By the early 1820s then, there was pressure for a British commercial and 
military base in Southeast Asia. By 1824, the British had formally secured Dutch 
recognition of the occupation of Singapore.10 As a means of luring traders to the
port of Singapore, and thereby countering Dutch monopolisation of Archipelago 
trade as well as advances by other European nations, the British established 
Singapore as a free port. This policy was enhanced by the capacity of Britain to 
administer the port through India, whose resources offset the immediate loss in 
revenue from Singapore.11 Under conditions of free trade, British manufacturers
and traders were confident of faring more favourably in the Archipelago and 
adjoining region. 
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Even before the establishment of the free port of Singapore British traders 
had carried out trade with the region. Private traders had been supplying 
inhabitants of the Archipelago with manufactures which had been brought from 
India and Bombay, and had also successfully challenged traders based in India in 
the Archipelago trade.12 However, with the advent of Raffles' founding of
Singapore there was a remarkable surge in trade, most of which was entrepot in 
nature, that is, trade in goods that are imported from one country and exported to 
another. Singapore was a convenient location for the exchange of merchandise 
and produce from Europe, India, China and Japan for the produce of the Malay 
Archipelago and the surrounding states of Siam, Cochin-China and Cambodia.13
The major imports from Britain at this time were arms and ammunition, iron and 
iron ore, copper, lead, and cotton and woollen piece goods. Singapore was the 
chief outlet for British cotton and woollen manufactures intended for regional 
consumption.14 The Straits produce which was exchanged for such goods included
spices, palm oil and coconut oil. Between 1818 and 1824, the export branch of 
Singapore trade emanating from the Archipelago increased four-fold.15
During the first fifty years entrepot trade increased eight-fold despite the 
Dutch Treaty of 1824 which restricted Singapore's trade with Java, Sumatra and 
other islands.16
Over time the sorts of entrepot trade conducted through Singapore, and the 
origins and destinations of such trade, underwent change. Most notably, the 
importance of the Malay Peninsula to Singapore was to considerably increase. It 
was not until the 1840s when the Chinese developed tin mining in the west coast 
Malay_ states and gambier and pepper cultivation in Johore that any very 
significant volume of trade from the Malay Peninsula passed through 
Singapore.17 However, the most significant change occurred after Malaya was
brought under British control in the 1870s facilitating greater exploitation of its 
natural resources and bolstering commerce. 
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Table 1: Principal Commodity Imports and Exports To and 

























and Destination, Year Ending 30 April 1836 
Principal place of origin 
East side of Malay P'sula and Borneo 
Calcutta and Bombay 
Britain and Java 
Calcutta and Madras 
Java, Siam, and Bali 
Siam and Cochin China 
Java, Malay Peninsula, nearby islands 
Principal Destination 
China 
Calcutta and Bombay 
China, Malay Peninsula, and Java 
Britain, China, and Calcutta 
Manilla, Siam, and Celebes 
Java, Borneo, Celebes, and Sumatra 
Britain, Java, and Celebes 
Britain, North America, and Bombay 




















Source: Compiled from T.J. Newbold, Political and Statistical Account of the 
British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca Volume 1, London: 1839, 
pp.292-342 as cited in Helen Hughes, "From Entrepot Trade to 
Manufacturing", in Helen Hughes and You Poh Seng (editors) Foreign 
Investment and Industrialisation in Singapore, Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 1969, pp.8-9. 
The first five years of the Federated Malay States (1895-1900) saw Malayan 
trade nearly double, the most important increases being in tin and rubber. Apart 
from greatly enhancing British interests, notably those of the big agency houses 
such as Guthries, this change was to promote a greater volume of import-export 
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trade between Singapore and Malaya. Buchanan points out that in 1836 the 
categories of food, drink, tobacco, opium and textile piece goods accounted for 
74.1 % of imports and 67.8% of exports; in 1936 the categories of tin ore 
(concentrates and plate), rubber and liquid fuel accounted for 79.8% of 
exports.18 The trading economy of Singapore was to generally develop a close
interrelationship with Malaya's export economy, not only as an outlet for Malayan 
primary exports, but also as the channel through which imports of manufactured 
goods, capital, enterprise and labour would pa·ss en route to the Malayan 
hinterland. 
The traditional trade between China and India, and among the countries of 
Southeast Asia, had largely been replaced by specialisation between raw material 
producers and manufactured goods importers. Singapore's transhipment functions 
reflected the change in this composition of goods traded (see Table 1). It now 
collected raw materials, principally tin and rubber, from the Malay mainland and 
the Archipelago for shipping to the rest of the world, and in the course of this 
activity undertook some of the preliminary sorting and processing. The service 
and maintenance needs of the growing port, building and construction activity, and 
increased consumer demand also began to stimulate manufacturing activities. 
Clearly though, trade still dominated the economy.19
Although the establishment of Singapore may not have given rise to as 
dramatic an increase in the sale of British manufactures as had been hoped, the 
strategic and commercial success of Singapore had clearly vindicated Raffles' 
choice. By the turn of the century Singapore had become the regional centre for a 
whole range of enterprises including import-export firms, agency houses, banks, 
shipping firms, insurance companies and numerous other services. The successful 
development of Singapore, however, had been contingent upon the establishment 
of important structural relationships which were absent in 1819. In particular, the 
rapid expansion of trade was facilitated by the evolution of an intricate network 
of relationships between European traders and Asian intermediaries. 
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Class Structure 
Though the port of Singapore displayed the necessary physical features to more 
than adequately fill the role sought of it by the British, its tiny population at the 
time of its founding as a British settlement meant that a considerable intake of 
immigrants would be required. More precisely, specific classes of people had to 
be attracted. Apart from the need for some wage labour, the British were 
conscious of the importance of attracting the experienced and knowledgeable 
merchants operating in the region so that links could be established with the 
various producers and merchants in the Archipelago and beyond. European 
business firms were understandably ill-equipped to either identify markets or 
communicate with producers and traders. John Crawfurd, who took over the 
Singapore Residency from Raffles in 1823, proposed that this problem be resolved 
by trading through "an intermediary class in whom both (Asian traders and 
European firms) can repose confidence 11 •20 Such an intermediary class had in fact
already been developed in the region and these people were quick to see in 
Singapore the scope for playing such a link role between the Europeans and 
indigenes of the region. 
The successful attraction of the requisite Malayan and Chinese traders to 
Singapore was in no small way due to the free port status of the island. A port 
free of monopolies, steep duties or restrictions of some kind, as was typical of 
European ports, or the uncertainties of Malaysian ports was quite novel for the 
East.21
Chinese commercial intermediaries were quick to move to Singapore. 
Chinese who had settled throughout the region, not just as traders but as farmers 
and miners, were already engaged in a network of commerce in Riau, Malacca, 
Penang, Bangkok, Manila, Batavia and other Javanese ports. These contacts were 
to be exploited from Singapore. Of the initial Chinese immigrants to Singapore, 
those coming from Riau and Malacca were predominant.22 Many of the
Malaccan-born Chinese had actually been educated at the Anglo-Chinese colleges 
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at Malacca and had even been employed for a time in the British colonial 
administration.23 For the most part, these Chinese immigrants concentrated
their commercial and trading activities in the nearby Asian ports of Bangkok, 
Saigon, Sumatra, the Riau-Lingga Archipelago, Bali, Borneo and the islands of the 
Malay Peninsula.24 Chinese pukats (large row-boats which were equipped to also
employ a sail) were also important in trade with the Straits of Malacca and the 
east coast of the Malay Peninsula. 
The importance of Chinese traders to the prosperity of Singapore and indeed 
the Malay Peninsula extended to the supply of labour. Singapore functioned as. a 
distribution centre for Chinese labour en route to the tin mines of the Peninsula as 
well as the Netherlands East Indies.25 The demand for labour in the Archipelago
by the early nineteenth century coincided with severe hardship for Chinese in the 
provinces of Kwantung and Fukien in particular. This gave rise to a preparedness 
by Chinese to emigrate. In view of both the low population of Singapore and the 
revenue benefits from a larger population, British authorities welcomed this trade 
in labour. Although some passages were paid for by the immigrants themselves, 
the majority of these people were too poor to pay their fares. Consequently, a 
virtual slave trade developed under the auspices of Chinese entrepreneurs. Trade 
in these labourers, or sinkhehs, quickly assumed a speculative nature. This labour 
trade, however, was not totally confined to Chinese traders. From the 1840s 
Singapore became the distribution centre for Indian labourers brought by planters 
from Ceylon.26
Of the non-Chinese merchants, the most important to Singapore in the early 
years were the Bugis. These people were from the south-west of the Celebes but 
had come to occupy the territory between Macassar and Mandar .27 They were
invaluable to the Archipelago trade since they formed the distributive link 
between European manufacturers and merchants and the people of the most 
remote, and otherwise inaccessible, regions of the Archipelago (particularly in the 
east).28 The Bugis merchants generally operated through Chinese intermediaries
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in Singapore. Their initial importance, however, waned as they came to feel the 
pressures of competition, especially from the Chinese.29
Aside from the Bugis and Chinese traders, Singapore also attracted 
merchants from Sumatra, mainly Malays. Like the Bugis, these people purchased 
from the Europeans through the Chinese traders. Opium and British and Indian 
piece goods were exchanged for local produce from the Sumatran coast such as 
rattans, gutta-percha and camphor.30 There were also some Indian merchants in
Singapore who had come from the large Indian commercial community of 
Penang.31
European merchants, notably British, dominated the entrepot trade. 
Starting as partnerships or owners of merchant houses, these groups evolved into 
the powerful managing agency houses towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
In 1845, of the 46 merchant houses in Singapore, 20 were British, six Jewish, five 
Chinese, five Arab, two Armenian, two German and one Portuguese.32 This
representation was to change over time, with a strong challenge to British 
dominance coming in the 1860s in particular·. 33 Expanding beyond the exportation
of raw materials and the importation of manufactured goods, these houses moved 
into direct control of tin mines and plantations, with a concomitant venture into 
the wholesale and retail trade of manufactured goods. 34 These Europ€an traders
enjoyed import-export advantages over their Chinese counterparts due to their 
control over raw materials, and of course in imports they held the upper hand 
since most manufactured goods invariably came from Europe. 
Buchanan argues that by the 1920s it was possible to delineate a clear 
complementary structure of ownership and control in which European investments 
controlled primary production and the trade associated with it (through the large 
agency houses), whilst the local Chinese merchants operated an intricate network 
of domestic commerce of small-scale collection, distribution and retailing.35
Even by Buchanan's own ·admission, the above schema is a simplification. There 
were local Chinese, for example, who were either directly engaged in commerce 
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or who even employed wage labour. For the most part, however, the larger 
commercial and financial services associated with Singapore's entrepot trade were 
provided by British-owned commercial houses and banks.36 Hughes explained the
extent to which European domination affected the structure of Chinese business 
as thus: 
The division between European and Chinese traders was reflected in 
the establishment of a separate Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 
1906, and Chinese merchants and bankers were by and large merely 
able to fill the interstices of Singapore's entrepot activities.37 
The circumscription of Chinese business activities by European capital was clearly 
evidenced in the European penetration into the rubber and tin industries of the 
Malay States. Tin mining had actually been pioneered by the Chinese hundreds of 
-years before the first investment by Europeans. By 1929, however, European
companies were producing 61 % of Malaya's tin, a position largely attributable to
the superior capital and organisational resources of the European companies.38
Investments in Malay tin mines had been one avenue for direct productive
investments by Singapore-based Chinese. Puthucheary argues that capital
investment by Chinese in Malay tin mines was stunted because of the presence of
European capital. 39 This is not to deny that many Singapore-based Chinese, being
heavily integrated through family capital networks, continued to reap significant
profits from direct investments in the mines. However, owing to the superiority
of European-based capital, especially following the innovation of the dredge in
1907, the majority of Chinese investments were concentrated in mines often
considered by the Europeans as too small to be of concern.
Direct productive investments in rubber by Singapore Chinese were also 
curtailed by the domination of European firms, led by Guthries. More than in the 
tin industry of Malaya, the position of Chinese capital suffered for lack of access 
to sufficient finance. Following the planting, it takes five to seven years before 
rubber can be tapped, and a further few years before the full crop is realised. 
Thus, a large supply of capital is essential. 4o For this reason, Chinese investors
from Malaya and Singapore could not compete with the agency houses, since the 
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former were hamstrung by the small level of capital accumulation in general as 
well as the absence of capital mobility from one industry to another.41
Although opportunities for direct foreign investment in rubber and tin by 
Chinese capital based in Singapore were restricted, Singapore merchants were 
nevertheless to do well out of this trade. The Singapore Chinese played a 
comprador role, acting as go-betweens or commission merchants. They provided 
financial guarantees to Western firms and personal credit to Chinese traders. In 
return, these compradores received a salary from the European firm which 
employed them and commissions from both the firms and the Chinese traders.42
Therefore, despite the restrictions on productive investments, many Singapore 
Chinese not only welcomed the expansion of European capital but actually became 
dependent upon it. Certainly the fortunes of a large number of Chinese traders 
based in Singapore were fundamentally enmeshed with those of the mainly 
foreign-owned estates and mines of Malaya. 43 Additionally, demand for
consumption goods rose with the growth of wage labour in these enterprises.44
Understandably then, locally-based merchants viewed favourably the stability in 
administration associated with British colonisation. 
The perils of the heavy dependence of Chinese capital on western business 
interests was demonstrated during the severe slump of the Great Depression. The 
price of rubber fell from an average of 34 cents per picul in 1928 to 4.,95 cents in 
June 1932. Tin prices also dropped dramatically. Unemployed rubber planters and 
tin miners came to Singapore in search of work, but only joined scores of others 
who had been affected by the downturn. 45 Turnbull argues that this obvious and
susceptible reliance on the trade of primary products prompted the more capable 
Singapore Chinese to explore both secondary industries and banking. Some 
Chinese, for example, actually set up their own rubber factories in Sumatra and 
Dutch Borneo.46 The trend towards greater diversification of interests, however,
had actually begun before the crash, but was no doubt strengthened as a result of 
it. By the late 1920s, Chinese merchants in Singapore had already moved into 
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banking and had even begun to challenge European control over ent:tepot goods. 
The broad structure of the economy at this time, however, still basically 
conformed with the generalisations made by Hughes and Buchanan. 
Trade Versus Manufacturing 
The very basis of Singapore's trading success was, at the same time, a major 
explanation for the failure to develop any significant manufacturing. From the 
outset, the free port status of the island, which provided the attraction for trade 
and merchants, meant there was little incentive for local manufacturing. That is 
not to say there were not arguments in favour of removing or modifying free port 
status. Some colonial administrators saw in the imposition of duties a means of 
redressing the colony's tax imbalance and achieving a balnced budget.48 The 
political weight of the British merchants, however, was sufficient to cancel out 
this pressure. 
Although investment was concentrated in the tertiary sectors, some small­
scale, light industries were nevertheless developed. By the early 1930s there was 
food production (including biscuits, sweets, cooking oil), simple manufactures 
(shoes, clothing, tyres), the manufacture of construction materials (flooring tiles, 
wire, nails), pineapple-canning, tanneries, dye-works, and a small motor-car 
assembly plant.49 Primary processing of rubber and tin had also developed as a
complement to Singapore's role as a port for the export of these commodities. 
In the early 1930s, the opportunity existed for a re-evaluation of the 
importance of manufacturing to Singapore's economic development. In the wake 
of the Great Depression and the devastating effects of this on Singapore's 
entrepot trade, Sir Cecil Clementi, the Straits Governor-General and High 
Commissioner of the Malay States (1930-34), appointed two committees to 
examine the possibility of a joint customs union between the Straits Settlements 
and the Malay States. Of course, a customs union would have been to the 
advantage of manufacture in Singapore since it would have afforded important 
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protection, especially for industries in infancy. It was largely accepted that 
without protection no significant development of manufacturing industry was 
possible. Even so, according to the 1933-34 Commission, Singapore's relatively 
high labour costs placed doubt on the likely effectiveness of protection. Both 
committees, however, rejected the customs union proposal in the belief that the 
negative impact on entrepot trade due to protection far outweighed the 
prospective gains of such a policy for the manufacturing sector. SO This view
prevailed. 
Although the idea of a customs union was rejected, the British government 
decided in 1932 to impose the principle of imperial preference on Singapore (and 
other Straits ports) on the condition that it did not adversely effect entrepot 
trade. This measure was intended to defend imperial manufactures, produce and 
foodstuffs by means of duties. Quotas were also imposed on the importation of 
foreign, notably Japanese, textiles in 1934, representing a further incursion on 
free trade.51 Overall though, the idea of government intervention to foster the 
development of indigenous manufactures was rejected and the politically weak 
manufacturing interests could do little to effectively challenge the conclusions of 
the Reports. 
The importance of the early structural relationships in the Singapore 
economy to its long-term development cannot be over-emphasised. Whilst there 
were important changes in the activities undertaken within the different sectors 
of the economy, during the period 1900-1960 the structure of the Singapore 
economy displayed remarkable continuity. During this period, between 70% and 
75% of the workforce was employed in the tertiary sector, from which 80% to 
85% of Singapore's income was generated. By contrast, the proportion of the 
workforce employed in manufacturing during the same period ranged from 10% to 
15%, with this sector's contribution to domestic income varying between 5% and 
10%.52
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Puthucheary, and later Buchanan, have argued that the 'biaseff economic 
structure of Malaya and Singapore was in large part the consequence of the 
'structural immobility' of capital. Since so much domestic capital formation took 
place within foreign-owned companies, the use to which the profits of these 
companies were put was crucial. According to Puthucheary, however, the 
dominant characteristic of foreign capital was its inability to filter from one 
sector of the economy to another. This tendency was explained partly by the fact 
that many of these companies simply specialised in primary production,53 and
partly by the 'homing instinct' of foreign capital. 54 Profits of these firms had to
be exported back to the country of origin before they could be reinvested; a 
problem which, for lack of a capital market in Malaya, could not be 
circumvented. Owing to the inertia created by previous developments, 
opportunities to reinvest these profits in manufacturing industries did not exist 
anyway. More attractive opportunities were available in other countries. The 
offshoot of this structural immobility of foreign capital was, according to 
Puthucheary, that local capital investment tended therefore to be complementary 
to this pattern. It was both logical and profitable to follow the path set by foreign 
capital.55
It is not possible at this point to engage in a detailed critique of 
Puthucheary's analysis of capital investment in Singapore and Malaya. 
Nevertheless, the basic point which he makes, that there were structural 
impediments to the diversification of capital investment, is justified. Singapore 
was from the outset a very specialised economy and the pattern of capital 
investment by international capital in the formative years reflected a broader 
international division of labour which largely discounted major investment in 
secondary industry in either Malaya or Singapore. Added to this, however, is the 
consideration that the business practices of the Singapore Chinese themselves 
placed some constraint on the development of secondary industry. In the first 
place, Chinese capital accumulation was, with some exceptions, generally very 
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modest.56 This must have constituted an objective limit on the horizons of many
investors. Furthermore, especially in the early days, much of the accumulated 
wealth was expatriated to family in China. 
Post-Depression Developments 
Towards the end of the 1920s, and beyond, various developments raised questions 
about the wisdom of the heavy dependence of Singapore upon trade. It became 
increasingly apparent that whilst this dependence had made possible dramatic 
economic growth, it also rendered the Singapore economy susceptible to equally 
dramatic downturns in economic fortunes. The crash in commodity prices and 
generally falling demand of the Great Depression naturally had severe 
implications for Singapore. More than this though, emerging economic 
nationalism began to pose a threat to Singapore's trade. 
In 1928, the French colonial tariff of 1892 was amended, removing the 
previous most-favoured-nation treatment enjoyed by Singapore and other products 
of British colonies which kept duties at minimum rates. The result was a 
significant decline in Singapore's trade with French Indo-China.57 A more
significant decline in trade was that with the Dutch East Indies. During the 1930s 
the Dutch discarded free trade in response both to the Great Depression and the 
general pressure for economic nationalism. This change in policy was intended to 
stifle the inflow of Japanese goods (notably textiles), 58 promote self-sufficiency
for the colony in food, and to develop light labour-intensive industries as a way of 
checking unemployment. 59
In spite of the setback posed by the new Dutch policy, Singapore continued 
to play a key role as an entrepot for Dutch colonial produce - primarily as the port 
for Outer Provinces. GO However, Singapore's portion of the colony's import trade 
did fall significantly, particularly as Singapore was increasingly being bypassed in 
favour of direct trade with the West (especially in the area of industrial goods and 
manufactures).61 The trend towards economic nationalism, expressed in self-
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sufficiency in food production and industrialisation, was becoming generalised in 
the region. It was not confined to French Inda-China and the Dutch East Indies. 
Singapore's trade also suffered due to the tendency towards greater direct 
trade within Southeast Asia. It was noted by the 1933-34 Trade Commission that 
Archipelago trade in shells, sharks' fins, ivory, edible birds' nests and other goods 
was to a growing extent bypassing Singapore for Hong Kong and the Treaty Ports, 
while Burmese, Thai and Inda-Chinese rice and dried fish were being directly 
shipped in greater amounts to those Southeast Asian countries in which they were 
being consumed.62 The expansion of direct trade within the region owed much to
the development of shipping goods under a system known as 'bill of landing'. 
Under this arrangement the merchant or producer was able to sell produce in the 
outport and ship it to its destination with merely transhipment at Singapore. 
Whilst Singapore lost out in the distributive and processing trade as a result of this 
arrangement, it did receive some benefits in stevedoring and warehousing.63 The
general conclusion of the Trade Com mission was that the losses owing to direct 
trade were more than offset by the gains made by Singapore resulting from the 
general expansion of production in the region stimulated by this direct trade.64
Despite the Commission's conclusion that Singapore's reliance on entrepot 
trade still provided the basis for Singapore's economic expansion, and its rejection 
of positive discrimination in favour of manufacturing industries, it was apparent 
that Singapore's trading future would not be without problems of adjustment. In 
the immediate future, these problems were to be alleviated as a consequence of 
World War II. Its role as an entrepot for the Dutch East Indies was aided by the 
fall of Holland and the increase of American purchases of tin and rubber for 
stockpiling purposes. Singapore thus resumed its smelting of tin ores for the 
Dutch East Indies. The war had also given rise to a boom trade in foodstuffs and 
essential raw materials, particularly with the US, though not enough to prevent 
the general hardship which the war brought with it for Singapore. However, with 
the conclusion of World War II, during which time Singapore was occupied by 
Japanese forces, this unusual trade pattern was discontinued.65
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At a glance, little differed in the immediate post-war period in the pattern 
of Singapore's trade when compared with the pre-war pattern. The most 
important trade partner continued to be the Malay Peninsula. In 1949, 71 % of 
Malay's imports and 67% of its exports passed through Singapore, representing 
about one-third of Singapore's total trade.66 However, whilst entrepot trade
continued to lead Singapore's expansion, there were some important changes in its 
composition following the war which were to a large extent inspired by emerging 
nationalist movements throughout the region precipitated by Japanese 
imperialism. In particular, the traditional Straits produce trade, with the 
exception of rubber, steadily declined in the post-war years as a result of both the 
trend towards economic nationalism amongst Singapore's neighbours and the 
ambition of these countries to conserve their scarce foreign exchange.67
Fortunately for Singapore, this trend was handsomely compensated for by a 
significant growth in the volume of trade in such manufactured goods as textiles 
and machinery, as well as foodstuffs such as canned fish, condensed milk, 
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cigarettes and beverages. The post-war years also witnessed a rapid expansion in 
the trade of petroleum. Singapore came to assume the role of storage and 
distribution centre for petroleum refineries of the Middle East. 68
Once again then, Singapore's heavy dependence upon entrepot trade 
appeared to have undergone sufficient modification to counter the problems of 
economic nationalism. However, in the decades to follow the war it also became 
apparent that the biased economic structure of the economy, so heavily weighted 
in favour of trade, presented other problems. These could not be addressed simply 
by modifying the composition of enfrepot trade. 
The chief problem in the post-war period was unemployment. In the pre-war 
period unemployment was of no real consequence. This was to a considerable 
extent due to the tremendous mobility and transience of the Singapore 
population. Prior to the war, economic downturns had simply prompted a flow of 
emigrants out of the country and, in more prosperous times, the reverse. 
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Immigration restrictions introduced in the 1930s, combined with the social 
dislocation resulting from the war, had, however, produced a more stable 
population. 69 The Chinese in particular had become more settled. Whereas,
according to the 1931 Census, 36% of Singapore Chinese were Straits-born in 
1931, by 1947 the proportion was up to 60% and by the mid-1950s as high as 
70%. 7o The spectre of unemployment was also heightened by the age structure of
Singapore's more stable post-war population. According to the 1947 Census, 36% 
of the population was below 15 years of age. With the economy so dependent upon 
a sector so subject to fluctuating commodity prices, there seemed little certainty 
in the capacity of the economy to provide sufficient opportunities for future 
entrants to the workforce. 
As had been the case in the past, major decisions about whether, and by 
what means, the heavy reliance upon trade might be corrected were spared by 
circumstance in the 1950s. In fact, with the advent of the Korean War primary 
commodity prices soared and the total trade of Singapore rose from $2.4 billion in 
1949 to $4.6 billion in 1950. It peaked at $7 .6 billion in 1951 but subsequently 
dropped to $5.4 billion in 1952 and then to $4.3 billion in 1953. 71 As Cheng points
out, the short-lived prosperity of the boom actually served to highlight the 
fundamental instability of the economy in view of the heavy dependence upon 
commodity trading. 72 It certainly did not obscure the structural problem of
Singapore's economy. 
First Attempts at Industrialisation 
In view of the inevitable social and political problems which would stem from high 
unemployment, examining ways of developing the manufacturing sector became 
less a choice and more an imperative as Singapore entered the 1950s. This process 
was stimulated by moves towards independence. The struggle which ensued, both 
between the people of Singapore and the colonialists and amongst the competing 
successors, ultimately overshadowed and certainly conditioned the approach to the 
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question of industrialisation. Although some initial steps were taken during th.8 
1950s these were tentative and exploratory moves, major decisions about an 
industrial strategy being delayed until self-government. 
Table 2: Employment By Industry, 1947 and 1957 Censuses 
1947 1957 Change from 
Industry 1947 to 1957 
Total % Total % Total % 
All Industries 357,535 100.00 471,918 100.00 114,383 31.92 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Hunting & Fishing 25,457 7.12 29,278 6.20 3,821 3.34 
Rubber,Oil Palm 
& Coconut 3,629 1.02 3,146 0.67 -483 -0.42
Mining & Quarrying 1,247 0.35 1,598 0.34 351 0.31
Manufacturing 58,922 16.48 76,837 16.28 17,915 15.66 
Building & 
Construction 9,375 2.62 22,028 4.67 12,653 11.06 
Electricity, Gas 
& Water 750 0.21 4,038 0.86 3,288 2.87 
Commerce 83,049 23.23 135,157 28.64 52,108 45.56 
Transport, Storage 
& Communication 52,976 14.82 49,434 10.48 -3,542 -3.10
Services 110,374 30.87 148,306 31.43 37,932 33.16 
Others 11,756 3.29 2,096 20.96 -9,660 -8.44
Source: S.C. Chua, Chief Statistician and Superintendent of Census, Report on 
the Census of Population 1957, Singapore: Government Printer, 1964, 
p.84.
According to data for 1947, the amount of employment provided by the 
manufacturing sector at the time was modest. As shown in Table 2, only 16.5% of 
the total employed workforce was engaged in this sector. The majority of these 
workers were employed in industries making use of raw materials from the region, 
especially rubber products, and those which had sprung up owing to the natural 
protection afforded them, such as food and beverages. A smaller number of 
workers were engaged in engineering and machinery work servicing the tin, rubber 
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and oil industries. 73 fadeed, consistent with the early structure outlined abo�..-e,
the small manufacturing sector was primarily geared towards meeting limited 
needs of the domestic market and to a significant degree was based on 
complementing Singapore's entrepot role. There was, therefore, presumably 
considerable scope for expansion within the sector. 
Despite the theoretical possibilities for the expansion of Singapore's 
manufacturing sector, the experience of the 1950s suggested that any growth 
potential the sector might have would not occur without a concerted attempt by 
authorities to nurture and develop industry. Although the value of output of 
manufacturing industries was estimated to be approximately $420 million in 
1956,74 detailed data from which GDP rates could be calculated were not
collected until 1959.75 Again, then, we are reliant upon employment data to 
ascertain the extent and nature of economic growth in the build-up to self­
government. Though this method has obvious limitations, 76 we do nevertheless
get some idea of the general trends between 1947 and 1957, the year of 
Singapore's next census of population. The data from the two censuses reveal, for 
example, that although employment provided by the manufacturing sector was 
17,915 higher in 1957, the sector's contribution to total employment had fallen 
from 16.5% to 16.3% (see Table 2). The greatest employment gains came from 
the commerce sector which employed 52,108 or 45.56% more people in 1957 than 
in 1947. This sector's share of total employment thus rose from 23.2% to 28.7% in 
this period. In 1957 then, the Singapore economy appeared more rather than less 
structurally dependent upon entrepot trade for expansion.77
Of the employment gains made within the manufacturing sector, the most 
significant came from footwear and wearing apparel, paper products and printing 
and publishing, food, and non-metalic mineral products industries. All these 
industries were leading employers in 194 7 so their gains did not suggest any 
qualitatively new developments in manufacturing. 
The first serious re-examination of the structure of the Singapore economy 
was embodied in a report compiled in 1955 by the International Bank for 
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Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). This was done at the request· of the 
governments of Singapore, the Federation of Malaya and Britain. The IBRD 
mission drew attention to the " ... age pattern and increasingly settled character of 
the population" and the consequent likelihood of an increasing labour force growth 
rate. 78 Industrialisation was underlined as the panacea, especially since Singapore
lacked any significant agricultural sector, or the possibility of one. A national 
market for Singapore and Malaya in which there would be a movement from 
naturally sheltered industries to those competing with imports, as well as a shift 
from small to large-scale enterprises were advocated in the report.79
In the closing stages of colonial government in Singapore, some measures 
were adopted as a result of the IBRD Mission Report. In 1957 an Industrial 
Promotion Board was created, 80 and in 1959 legislation providing tax relief for
pioneer industries was introduced.81 The Industrial Promotion Board was unable
to achieve results in attracting investment. The absence of necessary funds and 
staff to carry out the all-encompassing responsibilities entrusted it through the 
legislation curbed any potential the Board might have had. 82 The government
simply lacked the political will to seriously carry forward the industrialisation 
programme. Its immediate concerns at this point were not so much economic as 
political. Singapore's strategic location was still of importance to Britain's 
general security interests and energy was devoted to safeguarding these after 
colonisation. 
In 1958, the then Minister for Commerce and Industry in the Labour Front­
UMNO coalition government of Malaya, J.M. Jumabhoy, approached a Colombo 
Plan Industrial Advisor, F.J. Lyle, to compile a report on the possible industrial 
direction open to Singapore. The report, tabled in the Legislative Assembly on 15 
January, 1959, emphasised unification with Malaya as fundamental to the 
prospects of Singapore's industry. 83 A common market, identical tariff protection
and inducements to industry were all argued as essential.84 In keeping with the
IBRD Report, Lyle stressed the importance of the provision of capital funds to 
industry. 
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The concern in both reports with the formation of a common domestic 
market, and the measures appropriate to its exploitation, were grounded on the 
assumption that only through an import-substitution industrialisation strategy 
could significant industrialisation take place. 
Even though no major decisions had been made by this time, it was evident 
on the eve of the People's Action Party election success in 1959 that there was 
already considerable awareness of, and desire for, industrialisation in Singapore. 
With the PAP having heavily campaigned on a platform which included the 
creation of a 'united Malayan nation', there had also evolved a certain context 
within which Singapore's industrial strategy would be decided. 
Conclusion 
We have seen in this discussion how Singapore's peculiar historical circumstances 
gave rise to an economy heavily dependent upon entrepot trade and related 
services. Though there have been important changes to the economy since the 
time of Raffles, by 1959 the basic structure of the economy still reflected this 
legacy. Trade alone still accounted for as much as one-third of the Gross 
Domestic Product (at factor cost).85 The heavy dependence upon trade, however,
had facilitated very rapid economic growth and also promoted the development of 
a wide range of tertiary industries. In spite of these positive achievements, 
circumstances following World War TI in particular necessitated a re-examination 
of the island's development strategy. With a more stable and younger Singapore 
population emerging, it was apparent that almost exclusive reliance upon entrepot 
trade would involve serious social and political consequences. The need to 
generate secure employment became a matter of urgent consideration. 
Recognising the need to restructure an economy is of course no guarantee of 
the capacity to do it. Apart from the distraction of Singapore's political struggle 
for Independence, which came to be correctly viewed both by the British and the 
Singaporeans as primary to any restructuring, there were other constraints on 
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immediate action to generate industrialisation. In support and in consequence of 
Singapore's economic history a specific class structure had evolved which featured 
a well-developed and diversified range of merchant classes, both domestic and 
foreign. Domestic classes had for the most part developed patterns of capital 
accumulation which, whether in fields of trade or finance, were basically similar 
to and complementary with international capital. This was not necessarily due to 
any logical compulsion stemming from the universal character of international 
capital. However, given the historical role assumed by Singapore in the Southeast 
Asian region on behalf of British and European capital, the most profitable 
opportunities for Chinese capital tended to lay outside the manufacturing sector. 
Domestic-based capital did invest more heavily in this sector after World War II, 
and has successfully competed with international capital in banking and finance. 
The fact nevertheless was that as Singapore approached self government it lacked 
a strong industrial bourgeoisie, either of domestic or foreign origin. This would 
unavoidably have important implications for any government which was to assume 
power in 1959. Steps would have to be taken to nurture such a class and/or the 
state would be required to adopt public policies to compensate for the lack of an 
industrial bourgeoisie. Certainly the state would in all likelihood have an 
important role to play in any strategy for industrialisation. 
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PART Il : ESTABIJSHING THE POLITICAL PRE-CONDITIONS 
The way in which historical and political developments unfolded after World War II 
was to have a profound and lasting impact on Singapore's attempts to 
industrialise. The failure of bourgeois political forces_ to acknowledge and 
accommodate the depth of anti-colonial sentiment of the masses provided the 
opportunity for more radical elements to emerge triumphant during colonial 
disengagement. The People's Action Party (PAP), a convenient marriage of the 
left wing labour movement and, in British eyes, a more respectable group of 
middle class professionals, thus overwhelmed their opponents in the 1959 
elections. 
Despite the resounding electoral success of the PAP, serious differences 
underlay the alliance which characterised this Party. These were not contained 
for long after the PAP came to government. In the ensuing struggle for executive 
control, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his middle class cohorts exploited the 
Party's formal commitment to political merger with Malaya to force a showdown 
with the left. This precipitated the left's exodus and the formation in 1963 of a 
separate political party, th·e Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front). 
Executive power was subsequently employed by the PAP to extend its 
influence to all spheres of social activity, enabling it to establish control over all 
political groups. A virtual 'state party' emerged which not only entrenched the 
PAP, it also conditioned economic and industrial policy which, by this time, was 
closely tied with the fortunes of political merger. The PAP's import-substitution 
strategy was to a significant extent premised on access to Malaya's markets and 
the PAP had co-ordinated the apparatus of the state to support this programme. 
The exodus of the left from the PAP meant that as well as being relatively 
independent of direct political pressure from capital, the PAP was also 
unconstrained now by the demands of the labour movement. Ultimately, of 
course, the Party could not disregard the aspirations of the masses and, indeed, at 
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no time did it abandon its commitment to fundamental social reforms in housing 
and education. With this relative separation from both labour and capital, 
however, the PAP defined for itself the means by which social reforms would be 
achieved and exercised state power to support and justify that definition. This 
included the dissemination of a coherent ideology, one which reflected the PAP's 
objective need to derive its political legitimacy from its absence of close 
identification with any particular political force. It also reflected the world view 
of the leadership which, by virtue of its middle class and largely professional 
background, tended to view the art of good government as at least as much a 
technical as a political one. 
Successful as the PAP may have been in dealing with the question of its own 
political survival following the formal Party split in 1963, these circumstances had 
also led to heavy reliance upon merger with the Federation of Malaysia to solve 
Singapore's economic problems. By 1965, however, the merger proved untenable 
for a host of political reasons and it was evident that Lee's vision of industrial 
expansion through access to a common market had little prospect of fruition. The 
consequent separation thus not only posed new domestic political challenges for 
the PAP, it also undermined the import-substitution strategy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
AND INDUSTRIALISATION 
Introduction 
By the late 1950s, broad structural changes to the Singapore economy rendered a 
policy of industrialisation desirable. A decade later this policy had brought 
remarkable results. The explanation for this, however, is not simply that the 
government made technically correct economic choices. Such an interpretation 
takes for granted a variety of specific political processes and struggles which 
were necessary precursors of the economic policies enacted by the Lee 
government in the 1960s. In particular, these processes and struggles led to the 
formation of a special form of technocratic capitalist state. The PAP, which 
ultimately became a state party, was not in any sense a typical bourgeois party. 
Rather, owing to the peculiar class structure of colonial Singapore and the 
contradictions characterising colonial disengagement, the PAP state which 
emerged was capable of submitting both labour and capital to a broad social and 
economic plan. 
The roots of the political struggles which produced this technocratic 
capitalist state were formed well before self-government. Especially following 
World War Il, the labour movement in Singapore asserted itself as a fundamental 
force in the island's politics. The radical leadership of this movement, the product 
of a harsh colonial regime, did much to. organise and inspire anti-colonial 
sentiment and working class consciousness even though it operated outside formal 
political processes until the formation of the PAP in 1954. The PAP represented a 
working relationship between the radically-led labour movement and a group of 
middle class nationalists. Historical circumstances brought these quite different 
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social forces together in a joint effort to secure office in a self-governing 
Singapore. The political weakness of the domestic bourgeois classes and their 
total inability to acknowledge the strength of anti-colonial sentiment had 
contributed to the merging of these forces. From the outset, therefore, there 
were certain contradictions inherent in the PAP. 
Though the PAP's alliance of forces was sufficiently solid in the period 1954-
1959 to ensure a resounding electoral success, significant internal Party 
developments already under way were to have serious implications for post-1959 
Singapore. A battle for control of the Party's executive resulted in favour of the 
Lee Kuan Yew-led group of middleclass professionals. This afforded t�e group 
important tactical advantages in the inevitable post-1959 build-up of intra-Party 
tension and conflict. The delicate and tenuous balance of power in favour of Lee's 
group was eventually converted into supreme Party and state power. 
Although united in the commitment to a programme of industrialisation, the 
form that this would take and the associated implications for labour proved 
contentious issues for the PAP government. Questions about wage levels and the 
degree and nature of government intervention in the industrialisation process 
highlighted the Party's internal divisions. Differences over industrial policy, 
however, were but one area of dispute. 
The point to emphasise is that the political path taken by the victors in this 
internal power struggle had direct implications for industrial policy. Lee and his 
colleagues did not share the left's commitment to an industrial programme 
involving a transfer of economic and political power to labour. Instead, they held 
to the notion that economic and industrial policy was essentially a rational rather 
than political process, best decided in isolation from sectional or class 
considerations. As a result, whilst the PAP introduced extensive social 
programmes in housing and education on the one hand, on the other its labour and 
industrial policies were much less in keeping with the Party's broad commitments 
of 1959. The capacity to carry out such policies however was only due to the 
---------- - - - - - ---------�-�---�-�-
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unfolding of a complex set of social and political circumstances which had their 
origins in pre-1959 Singapore. 
Post-World War II Rise and Fall of the Labour Movement 
Radical and nationalist sentiments were present in Singapore even before World 
War IT although admittedly in a very embryonic form. Nevertheless, it was during 
this period that roots were laid for a radically-led anti-colonial force. Communist 
presence within the labour movement actually dates from 1925 with activists from 
the Main School, a Hainanese night school formed by agents of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) to promote anti-colonial and anti-capitalist 
propaganda.1 However, it was not until after the adoption in 1934 of a united
front policy based on worker support by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 
formed in 1930, that organised labour asserted a real influence.2 From this point
on, the Singapore labour movement and the MCP played an increasingly important, 
if occasionally interrupted, role in domestic politics. 
Being outlawed, the MCP sought to tap dissent and dissatisfaction amongst 
the working class under cover of various leftist and nationalist organisations. In 
the 1930s the MCP was particularly successful in getting a foot in the door of the 
student movement and from the beginning sought to link the labour and student 
movements. 3
In the labour movement, the MCP operated through the Malayan General 
Labour Union (GLU).4 By 1941 the Singapore GLU, by far the strongest branch of
the Malayan GLU, boasted a membership of 70 unions compared to a total of 51 
registered unions in Singapore. Membership, however, was concentrated in small 
workshops engaged in unskilled and semi-skilled work. The most significant 
sectors of the economy were not under GLU control.5 Importantly though, as with
the student movement, organisational links had been established which would 
provide a foundation for M CP penetration. 
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Arresting the labour movement in general and the influence of the MC.i? on 
the labour movement in particular was a top priority of the Singapore 
authorities. By 1940, however, it had become apparent that banishment and 
imprisonment of union officials was insufficient to curtail these developments. 
Institutional control over unions was thus legislated under the Trade Unions 
Ordinance of 1940, a measure intended to create less politicised unions by 
outlawing non-economic functions and regulating worker-employee relations.6
Before the legislation could be tested, however, Singapore was under Japanese 
occupation and organised labour was completely dismantled. 7
The force of international opinion against colonialism and the different 
mood of Singapore's more stable population after the war could not be ignored by 
the British.8 In 1946, under the Malay Union Scheme, Singapore was separated
from Malaya and declared a Crown Colony.9 In part, this decision reflected
British awareness of Malay fears that Singapore represented a challenge to Malay 
political ascendency.10 The decision to separate Singapore also reflected the
special strategic and geopolitical importance of the island to British military and 
commercial interests.11 Concern for such interests accounts for the cautious and
drawn-out process of constitutional change by which Singapore arrived at self­
government. 
Following recommendations from the Provisional Advisory Council set up 
after the war, a Legislative Council was inaugurated in 1948. This comprised six 
elected seats and 16 ex-officio and nominated seats. In the subsequent elections 
of 1951, the number of elected seats was increased to nine out of a total of 25. It 
was not until 1955 when 25 of the 32 seats for a new Legislative Assembly were 
elected that Singapore effectively ceased to be a Crown Colony. Even so, actual 
self-government did not eventuate until 1959. Although this constitutional 
process did promote the formation of political parties, those that contested the 
first two elections were never interested in or capable of representing the 
interests and aspirations of the Singapore masses. This early constitutional 
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process and the parties involved in it were remote from such concerns. The 
Singapore capitalist class was unable to form a party of any substance largely 
because of its close economic integration with colonial capital. It saw its future, 
as its past, tied to the fortunes of colonial trade and associated activities. This 
perception discounted any enthusiasm for a swift transfer of political power to 
Singapore. Consequently, the most significant political developments after the 
war occurred outside the formal political system, notably within the labour 
movement. Though government and employers were able to temporarily suppress 
such a tendency through harsh institutional means, the radicalisation of the labour 
force was ensured by the continued failure of the authorities to introduce 
necessary reforms. 
Circumstances after the war enabled the MCP to play a crucial role in the 
revival of the labour movement. Conditions for the working class, already 
miserable, further deteriorated: wage levels were reduced in real terms due to 
steep inflationary price rises on nearly all consumer goods;12 unemployment was
high; clothing and food shortages were widespread;13 housing was overcrowded
and filthy;14 the health of workers was poor.15 The basis for working class
discontent was therefore very concrete. At the same time, the MCP's prestige 
amongst the masses was high due to its role in leading the resistence to Japanese 
occupation. The British Military Administration (BMA), temporarily established to 
restore normality to the colony, actually required the co-operation of the MCP to 
effectively re-establish British rule.16 The British were still concerned about the
MCP/labour relationship, but the extent to which either labour or the MCP could 
be repressed was conditioned, initially, by the fear of insurrection and, to a lesser 
extent, the sheer popularity of workers' demands.17 When it could though, the
BMA acted with vigour to curb labour and the MCP .18 The subsequent civilian 
government, set up in 1946, perceived both the opportunity and necessity to act 
even more vigorously. 
I I 
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On 25 October 1945 the Singapore GLU was formally re-established under 
the leadership of the MCP.19 Almost immediately strikes involving seamen,
dockers and employees of the Singapore Traction Company took place.20
Although gains from these particular strikes were meagre, this was an omen for 
government and capital. A new phase of militancy was under way. In contrast 
with the pre-war position, the Singapore GLU was now capable of disrupting the 
key sectors of the economy, a fact underlined in 1947 with the virtual crippling of 
industry.21 At the time, the GLU claimed control of three-quarters of Singapore's
entire organised labour force.22 Militancy was not confined to the Chinese
proletariat either; it characterised �age and salary earners generally. The 
Singapore Clerical Union, for example, submitted a comprehensive list of demands 
in September 1946 for better conditions. 23
Up until early 194 7, labour militancy had succeeded in restoring wages to 
pre-war levels and brought about improved conditions of employment. Thereafter, 
however, the labour movement found itself on the defensive, fighting to retain 
these gains.24 An increased government determination to destroy the labour
movement was prompted by two factors. First, in the wake of massive disruptions 
to industry in February, employer agitation for stronger measures mounted. 
Second, the government itself became more concerned about the threat which 
organised labour constituted to its political control. 
Measures adopted in 194 7 by the government to control labour included the 
application of the 1940 Trade Unions Ordinance.25 From March, the government
began registering unions and asserting control over the use of union funds. By the 
end of 194 7 this supervision - had proven a serious problem for the Singapore 
Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU), as the SGLU was now known,26 invariably
curtailing union capacity to co-ordinate and support strike action. 27 The
government also encouraged the development of unions independent of the SFTU 
in an effort to break its hold.28 These measures were backed up by an 
intensification of intimidatory tactics, notably through arrest and banishment of 
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union activists. The government's strategy of encouraging open confrontation and 
conflict with the labour movement, however, was yet to be given its fullest 
expression. 
The hardened position of employers from early 1947 was reflected in the 
fact that of the 29 strikes which occurred in Singapore for the last nine months of 
1947, 13 were for the re-establishment of dismissed workers, six were in 
opposition to wage cuts and only five were for wage increases.29 Employers were
re-asserting discipline, not just cutting wages. 30 Employers also appeared to have
improved their position vis-a-vis the government too. This was demonstrated by, 
amongst other things, the successful agitation for the removal of S.P. Garrett in 
June as the Assistant Trade Union Advisor because of his labour sympathies.31
The government/employer offensive was motivated by a coincidence of 
interests, the former concerned about the political hegemony of labour and the 
latter about the economic effects of wage gains and stoppages. Primarily through 
the legal system, however, a number of significant blows were dealt to the union 
movement. As a result, the average number of days lost due to strikes in 1947 
was down to 4% per person, compared with 10% per person for 1946. Total man­
days lost were down from 1,173,000 to 205,000.32
The weakened capacity of the SFTU to support strike action in turn limited 
the capacity of individual unions to successfully strike. This, combined with the 
official intimidation in industrial stoppages, undermined the will of workers, 
especially when strikes were more directly concerned with SFTU hegemony per se 
than wage levels and employment conditions.33 Sensing a declining morale
amongst workers, the government's provocation of open conflict with the labour 
movement was increased in 1948.34 With the labour movement in disarray, the
final assault was delivered when Trade Union Ordinance Amendments were passed 
on 31 May which in effect banned the PMFTU, the SFTU and the state 
federations. The SFTU and the MCP thus went underground and in June the 
Singapore and Malaya governments had declared states of Emergency following an 
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outbreak of a.rmed revolt within Malaya.35 The options of the MCP had been so
curtailed that by now it had abandoned peaceful agitation in favour of an armed 
rural strategy. 36
The rise and fall of the SFTU and the MCP in Singapore in the immediate 
post-war years demonstrated two crucial points. First, the working class was 
capable of militant action provided it had strong leadership. Second, the 
determination of the government to destroy this leadership and prevent a militant 
labour force was absolute. What the government would eventually discover, 
however, was that the radicalisation of the labour movement was not just the 
instigation of communist agitators but the result of concrete conditions. In its 
close alignment with capital the government was unable and/or unwilling to 
ameliorate these underlying conditions. 
1948-1953: Increased Repression and the Failure of Constitutional Reform 
The Emergency period involved more than just an attempt to suppress 
communism. Leftist and nationalist organisations generally were attacked. 
Almost all political activities, save those of the Legislative Council, were 
outlawed or discouraged. Political meetings other than those for the Legislative 
Council elections were banned, left wing parties were proscribed and union 
meetings and leaders were subject to harassment by the Special Branch.37
Arrests certainly were not confined to communists. Between 1948 and 1953 
approximately 1,200 Singaporeans were arrested under Emergency regulations.38
For employers, the Emergency regulations gave further impetus to their 
already initiated offensive against labour. With most of the SFTU affiliates out of 
the way by 1950, and the government uncompromising in its opposition to labour 
militance, employers were able to cut wages in many industries, withdraw 
previously granted privileges and use the threat of redundancy to intimidate 
workers.39 Thus, as employers enjoyed boom conditions arising from the Korean
war, workers actually suffered a deterioration in living standards. 
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During the Emergency period, the government did allow the formation of 
labour unions but it made sure that such organisations would not only be incapable 
of affecting increased wages or improved conditions but they would be 
depoliticised too. In fact, the government encouraged the formation of a new 
central labour organisation as a means of safeguarding against any effective and 
politicised labour movement.40 On 20 May 1951 the Singapore Trade Union
Congress (STUC) was established with 24 affiliates and an estimated membership 
of 25,000, support coming mainly from Army Civil Services' Union (ACSU) and the 
Naval Base Labour Union (NBLU).41 The leadership of this Congress came mainly
from English-speaking Indian clerical workers who had similar objectives to the 
Singapore Labour Party (SLP).42 Government influence was sufficient, however,
to render the STUC a co-ordinating body and to delete references in its list of 
objectives to the right to call strikes or lock-outs. The government also insisted 
that STUC officials could not hold executive positions in any political organisation 
and refused to allow government employees to come under the STUC.43
The STUC was never able to effectively represent labour. In the first place, 
by agreeing to premise activities on the acceptance of the existing employment 
system, the Congress was certain to be more institutionally bound than the SFTU 
was. Second, partly due to the preparedness of the STUC to collaborate with the 
government in such a way, and partly because of the seemingly opportunistic 
nature of much of the STUC leadership,44 the bulk of Singapore's non-English
speaking workers never took the Congress seriously. Third, as an organisation, the 
STUC was inefficient and without a strong financial base. 45 Finally, the STUC
was totally unsuccessful in improving wages or conditions for its members. As a 
result, the majority of Singapore's workers remained either poorly or totally 
unorganised before 1954.46 What little support the STUC did enjoy was soon
alienated as the Congress became the battle field for competing factions of the 
SLP.47 By mid-1953 these self-destructive internal dynamics had negated
whatever marginal significance the STUC may ever have had for the labour 
movement. For the working class the political vacuum remained. 
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Whilst outright repression of the labour movement was the British tactic in 
the short term, the longer term plan was to promote a two-party parliamentary 
system with a gradual transfer of power to a trustworthy successor. The 
restrictive nature of the early elections had the effect, however, of producing 
parties which were so divorced from the masses that only in a superficial sense 
were they playing the role expected of them. Automatic registration was not 
introduced until 1955 and compulsory voting in 1959.48 Before this, it was
possible for parties to enjoy electoral success in spite of being aloof from the 
masses. This did little to develop channels by which discontent could be 
effectively managed by the authorities. 
Singapore's first political party was the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) 
which was inaugurated on 21 December 1945.49 The MDU was a leftist, anti­
colonial party which initially sought its objective of a united Singapore and Malaya 
through constitutional means. This was abandoned after events suggested the 
government was insincere in affecting a quick transfer of power.50 The MDU
comprised essentially of middle class, intellectual support, though it also had a 
close association with the co-operative and labour movements.51 It voluntarily
dissolved itself on 24 June 1948 in anticipation of government harassment owing 
to the Emergency. 
The first political party to be represented in the Legislative Council was the 
Singapore Progressive Party (PP). The PP was formed in 194 7 by the leaders of 
the Straits Chinese British Association and the Singapore Association to protect 
mercantile interests.52 In contrast wit;h the MDU, the PP was opposed to
immediate merger with Malaya, a position related to its fear of Malay political 
dominance. 53 The leaders of this political party were also predominantly English­
educated, many graduates of British universities. Unlike the MDU leaders, 
however, these people were not anxious for the demise of colonialism. The close 
association of the Party with Westernised professional-mercantile interests 
negated any militant anti-colonialism. Due to the limited size and 
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representativeness of the electorates this didn't matter. The PP won three of the 
six elected sea ts in 1943 and six of the nine in 1951. 54 The Party actually enjoyed
no appeal outside the immediate interest groups it was established to represent. 
If the transparent sectional interest base of the Party did not set it apart from the 
rest of the community, the close collaboration that its leaders had traditionally 
conducted with the colonial authorities certainly did. To the bulk of the 
population, the PP was simply a party of colonial stooges. 
This inability to build a broader social base was a function of the historic 
integration of British and Singapore capital. The absence of any economically 
independent domestic bourgeoisie fostered a high degree of political and cultural 
affinity with the British amongst the privileged classes of Singapore. 
By the time of the 1951 Legislative Council elections, the PP was challenged 
by the Singapore Labour Party (SLP). The SLP was inaugurated on 1 September 
1948 and led primarily by English-speaking Indians who were inspired by the 
British Labour Party model of social democracy.55 The Party had links with
various white-collar unions and its expressed intention was to develop a base in 
the labour movement. Its platform called for independence through merger with 
Malaya and included such pro-labour policies as a minimum wage, unemployment 
insurance and amendments to the Trade Unions Ordinance so that unions could 
participate in politics. The relationship between this party and the labour 
movement was nevertheless a tenuous one; its English-educated leaders were 
closely associated with the British attempts to sponsor apolitical unions as an 
alternative to the SFTU, despite the Party platform. Its union base was very 
narrow.56
Although the SLP enjoyed some success at the 1951 City Council 
elections, 57 by December 1952 intense personality-based faction fighting had
effectively destroyed the Party. The SLP was a decidedly opportunistic party 
with ideology or policy playing little part in its divisions. It failed to get any real 
foothold in the labour movement. 
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Clearly neither the PP nor the SLP were genuinely nationalist since they did 
not represent or articulate the cause for independence. Instead, they devoted 
their energies almost exclusively to the electoral process, never attempting to 
develop broadly-based membership or support. Both parties were content to 
operate within the strict confines of debate and constitutional change determined 
by the British. Owing to the narrow social bases characterising these parties, 
neither could have survived in the longer term.59
In these elections, the government's experiment had failed to attract either 
public interest or to encourage genuine political parties which could represent or 
ascertain the aspirations of the masses. Organisational links with them were 
absent and understandably the Chinese-educated, as well as a minority of English­
educated, simply regarded the Legislative Council elections as irrelevant. Thus, 
although the colonial government succeeded between 1948 and 1953 in quelling 
opposition, it failed to build a political framework to include the real, potential 
centres of social power in Singapore. As a result, there were no sustainable 
institutional safeguards against radical politics. 
The Re-Emergence of Radical Politics and the Formation of the PAP 
The effectiveness of the authorities' campaign after 1948 to wipe out left wing 
leadership and the unchallenging nature of the political parties to have gained 
representation in the Legislative Council gave Singapore the superficial 
appearance of political calm by 1953. By this time, the Federation government 
had also clearly gained the ascendency over the MCP in the jungle war. It was 
under these circumstances that political repression was relaxed somewhat and a 
number of political detainees released in 1953. The British government was also 
keen to allow greater freedom for 'legitimate' trade union activity, probably in 
recognition that suppression of this had contributed to the failure of the political 
experiment to reproduce a two-party system akin to the British. In 1954 the 
authorities also accepted the recommendations of the Rendel Report which called 
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for a more significant transfer of power from the colonial government to a 
Legislative Assembly.60 These new conditions were to give expression to a new
era of radical politics in Singapore which had been fomenting between 1948 and 
1953 beneath the appearance of political calm. Strong and effective leadership 
quickly emerged in the traditional arenas of radical politics, the student and 
labour organizations. This provided the basis of support for what would become 
Singapore's fi��- 1?--�ne nationalist, mass political party, the People's Action
Party (PAP). 
Just as the British had come to a re-assessment by 1953, the defeats in the 
jungles had also necessitated a reconsideration of strategy by the MCP. More 
thought was given to subversion in the cities. The imminence of self-government 
with the acceptance of the Rendel Constitutional Commission Report on 22 
February and the relaxation of restrictions on trade union activities announced in 
the Report further convinced the MCP that an urban strategy of peaceful 
agitation was now an appropriate response to the changed objective conditions.61
As explained earlier, the influence of the MCP within the Chinese schools 
was founded on deep, historical roots. Although much of this leadership was 
removed between 1948 and 1953,62 these roots were simply too extensive to
totally erase. In any case, the systematic discrimination against Chinese culture 
and education facilitated an atmosphere of discontent and rebellion in Chinese 
schools. 63 The 1949 victory of the CCP also increased Chinese pride and
consciousness within Singapore, weakened the influence of the KMT supporters 
within Chinese schools and generally raised anti-colonial feeling.64
The depth of popular opposition within the Chinese schools to government 
policy, and the extent to which this could be mobilised, was first demonstrated in 
1954. The government's decision to force 2,500 Singapore youths to engage in 
part-time National Service provoked widespread protest.65 This culminated in the
so called May 13 Incident in which violence erupted between protesting students 
occupying the Chinese High School and the Chung Cheng High School and the Riot 
- --- -- -�--c---- - - - ---��------, 
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Squad.66 In the wake of this incident the government rounded up 28 suspected
MCP front leaders, including eight students.67 This was followed by unsuccessful
attempts to pressure the Chinese School Management Committees to assert 
greater discipline over students and closer political screening of teachers.68 No
closures were attempted because the government feared that this would be 
interpreted by the public as an attack on Chinese education per se.69
Although the students failed to force the government to reverse its decision 
over National Service, the May 13 Incident achieved a great deal for the student 
movement and also represented the first major act of public defiance since 1948. 
Out of the struggle which ensued, an inter-school union, the Singapore Chinese 
Middle School Student Unions (SCMSSU), was formed which would facilitate 
greater co-ordination within the student movement. Furthermore, contacts 
between Chinese school students and English-educated undergraduates from the 
University of Malaya Socialist Club and the Federation of Pan-Malayan Students 
were strengthened.70 This represented an important broadening of the anti­
colonial base within the student movement, and indeed, from this point on, the 
;student movement came to assume a central place in Singapore's politics. Most 
important, the student movement contributed greatly to the interpretation of the 
struggle against capital as inseparable from the struggle against colonialism. 71
Simultaneous with the resurgence of the student movement during 1953-4, 
radical leadership within the trade unions was also being rebuilt. A new 
generation of young Chinese-educated militants, many of whom were MCP cadres, 
quickly welded the labour movement into a strong and radical force. Two 
Chinese-educated leaders were particularly prominent in this process - Fong Swee 
Suan and Lim Chin Siong. Fong, who had been expelled from the Chinese High 
School in 1952 because of his political activities, had risen from the position of 
bus conductor to be General-Secretary of the Singapore Bus Workers' Union 
(SBWU) by 1954. By 1955, the diligent Fong and his associates had brought all the 
10,000 workers in the six Chinese bus companies under the SBWU wing.72 Lim,
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also formerly active within the student movement, became Secretary-General in 
May 1954 of the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' Unions (SFSWU) which had 
been formed just a month earlier.73 Within 10 months of its founding, SFSWU
membership rose from 200 to more than 30,000.74
Though the SFSWU and SBWU were two of the most significant radically-led 
unions to emerge between 1954 and 1955, they were not the only ones. Rather, a 
whole group of unions came together to form what was known as the 'Middle Road 
Group' which met informally on the premises of the SFSWU in Middle Road. The 
Middle Road Group soon came to control unions in many complete sectors of 
industry and the public services. 75 By 1955, the SFSWU, which came to be the
pivot of the Middle Road Group, included 30 affiliated unions. 76 Success in
building up membership was due to the demonstrated ability of unions to bring 
immediate and tangible improvements in wages and conditions for members 
through strike action.77 But as with the SFTU, the Middle Road GrOl.{p viewed its
struggle for better conditions as part of the wider and more fundamental task of 
liberation from colonial rule in Singapore and Malaya. 
An important feature of the new association of unions belonging to the 
Middle Road Group was that it included both Chinese and English-educated 
militants on its 12-person executive committee. Though the latter was clearly a 
minority force, this new alignment signified the broadening of the anti-colonial 
movement in terms of social class and ethnic composition.78
As was intended, a number of new conservative and moderate reformist 
groups also sprang up in this climate. Most important of such forces was a small 
group of English-educated intellectuals whose earliest political roots can be 
traced to a 1949 discussion club of Malayan students in London known as the 
Malayan Forum.79 Through the Malayan Forum, Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee,
Toh Chin Chye and K.M. Byrne met and exchanged views.80 This group believed it
could play a vital and necessary role in Singapore's political future. In a 1950 
address to his fellow Malayans, Lee Kuan Yew enunciated the necessity of an elite 
core of middle class leaders: 
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. . . If we, who can become the most privileged part of the local 
population under British rule, openly declare that British imperialism 
must go, the effect will be immediate. But if we do not give 
leadership, it will come from the other ranks of society, and if these 
leaders attain power, as they will with the support of the masses, we 
shall find that we, as a class, have merely changed masters ... (But) 
our trump-card is that responsible British leaders realize that 
independence must and will come to Malaya and that therefore, it 
will be better to hand Malaya to leaders sympathetic to the British 
Commonwealth, and what is more importan�, willing to remain in 
the sterling area. 81
Lee evidenced quite early then not just his repugnance for communism, 82 but also
an uncanny appreciation of the scope that would exist to exploit the political 
realities of Singapore. 
Upon Lee's return to Singapore he soon became involved in politics. In 1951 
he aided J. Laycock and C.C. Tan in canvassing votes for the PP candidates in the 
Legislative election.83 Lee was not long in discarding the PP in searching for a
more solid social base for political support. Through his work as a legal advisor to 
English-speaking government employees, Lee started building up support within 
trade unions. As legal advisor to the Postal and Telecommunication Uniformed 
Staff Union, which went out on strike in May 1952, Lee was able to win support at 
the expense of SLP associates and also came into contact with S. Rajaratnam, 
President of the Singapore Union of Journalists.84 Lee's union work also exposed
him to the grievences of the Malayan public servants whose resentment of colonial 
racial discrimination was further fueled in 1952 when the government decided to 
pay special expatriation allowances to European officials. Lee, Goh and Byrne 
formed a Council of Joint Action (CJA) comprising representatives from 21 
government unions which successfully pressured the authorities to make major 
concessions to low-paid local employees. 85 Lee's influence and exposure was
further widened during the May 13 Incident in which he acted as legal 
representative for arrested students. This brought Lee into contact with C.V. 
Devan Nair of the Singapore Teachers' Union (STU) and thus opened the way for 
him to meet Singapore's most radical Chinese student leaders and develop an 
appreciation of the organisational depth and political potential of leftist forces. 
115 
With the government's granting of C(.)ncessions to low-paid local civil 
servants, Lee Kuan Yew and his group of English-educated, middle class 
colleagues enjoyed a new high in union support and gave serious consideration to 
the formation of a new political party. 86 The nationalist and labour-oriented
views of this group had already been outlined in the CJA memorandum to the 
Rendel Commission in November 1953 in which immediate self-government was 
called for. 87 The newly-formed Labour Front Party, created by former SLP 
members Lim Yew Hock and Francis Thomas and led by David Marshall,88 made 
overtures to Lee's group to join with this social democratic party. 89 By this time,
however, Lee was convinced that the only feasible alliance with another group 
would be one which could muster the support of the Chinese-educated masses. 
The mass of predominantly low socio-economic Chinese people would be eligible 
to vote with the introduction of automatic voluntary registration.90 Lee, through
his recently-developed contacts with the radical elements of the student and 
labour movements, had come to appreciate that only leftists such as Lim Chin 
Siong and Fong Swee Suan could offer the desired alliance. 
Whilst Lee's group and leftists such as Lim and Fong harboured significant 
differences in ideology and objectives, a genuine case of mutual convenience 
existed: Lee's group could offer the leftists political security with the shelter of 
middle class respectability and in exchange it would gain access to a mass 
political base, obviously an electoral necessity for any aspirant successor to the 
British. This mutual convenience gave rise to the formation of the People's 
Action Party (PAP) on 21 November 1954, with Lee Kuan Yew Secretary­
General. Eight of the 14 conveners of the Party's inaugural meeting were trade 
unionists, five of which belonged to government unions in close association with 
Lee Kuan Yew and the CJA.91
The fundamental objective of the PAP was immediate independence and 
merger with Malaya. The Party was also committed to the abolishment of "the 
unjust inequalities of wealth and opportunity inherent in the present political 
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system". 92 By the time the PAP was to contest the Rendel Constitution General
Elections of 2 April 1955, these nationalist and reformist objectives were given 
more concrete expression in the Party platform. Important nationalist policies 
included the Malayanisation of the Civil Service, complete control of foreign 
trade, and the encouragement of local industry through tariffs and subsidies. The 
PAP also called for such reforms as the introduction of free, compulsory 
education for children up to 16 years, legalisation of political funds for trade 
unions, and a Workers' Charter to provide for minimum wages and maximum hours, 
equal pay for women for equal work, unemployment benefits and workers' 
compensation.93 The policies being advocated by the PAP clearly defined the
Party as one representing the interests of the lower socio-economic classes, 
precisely the group which had thus far been ignored by the formal political 
process. 
From the outset, the PAP comprised two distinct and rival factions. One 
was led by Lee Kuan Yew, the so-called moderates, made up of English-educated 
nationalists representing the middle class. People such as Toh Chin Chye, Goh 
Keng Swee and S. Rajaratnam belonged to this group. The other faction was led 
by Lim Chin Siong and comprised radical Chinese-educated nationalists and 
socialists representing the worker-based mass movement. This latter group 
included some MCP supporters and sympathisers.94 Fong Swee Suan and Chan
Chiau Thor were two of Lim's closest colleagues from this faction.95 Within the
PAP executive, the Lee faction enjoyed superior numbers and influence, a fact 
which the radicals were quite prepared to tolerate for the first two years of the 
PAP since this low profile permitted "greater freedom of action in the field of 
trade union agitation". 96
That the alliance of forces which made up the PAP included MCP supporters 
and sympathisers may appear to contradict the anti-communist posture so clearly 
articulated by Lee during his time with the Malayan Forum. However, Lee's 
exposure to MCP cadre in the union, student and cultural organisations led him to 
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believe that "Any man in Singapore who wants to carry the Chinese speaking 
people with him cannot afford to be anti-communist".97 There was, however, no
illusion about this anti-colonial front being anything more than a temporary calm 
between the protagonists. As Lee commented: 
We never forgot that once the British were out of the way, there 
would be trouble between us and the Communists as to what kind of 
Malaya we wanted to have in place of the old British colonial 
Malaya.98
Indeed there was to be trouble between the two factions within the PAP following 
self-government, and not simply between Lee's group and communists. Evidence 
of the tension internal to the Party, however, could be seen long before self­
government. A power struggle was unfolding in which the competing factions 
attempted to create conditions favourable for their respective dominance when 
self-government arrived. 
1955 Elections 
With 80% of Singapore's population being Chinese, much of which was of low 
socio-economic status, the PAP's policies were quick to strike appeal. By the end 
of 1955 the Party boasted 2,000 members and had 10 branches, Chinese school 
activists and trade unionists forming the backbone of support. 99 The 1955
elections, with a voting electorate six-fold that of 1951, underlined this appeal 
and the capacity of the Party to mobilise the masses in its support. 
In view of the considerable powers retained by the British under the Rendel 
Constitution, the PAP strategy in 1955 was not to win but to selectively contest 
the election. The idea was to test the ground and exploit the electoral 
process.10° Four candidates were fielded, three of which were returned - Lee
Kuan Yew, Lim Chin Siong and Goh Chew Chua.101 As it turned out, although the
PAP won just 8.7% of the total vote, it secured 55.7% of the vote in the four 
electorates it contested.102
The results of the 1955 elections were contrary to British hopes because the 
party which had been groomed for office, the PP, performed dismally, taking just 
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four of the 25 seats. Government was actually formed by the Labour Front (LF), 
which won 10 seats, and the Alliance Party, 103 which won three. To a significant
but not determinant extent, the poor PP showing was the consequence of vote 
splitting between it and the other conservative party, the DP.104 There were,
however, more fundamental reasons. The PP was so aloof from the realities of 
mass politics that it persisted with policies which disregarded the feverish anti­
colonialism of the day and which perpetuated the discrimination against Chinese 
education.105
The strategy of the PAP in the 1955 elections to render selective support to 
the LF and the Alliance in order to defeat the PP was affected primarily by trade 
unionists and students.106 The Labour Front itself enjoyed significant support
from the 30,000 strong Singapore Trades Union Council (STUC).107 However, the
support of the PAP, notably Chinese students, was significant and this, combined 
with the PAP's own direct electoral success, underlined the arrival of mass 
politics and the demise of the PP and DP or any other party incapable of 
developing a broad social base. 
The victorious Labour Front coalition, led by David Marshall, found itself in 
an invidious position. On the one hand, the Labour Front endeavoured to represent 
the aspirations o( the Singapore masses, yet on the other hand it had inadequate 
constitutional means to do so. To appease the British it also had to keep the left 
in line, but this only opened the government to charges of being a colonial 
lackey. With the Labour Front in such a predicament, the PAP would be able to 
proclaim itself the only genuine, untainted anti-colonial political party.108
The PAP Under the Marshall Labour Front Government 
Following the 1955 general elections, the situation for the left improved with the 
conditions for trade unions relaxed and intimidatory police powers reduced under 
the Marshall government. As a result, heightened student and labour activity was 
conducted in confrontation with colonialists, government and capital. The left's 
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intention was to make life as difficult as possible for the LF and prepare the way 
for a more radical alternative once the constitutional anomalies were sorted out. 
This invariably strained internal PAP relations. The Lee faction feared excessive 
extra-parliamentary activity would invite the proscription of the PAP. Of course, 
it was only by conducting the struggle for power within the constitutional process 
that the Lee faction stood any chance of leading the masses. In the ensuing 
activity then, this faction would have occasion to distance itself from the tactics, 
if not the objectives, of the left.109
The increased militancy of the Middl� Road Group-led labour movement in 
1955 was reflected in the number and nature of strikes that year. Nearly 300 
strikes occurred, of which only one-third related to wage claims.110 The most
significant of these strikes involved the SBWU in a rostering dispute with the Hock 
Lee Bus Company. This culminated in riots in May involving 1,000 people in 
battles with police. Four people died.111 The government reacted by reversing
its relaxations of the Emergency Regulations and re-introducing the power of the 
Commissioner of Police to order curfews.112 The riots also posed problems for 
the PAP in the Assembly. Its opponents condemned the PAP for its policy of co­
operation with the MCP which was implicated in the rioting. Understandably, the 
PAP moderates disassociated themselves and the Party from the violence.113
Further labour militancy continued throughout the year, especially following 
the introduction of the Preservation of Public Security Act which restored police 
powers of search and curfew and roadblock imposition.114 Then in November,
under Fong Swee Suan's leadership, the SBWU brought all Singapore's bus 
companies to a halt. This strike was, however, heading for an unsatisfactory 
conclusion from the union's point of view until Lee Kuan Yew proposed a public 
examination of the bus companies' books. Upon this the employers weakened to 
union demands.115
Lee's rescue operation on behalf of the SBWU was motivated by his concern 
that continued disputation might provoke further British retaliation and jeopardise 
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the PAP. There can be little doubt that the militancy of labour and the left in 
general caused the Lee faction anxiety, a point which was probably emphasised 
privately. The disposition of this faction was such, however, that it had to adopt 
quite a different public posture on such matters. The preservation of the PAP, 
and Lee's control of it, was the fundamental consideration for Lee and his 
faction. With control of the PAP and access to the masses through the left's co­
operation, Lee could tolerate, though not necessarily approve, the left's 
militancy. Should this control be challenged, however, Lee's tolerance would be 
fully tested. 
1956 Constitutional Talks and PAP Factional Relations Under the Lim 
Government 
Whilst the Marshall government had introduced some significant reforms in its 
first year of government, it presided over turbulent times and was hamstrung by 
constitutional limitations.116 This latter problem was a source of considerable
frustration for Marshall who had avowed to the electorate to bring immediate 
self-government to Singapore. The April 1956 All-Party Constitutional Talks in 
London were seen by Marshall as vital to the retention of popular support for his 
government. The result of the talks would also have serious implications for the 
PAP. The left, especially that associated with the MCP, had a particular interest 
in a further transfer of power to Singapore so that the harassment by the British 
would cease to be so immediate a threat. 
The London talks of April-May 1956 ended without an agreement. 
Differences over the composition of a Defence and Security Council proved too 
great an obstacle.117 The reluctance of the British to hand over control of
internal security stemmed from the fear that insufficient control of the left would 
result. In this regard, the British had little faith in Marshall.118 Interestingly,
Lee Kuan Yew was initially keen on accepting the British proposals which were 
rejected primarily because Marshall and Lim Chin Siong resolutely opposed 
them.119 Lee's willingness to accept the proposals was instructive. It showed
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that he wanted to develop within the cocoon of the labour movement but also to 
enjoy British containment of the movement's left wing. 
The failed 1956 talks prompted a disappointed Marshall to resign as leader of 
the Labour Front in June 1956. He was succeeded by the then Minister for Labour 
and Deputy Chief Minister, Lim Yew Hock. Lim was a character of less liberal 
mentality than Marshall, his earlier political career owing much to British 
patronage. This leadership change represented an unfavourable turn for the left 
who had also been disillusioned with the constitutional talks and less trusting of 
Lee Kuan Yew in view of his position at the talks. This latter point was crucial. 
By now the anti-colonial mass movement had gained in strength and the left was 
concerned about the prospect of Lee's faction affecting a drift to the right by the 
PAP. As a result, the left's strategy altered and a move was made to capture 
greater direct control of the Party. Timely interventions by the authorities were, 
however, to thwart the left's takeover attempts. These events aroused the left's 
suspicions of complicity between Lee and the British.120
In the wake of the 1956 London talks, the left decided to redress the total 
dominance of the Lee group on the PAP executive. Thus, whereas in 1955 the left 
fielded no candidates for the Central Executive Committee (CEC), in July 1956 
the left captured four of the 12 seats.121 This was followed by attempts to have
the Party constitution altered to give greater power to. the branches and enable 
the branch committees to nominate members to the CEC.122 Naturally this
would pave the way for left domination of the CEC since it was in the branches 
that the superior mass support of the left was expressed. Understandably, Lee's 
group was determined to defeat such a redrafting of the constitution. It was able 
to do this with help from the authorities. 
Following the failure of the 1956 London talks, British authorities had 
expected that heightened nationalist and leftist agitation would prevail. From 
July 1956 then, extensive preparations were made to deal with any disturbances. 
These preparations involved a new Internal Security Plan, known as "Operation 
122 
Photo",123 which was jointly prepared by the Commissioner of Police and the
General Officer Commanding the Singapore Base District. The plan involved very 
detailed and extensive strategic deployments, including 40 continuous police radio 
car patrols, working co-jointly with army roadblocks and patrols and supported by 
RAF helicopters.124 The plan also involved the deployment to Singapore of more
than 30% of the entire infantry then in Malaya.125 Clearly the British expected
action. 
With the British security preparations complete, the Lim Yew Hock 
government went about its dealings with the left with greater aggression. The 
first attacks were on various cultural and social organisations in which the left 
was influentiaL 126 This was followed by the banning of the SCMSSU on 24
September on the grounds that it had reneged on its agreement to abstain from 
political involvement.127 SCMSSU Secretary-General, Soon Loh Boon, was
amongst a group of people arrested, two Chinese schools were closed and 142 
Middle School students expelled as part of this campaign against what the 
government saw as subversion.128 The sequel to this was a series of public
demonstrations and protests, including classroom protest meetings by 15,000 
Middle School students.129 The Middle Road group of unions also expressed
solidarity with the students.130 Eventually students were forcibly dislodged from
their sit-in on 26 October, with one student death at the Chung Cheng High School 
in the process. The police attacks on the schools precipitated riots which lasted 
for several days and resulted in the deaths of 15 people and over 100 injured.131
As is well documented by Clutterbuck, the British response to the riots was 
swift and effective.132 The single most important move by the authorities was a
series of co-ordinated raids by the Special Branch over 26-27 October in which 
almost the entire leadership of the left was detained. Six separate meetings, 
mostly involving the SFSWU and its affiliates, were simultaneously raided and 234 
people were detained.133 These included the so-called 'Big Six' leaders of the
Left - Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan, S.T. Bani, Jamit Singh, Sandra Woodhull 
and James Puthucheary.134
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The detentions and general clamp down on the left had crucial implications 
for the PAP. Amongst those detained were three of the four recently-elected left 
CEC members. With the left leadership removed, the Lee group would thus be 
able to defeat the attempt to give greater power to the Party's branch 
committees. It was also afforded important breathing space to consolidate its 
regained dominance of the Party. Without the arrests, the Lee group would have 
invariably been swamped by the left once the constitutional change was 
affected. Another implication of the arrests was that Lee would have a freer 
hand in the approaching Constitutional Conference in London in 1957. 
Though the arrests amounted to the salvation of Lee's group, Lee managed 
to minimise the embarrassment of benefiting from the intervention of the 
authorities. Lee astutely exploited these arrests, publicly condemning them and 
championing the cause of the left. He distinguished himself as a virulent opponent 
of the undemocratic provisions which made the arrests possible. 
With 15 PAP office holders under detention, including Lim Chin Siong, and 
its student and labour base depleted of leadership as well, the left faced an uphill 
battle to regain a position of influence on the Party executive. However, 
fortunately for the left, the Lim Yew Hock government's repression was not so 
prolonged in its seve:rity as to prevent a relatively swift comeback within the 
left's traditional spheres. The newly-formed Nanyang University quickly assumed 
the role previously played by the Chinese Middle Schools. Students from the 
banned SCMSSU formed the Nanyang University Students' Union (NUSU) and the 
political mobilisation of students was resumed.135 Workers also wasted little
time in re-organising. In December 1956 a Singapore General Employees' Union 
(SGEU) was formed to succeed the banned SSWFU.136 By mid-1957 the SGEU had
gained considerable strength and had begun to challenge the pro-Labour Front 
STUC. By August 1957, the SGEU was to have 32 affiliated unions.137
With a severe clamp down on the left already affected, the position of Lim 
Yew Hock was strengthened at the March 1957 Constitutional talks. He could 
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argue for a transfer of power on the basis that the communist threat was being 
dealt with. Of more significance, however, was the room to manouvre afforded 
Lee Kuan Yew as a member of the All-Party delegation. With the left 
unrepresented on this five-member delegation, it was now possible to negotiate a 
deal which the left was powerless to oppose. 
British proposals at these talks were almost identical to those rejected a 
year earlier.138 This time, though, neither Marshall nor Lim Chin Siong were
present to contest the principle of control over security. The outcome of the 
negotiations was agreement that the Constitution provide for an Internal Security 
Council comprised of three British, three Singaporean and one Federation 
member, with the Federation member exercising a casting vote. It was also 
agreed that Singapore's independence be achieved through merger with the 
Federation of Malaya.139 These proposals were anathema to the left who realised
that the then right wing Federation government could, and probably would, harass 
its leaders under the widescale powers of arbitrary arrest and detention of the 
Internal Security Council (ISC). For similar reasons, merger represented an equal 
threat to the left's survival. 
Lee Kuan Yew's stance in accepting the above proposals at London naturally 
raised deeper suspicions amongst the left as to his allegiances. What the left did 
not know at the time, but which was later divulged by Lim Yew Hock, was that 
Lee himself was instrumental in the ISC formula.140 Lee was to subsequently
explain his support for the ISC as a necessary pre-requisite for merger: 
Until there is independence through merger, the Internal Security 
Council has to be accepted, not because we want to protect British 
interests in Singapore, but because we must agree to allow the 
Federation to protect itself from being undermined from 
Singapore.141
At the time of the 1957 talks, however, Lee was aware that the left opposed 
merger. Lee's real intention behind the ISC related to his attempt to create the 
preconditions for the left's destruction and the cementing of his own group's 
leadership in the PAP. Now convinced that Lee was actively working to its 
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detriment, the left realised that its survival was dependent upon capturing the 
leadership of the PAP to prevent the merger and abolish the ISC. 
The above developments prompted the left to make an all-out attempt to 
capture control of the PAP executive at the 3rd Annual Conference of the Party 
in August 1957. Aware of the strength of the challenge being made, and the 
implications, Lee attempted to persuade voters at the meeting by naming seven 
candidates whom he wanted elected to the CEC. To Lee's d_isappointment, the 
left was successful in gaining six of the CEC seats and thereby ending the control 
previously enjoyed by the Lee group.142 Lee and Rajaratnam later asserted that
the left victory was aided by the admission of non-Party members being issued 
with PAP admission cards.143 In any case, Lee and his group had no intention of
taking their places on a CEC in which they would be unable to control the left.144
The P AP's new CEC was short-lived. Just 10 days after the elections, the 
Labour Front initiated another 'communist purge'. In all, 35 alleged communists 
were arrested, including five of the six newly-elected left CEC members, 11 PAP 
branch officials, as well as student and labour leaders.145 Lim Yew Hock's
motivation for the arrests was two-pronged. On the one hand, he was particularly 
concerned about inroads made by the left through the SGEU and the threat this 
posed for his own political base in the labour movement through the STUC.146 On
the other hand, Lim also asserted that he was not prepared to sit idly by while the 
PAP failed to defeat its own threat of communist infiltration.147
Once again, publicly Lee adopted the posture of defending the detainees and 
condemning the government for its actions.148 It was obvious by now, however,
that any further apparent rescue jobs by the police on Lee's behalf would be 
politically unwise. The problem was that the left's greater numbers at branch 
level would always threaten Lee's dominance. Determined to prevent a repeat of 
the 1957 CEC elections, or worse, Lee consequently embarked on changes to the 
Party's structure which would cancel out the branch support of the left. 
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Lee's move was to divide the PAP into four membership categories: 
probationary, ordinary, probationary cadre and cadre. Only cadre members were 
able to vote for the CEC. People who had "contributed substantially to the good 
of the Party" could become full cadres, and their membership had to be approved 
by the CEC.149 Cadres also had to be literate Singapore citizens, over 21 years
of age. This necessarily ruled out most students and many Chinese-born working 
class members, precisely the group forming the basis of the left's support.150
Cadres therefore comprised a very small percentage of total membership.151 The
new structure simply amounted to the existing leadership selecting an elite band 
of cadres who in turn elected the leadership. 
Whilst recent events had tested the tolerance of the left within the PAP, the 
overriding concern remained that of ensuring the PAP won office. Despite its 
mounting short-comings, it still was the most progressive of the major political 
parties. Clearly the ISC and merger issues would have to be defeated but the left 
calculated that this could best be done within government, not outside it. The 
inevitable showdown of left and right was postponed and the underlying mutual 
convenience of the alliance prevailed. The left still needed the cloak of 
respectability and acceptability to the British offered by Lee's group, and the 
latter still needed the support of the student and labour movements for electoral 
success. 
For all the apparent British complicity to secure Lee's control over the PAP 
and the essentially opportunistic nature of his relationship with the left, Lee was 
not simply a 'capitalist mole' in a socialist camp. To be sure, Lee did have a non­
communist socialist vision of sorts. He was committed to a range of social 
reforms which would transform the material conditions of the poor. He also had 
some vague but nevertheless real conception of merger with Malaya providing the 
political and economic basis for a more equitable distribution of wealth. Lee's 
vision did not, however, entertain any notion of direct transfer of political power 
to the working class. 
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1959 Elections: PAP to Government 
The 3rd All-Party Constitutional Talks in London in 1958 concluded a final 
agreement on self-government. The Singapore state would control all domestic 
affairs, foreign affairs and defence would be retained by the British, and internal 
security would be in the hands of the ISC. The State of Singapore Act, passed in 
August, also provided for a fifty-one-member legislative assembly to be elected 
on the basis of compulsory adult suffrage in May 1959. The Act ruled out the 
possibility of 'known subversives' contesting this election, a point which naturally 
aroused condemnation from the left.152
The PAP's internal problems had some negative impact on its preparation for 
the 1959 election. During 1957 the Party contested the City Council elections to 
gauge its electoral popularity but owing to its internal problems could field only 
14 candidates. Nevertheless, it secured all but one seat it contested, campaigning 
on the need to eradicate corruption and ensure that the Council deployed its funds 
more usefully and efficiently. The PAP did not enjoy an absolute majority on the 
Council after the elections, but due to the fragmentation of its opponents a PAP 
member, Ong Eng Guan, was elected Mayor.153 Over the next two years, the PAP
established a reputation for dedication and results in its Council responsibilities, 
going a long way towards establishing credibility in its claim to be the genuine 
expression of the masses and the only party capable of challenging vested 
interests.154
With the Lee group back in control of the CEC, PAP policy statements 
continued to reflect that group's commitment to merger with Malaya. In 1958, 
the Party's executive underlined this commitment in "The New Phase After 
Merdeka - Our Tasks and Policy" .155 Merger, it was argued, was a necessary pre­
requisite for socialism, but it was necessary to impress upon a fearful Federation 
government that it was a socialist and not a communist Malaya which the PAP 
envisaged.156 This point of distinction was not appreciated by some of the Party's
left. 
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After some initial apprehension over whether to contest the 1959 election, 
or whether to leave its bid until full independence, the PAP decided to seek 
government in the elections.157 The electoral manifesto was contained in The
Tasks Ahead, a reasonably detailed statement of proposed economic and social 
reforms. It was explained that only after merger with Malaya, however, could this 
objective be realised: 
It is obvious that the existing conditions are not favourable to the 
immediate attainment of a socialist society and that a fully­
developed socialist economy cannot be achieved as long as Singapore 
is separated from the mainland. Until such time as there is a 
merger of Singapore and the Federation and the appearance of 
conditions favourable to socialist construction we are only in a 
period of transition. In this period of transition, nevertheless, we 
have the important task of preparing the ground, step by step, for 
the transformation of a feudalistic and conservative outlook to a 
progressive socialist outlook and so Erepare the preliminary groundwork for a future socialist society.15 
As would be expected, the rhetoric of socialism was an important means by 
which the Lee faction fostered the identification of the left with the Party. 
Though both factions shared this rhetoric, there were basic ideological differences 
concealed by this practice. For many of Lee's faction, socialism was seen as an 
outcome, a result, that is, of improved material conditions for working people. 
The actual process by which such results were achieved, whether by private or 
public control of the means of production, was by implication a technical rather 
than a political or ideological consideration. 
The backbone of the PAP's proposed economic policies was its programme 
for Singapore's industrialisation. It was explained in the Party's manifesto that 
only through the promotion of manufacturing could Singapore's existing and 
prospective unemployment be addressed. The PAP was in no doubt about the 
fundamental economic, social and political importance of unemployment and the 
remedy for it: 
The main economic problem that faces Singapore today is to provide 
increasing opportunities for employment. Singapore's population is 
increasing at the fastest rate known to have been achieved by 
mankind in its long history ... 
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.. . If a large number of young people looking for work do not get 
work and remain unemployed, there can be no peace and stability in 
this country ... Indeed it is unlikely that the democratic system can 
survive the tribulations which a rapidly growing unemployed 
population will bring about. 
While Singapore could survive in the past mainly on its trade, there 
is no guarantee whatever that expansion of trade will be fast enough 
to provide work for our growing population. Other means of 
economic expansion must therefore be examined. In the absence of 
large tracts of agricultural land, the only alternative is for 
Singapore to expand her manufacturing industries.159
The development of manufacturing industries, however, was in turn dependent 
upon a large enough market for Singapore's manufactures. This was the economic 
basis for the commitment to merger with Malaya which was expected to provide a 
common market, free of import duties.160
As the elections approached, the likelihood of a PAP victory increased. Lee 
had cunningly laid down the condition of the release of all political detainees upon 
taking office, a stance which not only reduced alienation of the left but actually 
put him in the light of its public champion. The Party had other things going for 
it. The PAP's record in the City Council had earned it a reputation for efficiency 
and honesty. Its electoral programmes were also the most detailed and coherent, 
reflecting popular concerns and aspirations. Furthermore, organisationally, the 
PAP was best equipped to mobilise support in Singapore's first compulsory 
election. Finally, the PAP did an excellent job of exposing its opponents, 
especially the Lim Yew Hock government and his newly-formed Singapore People's 
Alliance (SPA).161 The Party benefited especially from the disclosure that the
SP A had received $500,000 from American sources.162
Though the PAP was expected to win the election, the size of its majority 
was not anticipated. It won 43 of the 51 legislative seats, gaining 53.4% of the 
total vote.163 Despite this great win, a period of turmoil and conflict lay ahead
for the Party. The merger issue was bound to lead to an uneasy relationship 
between left and right. In the course of this struggle it would become clearer too 




We have seen in this chapter how colonial rule contributed to the radicalisation of 
the masses in Singapore. We have also seen that the domestic bourgeoisie was 
economically too integrated with colonial capital to provide any leadership in the 
anti-colonial struggle. This paved the way for the emergence of a group of middle 
class professionals to form a successful political coalition with the working class. 
Though there were some serious contradictions in this alliance, their resolution 
was to be dealt with after and not before self-government. These political 
conditions would invariably place economic policy making in a quite specific 
context. Indeed, the ultimate resolution of the PAP's internal contradictions 
would produce a technocratic capitalist state which would come to assume 
paramount importance to the definition of Singapore's industrial path. 
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CHAP:rER 4 
FROM SELF-GOVERNMENT TO MERGER : THE BASIS OF 
SINGAPORE'S IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION PHASE 
Introduction 
It has been explained in the previous chapter that the PAP was characterised by 
fundamental internal contradictions from the beginning. Upon coming to office 
though, Lee's group could no longer rely on rhetoric to conceal the important 
ideological differences between the two factions. 
For a number of reasons, it took some years after taking office for the 
PAP's general commitment to an industrial programme to materialise as a 
detailed plan of action. Most of these reasons related to Lee's political problems 
in advancing the aim of merger with Malaya and creating an investment 
environment conducive to the attraction of private capital. Both objectives were 
central to Lee's favoured economic path and also an unavoidable source of conflict 
with the Party's left wing. In each case these objectives represented real or 
potential attacks on the political strength of the left, which goes a long way 
towards explaining Lee's commitment to them. Inevitably, an escalation in 
faction fighting occurred. The result was a formal split and the left forming its 
own party. Rather than marking the end of the bitter struggle, this only heralded 
increased efforts by the PAP to wipe the left out. Such a move was calculated 
primarily to secure the PAP's political hegemony but was also considered 
fundamental to the success of the industrial strategy which was important to the 
material improvement of the working class and the PAP's electoral survival. 
The period following the split thus witnessed a radical integration of state 
and Party. In one respect this was necessitated by the P AP's void of grassroots 
political structures due to the left's exodus. To compensate, the PAP employed 
the state bureaucracy to perform many functions traditionally assigned to the 
Party, notably those intended to mobilise political support. In other respects, 
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however, state institutions were exercised to frustrate the const.;_tutional 
activities of the PAP's opponents. The general pattern was for state power to be 
extended into all spheres of social activity, asserting state (PAP) dominance over 
all political groups. Top priority in this process was given to the defeat of 
organised labour as a means of reducing the effectiveness of its political 
opponents. 
As we see in the final section of this chapter, the government's success in 
attracting international capital was modest during the 1959-1963 period. In view 
of the political turmoil and uncertainty during these years this is understandable. 
Nonetheless, the foundations of the import-substitution industrialisation strategy 
were laid. State intervention had significantly raised the standard and supply of 
infrastructure. The prospect of a common market was also quite real by 1963. By 
this time the PAP had also asserted its political dominance and thereby reduced 
the militance of labour. An upturn in investment commitments in 1963 by 
international capital suggested that capital was itself beginning to share the 
government's optimism about Singapore's industrial future. 
Initial Period of Government and Factional Relations 
Upon coming to office, Lee held elections for the P AP's CEC to ensure the 
existing committee would be unchallenged for the next two years.1 With this
done, he released some, but not all, of the political detainees of the Lim Yew 
Hock government. Those released were: Lim Chin Siong, C.V. Devan Nair, James 
Puthucheary, Sandra Woodhull, Fong Swee Suan and Chan Chian Thor.2 These
people had of course been unable to contest the general elections but Lee 
appointed Lim and Fong political secretaries to the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Labour respectively.3 Despite this apparent show of solidarity,
neither Fong nor Swee could exert any real power in these positions. 
Furthermore, none of the released prisoners were able to obtain cadre membership 
of the PAP. Lee's group had no intention of sharing power with the left until the 
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left had demonstrated unqualified support for the existing PAP leadc;rship. The 
left was to find the leadership's policies an obstacle to maintaining such support. 
One of the early moves by the PAP government was to disband all 
management committees of community centres. Community centres had been set 
up in the early 1950s with the intention of encouraging the development of 
spontaneous and grassroots participation in community developments.4 Although
the Department of Social Welfare was responsible for the implementation of these 
centres, it tended to favour decentralisation of decision-making for community 
activities so that they could develop into the mass movements intended.5 Thus,
community centres were relatively autonomous throughout the 1950s and were run 
by management committees elected by participants in the centres' activities. The 
result was that political activists, mostly opponents of the PAP, came _to control 
these centres.6 Once. in office, Lee abolished all management committees of the
community centres and placed all community organisations under the direct 
control of the Department of Social Welfare, pending further reorganisation. 
There were a number of motivations for this move but the vision of these centres, 
under a new structure, serving to mobilise support for the PAP leadership was an 
important consideration. 
After the government re-asserted control over these centres, a Bill was 
introduced in July 1960 under which a new statutory body, the People's 
Association, would control the affairs of community centres. Centralised 
direction over the People's Association would more likely ensure that community 
centres did not deviate from, and were receptive to, the objectives of the PAP 
leadership. The primary political purpose of the People's Association was 
underlined by the composition of its Board of Management. Of its 14 members, 
nine persons were appointed by the Prime Minister who was also Chairman of the 
People's Association. 7 With this structure in place, the PAP set about expanding
the number of community centres in the hope of spreading the influence of the 
Party leadership and preparing the conditions for mobilising support for its 
! ! 
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policies. The government explained these changes in quite different terms but, in 
time, the control being established over these centres would assume considerable 
importance in its struggle with the left. At the time, such implications were less 
clear to the left which still harboured aspirations of eventually taking control of 
the PAP. Under such circumstances, this reorganisation of community centres 
was not perceived as such a threat. 
Though the above changes were affected without any internal PAP 
controversy, reforms dealing with industrial relations were more closely 
scrutinised by the Party's left and the labour movement. Even before the PAP 
came to office, the leadership's declared commitment to "industrial peace with 
justice" was viewed with suspicion by the left. 
The government's first major initiative in industrial relations was the 
enactment of the Industrial Relations Ordinance in 1960. This provided for a far 
greater role for the state in regulating industrial relations, specifying rules for 
collective bargaining between employers and unions and the setting up of an 
Industrial Arbitration Court (IAC).8 These changes were not intended to
undermine private collective bargaining, but to provide new procedures for 
conflict resolution. Under these procedures, however, a strike was defined as 
illegal once the IAC had taken cognizance of it, that is, once a joint application 
for arbitration had been submitted by the concerned parties or the Labour 
Minister had directed that the case be heard by the IAC. Such a provision 
virtually ensured that compulsory or voluntary arbitration would be resorted to.9
The overriding concern of the legislation was to create a climate of industrial 
peace. 
The unification of the labour movement had been a stated objective of the 
PAP in its 1959 platform. As was soon evidenced, however, the process by which 
this should be achieved and the function of the unification was a point of 
disagreement within the Party. Through the Trade Union Bill, proposed by the 
government in 1960, unification would take place under the aegis of a National 
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Trades Union Congress (NTUC) to which all unions would be affiliated and confer 
with before taking strike action. The NTUC would be closely linked with the 
government and would co-operate with it. The government also proposed that 
trade unions be reorganised on a craft basis to replace the prevailing arrangement 
whereby no specialist pre-requisite existed for membership to various general and 
splinter unions. The PAP leadership viewed the existing structure as too 
vulnerable to infiltration and subversion.10
The obvious intention of the Trade Union Bill was to limit the control of the 
left within the labour movement. However, after predictable condemnation from 
the left, the Bill was eventually withdrawn by the government.11 Amongst other
considerations, the government had come to fear the possibility of a left­
dominated NTUC which, of course, would be counter-productive for Lee and his 
group.12 Despite withdrawal of the Bill, friction within the Party had been
heightened and was no longer concealed behind Party doors. Towards the end of 
1960, for example, Fong Swee Suan's public criticism of Lee's stance on industrial 
relations led to Fang's transfer to the Deputy Prime Minister's Department.13
Apart from the transparent political motives behind the attempted 
reorganisation of trade unions, the left was irritated by the government's constant 
calls for wage restraint and industrial peace.14 The left suspected that the Party
leadership was more concerned with 'industrial peace' than 'justice'. STUC 
Secretary (Administration), S.T. Bani, thus responded to the government's appeal 
with the assertion that: 
No honest and decent socialist can support industrial peace at the 
inordinate price of the workers' legitimate claims. Industrial peace 
brought alone by enforcing law and order is unjust to the workers 
and must be rejected. And this is particularly so if the laws are not 
in favour of the workers.15
Not only was Bani expressing discontent with the nature of the PAP's legislative 
efforts to date, he was also echoing the concern of the left that the government 
had continually failed to revoke such anti-labour legislation as the Criminal Law 
Ordinance and the Public Security Ordinance Number 25 (1955). 
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The early experience of the left under the PAP government had been one of 
antagonism. Apart from the practical implications of the government's labour 
relations policies, there was an important philosophical question being raised 
which was not lost on the left. The notion that workers' interests should be 
dependent upon, and secondary to, a favourable climate for private capital 
investment was an uncomfortable one for the left. It began to appear as though at 
best the PAP had divided class loyalties. There were also other grievances 
developing in 1960 which indicated mounting internal friction and disillusionment 
with Party leadership. The government's policy on Chinese education, the 
continued detention of political prisoners of the Lim Yew Hock government and an 
amendment to the Citizenship Bill which deprived some left leaders of their 
citizenship had all contributed to this disillusionment.16 Nevertheless, for the
time being anyway, the left continued to publically declare its support for the 
government. Presumably the left's hope to eventually capture leadership, or at 
least sufficiently influence proceedings to correct the present course, disuaded it 
from any other action. The soon to be announced industrial plan of the 
government, however, would be a further cause for the left's discontent and 
disillusionment with the government. 
State Development Plan, 1961-1964 
When the PAP leadership did come to more closely examine the question of 
industrialisation, it called on the World Bank to provide the technical basis for 
more detailed policies. The consequent United Nations Industrial Survey Mission, 
headed by Dr Albert Winsemius, made the first of its two visits to Singapore 
between October and December 1960. The Winsemius Report, as it became 
known, confirmed the government's fears that the traditional backbone of the 
economy, entrepot trade and banking, would be unable to provide sufficient job 
opportunities for Singapore's expandin.g workforce. In view of the projected 
population increases for the decade, Winsemius estimated that to achieve full 
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employment, 214,000 new jobs would ha-ve to be created between 1961 and 
1970.17 For such a target to be realised, 98,000 new jobs would have to come 
from the manufacturing sector - an average of 9,800 per year. It was argued in 
the Report that the best option for Singapore to achieve the necessary growth 
would be through the adoption of an industrial strategy based on import 
substitution. Since Singapore had the highest per capita income in the region, its 
domestic market was considered sufficient for manufactures in spite of its small 
population size. Anticipated population growth and further increases in per capita 
income were expected to bolster this market. The possibility of a common market 
with Malaya would also provide impetus for the strategy.18
A significant feature of the Winsemius Report was that it envisaged private 
capital playing the leading role in direct investment in industry. Further, owing to 
the dearth of local industrial know-how and the structural immobility of locally­
based capital, it also envisaged the major portion of capital, entrepreneurial and 
technical skills would come from foreign investment. However, to render 
Singapore suitably attractive to such investors, a series of recommendations were 
submitted. These included: control over labour and holding wage levels down; the 
provision of various industrial estates; the upgrading of technical training; the 
provision of tax incentives; and free remittance of capital.19 In one way or
another most of these recommendations implied a key role for the state in support 
of private capital. The Report contained no apology for this, arguing that in view 
of Singapore's relatively late start in the effort to attract industrial capital, 
combined with its high wage levels, state intervention was essential if Singapore 
was to successfully compete with other countries iI?- the region for investment. 
The long-awaited State Development Plan, 1961-1964 was finally announced 
in early 1961 and closely mirrored the Winsemius Report, constantly drawing on it 
to substantiate and clarify policies. Most importantly, the Plan embraced the 
thesis that positive institutional and financial intervention by the state could form 
the basis for a fast-growing import-substitution programme led by private 
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investment. The Plan shared the assumption of the Winsemius Report that the 
pending economic unification with Malaya, important as it was, was no guarantee 
of Singapore's industrialisation. Therefore, Singapore needed to be an attractive 
investment site in itself .20
Under the State Development Plan, 1961-1964, a total expenditure of M$871 
million was allocated for investment in the public sector. This represented a 
120% increase over that spent on public sector capital investment during 1955-
1969. Of this sum, M$508 million, or 58%, was earmarked for economic 
development and a further M$350 million, or 40%, for social development. It was 
expected that M$591 million of the finance for the Plan would come from 
domestic revenue, reserves and borrowing. The balance was to come from loans 
and grants from the UK and the World Bank.21 Drawing on the Winsemius Report,
it was estimated in the Plan that 83,600 jobs would be required between 1961 and 
1964 but that without additional stimulation only 40,000 new jobs could be 
expected for the period. It was hoped, however, that through the Plan conditions 
of 'maximum acceleration' might generate a further 30,000 new jobs. The 
government was working on the assumption of a ratio of M$20,000 of private 
investment to each job created.22 Even under optimum conditions then, the
unemployment problem would not be solved in the period of the Plan. 
As represented in Table 3, the majority of the planned expenditure on 
economic development was for industry and commerce, the largest single 
allocation being for the Economic Development Board (EDB). Having been 
recommended in the Winsemius Report to spearhead the government's industrial 
programme, this statutory body was to promote the expansion of existing industry 
and the establishment of new industrial enterprises. A sum of M$100 million had 
been set aside for the EDB's activities for the four year period. 
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Table 3: Summary of Development Plan Capital 
Expenditure Estimates, 1961-1964 
$ million 
1. Economic development
a. Land and agriculture

































16. 87 349.88 
13.19 
Total 871.02 
Source: Ministry of Finance, State of Singapore Development Plan, 1961-1964, 
Singapore: Government Printer, 1961, Table 3.1, p.35. 
In keeping with the Plan, the government duly established the EDB in August 
1961, entrusting it with various tasks. It was empowered to: underwrite the issue 
of stocks and bonds of industrial enterprises; guarantee industrial loans; invest in 
and give loans to industrial enterprises; develop industrial estates; and provide 
technical assistance and advice to industrial enterprises. 23 Some of the above
functions were intended to circumvent the structural immobility and lack of 
industrial expertise of domestic capital. Other functions, however, were intended 
to lower the establishment and operational costs to capital. Medium and long 
term loans, for example, were offered by the EDB at below market interest rates 
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for up to 50% of fixed assets. Moreover, the EDB was expected to facilitate a 
high degree of cohesion in the industrial programme by virtue of its substantial 
organisational resources and close liaison with government. This would enhance 
and simplify the task of attracting and accommodating industrial capital. 
One of the most imaginative and ambitious aspects of the Plan was the 
government's designs for industrial estates. It was urged in the Winsemius Report 
that the construction of such estates, in which factories would be centralised 
around transportation, water, sewerage, power and communications requirements 
of industry in close proximity to a sizeable labour force, be given urgent 
priority.24 Such convenient sites would represent a cost saving to capital since
rents for factory space would not take account of total expenditure involved in 
their development.25 Special attention was paid to the development of industrial
estates for at least two considerations. First, with the highest wage levels in the 
region, the government had to examine other cost-cutting attractions to capital. 
Second, with Malaya's recently-established industrial town of Petalying Jaya, 
Singapore needed to provide at least similar, and probably better, conveniences to 
industry if some of the investment in the region was to be redirected Singapore's 
way. 
Numerous industrial estates were proposed under the Plan, each to be zoned 
according to the form of industrial activity desired and to encompass or adjoin a 
satellite town built by the recently established statutory body, the Housing 
Development Board (HDB).26 By far the most important estate was the proposed
Jurong estate for which a provisional M$45 million had been directly allocated by 
the government.27 Jurong would involve the preparation of 1,500 acres of land in
the first project but, as Minister for Finance Goh Keng Swee announced in late 
1961, would eventually comprise 9,000 acres. Mangrove swamp and undulating 
terrain needed to be reclaimed under the project. Jurong would also off er 8,500 
feet of deep water wharfage and would be connected to Malaya by raiI.28 Not
only would Jurong be Singapore's prime site for heavy industry, it would also 
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include zones for light industry as well as park, reci"eational, business and 
residential facilities such as schools, shops and community centres to service 
200,000 residents.29 Industrial estates in general, and Jurong in particular,
symbolised the government's commitment to resourcefully addressing itself to the 
needs of the private sector. 
The government's intention of significantly improving and expanding physical 
infrastructure was not confined to industrial estates. As indicated in Table 3, 
allocations for the development of public utilities amounted to M$147 million for 
the period 1961-1964, of which M$78 million would be required for electricity, 
M$54 million for water and M$14 million for gas. A sum of M$117 million would 
also be invested in transport and communications. Much of this expenditure would 
be directed towards a general improvement throughout the island in its 
infrastructural base. 
Of the M$350 million proposed for social development, projects for housing 
and education assumed greatest significance. Under the Plan, more than 51,000 
low-cost housing units would be constructed at a cost of M$153.6 million between 
1961 and 1964. The education plan, involving an estimated M$94 million, was 
aimed to provide Singaporeans with at least two years post-primary education 
with a vocational base and provide more schools with a technical and science 
base. An estimated average of 19 schools per year would need to be built between 
1961 and 1964. Obviously the educational base would be central to Singapore's 
long term industrialisation. These outlays, however, cannot simply be explained in 
terms of their utility to the industrial programme. Lee and his group were always 
looking to extend the social base of their faction's support beyond the middle 
class. 
Although the Plan did not specify in any detail the industries in which 
Singapore was expected to concentrate, the Winsemius Report identified the 
following areas as suitable: the expansion of ship-building and ship-repairing; 
expansion of metal engineering; establishment of an electrical equipment and 
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appliances industry; and improvement of the quality chemicals ii-idustries.30 The
EDB would also be conducting feasibility studies to ascertain the possibilities in 
greater detail. Lee himself had in 1960 expressed a desire for Singapore to 
establish an iron and steel mill of 500,000 tons annual capacity but the response 
from capital was one of total disinterest. Lee subsequently requested the 
feasibility of the proposal to be investigated by the United Nations Industrial 
Survey Mission which was due to report on the matter in mid-1961.31
After two years of indecision and inactivity on its industrial programme 
then, in early 1961 the government had finally announced a clear plan and strategy 
for industry and job creation. In the process, a special role had been carved out 
for the state which not only committed it to considerable outlays of public 
expenditure in the service of capitalism, it also involved the state, especially 
through the EDB, in fusing physical and social infrastructure in the most cost­
effective a�d attractive way to private investors. This involved a certain degree 
of abstract thought and projection beyond the inclination or capacity of individual 
capitalist investors. The government was not defensive about such intervention, 
contending that Singapore simply could not afford a laissez-faire economy if it 
was to be restructured towards greater manufacturing emphasis.32 Not
surprisingly, the accent on assisting private capital in preference to a more direct 
role for government investment in industrial enterprises prompted criticism from 
the PAP's left. Before the Plan had reached even the first stages of 
implementation, however, other grievances of the left came to the fore. Soon, 
the PAP was again pre-occupied with urgent political questions which temporarily 
over-shadowed the industrial programme. 
Lee's Def eat of the Left within the PAP and the Subsequent Split 
Despite the rapid deterioration in relations between Lee's faction and the left of 
the PAP following government in 1959, the first major post-election challenge to 
the leadership did not come from the left. Rather, it was the Minister for 
154 
National Development and ISC and CEC member Ong Eng Guan who first 
confronted Lee. Ong had long been a leading Party figure whose support amongst 
the Chinese chauvinists and long service to the Party had probably made it 
difficult to accept being assigned the relatively insignificant Ministry of National 
Development. Ong's pride would have been further dented when Lee subsequently 
removed local government and Harbour Board affairs from his ministerial 
portfolio on the grounds of Ong's poor administrative performance.33
Ong's challenge was mounted in June 1960 at a two-day meeting of the CEC, 
PAP Assembly people and branch executives held to review the Party's 
performance in government. On behalf of his Hong Lim electorate, Ong 
introduced 'Sixteen Resolutions' intended to rectify the PAP's mistakes in 
government.34 Amongst other things, these resolutions charged that the Party
had moved ideologically to the right and that it lacked intra-party democracy, 
specifically attacking the cadre system of membership. Ong also claimed that the 
Party had lost its anti-colonial essence and called for the release of those 
detained under the Preservation of Public Security Act before 1959.35
Given the nature of the resolutions forwarded by Ong, it may seem 
surprising that they did not arouse the support of the left. However, the left saw 
these resolutions as cynically calculated to muster its support so that Ong could 
advance his own personal leadership ambitions. To the left it was a personality 
clash between Ong and Lee. Ong was viewed as an opportunist over whom the left 
was not prepared to confront the Party leadership, however much appeal the 
resolutions may have had.36 The left thus joined with the PAP leadership in
condemning Ong.37 The Party's CEC duly dismissed Ong's charges as "red herr­
ings" to cover his "anti-party activities" and in July he was removed from the 
Ministry and expelled from the PAP, as were his two supporters from the 
Assembly.38 Ong was also subjected to a ruthless personal attack by Lee, not just
out of Lee's vindictiveness, real as it was, but as an example of what lay in store 
for those who dared to challenge the Party leadership. 39
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Though lacking support within the Party, Ong's support within the Hong Lim 
electorate remained loyal and considerable. He was thus able to successfully 
contest the by-election for that electorate in April 1961 necessitated by his 
earlier resignation from the Assembly. Ong campaigned around issues related to 
Chinese chauvinism and anti-colonialism, demanding immediate and unconditional 
independence from Britain. His landslide victory over the PAP's Jek Yuen Thong, 
Lee's Political secretary, was a severe blow for Lee and the PAP.40 So bitterly
disappointed with the apparent show of no confidence were the PAP leaders that 
they are even reported to have considered resigning from the Assembly but were 
reassured by their left colleagues that such a move would be unwise.41 The left
feared that resignation by the moderates might give rise to a harshly repressive 
coalition. 42
Though the results of the Hong Lim by-election painted a gloomy picture for 
the future of Lee's group, they soon prompted a fortuitous twist for Lee. Hitherto 
uninterested in merger with Singapore because of fears of a racial imbalance in 
favour of the Chinese and the existence of a strong left wing in Singapore, the 
prospect of resignation by the PAP moderates sparked a re-evaluation by the 
Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. He was extremely concerned 
about the possibility of a left wing government forming in the wake of resignation 
by the current leaders. This would mean the end of the ISC and Malayan control 
over Singapore's internal security. 43 From Lee's perspective, merger was very
attractive politically. He knew that conservative elements in Kuala Lumpur 
would not tolerate the communists within the PAP. Merger offered the prospect 
of the elimination of his major opponents without Lee having to do the job himself 
and also promised to provide the economic foundation for the ISI programme. The 
formation of a common market for manufactures would offer economies of scale 
likely to attract international capital. 
The Tunku first publically mooted merger on 27 May 1961, proposing a 
Federation of Malaysia which would include Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei and 
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Malaya.44 The Tunku's new perspective on merger was to have a profound impact
on the PAP. Up until now the left had been consoled that despite the PAP 
leadership's aspirations for merger it was evidently an unlikely event. With a real 
prospect of merger now looming, a whole range of issues which had been 
fomenting since the Party came to office combined to set the two factions of the 
PAP on a collision path and irreversible separation. 
Lee's commitment to merger had thus been enhanced rather than weakened 
by the Hong Lim by-election result. He apparently calculated that now was the 
time to move before the left could capitalise. At the 1961 May Day Rally of the 
STUC he reiterated PAP merger policy and invited those not beholding to it to 
leave the Party. Both the PAP leadership and the left knew that a break between 
them was always a possibility. Evidently Lee felt that the merger issue was the 
one most likely to render popular support for his group and was happy for the 
struggle between factions to centre around it. 45
The left was not long in reacting to the perceived threat of the merger 
proposals. On 2 June 1961, the 'Big Six' trade union leaders and the Party's left 
issued a statement of support for the PAP in the forthcoming Anson by­
election. 46 The statement also included demands for genuine self-government for
Singapore and the abolishment of the ISC. A total of 42 trade unions came out in 
support of these demands.47 The PAP leadership, through Party Chairman Toh
Chin Chye, responded on 9 June that the Party's objective was to seek "complete 
independence through merger with the Federation or a larger federation 11 •48 On
12 June the 'Big Six' widened their attack on the PAP leadership and listed a 
series of demands which related to grievances additional to the merger question. 
These included: the failure of the government's representatives on the ISC to 
secure the release of political detainees arrested before 1959; the abuse of civil 
liberties, such as freedom of speech and the press, through the Preservation of 
Public Security Ordinance; the failure of the government to unify the trade union 
movement; the deprivation of citizenship rights for left wing anti-colonialists; the 
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restrictions on Chinese education; the PAP's attempts to control the STUC; and 
the absence of intra-party democracy within the PAP.49 It was implied that
unless the left's demands relating to these grievances were met, support for the 
PAP in the Anson by-election would be withdrawn. The Party leadership stood 
firm, however, and C.V. Devan Nair, who since his prison release had closely 
aligned himself with Lee, asserted that the left were reneging on fundamental 
PAP policy: 
Lim Chin Siong and his friends have used the detainees issue to 
distract public attention from their fundamental deviation from the 
PAP's basic principles and 8olicies, and its fundamental aim of
merger with the Federation.5 
In the wake of the publically declared differences, eight PAP members of 
the Assembly came out in support of the 'Big Six's' demands and called for a 
conference of the executives of the 51 Party branches to be held post haste to 
discuss the current role of the PAP and the political circumstances surrounding 
it.51 Understandably, PAP supporters were by now in some confusion as to what
constituted the loyal course of action in the by-election. This was compounded 
when at the last moment the left came out in support of the Workers' Party's 
David Marshall who was contesting the by-election on a platform of total political 
independence, the abolition of the ISC, and the dismantling of the British Naval 
bases.52 The by-election, held on 15 July, resulted in a narrow win for Marshall
over his PAP opponent, Mahmud Awang.53
Following the Anson defeat, Lee took steps to finally force the merger issue 
with the Party's left. Realising that his numbers were relatively stronger in the 
Assembly than in the Party at large, and hoping to extract maximum public 
support for his struggle, Lee moved a motion of confidence in his own government 
in the Assembly. This gave him the opportunity to discredit the left, going so far 
as to make the fantastic allegation that the left was plotting with the British to 
overthrow the PAP government.54 Lee, of course, did not believe such an
absurdity but he was desperate to whip up sentiment for his group in the invariable 
Party split. In the all-night Assembly debate on the question of merger Lee 
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effectively forced the left to make a challenge for Party leadership and survived 
the vote by the narrowist of margins, with 26 of the 51 votes, to hold 
government. 55
Following the Assembly debate, the 13 PAP Assembly members who had 
abstained from the vote were expelled from the Party.56 Additionally, 14 PAP
district secretaries were dismissed and charged with disloyalty to the Party. On 
26 July the 13 Assembly people, the 'Big Six' trade unionists and their supporters 
formed a new party, the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front), with Lim Chin Siong as 
Secretary-General. This prompted a massive defection from the PAP, both of 
intermediate level leadership as well as the branches. The left had always 
dominated the branches and the second level leadership positions, providing the 
organisational links with the masses which the moderate-controlled CEC lacked. 
With the founding of the Barisan Sosialis (BS), 35 PAP branch committees 
resigned; 19 of the 23 paid organising secretaries of the Party defected; large 
numbers of cadres resigned; and many branches all but collapsed, 11 having less 
than 25 remaining members each and one with only 10.57 In 1962 only 20% of the
Party's former members paid their subscriptions. 58 Thus, although Lee held a
precarious parliamentary majority, his Party was reduced to a mere shell of what 
it had been prior to the split. He would now have to contend with the left under 
radically changed circumstances. No longer could he rely on the elitist Party 
structure to insulate him from leftist forces. From here on it would be an open 
political struggle for state power. The problem for the left was that at the time 
of the split it was Lee's group which retained that power, a fact which would 
prove decisive in the struggle. 
Implications of the Split for Government 
One of the immediate implications of the split for the PAP government was that 
the State Development Plan, 1961-1964 suddenly assumed even more importance 
than it already had. Lee's government would be heavily reliant upon the Plan to 
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take effect and thereby increase his government's electoral appeal. Not 
coincidently, from mid-1961 the implementation of the Plan rapidly gained 
momentum. After a very slow start in the first half of the year, by the end of 
1961 M$85.78 million of the M$118.84 million, or 72%, provided for economic 
development for the year had actually been invested.59 The EDB had also been
established in August and wasted no time in assuming its intended role. 
A significant economic initiative taken by the government in the wake of 
the split was quick action on the advice of the United Nations Technical Advice 
Bureau's inquiry submitted in mid-1961 into the feasibility of an iron and steel 
mill. The report recommended a more modest project than that initially mooted 
by Lee Kuan Yew, suggesting the establishment of a M$12 million, 60,000 tons 
annual capacity iron and steel mill. When overseas investors still shied away from 
the proposal, the government persuaded local merchants and bankers to raise 80% 
of the required capital, originally estimated at M$6.25 million, with the 
government putting up the remaining 20%. The resulting company, The National 
Iron and Steel Mill Ltd, was incorporated on 12 August 1961. 60 This was the
government's first major direct investment in industry but it planned to take 
further initiatives in the future to get things moving. Another initiative taken by 
the government in mid 1961 was to advance a big, easy-term loan, at just 2.5% 
interest, to local shipbreaking company Sim Lim and Company equivalent to 80% 
of the price of buying the necessary vessels to begin breaking. 61 It soon became
apparent to National Iron and Steel Mill Ltd, that it could feasibly set up its own 
shipbreaking yard and it soon established the wholly-owned subsidiary National 
Ship breakers. 62
At the same time as the government set about to stimulate economic 
activity, industrial militance picked up dramatically. The split of the left from 
the PAP had the immediate effect of intensifying the struggle between it and the 
PAP leadership for control of the trade unions. By this time, the STUC 
Secretariat was divided between the Devan Nair-led group which was pro-PAP and 
the Lim Chin Siong-led group, with the latter in the ascendancy. 63
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In an attempt to counter the left's dominance of organised labour, the PAP 
government de-registered the STUC and fostered the formation of the National 
Trades Union Congress (NTUC) to supersede it. 64 The left broke away to form a
separate Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU). The political struggle for 
control of the labour movement thereafter became intense, with both the left and 
the Devan-Nair-led factions liberally employing strike action as a means of 
demonstrating strength to attract membership.65 In 196i, there were 113 strikes
and four lockouts involving 43,764 workers, the highest number since 1955. 66
The formation of the BS had important implications for the PAP's social 
base and ideology as well as for industrial relations. With the bulk of the Chinese 
working class, students and intellectuals joining the BS en masse, the electoral 
viability of the PAP was fragile. Not only had the Party lost much of its 
traditional support, the PAP had also shed those elements which had been the 
driving force behind the Party's formal ideological commitment to socialism. This 
was to prove important as the PAP envisaged using the state apparatus to help 
build support among the working class. The civil service's upper echelons were 
dominated by the relatively privileged English-educated who were hostile towards 
socialism and suspicious of the PAP. Dropping the pretense of socialism would do 
no harm in gaining their co-operation. 
Upon taking office in 1959, the PAP abolished variable allowances for civil 
servants; introduced 'voluntary'. weekend country project work for civil servants; 
imposed new disciplinary measures; and required senior civil servants to attend 
the Political Study Centre where they were educated about the government's 
objectives and plans.67 After the split, however, the PAP fully restored the
variable allowances, in September 1961, in an attempt to improve its standing 
with civil servants .  68 Since 1959, however, the understanding of the civil service
of the PAP's policies, and hence sympathy for them, had been aided by the 
propaganda sessions of the Political Study Centre. Civil servants had also come to 
appreciate the political moderation of Lee's group within the PAP itself. Fur-
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thermore, the government's policies had significantly enhanced the role of the 
bureaucracy in Singapore society by this time. First, the dissolution of the City 
Council had contributed to a transfer of power to the civil service. Second, the 
establishment of various parastatal bodies such as the HDB, EDB and the Public 
Utilities Board (PUB), which drew on the expertise of both public and private 
bureaucracies, afforded considerable power to bureaucrats. These bodies also 
adopted profit motive management principles which ideologically appealed to 
conservative civil servants. At the time of the split then, civil servants were 
already more favourably disposed to the Lee faction of the PAP. 
The increased power of the public bureaucracy was accentuated in the years 
ahead. This was the consequence both of further state intervention in the 
economic sphere as well as the assumption of greater political functions by the 
bureaucracy. This latter tendency was in part the response of the PAP 
government to the fact of Party organisation being all but totally destroyed by the 
split. With few active Party members remaining after the split, and the PAP wary 
of entrusting newcomers with any responsibility, 69 the machinery of government
was entrusted with traditional Party functions. 70 Hereafter, the Party
organisation would exist to assist in the enactment of policy, the formation of 
which would be the exclusive domain of the government. The government was no 
longer to be responsible to the Party but the Party responsible to the 
government. The government itself would become indistinguishable from the 
state. Over the years, the Party would develop an elitist and authoritarian 
ideology to justify this separation of Party and state from open public 
accountability. 
Referendum for Merger 
Following the PAP split and the formation of the BS, the political fortunes of the 
PAP became even more dependent on satisfactorily negotiating merger. As 
already explained, the PAP was quite happy to keep the fighting with the BS 
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focused on this issue. On 24 August 1961, Lee and the Malayan Prime Minister, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, reached a broad general agreement over the terms of 
Singapore's incorporation into the Federation.71 Accepting that in all likelihood
merger would take place, the BS Secretary-General, Lim Chin Siong, declared at 
the Party's inaugural meeting on 17 September its unequivical support for a " ... 
full and complete merger ... " and the party's desire to" ... join the Federation as 
equal fellow citizens ... 
1172 The statement amounted to an acceptance of the
principle of merger but a rejection of the arrangement agreed to by Lee and the 
Tunku whereby Singapore citizens were denied the right to vote or stand in 
elections held in other states of the Federation. Objection was also being raised 
to the number of seats offered to Singapore in the Federal Parliament.73 The
conditions agreed to reflected the concern of Malays in the Federation about 
possible Chinese political ascendancy. 7 4 The BS argued that in so trying to
appease the Federation government, the PAP had sold out on Singapore's interests. 
Although the BS's criticism of the number of sea ts proposed for Singapore in 
the Federal Parliament aroused support from other parties (Ong Eng Guan's UPP 
and David Marshall's Workers' Party), its acceptance of the principle of merger 
and demand for Singapore to be incorporated on an equal basis with other non­
Malay states, Penang and Malacca, was a political mistake. The PAP was quick to 
exploit the contradictions inherent in such a proposal. It pointed out that under 
Federation law, by which Singapore would be bound, as many as half of Singapore's 
voters (who were not born in Singapore) would be ineligible for citizenship and full 
political rights if 'complete merger' were effected. The BS soon withdrew its 
proposal that Singapore enter the Federation on the same basis as Penang and 
Malacca and replaced this with the demand for equal and automatic citizenship 
for Singaporeans.75 The likelihood of this was very remote, suggesting that the
BS was not sincerely advocating merger but attempting to expose the PAP's 
position and generally frustrate the PAP's merger attempts.76
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The BS's original statement posed other problems for it in the ensuing 
debate. Only four days after the initial BS declaration of support for the principle 
of merger, Goh Keng Swee proposed a national referendum to settle the issue over 
the exact terms of Singapore's entry into the Federation. All debate thereafter 
was premised on the acceptance in principle of merger, thereby legitimising the 
concept itself, an effect not intended by the BS in the original statement. The 
government was able to argue in the Assembly on 16 March 1962 that since all 
parties agreed in principle to the idea of merger, Goh's proposed merger 
referendum need only include choices over the terms of merger, not -its 
desirability.77 Following further public debate, on 6 July 1962, the Singapore 
National Referendum Bill was passed in the Assembly. This provided electors with 
a choice of three types of merger: 
(a) The constitutional arrangements set out in Command Paper 33 of 1961
giving Singapore autonomy in labour and education.
(b) A complete and unconditional merger as a state on an equal basis with the
other eleven states in accordance with the constitutional documents of the
Federation of Malaya.
(c) Entry into Malaysia on terms no less favourable than the terms for the
Borneo territories.
The government contended that choice 'A' reflected the PAP's position and choice 
'B' the position of the BS. Choice 'C' was included at the request of the SPA.78
The choices were framed in such a way that there was little real alternative to 
proposal 'A'. The 'C' choice was not realistic since the terms for Borneo had not 
yet been worked out. The 'B' choice, originally mooted by the BS, had even come 
to be disowned by them because of the loss of citizenship and political rights 
implicated. 79 The referendum was thus heavily loaded in favour of a resounding
pro-PAP result. 
In the lead-up to the referendum of 1 September 1962, the government 
conducted a remarkably comprehensive campaign. In view of the recent political 
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defeats and defections, a victory in the referendum was crucial to the 
government's credibility. The government fully exploited the priviliges of office 
to saturate Singapore with propaganda in favour of proposal 'A'. With the press 
already tamed to a significant extent, the government also dominated the 
airwaves through the state-owned Radio Singapore, including a series of 12 nightly 
broadcasts by Lee Kuan Yew between 13 September and 9 October 1961.80 Lee
divulged· details of internal PAP struggles of the 1950s to whip up fear of the 
existence and extent of the MCP threat in Singapore in an effort to discredit the 
BS and enhance an 'A' vote. The Minister of Culture also pumped out volumes of 
propaganda on the P AP's behalf. The campaign style of Lee in the referendum 
mirrored the future: popular support would be mobilised by the state rather than 
the Party. As one PAP Minister reflected on the referendum campaign and 
subsequent exercises: "In many ways, the PAP and the government machinery 
have become one and the same 11 •81
Predictably, the referendum produced an overwhelming vote of 71 % in 
favour of the White Paper proposal, choice 'A'.82 Given the nature of the
referendum and the way it was conducted, it is difficult to draw unqualified 
conclusions about the government's popularity at the time. The subjective effects 
on the government were clearly discernable however. Tacticly the government 
had outpointed the BS. The process by which public support had been mustered 
held important lessons for the PAP which were not to be forgotten. The 
referendum result injected new enthusiasm and confidence in the PAP - not just 
confidence in negotiating with the Tunku now that the Party had the demonstrable 
support of the electorate to affect a merger acceptable to the Federation 
government, but confidence in its capacity to deal with the BS at home. Probably 
for the first time the PAP felt it was genuinely making ground in the battle of 
id�as. If this was so, it owed much to the PAP's bold.exercise of state power for 
Party objectives. 
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Lee Moves Against the Left 
Lee wasted no time in spelling out the implications of the referendum result for 
the BS and the left. Just three days after the referendum he stated on radio: 
Before September 1st, firmness would have been misinterpreted as 
fascist repression. After September 1st, I'm sure you will want me 
to do what is r!r'ht for the security and well-being of all in Singapore 
and Malaysia.8 
Subsequent to this statement, heightened repression of the left occurred. Though 
obviously pleased with the fact of the referendum victory, Lee was under no 
illusion that the PAP had surpassed the BS in electoral appeal. 
The first major measure to curb the activities of the left after the 
referendum was to ban a proposed SATU conference. The proposed conference 
had been organised with the intention to formulate a programme "to consolidate 
and strengthen the left wing trade union movement in the State 11 •84 Although
there was no suggestion that the conference would be conducted outside 
constitutionally acceptable. procedure, on 10 October the ISC declared that the 
conference could not take place. Amidst protests by the BS that legitimate 
opposition was being suppressed by undemocratic means, on 14 October Lee 
explained that the ban was necessary because the conference would be completely 
unacceptable to the Federation government. The PAP argued that it did not 
necessarily want to see the ban, but it was hamstrung by the priority of 
merger.85 Conveniently, the composition of the ISC afforded Lee the opportunity
to distance himself from the ban. The extent to which the move reflected Lee's 
domestic political interests seemed, however, more than co-incidental. 
Apart from the motive of repressing the BS, the above move was related to 
the government's general attempt to harass the SATU and promote the NTUC. 
Already on 26 October the government had initiated legal action against the 
SHBSA under the Trades Union Ordinance to " ... show how a small but active 
group of Communist cadres and sympathisers were able to manipulate thousands 
of good and politically innocent workers through trade unions 11 •86 At the same
time, the PAP was granting legal recognition to unions which accepted or sought 
I i 
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government co-operation and assistance. The government boosted the organising 
strength of such unions through financial aid and manpower support to the NTUC, 
including the secondment of civil servants to the NTUC to help in the preparation 
of wage claims and negotiations.87
A more severe attack on the left was delivered by the PAP in early 1963 
following fears that domestic opposition to merger might be enhanced by the 
position adopted by the Indonesian government. The Sukarno-led government, 
strongly influenced by the Comnmunist Party of Indonesia (PKD, objected to the 
inclusion of the Borneo states in the Federation of Malaysia. Indonesian 
opposition to Borneo's incorporation escalated and on 20 January 1963 the policy 
of 'Confrontasi' (Confrontation) with Malaysia was officially announced.88
Understandably, this new context of the merger presented political opportunities 
for the PAP's opponents to exploit. For one thing, the trade embargo which would 
follow would bring hardship to Singapore. Lee's government, however, did not 
intend to tolerate any re-evaluation of the merger and took immediate steps to 
ensure that the political consequences for the PAP resulting from Indonesia's 
policy were minimised. This was simplified by the Malaysian government's 
interpretation of Singapore's domestic politics as now of the utmost importance to 
Malaysia's security. 
The Tunku and Lee were particularly sensitive to any possibility of PKI/MCP 
collaboration, fearing that disturbances in Singapore could be whipped up in the 
event of Indonesian intervention in Northern Borneo. This, of course, would 
undermine the capacity of the British to retaliate due to extra pressure on 
security forces. The fact that the Naval Base and the harbour were dominated by 
BS-controlled unions was also seen as a potential threat to any British military 
response from Singapore.89 The policy of Confrontation had thus deemed Singa­
pore's domestic politics a matter of external security for the Malayan 
government. This provided the PAP with the pretext to consolidate its own 
political position by purging its opponents. Starting on 2 February 1963, the ISC 
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ordered the arrest of 111 persons in Singapore by the Special Branch in Operation 
Cold Store.90 The arrests cut a swathe through the BS's top level leadership.
Those arrested included 24 executives of the BS; seven people belonging to parties 
associated with the BS; 50 executives of 13 SATU trade unions; five left wing 
journalists; and 11 students from the Nanyang University. Amongst those detained 
were Lim Chin Siong, Sandra Woodhull, James and Dominic Puthucheary and Fong 
Swee Suan.91 It was not long before even the Party's second-echelon leaders were
detained. On 22 March 1963, BS nominal Chairman Dr Lee led a protest march 
against the February detentions. This resulted in the arrest of 12 more people 
who were not brought to trial until 29 August. 92
The obliteration of the BS's leadership had precisely the desired effect. 
Tension in Singapore over the impending merger soon waned.93 Moreover, Lee's
improved domestic political position strengthened his negotiating position in the 
final merger talks. The result was that, &mongst other things, Lee succeeded in 
getting agreement to a common market written into the Malaysia Agreement.94
Singapore would also be allowed to retain considerable control over finance, 
labour and education. Lee's negotiating strength, in turn, obviously had positive 
implications for the PAP's domestic popularity. 
Despite the setbacks suffered by the BS, it had not totally given up hope of 
frustrating the merger. On 25 July, the government's motion in the Assembly to 
elect 15 members to represent Singapore in the Malaysian Parliament was blocked 
by the BS.95 The BS argued that State Elections should be held prior to sending
representatives to the Federal Parliament, obviously hoping that the electoral 
defeat of the PAP would see an end to merger. Lee was, understandably, not 
receptive to the BS's request but instead declared de facto Independence for 
Singapore on 31 August 1963. On 16 September Malaysia was officially 
promulgated. Meanwhile, on 12 September, the PAP declared that a General 
Election would be held on 21 September, in just nine days' time. Significantly, this 
would be after, and not before, the fact of merger.96
168 
The 1963 Election 
PAP attempts to obstruct the BS's election effort were extensive. Apart from the 
extremely short notice of the election, the government ordered festivities during 
the nine-day period before the election to mark the proclamation of Malaysia. 
This thereby reduced the effective electioneering days for the BS to just four and 
a half. There were other impediments however. Printing services were busy with 
orders for the Malaysia festivities and had also been subjected to government 
pressure not to publish BS literature. By contrast, the PAP had all its literature 
ready for circulation.97 The BS also had problems in obtaining public licenses for
street banners and public meetings due to uncharacteristic bureaucratic 
delays.98 Whereas the BS had been caught on the hop with the early election and
subsequently frustrated in its limited campaign, Lee had been exploiting his office 
to conduct tours of all 51 constituencies from November 1962 up until September 
1963 under the guise of government business. These tours were blatant attempts 
to drum up support for the PAP. 99
Not prone to complacency, on the eve of the election the government took 
further steps to incapacitate its opponents. On 28 August, deregistration notices 
were served on seven unions on the alleged grounds that funds were being 
channelled to political activities.100 Then, on 9 September, just three days before
nomination day, the bank accounts of the three largest left unions were frozen by 
the Registrar of Trade Unions to ensure that their funds could not be used" by the 
BS in the election.101
The 1963 election resulted in victory for the PAP. It won 37 seats to the 
BS's 13, though the PAP had secured only 46.9% of the total vote compared to the 
BS's 33.3%.102 The BS's defeat was the product of various factors. Without
question, the PAP's systematic attack on the labour movement since the split and 
the wholesale obliteration of BS leadership impaired the Party's electoral 
performance. PAP control of state machinery also gave the government a 
considerable advantage in the dissemination of propaganda. The government's 
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opponents also compounded their problems through vote splitting.103 However
these factors alone do not account for the magnitude of the PAP victory. With its 
markedly changed image, the PAP had not only wooed the English-educated who 
had previously supported the SPA and the Malays who had backed UMNO,104 but
it had obviously achieved significant success in its appeal to the Chinese-educated 
since the BS vote was down considerably. By September 1963 the government had 
chalked up some positive achievements which probably accounted for a good part 
of its electoral success, especially amongst the Chinese-educated working class. 
Most impressive of the government's achievements by the 1963 election was 
the spectacular construction of public housing. The HDB had completed 22,336 
new apartments in just three years, providing accommodation for approximately 
100,000 people.105 Increased expenditure on education had also brought positive
results so that by 1963 there were sufficient schools to provide a place at primary 
school for every child in Singapore.106 The P AP'.s economic management record
in reversing a significant Treasury deficit in 1959 into a M$400 million surplus by 
1963 was impressive. In terms of the State Development Plan, 1961-1964, rapid 
progress had been made in boosting infrastructure, especially on the Jurong 
project which provided a visible demonstration of the government's commitment 
to industrial development. -Finally, the achievement of merger by the Lee 
government represented a major political victory, one which enhanced the PAP's 
standing in the electorate. It also represented a fillip to the government's 
industrial plans in view of the provisions for a common market which Lee had 
drawn into the merger agreement . 
.Aftermath of the 1963 Election 
Assured of office for five years, the PAP acted with renewed vigour and 
confidence in dealing with the left after the 1963 election. The student and 
labour movements quickly came under pressure. The intent, of course, was to 
cripple the BS even further to cement the PAP in government, not just for the 
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next five years but well beyond. Shortly after the election, the government 
revoked the citizenship of Tan Lark Sye, the founder of the Nanyang University 
and contributor of substantial funds to the BS election campaign in 1963. Students 
from the Nanyang University, whose guild of graduates had also supported the BS 
campaign, were soon harassed too.107
Moves against left-controlled unions followed in early October when SATU 
attempted to challenge the government's notices served on seven unions to show 
cause why they should not be deregistered. On 8 October, a two-day national 
strike was called which was to involve 30 SATU unions. The government 
threatened strong action against any strike or student support of union militance. 
Response to SATU's call was disappointing. However, regardless of the limited 
effect of the strike, Lee was in no mood to tolerate dissent. Following Lee's con­
tention that recent civil disturbances amounted to a "communist plot to create 
tension and unrest in the state", lOS 17 SATU union leaders were arrested under
the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance.109 Those arrested included three
key BS Assembly people, the Party's Organising Secretary and the editor of the BS 
newspaper, Plebian.110 Deregistration of the seven unions thus proceeded.111
The PAP also dissolved the BS-dominated rural associations and hawker 
organisations, deregistered more SATU unions and encouraged employers to 
dismiss BS trade union cadres.112 Within just weeks of the 1963 election then, the
PAP had practically destroyed the last vestiges of BS leadership. It had gone a 
long way towards denying the BS any possibility of cons ti tu tionally challenging the 
PAP's supremacy. The PAP objective was crystal clear by now - the creation of a 
state in which only one party would ever enjoy the right to govern, that is, the 
PAP. This would be arrived at by systematically merging state and Party in such 
a way that both would ensure mutual reinforcement and identification. This would 
not only involve further concrete changes to the Party's organisation but the 
promotion of an ideological acceptance of the paternalism and authoritarianism 
characterising such changes. 
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In line with the government's intention of merging Party and state, in 
December 1963 the PAP announced that Citizens' Consultative Committees 
(CCCs) would be established in each of Singapore's 51 constituencies.113
Comprised of representatives of the various non-elected Street Committees 
within the constituencies, these CCCs were supposedly of dual purpose: to clarify 
and explain government policy and to receive grassroots complaints and 
requests.114 Whilst the stated objectives of the CCCs were praiseworthy, the
fact that Street Committee members would not be elected but appointed by the 
Permanent Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office raised doubts about the sin­
cerity of the government's receipt of complaints. More likely, the intention of the 
CCCs was to ensure that political dissent was neutralised or minimised: first, by 
favourably presenting government policy; and second, by directing dissent through 
the PAP-controlled state. This direct link with the masses, without the partisan 
stigma of Party identification (yet certainly with PAP influence and control) had 
the potential to further circumvent the capacity of other political parties to 
harness the dissent of interest groups. Though the first of these CCCs did not 
become operational until January 1965, the announcement in December 1963 
signified a new degree of sophistication in the P AP's approach to the task of 
securing its continued reproduction as the sole party of government. Whilst these 
and other measures did little to enhance Singapore's international reputation as a 
political democracy, they had a positive effect in attracting capital to 
Singapore. This was to increasingly become the rationale for the government's 
quelling of political opposition and its own entrenchment. 
Manufacturing Development, 1959-1963 
Having outlined the unfolding of the political struggle in the early years of self­
government and establishing the significance of such developments for Singapore's 
industrial strategy, it remains to examine the accompanied concrete changes in 
industry. Here we see how investors responded to the government's industrial 
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strategy and gain an insight into some of the constraints and opportunities 
perceived by investors as a result of government policy and the general dynamics 
of Singapore's political economy. The discussion below also identifies some of the 
more important government initiatives adopted in reaction to these perceptions. 
Whilst the period 1959-1963 was one of great political turmoil and activity, 
actual progress in the manufacturing sector was less dynamic. From a very small 
base, gross output increased from $398.9 million to $829.9 million, or 107 .8%, and 
value-added rose by $102.6 million or 95.2%, from $142.8 million to $245.4 
million. Probably of most significance, the level of employment provided by the 
sector rose only marginally from 25,607 in 1959 to 41,220 in 1963, an increase of 
15,613. This fell well short of the estimated requirement of 9,800 per year until 
1970 to achieve full employment. The consolation was that at least Singapore's 
population growth had dropped to 2.5% by 1963 after being 4% in 1959. Even so, 
at the end of 1963 Singapore's unemployment rate had risen to 14.0% after being 
13.2% in 1959 (see Table 1 in Appendix). 
Despite the failure of the manufacturing sector to provide the sort of 
ambitious growth hoped for, this sector did undergo some significant structural 
changes between 1959 and 1963. Some of those industries which were dominant 
contributors to total manufacturing output and value-added in 1959 were either 
joined or surpassed by a new group of industries. The dominant industries in 1959 
included food, beverages, printing and publishing, and electrical machinery, 
collectively accounting for 40.2% of gross manufacturing output and 49.5% of 
total manufacturing value-added. By the end of 1963, however, these shares had 
dropped to 32. 7% and 34. 7% respectively. A group of industries had emerged: 
tobacco, wood and cork products, metal products, and chemicals and petroleum 
products. Their collective share of gross manufacturing output rose from 32.4% 
to 42.6% and their share of total manufacturing value-added from 21.9% to 42.6% 
between 1959 and 1963.115
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The growth of the tobacco industry owed much to the indirect protection it 
enjoyed following the introduction in 1960 of differential import duties on tobacco 
and cigarettes. The metal products industry and the wood and cork products 
industry expanded mainly due to the capital investment programmes of the HDB 
and EDB which boosted building and construction. All these industries were 
primarily driven by the demands of domestic markets. The chemicals, chemical 
and petroleum products industry, which increased its share of gross output and 
value-added from 14.1 % to 26.4% and 6.6% to 13.4% respectively,116 had also
based its growth on the domestic market though its exports were significant too. 
The world's leading petroleum refining companies had invested in Singapore 
because of its strategic position in a region which comprised rapidly expanding 
markets. The fast growth of this industry was the high point of Singapore's 
industrial expansion between 1959 and 1963 but, owing to its characteristically 
high capital-intensity and low labour-intensity, it was not surprising that the 
manufacturing sector could boast only modest increased employment 
opportunities. 
Despite the failure of the manufacturing sector to achieve the desired 
growth, Singapore's policy makers were nevertheless encouraged by the trend of 
private capital investment in 1963, particularly that of pioneer companies. 
Through the special incentives offered in 1959, pioneer companies were expected 
to provide the impetus required to broaden the base and increase the level of 
manufacturing activity. Initial response by capital had been very poor, however. 
By the end of 1962, pioneer status had been granted to just 24 projects with a 
subscribed capital of $68 million employing 2,261.117 In 1963, however, things
began to pick up. By June 1963 the number of new industrial projects had 
increased to 42, involving an estimated subscribed capital of $163 million. By the 
end of 1963, the number of pioneer firms had risen dramatically to 113 with an 
estimated subscribed capital of $233 million, of which about 56% was to come 
from locally-based capital.118 This sharp increase in investment commitments in
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the second half of 1963 reflected the expectation of a common market which was 
written into the merger agreement between Singapore and Malaya. It also 
reflected the greater degree of business confidence in view of the P AP's 
resounding electoral victory in September and the Party's clear commitment to 
curbing labour militance and wage rises. 
Table 4: Relative Shares of Local and Foreign Capital 
in Pioneer Firms in Production at end of 1963 ($'000) 
Industry Group 
Food & Beverages 
Textiles, Garments & Leather 
Wood & Paper Products 
Rubber Products 
Chemicals & Chemical Products 
Petroleum & Petroleum Products 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
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As is indicated in Table 4 above, foreign-based capital accounted for a 
greater percentage than locally-based capital of the total capital invested in 
pioneer firms actually in production at the end of 1963, with 52.9% compared to 
47 .1 %. As is also pointed out, however, if the heavily foreign-dominated 
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petroleum and petroleum products industry is excluded, then locally-based capital 
provided as much as 69.4% of total subscribed capital of firms in production. 
Foreign-based capital was also dominant in those firms engaged in textiles, 
garments and leather and the non-metallic mineral products industries (as well as 
the very small electrical products industry). In the remaining industry groups 
locally-based capital was relatively strongly represented. Overall, then, by the 
end of 1963 the development of pioneer industries had involved roughly equal 
participation from domestic-based and foreign-based capital. 
Table 5: Foreign Investment in Pioneer Industries at end of 1963 
Country of Origin No. of Firms Capital Subscribed 
($'000) 
Australia 6 2,320 
Hongkong 19 8,000 
Italy 1 370 
Japan 22 27,230 
The Netherlands 2 2,500 
New Zealand 1 250 
Sweden 1 3,200 
Switzerland 3 5,300 
Taiwan 4 2,210 
United Kingdom 5 3,680 
United States 3 18,300 
International 3 15,200 
Total 70 88,560 
Source: Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1963, p.16. 
Data on foreign investment in those firms granted pioneer status (see Table 
5 above) indicate that by the end of 1963 there was a large number of different 
foreign investors in Singapore. The leading investor, however, was Japanese-based 
capital with 22 pioneer firms and a subscribed capital of $27,230,000. These 
! I 
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iiwestments, many of which were joint ventures with locally-based capital, ranged 
across many industry groups including food, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, 
chemical products, rubber products, transport equipment and paper products. The 
relatively high level of Japanese-based capital was primarily motivated by the 
desire to retain markets already established in Singapore which the Japanese saw 
as threatened by Singapore's import substitution plans and associated tariff 
barriers. The proposed common market also offered new expansion possibilities. 
More than any other group of investors, the Japanese gave the PAP confidence 
that the lure of a common market would be the basis for a successful and rapid 
industrialisation programme. 
Of the remaining investors, United States-based capital was the next most 
significant subscriber with $18,000,000 from just three firms. This reflected the 
heavy commitment by Mobil to refine petroleum in Singapore. Hong Kong-based 
capital followed with a subscription of $8,000,000 from 19 different firms, mainly 
small labour-intensive operations, especially in textiles. 
By the end of 1963, capital had been subscribed to a range of manufacturing 
operations such as oil refining, a steel mill, cement plants, textile mills, plywood 
and veneer factories, a modern shipyard and a number of light industrial products, 
most of which were heavily geared towards production for the Singapore and 
Malaysia markets. It was hoped that herein lay the foundation of the import­
substitution strategy in keeping with the objectives of the State Development 
Plan, 1961-1964. The problem in the short term, however, was that the number of 
pioneer firms actually engaged in production was still very low, being 29 at the 
end of 1963 (see Table 6 below). At this stage, pioneer firms accounted for just 
12% of all manufacturing value-added, 10% of output and just 6% of all 
employment for the sector.119 It was estimated, however, that when all 113
pioneer firms were in production, direct employment would increase to 18,000 (see 
Table 6) .120
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Table 6: Pioneer Firms by Industry Groups as on 31 December rn63. 
No. of Firms that have 
Commenced Production 
Total 
Number Firms Firms com- No. of 
of in Pro- menced Firms in 
Pioneer duction Production Production 
Firms by 1962 in 1963 in 1963 
Food &Beverages 13 3 1 4 
Textiles, Garments & 
Leather 24 7 7 
Wool & Paper Products 5 
Rubber Products 3 
Chemicals & Chemical 
Products 18 2 1 3 
Petroleum & Petroleum 
Products 7 3 2 5 
Non-Metallic Mineral 
Products 7 1 1 
Metals & Engineering 23 4 3 7 
Electrical Products 6 1 1 
Miscellaneous 7 1 1 
Total 113 14 15 29 
Source: Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1963, p.83. 
Significant progress was also made towards the implementation of the State 
Development Plan, 1961-1964. As Table 7 shows, total public expenditure under 
the Plan for the three years was $480.32 million, representing 73.8% of the 
original target for the period. Given the slow start in implementing the Plan, this 
was quite impressive. Expenditure on economic development represented 74.9% 
of the target. Actual expenditure on electricity and the Jurong project exceeded 
original estimates and all of the $100 million provided for the EDE had been utilis­
ed. Progress on the Jurong project was such that by the end of 1963, 1,800 acres 
of land had been prepared, 24 million cubic yards being moved in the process. At 








Table 7: Development Expenditure, 1961-1963 
1961 1962 1963 1961-1963 
Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual 
Provision Expendi- Provis ion Expendi- Provision Expendi- Provision Expendi-
ture ture ture ture 
( In $ Mil lions) 
118. 84 85.78 122.69 88.73 140 .11 111.52 381. 94 286 .03 
84 .09 48.45 93.84 63.60 80.4 7 72.06 258.40 184 .11 
3.93 1. 74 3 .97 1. 94 2.78 6.50 10.68 10 .18 
206. 86 135. 97 220.50 151½.27 223.66 190.08 651.02 4 80 .32 
Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Office, First Development Plan 1961-
1964, · Review of Progress For The Three Years Ending 31st December 1963, 














Actual expenditure only exceeded Plan provisions for housing in the Services 
Sector between 1961 and 1963. This, however, was by far the largest portion of 
estimated expenditure anyway. A total of $118.30 million was channelled into 
housing during the period, enabling the HDB to build 29,635 units, against the 
target of 26,521.122
Table 8: Public Investments in Manufacturing in 1963 
Sugar Industry of Singapore Ltd 
National Grain Elevator Ltd 
Singapore Textile Industries Ltd 
United Industrial Corporation Ltd 
Singapore Polymer Corporation Pte Ltd 
Jurong Shipyard Ltd 
Ceramics (M) Pte. Ltd 
Equity Participation 
Govt. Foreign Local 
40.0% 23.5% 36.5% 
69.2% 10.8% 20.0% 
14.1% 17.9% 68.0% 
16.5% n.a. n.a.
37.0% 20.1% 42.9% 
10.2% 12.7% 77.1% 
14.9% n.a. n.a.
Source: Lee Sheng-Yi, Public Finance and Public Investment in Singapore, 
Singapore: Kong Brothers Press for The Institute of Banking and 
Finance, 1978, pp.216-223. 
Apart from the infrastructural improvements, the Singapore government 
also increased its direct stake in the industrial sector by the end of 1963. In April 
1963, the Jurong Shipyard was incorporated. This was a joint-venture of the 
Singapore government (49%) and the Japanese-based Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy 
Industries Company Ltd. (51 %). Initial authorised capital for the project was $30 
million.123 The purpose of the government's involvement was to stimulate the
shipbuilding and shiprepairing industry, one with large overheads and long 
gestation periods and therefore, unlikely to develop spontaneously out of local 
capital. This industry was also important to Singapore's development as an 
entrepot port and promised good growth prospects; Before long, this company 
would become sufficiently profitable to be an important source of government 
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revenue and an example of the scope for public investment in Singapore's 
industrialisation. In all, seven public enterprises in manufacturing were 
established in 1963, essentially out of anticipation of a large home market. Table 
8 above details these investments. These seven investments took the 
government's total to 11 by the end of 1963.124 This represented the start of an
important trend and reflected the government's thinking that the question of 
industrial structure should not be left solely to the market - especially given the 
absence of a domestic industrial bourgeoisie of any consequence. 
Conclusion 
The period between 1959 and September 1963 when Singapore entered the 
Federation of Malaysia was marked by profound changes. None was more 
profound than the political change which in turn decisively influenced the 
direction of social and economic change. Not only did the PAP split, and 
thereafter have to contend with the BS opposition, but a whole new state 
structure emerged through which the PAP attempted to institutionalise its own 
dominance and reproduction. As we have seen, this involved more than the 
blatant repression of political opposition and the labour movement. It also 
involved the merging of state and Party. Such a relationship was expected to 
generate ideological justification for the repression of opposition and the PAP's 
dominance. In the future it would also provide the government with the capacity 
to implement its industrial programme with great co-ordination of the factors of 
production and minimal opposition from organised labour. 
As has been explained, the industrial programme initiated by the PAP was in 
response to urgent social problems. Once the PAP split, however, the programme 
assumed greater political significance and various measures were adopted to 
accelerate the programme's implementation. Given that by now the PAP had 
successfully secured its electoral survival by a combination of labour control and 
improved material conditions for the working class, the basis for the emergence of 
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a paternalistic authoritarian state had been laid. As Singapore entered Malaysia, 
there was some evidence to suggest that industrial capital was increasingly 
appreciative of the nature of the Singapore state and optimistic about the 
prospects of a common market. There were, of course, many unsolved political 
and economic questions to be faced, but for the first time in Singapore's history 
there was a real possibility of the establishment of a significant industrial sector. 
182 
FOOTNOTES 
1. C.M. Turnbull, A History of Singapore 1819-1975, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1982, p.272.
2. Release was conditional on signed statements of disassociation with the
Malayan Communist Party.
3. Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945-
1963, London: Faber & Faber, 1973, p.151.
4. Seah Chee Meow, Community Centres in Singapore, Singapore: Singapore
University Press, 1973, p.14.
5. ibid., p.16.
6. This control was consolidated in 1957 following the Labour Front coalition
government's decision to establish the Community Recreation Division to
supervise the centres' recreational activities. This severed the Department
of Social Welfare's links with community centres. See ibid., p.17.
7. ibid., p.21.
8. The main function of the IAC, of which there were two by 1962, were to
register and certify collective. agreements, to interpret collective
agreements or awards, to vary the terms outlined in collective agreements
or awards, to play a conciliatory role and to refer disputes arising from the
administration of collective agreements to referees. See Pang Eng Fong,
"Changing Patterns of Industrial Relations in Singapore", in Peter S.J. Chen
and Hans-Dieter Evers (editors), Studies in ASEAN Sociology, Singapore:
Chopmen Enterprises, 1978, pp. 425-426.
9. Pang Eng Fong and Tan Chwee Huat in Frederic C. Deyo, Dependent
Development and Industrial Order, New York: Praeger, 1981, p.48.
10. Michael Leifer, "Politics in Singapore. The First Term of the People's
Action Party 1959-1963", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 2 (2),
1964, p.106.
11. Although the Bill passed the Legislative Assembly, it did not receive the
assent of the Head of State. This conveniently defused the issue.
12. Leifer, 1964, p.106.
13. ibid., pp. 106-107.
14. For example, see "Warning To Labour", Far Eastern Economic Review,
17 .11.60, pp.339-340.
15. ibid., p.340.
16. Pang Cheng Lian, "The People's Action Party, 1954-1963", Journal of
Southeast Asian History, X (I), 1969, p.149.
17. Goh Chok Tong, "Industrial Growth, 1959-66", in Ooi Jin-Bee and Chiang














The government appointed a World Bank Mission to examine economic 
aspects of Malaysia, in particular the "feasibility of common market 
arrangements". See Jacques Rueff, Mission of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, A Synopsis of The Report on the 
Economic Aspects of Malaysia, Singapore: Malaya Publishing House, 1963. 
Ngiam Peng Teck, "Industrialisation in Singapore", AMPO, Japan-Asia 
Quarterly Review, 8 (4) and 9 (1-2), Special Issue, 1977, p.109. 
Helen Hughes, "From Entrepot Trade to Manufacturing", in Helen Hughes 
and You Poh Seng (editors), Foreign Investment and Industrialisation in 
Singapore, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1969, p.24. 
Ministry of Finance, Singapore, State of Singapore Development Plan, 
1961-1964, Singapore: Government Printer, 1961, p.48. 
ibid., p.21. 
Kunio Yoshihara, Foreign Investment and Domestic Response, Singapore: 
Eastern Universities Press, 1976, p.21. 
This was emphasised earlier in International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, The Report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development on The Economic Development of Malaya, Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1955. 
This would make Singapore's factory space cheaper than that of comparable 
industrial space in Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan or the Philippines. See 
Joseph Z. Reday, "What Does Singapore Offer Investors?" Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 22.11.62, p.419. 
It was created in 1960 to build low-cost public housing and carry out slum 
clearance and urban renewal. 
This was later raised to M$200 milliion. See Willard A. Hanna, "Go-Ahead 
At Goh's Folly", American Universities Field Staff Report, Southeast Asia 
Series, XII (10), 1964, p.1. 
K. Tregonning, "The New York of Malaysia", Far Eastern Economic Review,
27 .9.62, p.565.
29. E.L. Wheelwright, Industrialization in Malaysia, Melbourne: Melbourne






Lee Soo Ann, Industrialization in Singapore, Camberwell: Longman, 1973,
p.29.
Hanna, 1964, p.4. 
Ministry of Finance, 1961, p.58. 
Turnbull, 1982, p.277. 
For the list of 'Sixteen Resolutions', see Shee Poon Kim, The People's 
Action Party of Singapore, 1954-1970; A Study of Survivalism of a Single­
Dominant Party, Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, 
Indiana University, 1971, pp. 40-41. 
35. ibid.
184 
36. Pang Cheng Lian, Singapore's People's Action Party: Its History,
Organization and Leadership, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971,
p.9.
37. A joint statement signed by Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan and Sandra
Woodhull declared: "The PAP has a very considerable task before it, and its
policies as set out in its election manifesto are fundamentally correct". As
quoted in ibid.
38. They were S.V. Lingam and Ng Teng Kian.
39. T.S. George, Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, London: Andre Deutsch, 1973,
p.54.
40. Ong won 7,747 votes and Jek Yuen Thong (PAP) just 2,820.
41. See Pang 1971, pp.9-10.
42. Shee 1971, p.47.
43. ibid., p.11.
44. The Tunku was addressing the Foreign Correspondents' Association in
Singapore. See Milton E. Osborne, Singapore and Malaysia, Data Paper
Number 53, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell
University, Ithaca, New York, July 1974, p.15.
45. Lee contended that the BS's argument about how the ISC represented an
attack on democratic rights was of no concern to voters in the Hong Lim
by-election. Rather, they were concerned about jobs and better and
cheaper housing. See Lee Kuan Yew, Battle For Merger, Singapore, 1961,
pp.60-61.
46. The 'Trade Union Six' or 'Big Six' comprised Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee
Suan, Sandra Woodhull, Dominic Puthucheary, S.T. Bani and Jamit Singh.
47. C. Paul Bradley, "Leftist Fissures in Singapore Politics", The Western
Political Quarterly, 18 (2), 1965, p.300.
48. As quoted in Leifer, 1964, p.109.
49. Pang, 1971, p.11.
50. ibid., p.12.
51. On the same day, 14 July, three political secretaries who opposed merger
challenged Lee Kuan Yew to sack them. This Lee did the following day.
See ibid.
52. ibid.
53. Marshall won by 546 votes, with 3,598 votes compared to Awang's 3,052.
54. Lee, 1961, pp.48-51.
55. Turnbull, 1982, p.279.
185 
56. The 13 included five party secretaries. See ibid.
57. Pang 1971, p.15.
58. See ibid., p.14.
59. See Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Office, First Development
Plan 1961-1964, Review of Progress For The Three Years Ending 31st
December, 1963, Singapore: Government Printer, 1964, p.3.
60. Hanna, 1964, p.7.
61. ibid., pp.9-10.
62. ibid., p.10.
63. Turnbull, 1982, p.283.
64. C.V. Devan Nair and Che' Awang, the former STUC and PAP candidate for
the Anson by-election, were the leaders of the NTUC. See Pang, 1971,
p.16.
65. Pang in Chen and Evers (editors), 1978, p.426.
66. "Industrial Unrest", Far Eastern Economic Review, 25.1.62, pp.130-131.
67. Seah Chee Meow, The Singapore Bureaucracy and Issues of Transition,
Occasional Paper Series, Number 12, Department of Political Science,
University of Singapore, February 1975, p.55.
68. Leifer, 1964, p.110.
69. Therefore, the PAP's 26 Assembly members were appointed chairmen of
their respective Party branches. See Pang, 1971, p.15.
70. See Thomas J. Bellows, The People's Action Party of Singapore: The
Emergence of a Dominant Party System, New Haven: Yale University
Southeast Asian Studies, Monograph Series, Number 14, 1973, pp.28-29.
71. Pang, 1971, p.16.
72. Bellows, 1973, p.48.
73. Singapore was being offered 15 of the 159 seats although its population
should have entitled it to about 30 seats. See Nancy McHenry Fletcher,
The Separation of Singapore From Malaysia, Southeast Asia Program,
Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, Data
Paper: Number 53, July 1969, p.29. The BS was joined by the UPP and the
Workers' Party in condemning the lack of proportional representation. See
Leifer, 1964, p.110.
74. See Osborne, 1964, p.l where he discusses the political significance of
Singapore's predominantly Chinese population for merger.
75. BS Chairman, Dr Lee Siew Choh, stated: "Our stand is that every Singapore
citizen should automatically become a Federal citizen on merger. That is
on merger, all 624,000 Singapore citizens, irrespective of whether they
were born in Singapore, India, China or Timbuctoo, will automatically (sic)
become 624,000 Federal citizens". As quoted in Shee, 1971, p.64.
186 
76. Leifer, 1964, p.111 suggests that the BS's objections to merger were
designed to sabotage and not improve it.
77. Clutterbuck, 1973, p.158.
78. Pang, 1971, p.16.
79. The PAP exploited this 'complete merger' proposal to the fullest in
attempting to discredit the BS. It argued that other drawbacks which
would follow from a 'Penang-type merger' included the introduction 9f the
Federation's discriminatory four-to-one ratio in the civil service and a
number of other measures would negatively affect English-educated civil
servants as well as Chinese educationalists and business people. See
Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation,
Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malay, 1974, p.162.
80. See Lee, 1961, which comprises the transcripts of the radio talks.
81. As quoted in Bellows, 1973, p.48.
82. 561,599 (90%) of the 624,000 registered electors voted. Of these, 397,626
voted for 'A', 9,422 for 'B', 7,911 for 'C', and 144,077 cast blank votes.
See Pang, 1971, p.16.
83. George, 1973, p.66.
84. As quoted in Alex Josey, "Singapore's Extreme Left Wing", Far Eastern
Economic Review, 6.12.62, p.529.
85. ibid.
86. As quoted in Fong Sip Chee, The PAP Story - The Pioneering Years,
Singapore: Times Periodicals for Chai Chee Branch, People's Action Party,
1980, p.125.
87. Pang in Chen and Evers (editors), 1978, p.426.
88. Fong, 1980, p.126.
89. "What is at Stake?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 21.2.63, pp.349-350.
90. Between 2 February and 8 February, 115 people were arrested. See ibid.,
p.349.
91. ibid. Also see Fong, 1980, p.128.
92. Clutterbuck, 1973, p.160.
93. Turnbull, 1982, p.281.
94. Leif er, 1964, p.113.
95. The vote was locked at 23 to 23. See Fong, 1980, p.133.
96. ibid., p.134.
97. According to the BS, the PAP's foreknowledge of an early election enabled
it to have its material published in Hong Kong three months earlier. See
Pang 1971, p.17.
98. George, 1973, p.67.
187 
99. Lee rationalised these tours as necessary "to ensure that the performance
of the Singapore Government is kept up to the best possible level of
achievement". See Pang, 1971, p.17.
100. Fong 1980, p.144.
101. Leifer, 1964, p.115.
102. For a full account of election results see Fong, 1980, pp.208-213.
103. The United People's Party (UPP), led by Ong Eng Guan, whilst winning just
one of the 46 seats it contested and securing just 8% of the total vote, was
indirectly responsible for the PAP winning sea ts in seven constituencies
against serious BS challenges. See Leifer, 1964, p.116. Pang, 1969, p.154
argues that some sort of alliance or arrangement between the UPP and the
BS would have served both parties well since in 21 of the 51 constituencies
the combined UPP/BS vote exceeded that of the PAP.
104. The Singapore Alliance, an electoral amalgamation of the SPA, UMNO,
MCA and MIC, obtained just 8% of the total vote and failed to win a single
seat. In only three constituencies did the Singapore Alliance indirectly
account for the PAP losing seats. See Leifer, 1964, pp.115-116.
105. "Singapore Under the PAP", Far Eastern Economic Review, 18.7.63, p.170.
106. Pang, 1971, p.18.
107. See Clutterbuck, 1973, p.161.
108. As quoted in Shee, 1971, pp.67-68.
109. Bradley, 1965, p.307.
110. Shee, 1971, p.67.
111. See Fong, 1980, p.144.
112. Turnbull, 1982, p.286.
113. Bellows, 1973, p.106.
114. ibid.
115. As calculated from Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix.
116. As calculated from Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix.
117. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1962, p.5.
118. Ronald Ma and You Poh Seng, The Economy of Malaysia and Singapore,
Singapore: Malaysia Publications, 1966, p.18.
119. Hughes in Hughes and You (editors), 1969, p.26.
120. Ma and You, 1966, p.18.
188 
121. Goh Keng Swee, The Economics of Modernization, Singapore: Asia Pacific
Press, 1972, p.261.
122. Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Office, 1964, p.30.
123. Hanna, 1964, p.10.
124. As calculated from Li Sheng-Yi, Public Finance and Public Investment in
Singapore, Singapore: Kong Brothers Press for The Institute of Banking and
Finance, 1978, Appendix 8A, pp.216-223.
129. As quoted in "The Jurong Story", Far Eastern Economic Review, 27.8.64,
p.383.
------�- - - -- -------------�---�. 
189 
CHAPTER 5 
THE MALAYSIAN EXPERIENCE, 1963-1965: THE FAILURE OF MERGER 
Introduction 
With the long-standing PAP objective of political merger with Malaya realised, 
the Singapore government looked forward to the economic union of the Malaysian 
states. The prospect of a market of 11 million people and the likelihood of 
greater political stability was expected to provide additional attraction to capital 
investing in Singapore, a site by now boasting quality social and physical infra­
structure. Merger, however, failed to fulfil the expectations of either the 
Singapore or Malaysia governments. Instead, a series of political conflicts 
culminated in Singapore's separation from Malaysia in August 1965, leading to a 
fundamental change in the direction of its industrial policies. 
The collapse of merger between Singapore and Malaya was the consequence 
. of a complex of problems. From the outset, the relationship was characterised by 
certain fundamental conflicts of economic and political interest. In themselves, 
these problems were not insurmountable. However, the attempt to resolve these 
contradictions was seriously handicapped by the mistrust and suspicion between 
the two governments which were born out of the embittered final negotiations 
over merger. An additional problem was that the perceived function of merger 
was not the same for both governments. This meant that the urgency of any 
problem was not always equally appreciated. In particular, the Tunku had no real 
commitment to or concern about Lee's import-substitution industrialisation 
programme. Furthermore, the PAP's perception of Singapore's importance to the 
Federation was not shared by the Alliance government in Kuala Lumpur. The 
assumption that its economic importance to the Federation entitled it to a special 
political relationship with the Federal government was never accepted by the 
Tunku. Moreover, this assumption inevitably incurred the wrath of the Malayan 
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Chinese Association (MCA) which fully comprehended the threat posed to it by 
such a view .1
Even before separation, the various difficulties of merger had manifested in 
economic relations between Singapore and Malaya. Thus, economic co-operation 
gave way to competition. Not surprisingly then, capital's initial enthusiasm for 
the prospect of an expanded market was followed by justified scepticism. 
The failure of merger represented devestation for the PAP's economic 
strategy. It also constituted a grave political failing on its part since so much of 
its political credibility had been invested in merger. The latter was less 
problematic in view of the declining potency of political opponents in Singapore. 
The economic dilemma, however, cannot be under-stated. The apparent loss of 
any hope of a large common market would certainly undermine the PAP's efforts 
to attract sufficient capital to make a success of its strategy of import­
substitution industrialisation. Needless to say, the collapse of this strategy and 
the failure to address the serious level of unemployment would in turn adversely 
effect the PAP's political fortunes. The collapse of merger therefore precipitated 
a whole new context within which industrial policy would be decided. A radical 
change in dfrection soon resulted. 
Background to Merger 
In contrast with negotiations over political responsibilities and rights, reaching 
agreement over financial and economic relationships between the Singapore and 
Federal governments proved an arduous and, ultimately, divisive process.2 The
difficulties encountered in these negotiations not only contributed to the spirit of 
mistrust which plagued inter-governmental relations from the time of Malaysia's 
birth, they also foreshadowed conflicts of interest which would later assume 
greater significance. 
Whereas for the PAP merger was primarily of importance to its industrial 
programme, for the Malayan government it was essentially a means of securing its 
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own political security by more direct control over Singapore and its left wing. 
Apart from this difference in perspective, there were more concrete reasons for 
the reluctance of the Federal government to be drawn into any detailed 
agreement on a common market. So long as Singapore manufacturers enjoyed the 
duty-free import of raw materials by virtue of the island's entrepot port status, as 
well as cheaper labour costs, it was unlikely that the removal of tariff walls would 
be to the benefit of manufacturers in Malaya. The PAP, of course, was reluctant 
to sacrifice the duty-free status of its port since its economy was so dependent 
upon this trade in the short term. A compounding difficulty in negotiations over a 
common market was that the Alliance government lacked any comparable long 
term vision of economic goals or strategy to that of the PAP. 
Negotiations over financial relations also encountered problems. In essence, 
Singapore sought to secure a far greater degree of autonomy over its finances 
than the Federal government was prepared to accept. The PAP argued that its 
own programmes in housing, industry, education and welfare necessitated 
considerable revenue. For its part, the Federal government was determined that 
Singapore make a substantial contribution in revenue in view of the services it 
would receive. Furthermore, it was keen to see that Singapore's prosperity 
strengthened the Federal government's capacity to promote balanced economic 
growth throughout the Federation. 
The PAP's success in eventually forcing an agreement on the common 
market was due to a number of factors. However, Lee's success in convincing the 
Tunku that a settlement on revenue would be enhanced by an undertaking on the 
common market was decisive. The exploitation by the PAP of a report by the 
IBRD, which had been requested by the Federal government assisted Lee in this 
approach. The Reuff Report, as it was known, added weight to the PAP's 
argument for a common market and, even though the Federal government was less 
than happy with its recommendations, it became the basis of subsequent negotiat­
ions. 3 Once discussions focused on the question of a possible economic union, the 
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greater expertise and clearer economic vision of the PAP worked in its favour. 
Lee also exploited the growing political opposition by the Indonesian government 
to the formation of Malaysia. He knew that the Tunku would be receptive to 
compromise rather than allow opponents of the Federation to capitalise on public 
disclosures of differences between the Federal and Singapore governments.4
Whilst Lee was driving a hard bargain in the merger negotiations, matters 
were further complicated by public clashes between the PAP and the MCA. 
Attempts by the MCA to 'revitalise' its Singapore branch were not welcomed by 
the PAP. Such moves were seen as an attempt to undermine the P AP's domestic 
relations with business and to mar relations between Lee and the Tunku. Lee 
appealed to the Tunku to "sort them out", that is, the MCA.5 The Tunku,
however, dismissed Lee's claim that UMNO's relations with the MCA were in any 
way problematic to merger.6 There was no doubt that even before merger the
PAP and MCA saw each other as direct threats to their respective political 
fortunes in the new Federation. 
Naturally the tensions created by the caustic public exchanges between the 
PAP and the MCA and Federal government did not aid the negotiations over 
financial arrangements. Lee's refusal to submit to the Tunku's demands that 
Singapore pay the Federal government $50 million out of its healthy reserves to 
assist in the development of the Borneo territories also added to ill-feeling 
between the two governments. 
The final agreement, arrived at on 5 July 1963, resulted in a compromise 
between the parties. Singapore agreed to pay 40% of its national income from 
taxes (equivalent to 27% of its total revenue) to the Federal government as its 
contribution to pan-Malaysian expenses. The Federal government obviously hoped 
to improve on this arrangement in the future however, since it was agreed that 
this amount be reviewed one year after the establishment of Malaysia and every 
two years thereafter.7 On the question of a special Borneo grant, the Singapore
government did not agree to give any money but to provide a 15-year loan of $150 
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million to the Borneo territories on the condition that Singapore could supply up to· 
50% of the labour required for the projects it would be financing. 
The agreement which Lee secured over a common market was contained in 
Annex J of the written document, and only after considerable persistence. It was 
only a loose and vague agreement by comparison with the recommendations of the 
Reuff Report : 
The Federal Government ... shall progressively establish a common 
market in Malaysia for all goods or products produced, manufactured 
or assembled in significant quantities in Malaysia, with the 
exception of goods and products of which the principal terminal 
markets lie outside Malaysia.8 
The agreement provided for a Tariff Advisory Board (TAB) to be established to 
make recommendations on protective duties.9 Given the role assigned the TAB,
the government provided for less freedom of competition in the Malaysian market 
than originally argued for by the Singapore government. Still, in essence the 
PAP's crucial common market request was embodied in the agreement. 
Although the financial and economic questions had been temporarily 
resolved, the difficulties between the governments were not yet over. In response 
to international pressure and mounting Indonesian hostility towards the 
prospective merger of the Borneo territories with the Federation of Malaysia, the 
Tunku supported the idea of a United Nations mission to Sarawak and North 
Borneo to gauge the will of the Borneo people before proc�eding with merger.10
Lee, however, was not prepared to delay the official declaration of Malaysia to 
allow the mission the necessary time. Lee defied the Tunku's requests for co­
operation and proclaimed Singapore's independence on 31 August 1963 rather than 
wait for the re-scheduled date of 16 September. According to Lee, the Singapore 
government was the Trustee for the Federal government over the next 15 days in 
defence and external affairs matters. If this premature declaration was not 
enough to cause bitter resentment, Lee added insult to injury by referring to the 
"naive approach" of some people to whom power had been handed over "on a silver 
platter with red ribbons" .11 This only served to further arouse the suspicion and
resentment of the PAP by the Alliance partners.12
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Clearly, as Singapore entered Malaysia relations had suffered from the 
process by which differences had been discussed and pursued. Added to this, there 
were certain underlying conflicts of interest which had not been satisfactorily 
resolved in the merger agreement. Though the Federal government viewed the 
terms of the agreement to be particularly favourable to Singapore, it was hopeful 
that a mutually acceptable redress would eventually be arrived at. Political 
differences soon surfaced, however, which made that redress more urgent and yet 
less attainable. 
Political/Racial Conflict 
Despite the clashes before the official declaration of merger, the PAP genuinely 
sought to work in concert with the Federal government. This was underlined by 
Lee on the eve of Singapore's September elections in which UMNO and PAP 
candidates contested seats: "It is my belief that the Tunku and Tun Abdul Razak 
will work with us - not today or next month, but in years to come. We calculate in 
terms of elections".13 The implications of this statement were clear to the MCA
leadership which had already concluded that the PAP posed a threat to its 
partnership with the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) in the Alliance 
government. As for UMNO itself, it too was wary of the long-term implications 
of any PAP electoral presence on the mainland. This was already reflected in the 
disproportionately low number of seats granted to Singapore in the Federal 
parliament, an indication of the Alliance's desire that the PAP play only a nominal 
political role in the Federation.14 A speech by Lee on 9 September in which the
Tunku understood Lee was discounting the possibility of the PAP contesting the 
1964 Federal elections was thus welcomed by UMN0.15 UMNO's view of the PAP
as a potential threat was hardened by the poor showing of its own candidates in 
Singapore's September elections in which the PAP enjoyed considerable Malay 
support. 
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Interesti1:gly, Lee evidently presumed that his Party's performance in the 
September elections must have enhanced the PAP's chances of eventual Federal 
recognition : 
We want to co-operate and work in the common interests of 
Malaysia. We want to help them understand what they do not 
understand - the problem of urban Chinese in the cities, in the town 
where over the last few years, the MCA and MIC have lost ground to 
a whole host of opposition parties in Malaya - like the PAP, the 
Socialist Front and the UDP. And it can be resolved provided there 
is an intelligent appraisai.16
Drysdale argues that this statement appeared to suggest that Lee anticipated the 
Alliance would invite one or two of the PAP's House of Representatives members 
into the Ministry. The "intelligent appraisal" would ultimately require the MCA to 
be replaced by the PAP as a government partner.17 The Tunku, however, did not
entertain such thoughts of the PAP's importance to Malaysian politics, nor the 
apparent assumption that the PAP would be brought into government under some 
vertically structured power sharing arrangement.18
Reservation and suspicion about the PAP also stemmed from the radical 
associations and image of the Party. This was not unfounded. Al though the PAP 
had proven a less radical government than first anticipated, the Party 
nevertheless had a clear commitment to, and record of, a more equitable 
distribution of wealth and opportunity. The PAP was also characterised by a 
relative separation from business interests which made it possible to carry out 
social reform without harm to its political base. This contrasted with the 
conservative Alliance government. Moreover, the PAP's analysis of Malayan 
society and its prognosis for improved living conditions for the masses placed 
fundamental emphasis on socio-economic questions. Communalist questions were 
secondary to, and consequent of, socio-economic questions. Any attempt to 
obscure these fundamental questions was viewed by the PAP as a convenient 
screen by which vested interests tried to reproduce their own dominance: 
If Chinese, Malay and Indian workers and farmers can be led to 
believe that economic conflict is based on racial rather than class 
interests, then, so the forces of reaction calculate, there will be no 
danger of Chinese, Malay and Indian workers uniting on a class basis 
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to resist exploitation by Chinese, Indian, Malay and British 
capitalists. Thus it is significant that left wing and socialist parties 
in Malaya are organised on a non-racial and non-communal basis. On 
the other hand, the communal parties in Malaya, by and lar�9 
stand 
for the economic status quo - that is for a capitalist society. 
While the PAP's opposition to capitalism may have moderated since the 
above was written into the Party platform in 1959, its stated opposition to 
communalism was as strong as ever at the time of merger. For this reason, the 
PAP argued that it was unable to extend the Special Privileges enjoyed by 
mainland Malays to those in Singapore. The preference for socio-economic 
questions, however, taken in conjunction with the fact that the PAP was a 
Chinese-dominated party, was suspected by some UMNO elements to amount to 
anti-Malay prejudice. This suspicion was to greatly complicate the PAP's 
relations with the Federation. 
If Lee had in fact implied that the PAP would not be contesting the 1964 
Federal elections, circumstances soon prompted a revision. With the Federal 
government putting its full weight behind a resurgence of the Singapore branch of 
UMNO, and with the Tunku so far disregarding the P AP's electoral strength in 
favour of the MCA, the PAP decided that a 'token' participation in the elections 
was necessary. A demonstration of electoral appeal had become a matter of 
urgency since the decision to hold state elections in Malaya concurrently with 
Federal elections would otherwise deprive the PAP of the chance to prove its 
worth for another five years.20 The PAP's belief that it had a future as the
rightful representative of the increasing urban proletariat was summarised thus : 
Our long-range objective, quite frankly, is to start a social 
revolution in Malaysia and break down the communal walls in this 
country. Our short term objective is just as clear. We want to 
defeat the Socialist Front and the Malayan Chinese Association, and 
by doing so prove to the Tunku that we are the only party that can 
appeal to progressive-minded Malaysians in the cities of this 
country.21 
The PAP was at pains, however, to emphasise that it was contesting the MCA and 
not UMNO itself in the election. 
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Although UMNO may have had doubts about the electoral appeal of the 
MCA, the PAP's participation in the April elections served only to bring the 
Alliance partners closer together. The Tunku considered that Lee had broken an 
earlier pledge not to contest the elections.22 The more extreme Malay
nationalists, such as UMNO Secretary-General Dato Syed Jaffar Albar, were 
convinced that the PAP was ultimately out to destroy UMNO and the Malayan 
Indian Congress (MIC).23
The election results were disastrous for the PAP. It won only one of the 
nine seats it contested in peninsular Malaysia, with the MCA picking up six of the 
remaining eight. Although there were various reasons for the poor PAP showing, 
the most important point to emerge was that the Party's attempt to transcend 
communalism had been counter-productive. As a Chinese-dominated party, 
concentrating its campaign in the predominantly Chinese-populated cities, the 
PAP appeared to its opponents to be striving to re-assert the very Chinese social 
and economic ascendancy which they were committed to correcting. Lee's talk 
about the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' and the call for social and economic changes 
to solve problems of inequality fell on deaf ears. The real intentions of the PAP, 
it was presumed, were concealed by such talk. Lee appeared insensitive to the 
extent to which Malay cultural nationalism influenced the consciousness of his 
political opponents and the electorate generally. From this point on, fears and 
resentment of the PAP by the MCA and UMNO intensified. In particular, the 
more extreme elements of UMNO stepped-up their campaign to expose what they 
saw as the socialist intent of the PAP. Lee's abrasive debating style and 
continued denunciation of communalism only compounded the conflict. 
UMNO's attacks on the PAP increasingly focused on the plight of Singapore's 
Malays who enjoyed almost none of the privileges of Malays across the 
causeway.24 Since merger, the material improvement of Malays in Singapore had
been minimal, despite expectations to the contrary. By June 1964, significant 
discontent among Malays had surfaced. This was accentuated when the PAP 
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government began resettling Malays from their l:ampongs to make way for HDB 
flats. UMNO exploited this discontent and, through the Malay language Singapore 
daily newspaper, Utusan Malayu, stirred up anti-PAP sentiment. On 12 July, 
Jaffar Albar arrived in Singapore to mount a campaign to secure privileges for 
Singapore's Malays.25 Lee subsequently refused to meet the UMNO 'action
committee' to discuss the question.26 He remained adamant that legislation to
give economic advantages to Malays was not on. By this time, communal tension 
was high. On 20 July, pamphlets headed "Singapore Malay National Action 
Committee" were circulated in which it was claimed the Chinese in Singapore had 
plans to kill Malays.27 The next day, communal incidents at a Muslim procession
sparked a full-scale race riot in which 21 people were killed and 460 injured.28
Another smaller riot broke out on 4 September in which eight people were killed 
and sixty injured. This second riot appeared to involve some Indonesian 
complicity. 29
From UMNO's point of view, the riots resulted from the legitimate 
grievances of oppressed Malays in Singapore. From the PAP's point of view, much 
of the discontent had been manufactured by UMNO extremists. In any case, both 
Lee and the Tunku recognised the peril of continuing the brazen verbal attacks on 
each other and it was mutually agreed in August that a 'truce' be called in the 
interests of racial harmony. This was short lived, however. In September, the 
Malayan Minister Khir Johair announced that efforts would be made to ensure the 
newly-formed Singapore Alliance Party (a political union of UMNO, MCA, MIC 
and the SP A) defeated the PAP at the next general elections in Singapore in 
1967. The PAP Chairman, Toh Chin Chye, responded with the news that the PAP 
was soon to be 'reoriented and reorganised so that we can get at Malaya'.30
With an escalating war of words providing the background to the 
November/December budget debate in Federal parliament, the PAP adopted the 
role of 'de facto opposition' rather than its previous self-defined role of 'loyal 
opposition' in closely scrutinising the budget. Apart from specifically attacking 
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the budget estimates and proposals for payroll and turnover taxes, both inside and 
outside parliament, the PAP condemned the tenor of the budget which it claimed 
favoured the rich at the poor's expense. 31 Unaccustomed to such close analysis,
the criticisms were received as divisive and destructive by the Federal 
government. By this time the PAP had most likely given up all hope of partnering 
UMNO but, just to make sure, in December the Tunku reiterated that there would 
be no place for the PAP in any Federal government.32 In the same month, the
Tunku also first publically raised the possibility of separation. 33
In the following months public recriminations continued virtually unabaited 
and the proposed common market started to feature in the dispute. More 
significantly, positions over communal relations became more polarised. Another 
important development was the merging of four separate Alliance parties in the 
States of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak to form the Malaysian National 
Alliance Party (MNAP).34 This prompted the PAP to draw together parties of the
various Malaysian states to form a united opposition front, the Malaysian Solidar­
ity Convention (MSC).35 Whilst the collective electoral significance of the
parties comprising the MSC may have been modest, it nevertheless represented 
the merging of diverse racial groups. This was ideologically symbolic. The MSC's 
aim was the realisation of a II Malaysian Malaysia 11 : 
A Malaysian Malaysia means that the nation and the state is not 
identified with the supremacy, well-being and the interests of any 
one particular community or race. A Malaysian Malaysia is the 
antithesis of a Malay Malaysia, a Chinese Malaysia, a Dyak 
Malaysia, an Indian Malaysia or Kadazan Malaysia ... 
The special and legitimate rights of different communities must be 
secured and promoted within the framework of the collective rights, 
interests and responsibilities of all races ... 36 
As had been the case in the past, the PAP's attempts to put communalism 
into a broader political context only stirred accusations of racialism. Despite 
Lee's view that the dispute was not over the desirability of a non-communalist 
society but the route by which this was to be achieved, the route advocated by 
Lee, via socio-economic change and not special privileges, would necessarily 
effect the result. Open and equal competition for all citizens for political power 
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would almost certainly produce a largely Chinese government in view of their 
favourable socio-economic disposition. The Alliance's approach was to assist the 
Malays in their development so that eventually they might be able to compete 
more equally with the Chinese.37 The MSC was thus viewed as a new stage in the
attack on Malay rights. At UMNO's 18th general assembly on 15 May, a resolution 
calling for the arrest and detention of Lee was unanimously passed, although not 
acted on by the Tunku. 38
Fears about the threat of the MSC's "Malaysian Malaysia" concept for Malay 
special privileges were enhanced in May 1965 when Lee drew on historical and 
demographic data to question whether Malays were in fact any more native than 
other racial groups in Malaysia.39 This was received as especially insulting and 
the concept of a "Malaysian Malaysia" denounced as aimed at "destroying the 
Malay race in its homeland and destroying Islam and the Islamic state of 
Malaysia".40 As the debate raged and Lee persisted with his reference to
population data, the Tunku's calls for calm within UMNO became less effective. 
Internal pressure for extreme measures to stem the attacks from Singapore 
mounted.41 Meanwhile the MSC had attracted almost exclusively Chinese
support, adding weight to the claims that it was outrightly communalist.42
In the ensuing parliamentary session, starting on 26 May, debate was 
unrestrained and inflammatory. Criticism of Singapore's incorporation into 
Malaysia also became widerspread among UMNO ranks. Against this background a 
disillusioned Tunku left for London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
Conference. An attack of shingles extended his stay in London and afforded him 
the chance, while hospitalised, to weigh up the pros and cons of perseverance with 
Singapore in the Federation. 
In the Tunku's absence, PAP/Federal government relations further 
deteriorated. In the Hong-Lim by-election in Singapore on 10 July, the PAP 
devoted much of its energy to attacking the Federal government.43 The Federal
government's expulsion of British journalist Alex Josey, whose portrayal of events 
had been consistently sympathetic to the PAP, also aroused severe PAP 
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conde!."i'lnation.44 In the wake of these events, Dr Goh Keng Swee publically
rejected the Federal government's request that Singapore's contribution to Federal 
finance be increased from 40% to 60%. In fact, Goh demanded it be reduced from 
40% to 30% and indicated that the $150 million loan to the Borneo territories 
would not be forthcoming either.45
Following the Tunku's assessment of the cost of Singapore's continued 
participation in the Federation and a senior cabinet meeting reaching a unanimous 
agreement on separation, the Tunku instructed Tun Razak from London "to 
proceed with the necessary legal chores and amendments to the constitution".46
Subsequent discussions between Lee, Goh and Tun Razak failed to avert the 
secession of Singapore. On 9 August 1965, a Bill proclaiming the separation of 
Singapore from the Federation and the granting of independent sovereign nation 
status was passed 128-0. This unanimous vote, however, did not genuinely reflect 
the shock and disappointment of Lee and the PAP. Lee claimed that he had been 
presented with a fait accompli, with the implicit threat of Singapore's 
continuation in the Federation at the cost of the repression of the PAP.47 There
can be no doubt that Lee and the PAP were deeply committed to merger, even in 
view of the difficulties : 
Every time we look back to the moment we signed this document it 
is for us a moment of great anguish. For me it is a moment of 
anguish. All my life, all my adult life, I have believed in merger and 
unity of the two territories. We are connected by geography, the 
economy and ties of kinship ... It broke everything we stood for.'1:8
The failure of merger was due to a variety of inter-related problems. 
Conflicting interests and perspectives could never be resolved in the atmosphere 
of mistrust and political competition which characterised Singapore's brief merger 
experience. Moreover, when communal questions became embroiled in the various 
political controversies, and ultimately assumed the centre stage, the threat of 
racial conflict became real and the likelihood of differences being resolved 
seemed remote. Attempts to rationalise the continuation of Singapore in the 
Federation also ran the risk of creating deep divisions within UMNO. This cost 
seemed too high to the Tunku, especially since the original motivation for merger, 
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ensuring the ndlifying of Singapore's left, no longer applied. The P AP's political 
dominance in Singapore, together with measures taken by the Federal government 
itself, had allayed the threat of the left. Unlike the PAP and Lee, UMNO and the 
Tunku had no overriding commitment to an industrial strategy dependent upon 
merger to warrant perseverence with political union. 
Economic Problems and the Common Market 
With Singapore's unexpected entry into Federal politics, the question of revenue 
collection and Singapore's industrialisation assumed direct political signifance for 
the Federal government. The prosperity of Singapore, without adequate benefit 
transferred to other states, would not only produce unbalanced economic growth 
but run the danger of enhancing the electoral appeal of the PAP in view of 
impressive economic achievements.49 This does not mean that the Federal
government was bent on sabotaging Singapore's industrialisation or the common 
market. However, there was understandable caution about a common market until 
certain political differences were settled. These, of course, were never settled 
and the political struggles not only stultified progress towards a common market 
bu� in many cases generated direct economic competition rather than co­
operation. 
Al though the creation of a Tariff Advisory Board was part of Annex J and 
the Malaysia Agreement, this body was not established until July 1964. 50 It was
not until early 1965 that the first lists of possible common market items were 
published.51 This was all that the TAB had achieved by the time of separation.
No concrete steps towards the harmonisation of duties in the two states had been 
taken. 52 On the one hand, this lack of progress reflected the low priority
accorded a common market by the Federal authorities. On the other hand, in view 
of the unresolved question of revenue sharing between governments, and the TAB's 




If the tardiness of the TAB was fortuitous in a political sense, it certainly 
was not for Singapore's import-substitution industries. Industry complaints about 
inadequate protection from import competition thus saw the introduction of 
import quotas on over 30 categories of goods by July 1965 as a stop-gap measure 
by the Singapore government.53 Moreover, instead of access to the Malayan
market being enhanced by merger, the Federal government imposed prohibitive 
import duties on some Singapore goods to protect Malay's own fledgling 
industries. 54 Acceptance of a range of import duties was later explained as the
price Singapore would have to pay for the elusive common market. To the 
Singapore authorities, import quotas were intended simply to obstruct Singapore's 
development. 55
Probably the controversy which most clearly demonstrated the inability of 
the two governments to co-operate at the economic level was that over textile 
quotas. This dispute not only raised serious questions about the legal relationship 
between the Singapore and Kuala Lumpur governments, it also evidenced the 
depth of mistrust which underlay inter-governmental relations.56
Starting in the latter half of 1963 and into 1964, exports of textiles and 
garments from Singapore to the United Kingdom showed dramatic growth.57 The
number of factories exporting to the UK had risen from six at the start of 1964 to 
20 by May of that year, by which time such factories represented a fixed capital 
of $15 million. Of most significance, they provided jobs for about 2,600 
people. 58 The impetus for this expansion had come from Hong Kong-based
manufacturers who invested in Singapore to circumvent UK trade restrictions on 
textiles from Hong Kong. The problem for Singapore, however, was that in 1964 
the British Trade Board decided that, as from May of that year, no new textile 
contracts would go to Singapore manufacturers. It was taken for granted by the 
Board that a previous agreement with Malaya that the import quota of five million 
square yards of textiles would also cover Singapore now that the territories had 
merged. This decision spelt doom for Singapore's infant textile industry and a 
significant loss of jobs.59 Despite immediate protests, it was only after the
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Singapore government banned 46 classes of British goods and subjected all other 
goods to specific import licencing in August that the British committed 
themselves to a serious re-negotiation of the quota.60 Even then, it was not until
union action was taken that negotiations really got under way. 
The NTUC, cognizant of the threat to jobs and unhappy with the early 
revised British offers, threatened to ban the handling of British goods by its port 
workers unless measures were taken to arrest the retrenchment of textile 
workers. 61 By the end of March 1965, more than 1,000 textile workers had been
laid off.62 By this time, however, Dr Goh Keng Swee had publically revealed that
the real obstacle to a settlement was the Federal government.63 The British had
offered a new deal which allowed for all contracts entered into before 1 May 
1964, plus Malaysian quotas of 8.2 million square yards of textiles and 7 .6 million 
square yards of garments. The unexpected off er of garments became the focal 
point of the rivalry. 
In the ensuing dispute, the Singapore government argued that the additional 
7 .6 million square yards of garments was intended exclusively for it, insufficient 
as it was to provide for the industry's productive capacity and restore job losses. 
The Federal government, however, claimed that the "110 textile factories in 
Malaya, having been governmentally restrained from importing previously, deserve 
a sizeable share of the 7.6 million".64 The claim that so many factories existed at
all, let alone had the capacity to meet the quota sought was questionable if not 
spurious. To the PAP leaders, the Federal government's motive in seeking a 
substantial share of the quota was to sabotage Singapore's industrial programme. 
Goh Keng Swee complained of: 
a series of actions taken by Kuala Lumpur which had the effect of 
damaging Singapore's industrial progress. It is clear that the Central 
Government of Malaya in its relations with Singapore considers 
itself not the Government of Malaysia but the Government of the 
States of Malaya. Singapore is considered not as a constituent state 
of Malaysia but as a dangerous rival to be kept down at all costs.65
In response, the Federal government charged that it had a responsibility to 
promote balanced development in all states and that, furthermore, investors in 
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Singapore had been injudicious in assuming unrestricted access to the UK 
market.66
Suspicion of the Federal government's motives also surfaced with the 
amendment to legislation which gave it the power to grant pioneer certificates. 
The PAP was accused by the Federal Minister for Finance Tan Siew Sin of having 
been too liberal in its granting of certificates in the past. He told industrialists 
that they should first consult the Federal government before establishing 
industries in Singapore, otherwise their calculations might be based on false 
assumptions.67 Goh interpreted this as confirmation that the Federal government
was bent on "frustrating" Singapore's industrialisation. 68 Goh later went into
detail about how the Federal government had done its best to deprive Singapore of 
new industries.69 Certainly few, if any, pioneer certificates were granted by the
Kuala Lumpur government to manufacturers in Singapore during 1965. 7o
Singapore-based industrialists had also complained about unfair treatment in the 
granting of certificates. 71 What lay at the heart of the certificates controversy
was the general preference by industrial capital for Singapore as a production 
site. The Federal government was concerned about an appropriate ration of 
industry for Malaya, 72 especially in view _ of Singapore's reluctance to meet
Federal revenue requests. 
Another issue, though inseparable from the political conflict, which 
reflected the contrasting economic bases of the two territories was the 
introduction of a 0.5% turnover tax on gross earnings of all trades and businesses 
and a 2% payroll tax. The purpose of the taxes was to raise funds for the defence 
effort necessitated by Confrontation. However, Malaya's greater emphasis on 
agricultural production meant that Singapore's economy would be 
disproportionately effected by the taxes. Even though the Singapore state stood 
to gain more revenue than the Federal government, the PAP was sensitive to the 
impact of the taxes on labour-intensive industry.73
Yet another economic conflict was that centred around the Federal 
government's announcement in December 1964 that it intended to close the 
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Singapore branch of the Bank of China.
74' Under the Malaysian Banking
Ordinance, any bank with 50 % or more ownership by or on behalf of a foreign 
government was not allowed a licence. In any case, the Federal government 
claimed that the Bank's continuance facilitated the funding of subversion. 75 This
decision was of considerable importance to Singapore because the Bank played a 
crucial role in providing low-interest finance to traders and small business people 
to facilitate the food trade with China. The closure would significantly reduce 
Singapore's trade, already suffering due to Confrontation. 76 After much heated
debate and the Bank's insistence on staying in Singapore, the Bank Negara finally 
took over the Bank on 5 August 1965. The scheduled closure, however, was saved 
by Singapore's separation shortly after. Amongst other things the Bank of China 
affair demonstrated the difficulty of merging different economic and legal 
backgrounds. 
As we have seen above, in conjunction with the serious political differences 
between the PAP and UMNO, the period of merger involved clashes of economic 
interest. Though these clashes had some objective basis to them, invariably they 
were exaggerated by the political context within which they occurred. Since 
there was no joint commitment to a single economic or industrial strategy, the 
prospect of co-operation to resolve short-term problems never really existed. 
Instead, the various circumstances served only to sharpen economic contradictions 
and jeopardise Singapore's access to a common market of Malaysia. 
Manufacturing and In.vestment 
Having identified and analysed the major economic and political problems 
characterising the period of merger, let us now examine the extent to which the 
PAP's ISI strategy was actually implemented. As would be expected, the inter­
government friction and the trade embargo with Indonesia negatively affected the 
Singapore economy. Nevertheless, some limited progress occurred in the man­
ufacturing sector in 1964, with GDP up by 3.69% (at 1968 market prices) even 
though total GDP dropped by 3.49% for the same year. In the following year, 
! I 
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manufacturing GDP rose by 13.44% compared i,o the total GDP rise of 7.5%.77
This was brought about by the progress of a broad group of import-substitution 
industries, a trend established before merger. The broadening of operations by the 
state-owned National Iron and Steel Mill was one of the features of this 
period. 78 In the export field, the petroleum and petroleum products industry and
the textiles industry experienced significant growth. The textile industry's 
already heavy export orientation became accentuated with the influx of Hong 
Kong-based capital. This industry assumed importance as a provider of jobs in the 
period, but its precarious existence as an export industry did not auger well for 
long-term employment hopes. Indeed, the problem with the industrial 
development which had taken place under the import-substitution programme was, 
apart from textiles, the relatively capital-intensive nature of manufacturing 
operations. Thus, the total number of workers employed in the sector rose by only 
3,120 in 1964 and 5,820 in 1965. Pioneer industries accounted for 1,686 and 2,762 
of these new jobs in the respective years and expanded the number of firms in 
production by 27 in 1964 and 39 in 1965 (See Table 9). 
In view of the political instability between the Singapore and Kuala Lumpur 
governments, and the lack of progress on the common market, private foreign 
investment during merger did not quite match the PAP's initial expectations. The 
decision by Mobil Oil to join Shell, Maruzen, Caltex and Castrol was a significant 
development, confirming Singapore's attraction as a refining centre. The other 
significant developments, however, were the considerable influx of Hong Kong­
based capital in the textile industry and the continuation of mainly Japanese­
based capital investment in import-substitution industry. Japanese investors 
continued to show a preference for joint-ventures. By August 1965, fifteen 
projects jointly financed by Japanese and Singapore industrialists had been 
established. As progress towards the common market became delayed though, the 
momentum of Japanese capital slowed and investors adopted a 'wait and see' 
attitude rather than actively implementing their approved projects.79
INDUSTRY GROUP 
Food & Beverages 
Textiles, Garments &
Leather 
Wood & Paper Products 
Rubber Products 
Chemicals & Chemical 
Products 









Table 9: Firms Granted Pioneer Status and Pioneer Firms in 
Production, 1964 and 1965 
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Table 10: Capital Structure of All Pioneer Firms 
as at 31st December 1964 ($000) 














































































































Percentage of Local Capital 
-J, Issued capital = actual subscribed capital 
Source: Economic Development Board, 
Annual Report 1964, p.57. 
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Table 11: Capital Structure of All Pioneer Firms as at 
31st December 1965 ($000) 












































































































* Pan-Malaysia Cement Works Ltd. has not been included as all necessary
finance is advanced by the parent company.
Percentage of Local Capital 
Source: Economic Development Board, 
Annual Report 1965, p.53. 
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The overall contribution of foreign investment to pioneer firms is shown in 
Tables 10 and 11 above. Foreign capital represented 43.2% and 60.83% of issued, 
that is, actual subscribed, capital in 1964 and 1965 and 45.3% and 44.2.6% of paid­
up capital for the respective years. Of course, the contribution appears more 
modest if the petroleum and petroleum products industry is excluded. Up until 
this point then, local participation was still significant. 
The total level of actual foreign investment as measured by gross fixed 
assets reached $157 million by the end of 1965 (See Table 9 in Appendix). Of this 
sum, however, $99 million was in the petroleum and petroleum products industry 
and this accounts for how Dutch and British capital surpassed the level of 
Japanese capital at the end of 1965.80 Whatever the distribution of this sum in 
terms of country of origin or industry, it was certainly less than the PAP leaders 
had hoped for. What is more, with the prospects of a common market dashed, the 
capacity to improve on this sum was in very serious doubt following separation. 
Position of the Left During Merger 
Singapore's merger experience was not only characterised by political 
confrontation and economic difficulty, it also culminated in political 
embarrassment for the PAP with separation. Instead of these circumstances 
leading to a weakening of the government's political position, however, PAP 
dominance only grew during this period. This was due, amongst other things, to 
the continued repression of the left by both the PAP and the Federal government 
and the internal disintegration and weak leadership of the BS. 
In the area of industrial relations, the PAP continued its endeavours to 
weaken the BS base and militant unions. It legislated for the establishment of a 
Pioneer Industries Union (PIU), affiliated with the NTUC, which provided for the 
agreement between this union and pioneer firms to collective agreements on 
wages and employment conditions for a set number of years. During these years, 
strikes for improved conditions were forbidden. 
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Already weakened by Operation Cold Store, the BS's organising strength was 
further reduced following splits within the Party in May 1964. Dr Lee Siew Choh's 
pre-occupation with the thesis that Singapore was still dominated by colonial and 
neo-colonial forces had led to his call for an all-out attack on the government's 
proposed national registration and conscription to meet defence needs during Con­
frontation.81 This emphasis was viewed as misplaced by others within the Party
and in the ensuing struggle Dr Lee resigned, as did other BS executive 
members. 82 These problems impaired the response of SATU to the NTUC which
was growing in influence amongst labour. Thus, by the end of 1964, SATU and its 
affiliates were no longer effective rivals to the NTUC.83 The withering away of
independent labour and left wing influence was further advanced in 1965 when the 
Federal government banned go-slow campaigns and, subsequently, all forms of 
industrial action, including strikes, in essential services.84 By August 1965, a
unified labour movement under the control of the NTUC had emerged. 85
Aside from the Central government's clamp on militant labour, in mid-1964 
it also exercised its powers under the internal security provisions to arrest more 
than 50 students at Nanyang University for alleged communist activities. 86 This
was followed by the introduction of "suitability certificates" under which students 
of "political left leanings" were banned from tertiary education.87
The weakness of the BS was demonstrated in the Hong Lim by-election in 
July 1965. As a constituency heavily dependent upon trade for the livelihood of 
merchants, shopkeepers and labourers, the negative effects of merger were fully 
felt here. The divisions within the BS, however, significantly reduced its electoral 
effectiveness. The subscribers to Dr Lee's neo-colonial thesis wanted the demand 
for secession from Malaysia to form the basis of the Party's campaign but a 
different view prevailed. The BS slogan was instead "Crush Malaysia". Not only 
did this lead to less than total Party leadership commitment to the campaign 
strategy,88 it also left the BS open to charges of anti-nationalism.89 Moreover,
the talk of Singapore's independence as "phoney" had little electoral appeal. Thus, 
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despite the adversity created by merger, the PAP secured 58.9% of the vote in the 
Hong Lim by-election.90 This highlighted the political ineptitude of the BS.
Conclusion 
As we have seen above, no single problem caused the ultimate breakdown in 
relations between the Singapore and Malaysia governments. Rather, with merger 
being founded on mistrust and a poor understanding of each other's agreement, 
inevitable conflicts of political and economic interest were compounded. 
Ultimately, the Malaysian government calculated that it had more to lose than 
gain by persevering with merger. The position for Singapore, however, was quite 
different. The economic need for merger was as, if not more, important by 
August 1965 as it had ever been. Even the mere prospect of a common market 
was vital to the PAP's efforts to attract industrial capital and generate 
employment. With separation such a prospect was almost certainly lost. This 
effectively marked the collapse of the PAP's economic strategy, for although the 
scope for import-substitution industry within Singapore was by no means 
exhausted, a market of 2 million people could not sustain the growth necessary to 
alleviate the serious unemployment problem. Meanwhile, separation had caught 
many investors out who would now have to adjust to the unforeseen circumstances 
or withdraw from Singapore altogether. For Singapore, separation represented an 




1. The Malayan Chinese Association was subsequently re-named the Malaysian
Chinese Association.
2. It was formally agreed in late August 1961, for example, that Singapore
would retain autonomy over labour and education, in contrast with other
Federation members, and defence, external affairs and security would be
the exclusive responsibility of the Federal government. Not long after,
agreement had also been reached on the more controversial questions of 
citizenship rights and Singapore's representation in the Federal House of 
Representatives.
3. Singapore representatives delighted in referring to the Reuff Report as the
Federal government's Report, a matter of obvious embarrassment to
Federal authorities. See footnote 18 of Chapter 4.
4. Milton E. Osborne, Singapore and Malaysia, Data Paper: Number 53,
Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University,
Ithaca, New York, July 1964, p.54.
5. John Drysdale, Singapore: Struggle For Success, Singapore Times Books
International, 1984, p.329.
6. ibid., p.330.
7. Osborne, 1964, p.55.
8. As quoted in Nancy McHenry Fletcher, The Separation of Singapore From
Malaysia, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, ·cornell
University, Ithaca, New York, Data Paper: Number 53, July 1969, p.13.
9. The Annex did not go into what criteria would be used in deciding upon the
application of protective duties.
10. Drysdale, 1984, p.335.
11. As quoted in Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore
Separation, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1974, p.186.
12. For detail on the subsequent exchanges see Milton E. Osborne, 1964, pp.47-
48.
13. As quoted in C.M. Turnbull, A History of Singapore 1819-1975, Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982, p.287.
14. Harvey Stockwin, "Look Forward With Hope?" Far Eastern Economic
Review, 18.8.66, p.317.
15. Lee had actually said that" ... even if the PAP keeps out of the election on
the mainland, the MCA will still lose ... " In other words, he spoke of an
hypothetical situation. He did not unequivocally state that the PAP would
not contest the elections. See Drysdale, 1984, p.344.
16. As quoted in ibid., p.346.
17. ibid.
215 
18. Lee's public attacks on Tan Siew Sin, Khan Kai Boh and other MCA
representatives served only to bring the Tunku himself out in public support
for the MCA. See Drysdale, 1984, pp.346-347.
19. People's Action Party, The Tasks Ahead, Part 1, PAP's Five-Year Plan,
1959-1964, Singapore: Boon Hua Printing for Petir, 1959, p.14.
20. Michael Leifer, "Singapore in Malaysia: The Politics of Federation", Journal
of Southeast Asian History, 6(2), 1965, p.60.
21. An anonymous official of the PAP, as quoted in Fletcher, 1969, p.33.
22. See Footnote 16.
23. Fletcher, 1969, p.37.
24. They did receive some financial assistance in education.
25. An UMNO-sponsored convention comprising approximately 150 Malay
organisations assembled at Pasir Panjang's New Star Theatre on that date
at which Albar was the principal speaker. See Drysdale, 1984, pp.360-361.
26. Earlier, on June 21, the Minister for Social Affairs, Othman Wok, had sent
letters to 144 Malay welfare, sports, social and cultural organisations
inviting representatives to meet with the Prime Minister and other
ministers on July 19 to discuss the position of Malays. UMNO, the political
representative of the Malay community, however, was not invited.
27. The conclusion to the circular read: "Before Malay blood flows in
Singapore, it is best to flood the state with Chinese blood". As quoted in
Leifer, 1965, p.65.
28. Drysdale, 1984, p.362.
29. ibid., p.365.
30. As quoted in Fletcher, 1969, p.46.
31. ibid., p.24.
32. The Tunku-asserted that the Alliance would continue to fight elections even
if there was only one person left in the MCA. See Leifer, 1965, p.68.
33. Fletcher, 1969, p.46.
34. The Alliance parties were the Singapore People's Alliance, UMNO, MCA
and the Malayan Indian Congress. See Drysdale, 1984, p.379.
35. The parties forming the MSC were the PAP, the United Democratic Party
(UDP), the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and the Machinda Party (from
Sarawak). See ibid., p.381.
36. As quoted in ibid.
37. Fletcher, 1969, p.59.
38. Drysdale, 1984, p.381.
39. Fletcher, 1969, p.62.
40. As quoted in ibid., p.64.
41. ibid., pp.64-65.
42. Sopiee, 1974, p.203.
43. ibid., p.208.
216 
44. The expulsion was interpreted as an indication that repressive measures lay
in store for the PAP leaders. Dr Toh Chin Chye claimed on 8 June that
"instructions were given to make a case for Mr Lee's arrest". As quoted in
ibid.
45. ibid., p.209.
46. As quoted in Drysdale, 1984, pp.390-391.
47. In the Tunku's speech to Parliament on 9 August 1965, he said the option to
separation was to take repressive measures against the Singapore
government "for the behaviour of some of their leaders". See Alex Josey,
Lee Kuan· Yew, Volume 1, Singapore: Times Books International, 1980,
p.283.
48. Lee Kuan Yew, as quoted in Drysdale, 1984, p.394.
49. R.S. Milne, "Singapore's Exit From Malaysia: The Consequences of
Ambiguity", Asian Survey, VI(3), 1966, p.176.
50. Fletcher, 1969, p.13.
51. Alistair Humby, "Separate Questions", Far Eastern Economic Review,
18.11.65, pp.337-338.
52. ibid., p.339.
53. Anthony Oei, "Anxious Importers", Far Eastern Economic Review, 1.7.65,
p.12.
54. Goods affected included electric bulbs, condensed milk, garments and
tyres. See Drysdale, 1984, p.357.
55. See ibid.
56. Harvey Stockwin, "Broken Threads in Malaysia", Far Eastern Economic
Review, 15.4.65, p.118.
57. For details, see R.H. Leary, "Out Through Singapore", Far Eastern
Economic Review, 10.9.64, pp.493-494.
58. Anthony Oei, "Made-Ups Make-Up?" Far Eastern Economic Review,
17.9.64, p.509.
59. Goh Keng Swee claimed that the dispute had prevented the establishment
of 50 factories and the loss of 10,000 potential jobs. See Fletcher, 1969,
p.22.























A segment of Goh's statement is quoted in ibid., p.118. 
ibid. 
As quoted in Fletcher, 1969, pp.22-23. 
ibid., p.23. 
Drysdale, 1984, p.376. 
Harvey Stockwin, "Broken Threads in Malaysia", Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 15.4.65, p.119. 
See Fletcher, 1969, p.20. 
No data on pioneer certificates were published during this period. See ibid. 
Turnbull, 1982, p.290. 
This was one of the reasons why the development of Port Klang was so 
important to the Federal government. See Andrew Nathan, "Moves for 
Malayan Industry", Far Eastern Economic Review, 11.6.64, pp.564-565. 
See Anthony Oei, "Taking The Biscuit", Far Eastern Economic Review, 
20.5.65, p.373. 
Fletcher, 1969, p.24. 
ibid. 
For a discussion of some of the problems involved in ascertaining the exact 
trade with Indonesia, see Lee Soo Ann, "Trade and Shipping Growth in 
Singapore", in Wong Kum Poh and Maureen Tan (editors), Singapore in the 
International Economy, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1972, pp.68-
83. 
As calculated from Table 8 in Appendix. 
See Anthony Oei, "Excellent Prospects", Far Eastern Economic Review, 
2.12.65, p.426. 





University Press of Hawaii, 1978, p.21.
Shell Oil Company is a Dutch/British consortium.
Chan Heng Chee, The Politics of Survival 1965-1967, Singapore: Oxford
University Press, 1971, p.20.
Fletcher, 1969, p.75.
Pang Eng Fong, "Changing Patterns of Industrial Relations in Singapore", in
Peter S.J. Chen and Hans-Dieter Evers (editors), Studies in ASEAN
Sociology, Singapore: Chop men Enterprises, 1978, p.427.
84. Fletcher, 1969, p.76.
218 
85. Pang in Chen and Evers (editors), 1978, p.427.
86. Fletcher, 1969, pp.75-6.
87. Han Suyin, "Singapore Separation", Far Eastern Economic Review, 19.8.65,
p.349.
88. As a result of the left's failure to have succession as the Party's plank, none
of the left union leaders appeared on Party platforms. See Harvey
Stockwin, "Hong Lim Result", Far Eastern Economic Review, 29.7.65,
p.210.
89. ibid.
90. Fong Sip Chee, The PAP Story - The Pioneering Years, Singapore: Times
Periodicals for Chai Chee Branch, People's Action Party, 1980, p.213.
219 
PART ill: BUILDING THE EXPORT-ORIENTED MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
We have already seen how in the post-1959 battle for political supremacy Lee 
Kuan Yew's PAP successfully merged state and Party to the detriment of its 
political opponents. With the collapse of merger, however, fresh political and 
economic challenges witnessed a new level of mobilisation and sophistication in 
the exercise of state power by the PAP. This enabled the PAP to facilitate a 
swift and decisive turnaround in economic strategy, putting Singapore on an 
export-oriented industrialisation path. Remarkable growth in manufacturing soon 
followed. 
In the immediate wake of separation from the Federation of Malaysia and 
the collapse of the import-substitution strategy, the PAP exploited the sense of 
crisis and indeed contributed to it. It employed the ideological apparatus of the 
state to sponsor a set of values and social attitudes which enhanced the political 
legitimacy of the PAP's right to exclusive and unquestionable power to determine 
the course ahead. Extolling the virtues of self-restraint and self-discipline in the 
PAP-defined 'national interest', and simultaneously curbing all effective 
constitutional opposition, the Party further cemented its already extensive social 
control. Ideological notions about the functional necessity of elitism and 
meritocracy became institutionalised, further rationalising the structures of 
political control instituted by the PAP. 
This new emphasis on ideological control, which in some respects amounted 
to an accentuation of tendencies present before 1965, is only partly explained by 
the perceived political insecurity resulting from the failed merger. There was 
also an economic consideration. It became increasingly obvious in the post-1965 
period that the option offering the most rapid private-led industrialisation rested 
on export orientation. However, following the examples of Hong Kong and Taiwan 
would necessitate a serious address of labour costs and competitiveness. The new 
ideological emphasis was thus linked to the attempt to justify the further and 
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complete defeat of the labour movement, an essential prerequisite of the new 
economic strategy. In time then, draconian measures followed to reduce wages 
and drastically curtail and circumscribe the bargaining power of unions. These 
radical measures were the basis of the PAP's programme to attract international 
capital to Singapore. Cheap and docile labour was the foundation of the new 
economic strategy. 
The provision of cheap and docile labour was not the only element of the 
government's strategy however. Just as the absence of a domestically-based 
bourgeoisie of sufficient economic and political power had meant that any 
private-led industrialisation was dependent upon the seduction of international 
capital, so too it had contributed to the state assuming a range of important 
economic functions in that seduction. Recognising that Singapore's labour was not 
of itself an absolute attraction even after the wage reductions, the PAP 
endeavoured to add to the island's competitiveness by embarking on substantial 
infrastructural improvements and a range of direct and indirect subsidisations of 
private capital's establishment and operating costs. State control was extended to 
all facets of the economy in the introduction of a highly co-ordinated and 
effective programme of support for EOI. This cohesive approach, epitomised in 
the various functions of the state's chief mobiliser of economic resources and 
investments, the Economic Development Board, assured capital of quick and 
inexpensive access to Singapore's labour. The state's capacity to fulfil this role 
owed much to its relative autonomy from capital and labour outlined in the 
previous section of the thesis. 
This capacity of the state to affect change in economic policy with great 
rapidity proved no less important within the export-oriented programme than it 
did in the transition to it. Thus, once the unemployment problem was eased and 
Singapore became dependent upon imported labour to fill labour shortages, the 
state initiated active encouragement of relatively capital-intensive, higher value­
added investments by international capital. However, with the 1974/75 global 
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recession quickly reversing Singapore's industrial fortunes, once more the 
government swiftly changed emphasis and softened its attitude to labour 
intensive, lower value-added investments. The government's policy reversals and 
modifications invariably enjoyed the support of systematic and comprehensive 
state co-ordination. By the late 1970s, however, a number of economic and 
political contradictions generated pressures for decisive steps to resolve the 
longer term direction to be taken under the EOI strategy. 
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CH.APrER 6 
THE INITIAL LABOUR-INTENSIVE PHASE OF EXPORT-ORIENTED 
INDUSTRIALISATION: 1965-1969 
Introduction 
With the severe economic setback of losing the prospect of a common market, the 
PAP faced the daunting task of securing Singapore's viability as an independent 
nation-state. Immediate post-separation events ruled out any co-operation to 
achieve some sort of economic rationalisation. Other setbacks compounded 
Singapore's economic difficulty and the unemployment problem. Under these 
circumstances, the PAP opted to follow the examples of Hong Kong and Taiwan 
and pursue an export-oriented industrialisation (EOD strategy. This shift in policy 
involved the state in social, political and economic intervention to create those 
conditions necessary to successful competition for the labour-intensive 
investments of international capital. In some respects, this represented an 
accentuation of a role already assumed by the PAP state, particularly in the 
repression of labour. In other respects, however, a new degree of state co­
ordination of and intervention in economic activities materialised, including a 
variety of institutional measures to assist manufacturers. 
The more central economic role played by the Singapore state in the EOI 
strategy involved it in a range of initiatives. Considerable sums were devoted to 
the development of infrastructure and the provision of finance. The state also 
established various technical advisory and support schemes to promote export 
manufacturing. In many respects the state was fulfilling the role of a capitalist 
class. The existing capitalist classes in Singapore were embedded in trade or, to a 
lesser extent, import-substitution industry. There simply was no capitalist class 
interested in or capable of mobilising capital and other factors of production in 
support of the new strategy and no government desire to rectify this in view of 
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links between the Chinese business community and elements of the BS. This new 
degree of economic intervention by the state was integral to the strategy and, as 
we shall see later, expanded significantly over time. 
In the process of responding to difficult circumstances, the PAP displayed an 
impressive capacity to adapt quickly to change and effectively institute re-
directions in economic policy. This capacity owed something to political 
relationships initiated before separation occurred. In particular, the merging of 
state and party was accelerated as the PAP sought to implement and justify its 
policies. Such radical policies as those which cut wage levels and curbed the 
activities of organised labour could only have been successful in a certain political 
context. It was that context, of PAP dominance and control of the Singapore 
state, which combined with the various institutional measures to provide the basis 
for Singapore's successful and dramatic incorporation into the new international 
division of labour. This brought with it rapid progress towards the alleviation of · 
Singapore's unemployment problem by the late 1960s. 
The Compounding Problems of Separation 
Although the Independence of Singapore Agreement contained a reference to the 
need and desire for economic co-operation between Singapore and Malaysia, this 
did not eventuate. Only a matter of days after separation, the Singapore 
government announced import restrictions on as many as 187 manufactured items 
from Malaya. The decision was explained as a move to redress the advantage 
enjoyed by Malayan manufacturers who had, up until such time, exported to 
Singapore free of duty or quota; the same benefit had never been extended to 
manufacturers from Singapore to Malaya. From the PAP's point of view, it made 
no sense affording special privileges to Malayan manufacturers unless these were 
related to access to a Malaysian common market. Significantly, the list of goods 
placed on quota corresponded with those listed earlier by the TAB for possible 
inclusion in a common market. However, if the PAP's move was in any way 
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intended to impress upon the Alliance government how important some ultimate 
economic union was, it only backfired. Interpreting the P AP's measure as pro­
vocative, the Malaysian government responded by applying licensing and quota 
restrictions on Singapore goods.1
The evident concern of and damage to the business communities of both 
Singapore and Malaysia prompted the two governments to take measures to avert 
any further trade impediments. After difficult negotiations, which again found 
Lee Kuan Yew publically denigrating the Alliance government,2 it was agreed on 8
October to revert back to the pre-separation position by abolishing most import 
quota restrictions but retaining duties. The appearance of any co-operation, 
however, was exposed just one day later when the Malaysian government made the 
shock announcement of steps to establish a common market with Sabah and 
Sarawak by abolishing quota restrictions on goods on the common market lists 
entering Malaysia.3 Trade on 160 items was freed between the states of Malaya
and the Borneo states (but excluding Penang and Labuan which were free ports)· 
and duties on over 200 goods entering Sabah and Sarawak were abolished.4 Having
been excluded from this common market, the Singapore government responded by 
imposing tariffs on 154 items in 30 classes of Malayan manufactures.5
Although it remained technically feasible for a limited customs union 
between Singapore and Malaysia to be introduced at some later stage, this was 
never to be. Instead, the differences between the two governments prevailed. 
Over the next few years, their inability to co-operate manifested in a range of 
issues.6
Apart from the blow of having lost any hope of an economic union, the post­
separation period witnessed a declin.e in Singapore's entrepot trade headed for 
Malaysia, particularly from mid-1966. 7 In that year, Tan Siew Sin reiterated his
government's objective of reducing dependence on Singapore and stressed that it 
was imperative for Malaysia's own development to gradually switch to its own port 
facilities at Port Swettenham and Penang.8 For similar reasons, the resumption
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of trade with Indonesia, following restoration of diplomatic relations, did not 
generate the business anticipated by Singapore's traders. Thus, the PAP's 
eagerness to resume trade was more successful in offending the Malaysian 
government than cushioning the loss of a prospective market for manufactures.9
If the above were not enough to threaten the viability of Singapore's 
economic plans, the announcement by the British in April 1967 of the intention to 
withdraw all military bases by 1975 posed an added problem. In January 1968 the 
British further announced that there would be an accelerated withdrawal so that 
all forces would be out by 1971.10 This represented a significant blow �o the
Singapore economy. In 1967, the British had spent $450 million in Singapore 
through their bases, representing 12% of the country's total GNP.11 However, the
bases were estimated to be responsible for another 11 - 12% of GNP since the 
livelihoods of thousands of taxi drivers, grocers, domestic helpers, property and 
bar owners and others benefited from the 'spin-off' effects of the bases.12 The
withdrawal was expected to lead to an estimated loss of approximately 100,000 
jobs. In 1967, the bases directly employed 42,150.13 Even more were believed to
have derived their livelihood from base expenditure.14
When all these problems were added up, it was understandable that many 
writers, and the PAP itself, referred to Singapore's predicament as an economic 
crisis. 
Initial Policy Response 
With the loss of the prospect common market, it was obvious that Singapore's 
small domestic market would, of itself, be insufficient a base for the scale of 
manufacturing activity necessary to generate the required employment 
opportunities. The difficulty confronting the PAP was indeed formidable, as 
Singapore's Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam admitted: "The task is not to wipe out 
a backlog of the existing unemployed but also to provide another 95,000 jobs in 
1966-70 for those entering the labour market" .15 Under the circumstances,
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Singapore's policy-makers opted to radically re-formulate their industrial plan in 
favour of export markets. The conclusion was quickly drawn by the PAP that its 
best option was to emulate the EOI models of Hong Kong and, to a lesser extent, 
Taiwan. It took some years, however, for the range of policies in support of this 
strategy to unfold. For one thing, it took time for the PAP to comprehend the full 
implications of its momentous policy reversal. For another, it was only when the 
subsequent loss of British military bases and the poor trade performance with 
Malaysia became evident that the implementation of this strategy assumed great 
urgency. 
The first major policy indication of a revision of industrial strategy came 
towards the end of 1965. Finance Minister Lim Kim San announced the 
introduction of fiscal measures to promote export-oriented industry. Firms 
engaged in exploring export markets would be able to make double tax deductions 
on any expenses incurred in such activity. In essence, this measure was directed 
at existing manufacturers within Singapore.16 By this time, the EDE had also
undergone a noticeable change in its promotional emphasis towards export­
oriented industry. However, though a re-formulation of strategy may have been 
apparent by late 1965, it was at this stage only a general shift in emphasis rather 
than any detailed plan of action characterising the government's approach. 
Towards the overall development of industry, Lim Kim San also announced the 
government's total outlay for the Second Development Plan 1966-1970 of $1,521.1 
million, of which $975.9 million, or 64.2%, was capital expenditure on economic 
development.17
Once the seriousness of the post-1965 trade decline with Malaysia became 
apparent and the British announced their intention to withdraw military bases, the 
PAP introduced more comprehensive measures to promote export-oriented 
industrialisation. In Lim's budget speech of late 1966, he declared it his 
government's intention to attract investment from big international companies 
which would bring expertise and "assured markets".18 In other words, the PAP
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sought to enter into competition for investment in labour-L:1tensive manufacturing 
production for established markets in the developed, industrial countries. This 
implied a number of things, including the need for Singapore's fiscal incentives to 
be "as attractive as, if not more so, than those offered by other countries".19 Lim
thus outlined various incentives which were subsequently embodied in the 
Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief From Income Tax) Act, passed in 
December 1967, and amendments to the Pioneer Industries Ordinance.20 Amongst
other things, the Act allowed for profits on the export of manufactured goods for 
existing and new industries (excluding processing) to be taxed at the equivalent of 
one-tenth of the normal company tax rate, that is, at an effective rate of 4%.21
This incentive was specifically intended to lure direct foreign investment. 
Incentives were also provided to encourage the general application of industrial 
technology to the mutual benefit of foreign and local investors. Thus, income tax 
on earnings from approved royalties, technical assistance fees and contributions 
on research and development were reduced from the normal 40% company tax 
rate to 20%.22 Other incentives under the Act were: unlimited duty-free import
of equipment, machinery and raw materials needed by industrial enterprises; 
accelerated depreciation allowances; tax exemption for interest payable to 
foreign lenders on approved loans advanced to Singapore enterprises for the 
purchase of production equipment. 23 It was hoped that these incentives, when
combined with the provision for free remittance of profit and repatriation of 
capital, would go a long way towards ensuring international capital played the 
leading role in Singapore's industrialisation. 
These specific measures to promote EOI were accompanied by general 
prime-pumping measures to promote economic growth in view of the British 
withdrawal announcement. Thus, Singapore's new Finance Minister, Goh Keng 
Swee, announced the government's intention to inject $1,070 million between 1968 
and 1972 in the public sector. 24 The target of $1,070 million was computed on the
basis that British expenditure per year was $465 million, a considerable under-
- -- - --~---~---- -- - - -- - - --
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estimate of the more probable sum of $700 million when indirect spending was 
taken into account.25 However, Goh and his government had by now concluded
that at best the prime-pumping would constitute a partial and temporary 
solution. It had also expressed its optimism that Singapore could develop as a 
financial services centre to help compensate. 26 The real hope, however, had to
lie with the plan to attract international capital to use Singapore as an export 
base for manufacturing. Particularly in the next year, the government introduced 
drastic measures to secure the success of this plan. 
New Ideology Emerges 
Given that so much of the rationale behind past PAP policy had been linked to the 
necessity of merger, the separation of Singapore from Malaysia constituted more 
than a collapse of economic strategy. Rather, as leaders of a small, independent 
city-state, the PAP suddenly felt the need to explain and justify the political 
existence of Singapore. What emerged out of this was a coherent set of 
arguments which focused on the threat to, and requirements of, Singapore's pol­
itical and economic survival. This ideology of survival, as it has been referred 
to, 27 insisted on the inseparability of economic and political survival and the
necessary subservience of all other considerations. Above all else, survival 
demanded the internalisation of an entirely new set of social attitudes and beliefs 
which embodied self-sacrifice for the 'national interest'. An important aspect of 
the new ideology was the acceptance of the P AP's sole right to determine this 
interest and the belief that the PAP's own political survival was paramount to 
Singapore's survival. 
The view that overcoming the difficulties posed by separation depended 
principally on the nature of the subjective responses of Singapore's citizens was 
first clearly articulated by Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam in late 1965: 
Whether Singapore survives or collapses will depend not so much on 
the fact that it may face difficulties as on whether we have the 
courage and determination to overcome them ... However, self­
confidence is not enough. We must also learn to understand the kind 
! I 
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of problems we are likely to face and take measures how to meet 
the problems. It is no use trying to meet the problems when they 
are sitting on top of us. In other words, what we need is a 
population with a new attitude.28
This 'new attitude' was the ideology of survival. There were four major elements 
to this ideology which can be discerned: the necessity for citizens to be devoted 
to nation-building; the importance of Singapore's population being 'highly 
organised'; the need to adapt quickly to change; and the importance of societal 
rewards being distributed according to merit. 
Initially, PAP leaders were in a quandary over the question of nationhood. 
Even after separation the Party had not discounted the possibility of some distant 
re-merger. As late as March 1966, S. Rajaratman contended that it was "ludicrous 
to speak of a national identity for Singapore" .29 Therefore, up until mid-1966, by
which time the faith in even any distant re-merger had dissipated, PAP leaders 
usually referred to 'community' or 'society' rather than 'nation' when appealing 
to Singaporeans to make sacrifices for the collective good. 30 Thereafter,
however, the concept of nationhood became central and towards this objective 
trade unionists and workers in particular were expected to endure difficulty. As a 
concrete step towards engendering this notion of self-sacrifice and collective 
consciousness, 21 Ministers and MPs signed up in December 1965 with the newly-
established People's Defence Force. 31 Subsequently, in February 1967,
compulsory national service was introduced.32 Particularly following the
announcement of the British intention to withdraw its bases, the appeal to 
national interest became a recurring theme in government propaganda. 
The PAP also placed emphasis on the importance of social organisation to 
Singapore's survival. As Lee Kuan Yew saw it, this was necessitated by the small 
size and limited resources of the city-state: 
Societies like ours have no fat to spare. They are either lean and 
healthy or they die. We have calculated backwards and forwards for 
eleven months, on an independence we never sought that our best 
chances lie in a very tightly organized society. 33
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However, Lee's "very tightly organized society" was intended to produce a definite 
mentality. He was as much interested in the political consequences of social 
organisation as the economic benefits. Lee envisaged a "tightly organized 
society" producing disciplined yet resilient citizens capable of sacrifice. Through 
effective socialisation he believed such a society could be created: 
It depends on the education we give them; the training they 
receive; the values that they are taught - what is good, what is 
bad; what should be done; what should not be done; whether we 
should have a soft society, a tough, rugged society ... We want to 
live our lives as free men in an open society, not as sycophants or, 
worse, as serfs doing other people's bidding ... If you want to live 
your own life, then you must be well organized and you must have a 
tough society. And everybody must know that small we may be, this 
place is not a digestible morsel. 34
Though such a society would no doubt enhance Singapore's defences, Lee's 
reference to the desirability of an "open society" was not easily reconciled with 
the discipline which was to become institutionalised thereafter. Lee's real 
concern for a "tightly organized society" was more to do with the perceived 
political need for social control than the military defence of Singapore or the 
safeguarding of a free, open society. 
This political objective of social control was directly related to the sort of 
economy the PAP hoped to develop. The new generation of the "rugged society" 
were expected to be dedicated to the task of increasing work skills to contribute 
to the development of industry. Moreover, to be successful in the highly 
competitive world export markets, workers would be required to accept both 
delayed gratification, that is, no wage improvements until the economy had 
developed, and the vagaries of global market forces, that is, sudden changes in 
demand. In effect, Lee hoped that his "tightly organized" and "rugged" society 
would produce people who saw the economy as something given to which they had 
to respond rather than a product of human relationships which could itself be 
modified: "If every year Singapore could turn out men and women who understood 
the mechanics of a modern society and a modern economy its position would be 
consolidated". 35
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Another common theme in the PAP's emphasis on the attitudes essential to 
survival was the necessity of being adaptable to change. Obviously an acceptance 
of the need for change is complementary to the objective of constructing a 
"rugged" and "tightly-organized society". It was the need to adapt to economic 
forces which underscored the emphasis on change; the social organisation was 
essential to provide the structure through which particular forms of change could 
be ushered in. It was indeed a specific sort of change which Lee and the PAP 
envisaged: 
Societies which modernize rapidly and smoothly are those which 
accept change as inevitable, necessary and a normal part of 
existence - not as unpleasant deviations from the norm to be fought 
off for as long as we can. Change as a way of life is particularly for 
developing countries the �nly r�tional �pprogch to the kind of worldmodern technology and science 1s crea tmg. 3 
There was of course, an obvious political utility in the emphasis on change per 
se. Any number of policies could be rationalised with respect to this tenet.37
Singapore's leaders were also astute in the recognition that responding quickly to 
market conditions would be the essence of the new industrial strategy and this 
called for flexibility at all levels of society. 
In conjunction with the emphasis on change, the PAP also promoted a sense 
of urgency about time and the need to chart out a plan of positive action for the 
future. There was always a pending crisis of variable magnitude which 
Singaporeans were called to prepare for. The PAP made a very conscious effort 
to ensure that government institutions not only had a "forward and enlightened 
outlook ... enthusiasm for development ... " but also the "flexibility to facilitate 
it 11 • 38 This was important if Singapore was to get the edge on its regional
competitors for export-oriented manufacturing investment. Equally, the 
government expected institutional flexibility at other levels of society, especially 
from trade unions, in support of the effort to attract capital. Promoting a general 
receptivity to change, then, had very practical applications. 
The PAP linked its emphasis on the objective of a modernised and 
technological economy and society with emphasis on scientific and rational 
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thought. By promoting such thought, it was believed Singapore's problems could 
be solved. The PAP insisted that these problems were objective. The Party was 
determined to dispel any question that the course and nature of economic 
development was in any sense political. As the Director of the Party Political 
Bureau put it: 
We do not want a clear-cut ideology because ideology is changing. 
At this juncture, doctrinaire ideology prevents flexibility. A distinct 
ideology does not help to solve real problems such as modernization 
and national unity. We are more a problem-solving party. Our 
philosophy is based on what we do.39
The PAP con tended that policy had to be based on scientific, rational findings 
rather than ideology. Good leadership was essentially about 'scientific 
pragmatism', not ideology. In support of this approach, the PAP created a new 
Ministry of Science and Technology in 1968 and downgraded the status of social 
sciences in favour of the natural and physical sciences in secondary and tertiary 
education. 
Despite PAP attempts to create a contrary awareness, scientific rationality 
is, of course, not devoid of ideology.40 The problem-solving which Singaporeans
were called on to address was essentially that of hmv to generate a successful 
market-oriented economy. Arguably this was more or less problematic depending 
upon one's position in the class structure. The belief that the application of 
scientific thought somehow neutralised this question demonstrated the PAP's 
subscription to the ideology of scientism.41 The effect of this ideology was to
legitimise the existing social order, justifying questions of social control and the 
distribution of resources on rational or scientific grounds. 
Towards achieving a modernised and problem-solving society, the PAP 
believed that Singapore had to be ultra-meritocratic to maximise its human 
resources. Indeed, Lee explained that his adherence to socialism was based on its 
technical superiority in allowing the most gifted persons to rise to the top: 
I believe in socialism because I believe it is one of the most 
effective ways of mobilizing human resources. Give equal 
opportu:nities to all, regardless of rank, race, religion, sex, in a given 
nation and you are likely to draw the best from each of your 
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nationals. Give him the best opportunity to educate himself in order 
to use his talents and, if you throw your net wide enough to cover 
your whole population, the chances are you will have ever so much 
more talent that will emerge at the top. And in a society based on 
equal opportunity, if rewards are correlated to the effort and output 
of the man and not to his possession of weal th or status, then it is 
likely that you will give your people the incentive to strive for 
themselves and for their community.42
Whilst Lee emphasised the importance of equal opportunity, he also accepted 
inequality in individual capacities as natural and functional, indeed crucial in 
Singapore's survival. Lee remarked in 1967 that every society has approximately 
5% of its population: 
... who are more than ordinarily endowed physically and mentally and 
in whom we must expend our limited and slender resources in order 
that they will provide that yeast, that ferment, that catalyst in our 
society which alone will ensure that Singapore shall maintain its pre­
eminent place in the societies that exist in South and Southeast 
Asia.43
The difference between the "rugged society's" elite and elites of other 
societies was that it would, supposedly, be based on ability, not wealth. According 
to Lee, however, ability or intelligence was hereditarily determined. The task 
ahead was to devise ways of effectively ensuring that those with the pre­
determined capacities to provide the most rational and effective leadership were 
able to rise to the top. The "rugged society's" elite was therefore, according to 
the PAP, entitled to respect and obedience by virtue of functional superiority in 
the survival of Singapore. This elitist perspective not only promoted achievement 
orientation but also became the guiding principle in education. In 1969, the first 
junior schools were established to cater for the intensive preparation of a hand­
picked elite considered to be rightful claimants to power and prestige.44
Lee's premise that society could not function effectively without an 
hereditarily-determined elite contained important implications. In concentrating 
on uncovering such an elite, the depth of the socio-economic obstacles to 
individuals realising their capacities could be concealed. Thus, instead of Lee's 
meritocracy posing any challenge to the class system, it actually reinforced and 
legitimised it. Lee himself seemed convinced that the working class was 
234 
genetically inferior to the ruling class and legalised abortion in 1969 with the aim 
of averting the contamination of the population by this class: 
... We must encourage those who earn less than $200 per month and 
cannot afford to nurture and educate many children never to have 
more than two. We will regret the time lost if we do not take the 
first tentative steps towards concreting a trend which can leave our 
society with a lar{e number of the physically, intellectually and
culturally anaemic. 5 
The PAP's meritocratic society thus threatened to be less a liberating experience 
for the traditionally oppressed than a process which would rationalise greater 
control by an elite. 
It can be seen from the above that the ideology of survival stressed a 
number of inter-related values: discipline, resilience, achievement-orientation, 
future-orientation, adaptability, patriotism and self-sacrifice. Though the PAP 
may have seen intrinsic merit in these values, their overriding concern to imbue 
Singapore's citizens with them was because of their practical utility to Singapore's 
economic and political survival. This was the thread which wove these values into 
a purposeful ideology. The PAP played on the sense of crisis created by 
separation and the British withdrawal to exhort the population to respond in 
accordance with these values. In this the Party was very effective and skilfully 
harnessed adversity to its political advantage. The success in institutionalising 
these values was assisted by the already-established state structures. The Minist­
ry of Culture, Radio Singapore and the CCCs provided excellent channels of 
propaganda, as, of course, did the school system. Understandably, special efforts 
were concentrated on youth and in this regard the CCCs were crucial.46
At one level, the new ideology represented an accentuation of the PAP's 
shift to the right which was under way before separation. However, the post­
separation circumstances afforded far greater clarification, even revision, of the 
Party's philosophy. In particular, the PAP pointed out in an official document that 
though an "independent, democratic, non-communist, socialist Malaya" may have 
been the Party's objective, a socialist Singapore was "an economic 
impossibility".47 Singapore's predicament had dictated that the Party concentrate
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its efforts on attracting private investment to Singapore. It was towards this end 
that the new ideology had special relevance. Having rationalised the long term 
preservation of capitalism, the Party was less constrained in measures to weaken 
the working class to facilitate a favourable climate for international capital. 
More importantly, the PAP now had a strong ideological justification for such 
action, couched in terms of objective necessity and pragmatism. 
Implications of New Strategy for Labour 
Following separation it became increasingly obvious that labour costs and labour 
competitiveness would be crucial now that import-substitution, and therefore 
protection, was no longer an option. The political defeat of labour thus became 
essential. As a first move towards this, in late 1965 the NTUC, the Singapore 
Manufacturers' Association and the Singapore Employers' Federation were brought 
together to ratify a "Charter for Industrial Progress". The essence of this Charter 
was the primacy of rapid industrial growth. Therefore, "... all partners in the 
industrialisation programme, worker, employer, government, must pool their 
efforts and strive for a continuing increase in productivity and output in all 
enterprises". 48 Industrial peace was fundamental to this joint objective. The 
appeal of the Charter was consistent with the PAP's ideological notions of self­
sacrifice for the collective good and economic problems being above class 
interests 
The appeal to trade unions to act with social responsibility was continually 
repeated throughout 1966. Initially, the NTUC seemed responsive to this plea, as 
evidenced by its announcement at the 1966 May Day Rally to launch a massive 
campaign to 'explain' the nature of the economic and political problems of 
Singapore to workers and the need for wage restraint and industrial peace. This 
view changed slightly, however, once the government passed the Trade Union 
(Amendment) Bill on 17 August. The Bill declared strikes and other industrial 
action illegal unless approved through secret ballot by a majority of a union's 
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members and banned strikes altogether in essential services.49 It also provided
for compulsory registration of branch and paid officials of a trade union. This 
would allow greater direct government control over unions. The NTUC protested 
against the legislation as anti-labour and unnecessary.50 Even though the NTUC
was by now closely related to the PAP, its officials were probably sensitive not 
just to the disproportionate burden placed on workers, but also to the continuing 
erosion of its autonomy over labour affairs. 51
Apart from the verbal protest by the NTUC, the Bill also prompted the 
NTUC affiliate, the Public Daily-Rated Employees' Unions Federation (PDREUF), 
which belonged to an essential service, to threaten strike action unless the 
government agreed to settle longstanding grievances on wages and conditions.52
The NTUC issued statements of support for the PDREUF but eventually adopted 
the moderate line of calling for arbitration. The tardy negotiations, however, 
resulted in cleaning workers from the Public Health Department striking in 
protest. The government swiftly deregistered the PDREUF and another affiliate 
for calling an illegal strike and followed this up with yet another amendment to 
the Trade Union Ordinance which outlawed sympathy strikes and entrusted the 
Labour Minister to bar the formation of a federation of unions in essential 
services.53 Significantly, when things got hot the NTUC was not prepared to
challenge the government's treatment of its affiliated unions. The PAP had made 
it plain that it did not just expe�t labour discipline, it would enforce it.54 A
further three unions were deregistered in June 1967 for involvement in unlawful 
strikes in April protesting about the Trade Union (Amendment) Act. 55 These
unions were not affiliates of the NTUC but their fates served as examples to 
labour in general. 
Following the announcement of the intended British withdrawal, there was a 
new sense of urgency about the labour question. By now, the government had 
become fully committed to promoting EOI and was prepared to adopt drastic 
measures to ensure the low wage, disciplined labour force required. Such 
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measures, however, came only after the PAP brought the 1968 election forward by 
seven months to obtain a mandate for unspecified action to deal with the 
economic crisis. The PAP did not risk outlining the legislation it had in store for 
fear of alienating its supporters. The resounding victory, however, provided the 
justification for legislation essential for economic survival, and it was with this 
rationale that the PAP introduced the Employment Act of 1968 and the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Act. 
Introduced in May 1968, the Employment Act significantly altered the 
conditions of service and remuneration of employees. Under the Act: the 
standard weekly working hours were increased from 39 to 44; public holidays were 
reduced from 15 to 11 per year; rest days and sick leave were also reduced; 
annual paid leave was restricted to seven days for workers with .less than 10 years' 
continuous service and 14 for those with more than 10 years'; retirement benefits, 
other than those from the CPF, only applied after seven years' continuous 
service; overtime was limited to 48 hours per month; retirement was compulsory 
at 55 years of age; retrenchment benefits only applied to workers of three years' 
continuous service. In addition, bonus or ex-gratia payments were limited to up to 
an equivalent of one month's salary per year. Any additional bonuses must be tied 
to productivity. This represented a significant form of wage control since annual 
bonuses in the private sector ranged from two weeks' to 23 months' wages and 
were regarded by workers as inherent to their wage, rather than tied to 
productivity.56 As was intended, the Act represented considerable savings to
employers in direct and indirect payments to labour. 
As a complement to the Employment Act, the government introduced the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act in the same year. The prerogatives of 
management were considerably expanded under the Act. Issues such as 
promotions, transfers, retrenchments, dismissals, re-instatements and work 
assignments were barred from union negotiation with employers. Such issues were 
also now beyond the jurisdiction of the IAC. The minimum and maximum duration 
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of collective agreements between employers and employees were also raised under 
the Act, from one-and-a-half to three years and three to five years respectively. 
Such agreements, however, could not include more favourable terms than those 
stipulated in the Employment Act. 
By expanding the rights of management and limiting the occasion for re­
settling collective agreements, the PAP hoped to greatly weaken the scope for 
industrial action. The principle of collective bargaining was clearly attacked, 
since labour's bargaining position had been seriously undermined. According to the 
Foreign Minister, however, this had to be viewed in the context of Singapore's 
primary objective of attracting investment: 
Collective bargaining is the essence of a free and democratic 
society, but vital management rights must not be eroded if we are to 
create the necessary climate of stability for investors to come in.57
More than weakening the bargaining position of labour, the government's 
legislation represented an attack on the traditional function of unions per se. For 
some time the PAP had claimed that it was the embodiment of workers' interests 
and that unions should therefore work together with the PAP government. 
However, despite this perspective, and PAP influence on the NTUC, unions had 
continued to operate as sectional interest groups. In view of the urgent need to 
attract investment now, however, such a role could no longer be tolerated. 
Unions, including those affiliated to the NTUC, were seen as obstacles to creating 
the appropriate investment climate. Lee even went so far as to contend that 
unions were unimportant and had, in any case, not been responsible for the 
benefits workers had achieved over the years.58 The labour legislation negated
the legitimacy and undermined the capacity of unions to act as sectional interest 
groups. Goh Keng Swee explained the broader context within which unions would 
now be expected to operate: 
The Employment Act enJoms upon the labour movement higher 
standards of discipline, restraint in wage negotiation and, generally, 
a greater awareness of organized labour in the larger framework of 
the national interest.59 
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Naturally, the new labour legislation was welcomed by employers. The more 
interesting response was from the NTUC. Al though the NTUC leadership 
protested about specific provisions of the legislation, it did not confront the 
government over the need for such a general attack on the power of trade 
unions. This is not to deny that certain elements within the NTUC were greatly 
concerned. However, there was sufficient PAP influence through its direct 
membership of the NTUC to curb these elements and ensure the legislation's 
acceptance. By this time, the NTUC had also established its authority over 
affiliate unions in almost all questions of policy.60
Having denied unions their traditional role as legitimate interest groups, the 
PAP turned its attention to the task of more effectively harnessing unions to the 
government's management needs. Towards this, C.V. Devan Nair was returned to 
Singapore in 1969 as NTUC advisor and he played an important role in re-orienting 
union activities.61 A new kind of trade unionism was subsequently foreshadowed
in late 1969 when a NTUC seminar entitled "Modernization of the Labour 
Movement", dominated by leading PAP figures, outlined the supportive function 
organised labour was expected to play for government. S. Rajaratnam argued that 
historically new circumstances meant that workers now stood to benefit by co­
operating with employers and government in the task of modernisation and 
economic development. It was now appropriate to genuinely talk of "national 
interest:. Under these circumstances, a modernised labour movement was 
required which, amongst other things, would devote itself to raising the skills of 
the workforce in the interests of productivity.62 Another seminar participant
referred to the need for the NTUC to "become an effective instrument in 
determining public opinion", obviously of particular relevance to securing support 
for the government's low wage policy. 63 In short, the theme of the seminar was
that the only possible role for organised labour was in 'active acceptance' of the 
PAP's plans for economic and social change. 
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Out of the 1969 seminar, a number of important recommendations were 
made to the NTUC which would facilitate the 'active acceptance' being sought. 
One of these was the establishment of workers' producer and consumer co­
operatives. Through these, labour would have a direct financial stake in the 
national economy and would, thereby, hopefully be more committed to its 
development. Recommendations were also made to recruit full-time professional 
staff to the NTUC to ensure "effective leadership" in the effort to build the 
economy. These professionals, trained economists and politicians,· could ensure 
that the NTUC and its affiliates direct resources most efficiently towards state­
defined goals. For the NTUC to generate necessary finances for such officials, as 
well as support its proposed co-operative enterprises, it was recognised that union 
membership, which had fallen off in recent years, needed to be boosted. 
Subsequently, measures were taken to implement all of these recommendations.64
The introduction of legislation to further weaken union power and the 
exercise of deregistration to intimidate labour contributed to a reduction in union 
membership and militancy between 1965 and 1969. Improved economic conditions 
also, to some extent, reduced the need to strike towards the end of this period. 
From a total of 30 stoppages in 1965, involving 3,374 workers, industrial disputes 
declined and in 1969 Singapore experienced its first strike-free year (see Table 16 
in Appendix). There was a drama tic decline in industrial action following the 
introduction in 1968 of the Employment Act and the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Act. There was no doubt that the government's legislation was 
fundamental to the economic success which accompanied this taming of labour, a 
point which the World Bank had made in an October 1969 report.65 The declining
capacity of unions to act in defence of its membership, however, naturally 
disillusioned the workforce. Thus, from a total union membership of 154,054 in 
1965, membership dropped to 120,053 in 1969 (see Table 17 in Appendix). When 
the government came to favour a policy of promoting 'active co-operation', it 
became necessary to revive union membership, one of the problems addressed at 
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the 1969 seminar. One thing was abundantly clear though: militant trade 
unionism was finished in Singapore. 
Institutional Measures and Public Investment 
Apart from the PAP's crucial role in reducing the cost and militance of labour, 
there were various other ways in which the government attempted to create a 
climate conducive to EOI. This not only involved accelerated infrastructural 
development through statutory bodies, but also the provision of special 
institutional support and even direct government investments. 
Institutional support in the late 1960s was characterised by increased 
specialisation. This particularly affected the EDE which shed many of its 
increasingly complex and demanding functions to make way for new, more 
specialised institutions. One of the most important of such was the Development 
Bank of Singapore (DBS) which was incorporated in July 1968 as a public limited 
company, with 48.6% government equity, to relieve the EDE of responsibility for 
financing the development of industry.66 Up until this point, the EDE had been
required to reconcile the contradictory functions of promoting industry and yet 
acting as a prudent financier of it. 67 The DBS was not only intended to resolve
this contradiction but also facilitate greater specialist attention to promoting 
EOI, both from established and new firms. The DBS was established with an 
authorised capital of $200 million and a paid-up capital of $100 million. Not only 
was the DBS to provide long-term finance in favour of EOI at relatively low 
interest rates, 68 it was also to take a sizeable equity with private capital as a
means of stimulating EOr.69
The DBS wasted no time in assuming its functions. By the end of 1969, it 
had commitments amounting to $264.6 million in 98 ventures, made up of $160.1 
million in loans, $42.9 million in equity and $61.6 million in guarantees. 78 of 
these ventures were in the manufacturing sector, making up $195.3 million or 
73.8% of the total commitments.70
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Soon after, in November 1968, the government established the International 
Trading Company (Intraco) as a public limited company to relieve the EDB's 
Export Promotional Division of its functions. 71 Intraco's purpose was two-fold:
to develop overseas markets for Singapore-made products and to source cheaper 
raw materials for local industries through bulk buying. In particular, Intraco was 
to handle trade with centrally-planned economies, something a large state body 
could do more effectively than any individual traders. Direct government equity 
in Intraco was 25% but the DBS held another 15%.72 The company's authorised
capital was $50 million. 73 Like DBS, Intraco also became active in equity
participation. 
As an additional measure to improve the prospects of export manufacturing, 
in January 1969 the government established a 100% government equity public 
limited company, Neptune Orient Lines. This reduced Singapore's dependence on 
foreign shipping, particularly Conference Lines, and facilitated easier trade with 
centrally-planned economies.74 Developing countries had long complained that
Conference Lines discriminated against them with excessively high charges, a 
practice making exporting very costly. Neptune Orient Lines was intended to 
expedite foreign trade and ensure lower freight rates for Singapore-manufactured 
goods.75
Another outgrowth of the EDB was the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) 
which was established as a separate statutory body in June 1968 under the 
Ministry of Finance. It took over all responsibility for industrial land and estates 
from the EDB's Industrial Facilities Division. The volume and complexity of this 
work became particularly acute from 1967 when demand threatened to outpace 
the supply of industrial land. The JTC was thus created to provide more specialist 
attention and prevent any bottlenecks. It quickly implemented expansions. At the 
time of its establishment, 101 hectares were under preparation. By the end of 
1968, however, 662 hectares were under preparation, 383 of which were ready for 
use within one year. This increased the supply of fully-prepared land by one­
quarter. 76
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Shedding some of its functions to new bodies, the EDE was able to 
concentrate on promoting export-oriented investment in Singapore. By the end of 
1969 it had established promotional centres in New York, Hong Kong, San 
Francisco, Chicago, London and Tokyo and had plans for Frankfurt. 
Other statutory boards set up to enhance industrial development included 
the National Productivity Centre (NPC) in 1967, the Engineering Industries 
Development Agency (EIDA) in 1968, 77 and the Singapore Institute for Standards
and Industrial Research (SISIR) in 1969.78
In conjunction with the institutional measures to promote EOI, expansion 
through existing state bodies generated infrastructural improvements. Total 
government expenditure on economic development rose from $184.4 million in 
1965 to $332.8 million in 1969-70. 79 Of these sums, favourably termed loans to
statutory boards amounted to 61.8% and 53.5% of the respective years.80 The
government's capacity to provide finance for development was enhanced in 
September 1968 when it increased the rate of contribution by employers and 
employees to the Central Provident Fund (CPF) from 5% to 6.5% each. 
Contributions to the CPF rose from $68.0 million in 1968 to $106.6 million in 
1969.81
The government also turned to direct productive investments as a means of 
influencing Singapore's industrial structure. Whereas between 1960 and 1967 the 
total number of public investments in manufacturing enterprises was 18, as many 
as 13 such enterprises were established in 1968 alone and another eight the 
following year. 82
One of the main explanations for the surge in public investments was the 
government's initiative in taking over various operations vacated by the British. 
The government was not prepared to just hope that private enterprise would fill 
the gap. This was the case with the establishment in December 1968 of the 
Sembawang Shipyard as a private limited company with 75% government equity to 
take over the Royal Naval Dockyard.83 The Dockyard not only provided many
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jobs but also represented a viable commercial enterprise. Indeed, the government 
insisted that profitability be the guiding principle of Sembawang's operations. 84
The importance the government attached to this industry, one in which it 
already had a considerable stake, was also underlined in August 1968 when Keppel 
Shipyards Pte Ltd was separated from the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) to 
form a wholly government-owned enterprise. This afforded the enterprise greater 
commercial flexibility. In the same year, the government invested in the 
Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineering Pte Ltd (23.4% equity) and Jurong Ship­
builders Pte Ltd (33.3% equity) and in the following year in the rigs, drilling and 
small vessels building company Bethlehem (8) Pte Ltd. (30% equity). 85 The
government's direct involvement in the industry had been given a fillip in view of 
the urgency of job creation and the opportunities created by the British 
withdrawal. 
Shipbuilding was not the only enterprise inherited from the Dockyard. The 
Singapore Electronic and Engineering Pte Ltd, a wholly government-owned 
company, took over the Weapons and Radio Organisation. Here was another case 
of the government recognising commercial viability and taking the initiative to 
ensure the survival of the enterprise. 86 Of the other public investments between
1968 and 1969, one of the more significant was the entry into the petroleum 
industry through joint-venture with the US-based Amoco (63%) and the Japanese­
based Oceanic Petroleum (5. 7%) called the Singapore Petroleum Company (SPC) in 
which the government's equity was 31.3%. The absence of any private domestic 
capital in this vital and lucrative industry meant that any local participation had 
to come from government.87 As the list in Table 12 below shows, other
investments spanned a number of industrial groups, each one involving certain 
specific considerations. The point to bear in mind, however, is that the sudden 
overall increase in public investments was part of a broader strategy to promote 
industrialisation. Specific considerations became more pertinent in the context of 
the British withdrawal and the anticipated economic consequences. 
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Table 12: Government Equity Participation in Manufacturing,, 
1965-1969. 
Year Company 
1965 Raya Mills Corp Pte Ltd 
1962 Acma Electrical Industries Ltd 
1967 Sigma Metal Co Pte Ltd 
1967 Far East Levingstone Ship-
building Ltd 
1967 Fairlady Fashions Ltd 
1968 Cerebos (S) Pte Ltd 
1968 United Vegetable Oil Pte Ltd 
1968 Cedar Garment Factory Ltd 
1968 International Wood Products 
1968 Toppan Printing Co (S) Pte Ltd 
1968 Copper Industries Ltd 
1969 Diaward Equipment Pte Ltd 
1968 Keppel Shipyard Pte Ltd 
1968 Jurong Shipbuilders Pte Ltd 
1968 Sembawang Shipyard Ltd 
1968 Singapore Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Pte Ltd 
1968 Naigai (S) Pte Ltd 
1968 Blue Bells Fashion Pte Ltd 
1969 Straits Fisheries Pte Ltd 
1969 John White Footwear 




Singapore Petroleum Co Pte Ltd 
1969 Singapore Electronics and 
Engineering Pte Ltd 
1969 Trans-Aire Electronics (S) 
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Government participation is defined as participation by the Ministry of Finance 
Incorporated, Development Bank of Singapore and Intraco. 
Source: Lee Sheng-Yi, Public Finance· and Public Investment in Singapore, 
Singapore: Kong Brothers Press for The Institute of Banking and 
Finance, 1978, pp.216-219. 
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Apart from the above measures to stimulate industry and shape its structure, the 
PAP was also active in tailoring the education system to the needs of industry. In 
1969 six new vocational institutes were established (there was previously only one) 
for the teaching of trade skills and in approximately one year the intake of 
students rose from a few hundred to 2,151 in 1969.88 In the same year, the
faculties of engineering, accounting and business administration and building and 
architecture were introduced to the University of Singapore. 89
It is quite clear, then, that the effort to promote industrialisation in general 
and EOI in particular involved a host of government measures. These represented 
_ various forms of direct and indirect intervention in the economy. As is outlined in 
detail later in this chapter, the response of international capital to these policies 
was extremely positive. This high government profile was integral to the 
industrialisation process and such a role would not diminish in the years ahead. 
Birth of the One-Party State 
At the same time as the PAP set about inculcating Singaporeans with a new 
ideology and restructuring the economy, its political opponents were conveniently 
in an advanced stage of self-destruction. The BS leadership persisted with the 
neo-colonial thesis and contesting the fact of Independence. This thesis not only 
created internal divisions but also provided part of the justification for the BS's 
crucial decision to boycott Parliament instigated by Dr Lee in December 1965. 
Though this decision lacked total Party support, by October 1966 all BS Assembly 
representatives had resigned from Parliament.90 The BS asserted that its
participation in Parliament was dependent upon eight specified conditions being 
met by the PAP to enable serious political opposition to survive, including the 
release of political prisoners, freedom of speech and the abolition of detention 
laws.91 The PAP, of course, had no intention of meeting such demands, as the BS
well knew. After all, in December 1965, Foreign Minister S. Rajaratman had 
boasted of how the Government "has induced the opposition to liquidate 
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themselves out of the Chamber". 92 On 7 October 1966, then, Dr Lee declared
that the BS would "carry on outside Parliament the struggle against imperialist 
oppression!" and "take our struggles into the streets" .93
The BS's first public outing under its new strategy on 23 October 1966, an 
Aid Vietnam show, produced violent clashes with police. This resulted in the 
detention under the ISA of 22 BS members, including the Party's organising 
secretary, and undermined plans for further demonstrations.94 The most
significant public disturbances in 1966, however, stemmed from student 
dissatisfaction and were not reliant upon BS leadership. In particular, the 
recommendation of the Commission set up to investigate the academic status of 
Ngee Ann College that the institute become a junior college contrasted sharply 
with student aspirations for university status. Sit-in strikes by students followed 
and the University of Singapore Students' Union (USSU) and Nantah 
undergraduates added their support in a dispute which widened to include issues of 
general academic freedom.95 Events culminated in a demonstration on 4
November 1966. Clashes between police and demonstrators resulted in the arrest 
of 10 students. 96 Subsequently, 112 students were expelled from Nanyang, 81
from Ngee Ann and 71 from Singapore University.97 Trouble died down at 
Nanyang by 1967 and by the following year at Ngee Ann.98 The PAP's control
over educational institutions was considerably increased. Changes to school 
management, revision of school syllabus, the penetration of teachers' unions by 
the PAP, and a de-emphasis of Chinese education all facilitated greater direct 
control. At the same time, influence over universities was increased, especially 
through PAP representatives being appointed to university syndicate, the faculty 
and student organisations. The appointment of PAP Deputy Prime Minister Toh 
Chin Chye to the Vice Chancellorship of the University of Singapore left no doubt 
about the relationship between university and government.99
In 1967 the BS became more active in trying to effect its strategy outside 
Parliament. Part of the reason for this was the success of Dr Lee at the March 
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1967 Party Congress in regaining his position as Party Chairman and relegating 
internal opponents of this strategy.100 However, the discord created by
continuing to boycott Parliament and persistence with the phoney Independence 
thesis reflected in the BS's declining influence over non-NTUC unions. This was 
demonstrated by the poor response to the Party's call for a general strike in April 
1967 to protest against the P AP's proposed changes to the Trade Union Act. The 
demonstrations which the BS did successfully organise in 1967 were forcefully 
suppressed by the government, resulting in massive arrests. The PAP continued to 
work from the assumption that opposition was of necessity communist-inspired 
and justified its repression on such grounds. A May Day demonstration led to the 
arrest of 46 people, including the Vice Chairman of the BS, and another 'sit down' 
protest outside Changi prison in June 1967 against alleged torture and ill­
treatment of political detainees resulted in more than 300 arrests. Eventually, in 
December, prison sentences ranging from three to six months were handed out to 
the mass of those arrested.101 The fate of the protesters confirmed two things:
first, the PAP was intent on suppressing all opposition, communist or not, and, 
second, in view of the government's predictable response, the extra-parliamentary 
strategy of the BS was doomed to fail. 
Ineffectiveness of the BS outside Parliament did not force a revision of 
strategy. Instead the Party boycotted the 1968 general elections. As a result, the 
PAP was unopposed in 51 of the 58 constituencies and easily won the remaining 
seven seats. The only other party to contest the elections was the Workers' Party, 
fielding two candidates.102 The overwhelming support for the PAP indicated that
many previous BS voters had changed camp. Had the BS contested the elections, 
then, it would not have won office but at least received enough seats to exploit 
the parliamentary forum.103
The government's success in the 1968 elections reflected the ever-growing 
satisfaction of middle and lower income earners with the rapidly-materialising 
social reforms, especially in public housing.104 By this time, there was also
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evidence that efforts to attract industrial capital were meeting some success. 
Overall, the government enjoyed an impressive record of efficiency and 
achievement under difficult circumstances. The government's electoral success 
also derived in part from the PAP's ideological campaigns. With the 
institutionalisation of the concept of survival, there was a simultaneous and 
related decline in critical appraisal of PAP actions and an increase in public 
receptivity to PAP rationalisations of its own behaviour. 
At one level, arriving at a political system exclusively dominated by a single 
party was not problematical for the PAP, indeed it was conducive to good 
government if Lee Kuan Yew's earlier pronouncements had any relevance. Lee 
had held serious reservations about the value of one-person-one-vote systems in 
Asia: "At a time when you want harder work with less return and more capital 
investments, one man one vote produces just the opposite".105 Lee continued on
to claim approvingly that the one-person-one-vote system and its associated 
public accountability had been: 
superseded by systems which give power effectively to one man or a 
group of men for an indefinite period. Government to be effective 
must at least give the impression of enduring, and a government 
which is open to the vagaries of the ballot box when the people who 
put their crosses in the ballot box are not illiterate but semi­
literate, which is worse, is a government which is already weakened 
before it starts to govern ... If I were in authority in Singapore 
indefinitely without having to ask those who are being governed 
whether they like what is being done, then I have not the slightest 
doubt that I could govern much more effectively in their own 
interests ... 106
At another level, however, the PAP was at least concerned about the appearance 
of parliamentary democracy, if not the substance of it. This was understandable 
in view of the .attempted high profile by the PAP in international affairs and its 
aspirations as a representative of and model for the Third World. 
Before the 1968 elections, and following the BS withdrawal from Parliament, 
a government-appointed Constitutional Commission had, to the government's 
displeasure, focused on the general dangers arising from the effective monopoly of 
power enjoyed by the ruling party and recommended safeguards against abuses of 
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power.107 Only after considerable reticence, reservation and modification did 
these recommendations win the government's limited acceptance.108 Whilst
concerned with appearance, then, the PAP had no intention of burdening itself 
with constrain ts on the exercise of state power. 
The circumstances immediately following the 1968 elections raised a new 
set of questions about the dominant single party state. This time there were 
practical implications for the PAP's own functioning. At a time when the Party 
was trying to prepare a new generation of leaders for the future, 109 the existing
leadership speculated that the selection of appropriate successors might be 
impaired by the docile political climate. There were other negative implications 
for the Party such as the effect of this climate on intra-party debate and morale 
as well as the question of Singapore's international image.110 Lee talked of the
need to re-introduce some form of political opposition: 
Opposition in this Chamber will, and must, inevitably return. But 
the Opposition will not be individuals claiming to act as the 
conscience of the people, or offering themselves as the necessary 
accoutrements of parliamentary democracy or the spurious 
argument that because there is no Opposition, therefore there is no 
parliamentar
1 
democracy. Singapore is not that gullible and 
incredulous. 1 1 
Exactly what Lee had in mind was not altogether clear but a subsequent support 
statement by S. Rajaratnam indicated that consideration was being given to 
nurturing an opposition from within the PAP's own ranks: 
In the Prime Minister's speech, he expressed the hope that one day 
the Opposition would and must inevitably return. Before that day 
comes, we, the P.A.P., within ourselves in this House are already 
creating the "Opposition" group in the form of the Backbenchers. 
Although this form of Opposition, as the .Prime Minister observed, is 
not the same as the real opposition that he and his colleagues 
experienced in the fifties and sixties, nevertheless the new Back­
benchers who represent a wide cross-section of our society will 
undoubtedly be able to keep the parliamentary machinery going ... 112
The PAP leadership appeared, then, to have a rather utilitarian notion of an 
opposition at this stage, something which could serve the Party's needs yet 
enhance Singapore's international image. However, the idea of a parliamentary 
opposition and questions over what form it might take seemed to have lost favour 
by the end of 1969.113
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Meanwhile ideological justification for the single party state was not 
difficult. After all, it was the logical extension of the Party's constant equation 
between itself and Singapore's economic and political survival and the notion that 
the PAP's mission was above party politics.114 In any case, whatever harm this
situation may have done to Singapore's image as a parliamentary democracy, it 
certainly did no harm to the P AP's overriding objective of instilling business 
confidence in Singapore as a site for export production. Quite the contrary, 
especially when viewed in conjunction with the pro-capital measures introduced by 
the PAP in 1968 in particular. 
Manufacturing Growth and International Capital 
What we have seen above is that the PAP's decision to embark on a new strategy 
to industrialise involved both interventionist economic policies and the creation of 
an appropriate political climate. The PAP reasoned that for successful incor­
poration into the new international division of labour, the investment climate had 
to be in keeping with the needs of international capital which, in Singapore's case, 
was the only fraction of capital capable of affecting such a strategy. The PAP 
was also averse to local Chinese capital on political grounds and was therefore not 
interested in assisting it make the transition to, or play any significant role in, the 
EOI programme. The local Chinese business classes had sympathies with some of 
the PAP's opponents and had extended funds to such groups. 
Given that the primary motivation behind international capital's 
establishment of export bases in developing countries was to exploit lower 
production costs, primarily labour, the PAP's political dominance was necessarily 
central to Singapore's industrial success. It facilitated the defeat of organised 
labour and legislated for wage reductions. At the same time, the state accepted 
responsibility for putting in place various forms of infrastructure which would not 
be forthcoming from local capital. In addition to these moves the state cushioned 
the costs of investment implementation as a lure to capital. In short, what we 
I ! 
252 
have discussed above is the establishment by the PAP of the perceived 
preconditions for EOI under the aegis of international capital. Developments in 
the manufacturing sector between 1965 and 1969 suggested that the PAP's reading 
of these preconditions was insightful, and its capacity to affect them 
fundamental. 
Between 1965 and 1969, the Singapore economy underwent considerable 
expansion. Total GDP (at 1968 constant market prices) rose from $3,048.7 million 
in 1965 to $4,906.1 million in 1969, an increase of 60.9% (see Table 8 in 
Appendix). Growth was particularly rapid for the years 1968 and 1969, being 
13.9% and 13. 7% respectively. This rapid growth owed much to the development 
of the manufacturing sector in general and the response of international capital to 
the government's EOI strategy in particular. 
The expansion of the manufacturing sector between 1965 and 1969 was 
impressive in both absolute and relative terms. The sector's contribution to GDP 
rose from $465.1 million to $942.4 million during the period, and at growth rates 
of 20.7% and 22.4% for 1968 and 1969 respectively (at 1968 constant market 
prices). The manufacturing sector's contribution to total GDP thus increased from 
15.3% in 1965 to 19.2% in 1969 (see Table 9 in Appendix). Manufacturing 
expansion towards the end of the period was quite remarkable. Output increased 
in 1969 by 53.1 % over that of the previous year and value-added by 41.3% (at 
current market prices) (see Table 1 in Appendix). This development gave rise to a 
steep increase in job opportunities. Employment in the sector rose by 54,618 or by 
108.9%, during the period. Of this, 53.8% was generated in 1969 alone (see Table 
6 in Appendix). By the end of 1969, total unemployment in Singapore had fallen to 
6.7% (see Table 1 in Appendix). 
The above indicators show that the most impressive gains occurred following 
the government's concerted attempts to attract export-oriented capital from 
abroad. Indeed, the dramatically successful attempts to attract international 
capital were crucial to Singapore's industrialisation between 1965 and 1969. Gross 
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fixed assets of foreign investment in Singapore amounted to just $157 million at 
the end of 1965. By the end of 1969, however, this had risen by $443 million, of 
which $297 million was invested in 1968 and 1969 (see Table 10 in Appendix). As a 
result, by 1969, foreign investment represented 54.2% of total gross fixed assets 
in manufacturing, after being just 45.4% as recently as 1966.115
The rapid growth in foreign investment had important implications for the 
orientation of production in manufacturing. By 1969, a positive correlation had 
been established between foreign investment and export production. In 1969, 
whereas 70% of wholly locally-owned firms did not export, the proportion for 
wholly foreign-owned firms was just 30% and 37% for joint-ventures. Likewise, 
whereas only 2% of locally-owned firms exported all of their output, the figure 
was 13% for foreign firms and 8% for joint-ventures.116 Foreign investment,
then, was largely, though not exclusively, responsible for the boost in the export 
of manufactured goods which occurred particularly towards the end of the 1965-
1969 period. 
The overall growth in the direct export of manufactured goods is shown in 
Table 5 of the Appendix. It rose from $858.5 million in 1965 to $1,971.2 million 
(in current prices) by 1969, an increase of 129.6%, of which 111.6% was generated 
in 1969 alone. There was, then, a very sudden and positive response to the 
government's measures to promote export growth. Such was the response that the 
ratio of export sales to output for the sector, which had declined from 51.4 in 
1965 to 36.3 in 1968, recovered to reach 46.2 in 1969. Similarly, the ratio of 
direct exports to total sales for the sector had declined from 51.6 in 1965 to 36.3 
in 1968 but recovered strongly to 45. 7 in 1969 (see Table 2 in Appendix). The 
pattern amongst pioneer firms was similar. Between 1965 and 1969, the number 
of pioneer firms in production rose from 95 to 236 and the export/output ratio of 
these firms rose from 27. 7 to 38.3 (see Table 15 in Appendix). It was too early to 
ascertain the durability of this trend, but by 1969, certainly a marked and decisive 
shift in the direction sought by the government had been achieved. This was also 
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reflected in the increased percentage of manufactured exports destined for 
markets other than Malaysia, up from 46.3% in 1965 to 84.6% in 1969.117
An examination of expansion in manufacturing activity on an industry basis 
reveals more clearly the nature of the growth in this sector. In terms of output, 
the petroleum refineries and petroleum products industry was by far the dominant 
growth industry between 1965 and 1969. Output increased by 495.17% (at current 
prices) for the period. Value-added also increased significantly, by 238.8% (at 
current prices). This industry also played the leading role in boosting 
manufactured exports. Between 1965 and 1969, there was a 741.9% increase in 
direct exports by the chemicals, chemical and petroleum products industries, of 
which 581.0% occurred in 1969 alone (see Table 5 in Appendix).118 The
export/output ratio for these industries was up from 28.9 in 1965 to 56.1 in 
1969.119 This export surge derived from Singapore's position as the largest
petroleum refining, blending and distribution centre in Southeast Asia. 
Consequently, Singapore benefited by increased demand for refined petroleum 
exports to South Vietnam during the Vietnam War as well as from its East and 
Southeast Asian neighbours which were experiencing general economic and indust-
rial expansion. Significant as growth in this industry was, however, these 
developments constituted more an accentuation of earlier prominence and 
tendencies rather than a decisive structural shift. 
Behind petroleum refineries and petroleum products, the major growth 
industries in terms of output between 1965 and 1969 were food, transport 
equipment, electrical machinery and sawn-timber. The leading contributors to 
value-added were transport equipment, petroleum refineries and petroleum 
products, electrical machinery, food and sawn timber (see Table 4 in Appendix). 
Some of the traditional leading growth industries, such as food, beverages and 
tobacco, though still important, had fallen behind the newly-emerging industries 
of transport equipment, and electrical machinery in their contribution to total 
manufacturing value-added. 
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The newfound importance of the transport industry was of course no 
accident. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the government had deliberately 
promoted this industry's development, with special focus on shipbuilding and 
repair. As both a labour and skill-intensive industry, this was understandable.120
A total of 12,020 more jobs were provided by the transport equipment industry 
between 1965 and 1969, 22% of the total new jobs for the period (see Table 6 in 
Appendix). Export expansion was significant in the industry's growth, particularly 
within shipbuilding and repair. By 1969, with an export/output ratio of 30.4 the 
transport equipment industry was one of Singapore's leading export industries.121
Even so, the industry was, overall, not export dominated but drew on both 
domestic and foreign markets. 
The expansion of the shipbuilding and shiprepair industry was very rapid. As 
late as 1967 there was just one major shipyard (Jurong) and 24 small ones, with the 
industry employing 6,308 people and output value at $82.8 million. By the start of 
1969, however, 45 shipyards were in operation and 12,000 workers were employed, 
with output value standing at $150 million.122 Regional demand for shipbuilding
and shiprepairing was boosted by the increasing traffic of oil transporting vessels 
and the Vietnam War, whilst opportunities stemming from offshore oil exploration 
also benefited companies engaged in rig construction and supply.123 Added to the
upturn in demand, Singapore became increasingly attractive as an export base for 
shipbuilding and shiprepair for Japanese-based companies. By the late 1960s, 
Japanese wage costs had risen to levels approaching those of the USA and Europe, 
land was becoming precious and expensive in Japan, government-imposed pollution 
controls were raising production costs and the ongoing revaluation of the Japanese 
yen further eroded the competitiveness of export production in Japan.124
It was the emergence of the electrical machinery industry by 1969, above all 
else, which defined the government's EOI strategy as successful. The industry's 
growth in 1968 and 1969 was outstanding. Of the industry's $39.7 million increase 
in value-added between 1965 and 1969, 78.3% of this occurred between 1968 and 
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1969. During the same brief period, 70.1 % of the $102.1 million increase in output 
between 1965 and 1969 also occurred (see Table 3 in Appendix). The contribution 
of exports to total output was extremely high. Exports rose from $15,046 million 
in 1965 to $84,605 million in 1969 and in 1969 the industry had an export/output 
ratio of 66.3.125 The result of this massive expansion was an increase of 5,564
jobs between 1965 and 1969 in the industry, of which 4,617 were generated in 1969 
(see Table 6 in Appendix). Operations in the 'industry were inherently labour­
intensive, whether in the assembly of electrical goods or the manufacture of 
electronic components. Products involved included a range of consumer electrical 
appliances such as radios, televisions, tape recorders, electric fans, as well as 
electronic components such as integrated circuits and semiconductors. 
The spectacular growth of the industry towards the end of the 1960s was 
essentially the product of a tendency amongst US-based companies to develop new 
export bases to keep up with the boom in demand for electrical and electronic 
goods in the markets of Europe and the USA. At the same time, the measures 
taken to boost low-cost and disciplined labour in 1968, combined with the 
declining political stability of the established offshore base for electronics, Hong 
Kong, rendered Singapore suitably attractive.126 The EDB also spared no effort
to entice such companies and ensure their smooth and uncomplicated 
establishment. The assumption the EDB worked from, which proved to be correct, 
was that investments by these companies would have a catalytic effect, 127
pressuring other firms to come to Singapore in order to remain competitive. This 
is precisely what happened, especially amongst semiconductor manufacturers. 
Production in the electrical and electronics industry by international capital 
in Singapore characteristically involved only the least sophisticated, most labour­
intensive aspects of these firms' international divisions of labour. Technological 
advances had made it possible for the different stages of production to be sourced 
out to the most cost-efficient production sites available in the world. Singapore's 
attractiveness as a site for such production would always be subject to the global 
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options available to these firms and the dynamism of technology which would in 
turn influence the nature of the international division of labour by which firms in 
the industry operated. 
Though not significant in terms of relative share of total manufacturing 
value-added or output, another group of industries emerged in the 1965-1969 
period as important generators of employment. The textiles, clothing, footwear 
and leather group of industries accounted for only 6.3% of increased value-added 
and 5.3% of increased output in manufacturing yet as much as 14.8% of new 
employment by the sector (see Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix). This highly labour­
intensive, low value-added group was also heavily export-oriented with an 
export/output ratio of 56.1 in 1969.128 The heavy dependence upon export
markets was reinforced with the relocation of Hong Kong-controlled textile 
companies after 1967 in search of political stability and, later, favourable labour 
costs.129 Another rapid genera tor of employment between 1965 and 1969 was the
sawn timber industry which provided 3,581 more jobs at the end of 1969. Like the 
above group, this was also heavily export-oriented with an export/output ratio of 
45.4 in 1969.130
The above-discussed industries were not the only fast-growing industries in 
the period 1965-1969. The point was, however, that by 1969, amongst other 
things, a new group of labour-intensive industries had come to assume prominence 
alongside the petroleum refining and petroleum products industry. A significant 
portion of this industrial growth had been based on the exploitation of relatively 
low-cost labour and was geared towards production for the world market. To a 
greater extent then, the sorts of products manufactured, the techniques involved 
in production and the destination of products manufactured in Singapore were tied 
up with the requirements of international capital and its associated international 
division of labour. 
In terms of the origins of foreign investment, by far the most significant 
development for the period 1965-1969 was the emergence of US-based capital as 
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the leading investor in Singapore's manufacturing sector (see Table 12 in 
Appendix). This was due primarily to the steep investment increases in 1968 and 
1969 in the electrical and electronics industry. Total US-based capital doubled 
between 1967 and 1968 and increased by nearly two and a half times between 1968 
and 1969. In 1968, US-based electronic companies Teledeyne, International 
Technology, National Semi-conductor and Texas Instruments all established 
subsidiaries in Singapore. The following year another eight US-based companies 
followed sui t.131
In keeping with earlier developments, US-based companies continued to 
expand investment in the petroleum refineries and petroleum products industry, 
with Esso setting up a refinery and lubrica tring plant during the period. There was 
also an assortment of small import-substitution activities, supplemented with 
some orientation towards regional markets'.132 Overall, however, it was the shift
towards labour-intensive, export-oriented manufacture, most especially in 
electronics, which was the outstanding feature of US investment between 1965 
and 1969. 
The other significant feature of foreign investment between 1965 and 1969 
was. the virtual cessation of growth in investment by Japanese-based companies, 
growing by just $9 million for the period. This reflected the view that without a 
common market with Malaysia, Singapore's small domestic market was an 
fosufficient basis for manufacturing investment. Japan continued to be more 
interested in domestic Southeast Asian markets than in manufacture for export. 
Thus, after being the dominant investor for the first half of the decade, Japanese 
interest generally waned, with the exception of the shipbuilding and repair 
industry discussed earlier.133
The US was followed by British and Netherlands-based capital as the leading 
investors between 1965 and 1969 in Singapore. However, the bulk of investment 
by these two was due to the investments of the British/Dutch Shell Group which 
increased capacity during 1965-1969. Shell completed a second refinery in 
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1967, 134 and also established two subsidiaries in 1969 to make hydrocarbon
solvents and base lubeoil.135 Neither country's investors were _generally active in
Singapore's industrialisation in this period, the British agency and merchant houses 
in particular showing no real inclination to diversify from its traditional base into 
manuf cturing. 
Conclusion 
We have seen above that the PAP responded to the economic challenges posed 
between 1965 and 1969 with vigour and success. The measures to promote EOI 
were particularly successful towards the end of this period. Creating the 
appropriate investment climate for this strategy's success involved the PAP in 
measures to generate physical and social infrastructure, provide fiscal incentives, 
provide government equity participation and, above all else, ensure a relatively 
cheap and docile labour force.136
The drastic measures adopted to tame labour were taken with the 
confidence of a Party which in many respects had become indistinguishable from 
the state. Indeed, it was the longstanding and successful effort to weaken the 
independent labour movement and the establishment of a government-sponsored 
substitute organisation which ensured that there would be no organised resistence 
of any consequence to these policies. Equally, the PAP's autonomy from any 
single element of capital enabled it to address the question of industrial strategy 
without fear of alienating its base of support or being conditioned by political 
constraints. This was important not just in deciding the economic direction of 
Singapore, but also in the state adopting an economic interventionist approach to 
the implementation of its strategy. The capacity of the PAP to create conditions 
favourable to the attraction of international capital for export production, then, 
derived in large part from power relations initiated before the PAP 
wholeheartedly adopted the export strategy. Once adopting this strategy, 
however, these relationships were accentuated. 
authoritarianism of the PAP state was given a fillip. 
The paternalism and 
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Of particular relevance to the EOI strategy was the coincidence of an 
appropriate investment climate with the PAP's own political objectives. Thus, the 
weakening of labour was but part of the broader political project of creating the 
conditions for the PAP's unchallengeable dominance of Singapore's political 
system generally. All manner of repression could now be justified on the grounds 
of Singapore's desperate economic need to ensure the success of the export 
strategy and create the associated favourable investment conditions. Such 
conditions virtually excluded the possibility of any organised political opposition 
capable of being any threat to the PAP, particularly one which was based on 
labour support. Between 1965 and 1969, then, the monopoly of power by the PAP 
became entrenched, with a comprehensive ideology being promoted in the hope 
that the legitimacy of this monopoly would become internalised in the population. 
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the success of the government's 
economic strategy, indeed even the possibility of such a strategy, owed something 
to historical circumstances. Not only was the tendency towards international 
sourcing and offshore production by international capital a relatively recent and 
specific phenomenon, but the point at which the PAP attempted the attraction of 
such capital coincided with a particular need for US electronics companies to 
expand capacity. Neither the general tendency of international capital nor the 
particular requirements of US electronics companies were within the PAP's 
control. The PAP had demonstrated, however, that Singapore's own historical 
circumstances enabled it to fully exploit these international factors. Further 
development of the Singapore economy was to increasingly rely upon the capacity 
of the Singapore state to identify and respond to changes in the international 
division of labour. 
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EARLY SHIFT TOWARDS ffiGHER VALUE-ADDED PRODUCTION: 1970-1975 
Introduction 
Having expanded the manufacturing sector through the promotion of international 
capital investment and production for the world market, the Singapore 
government experienced almost immediate success in stimulating economic 
growth and generating employment. This closer integration of the manufacturing 
sector with the world economy, however, also committed that sector to a certain 
logic which would yet be felt in other ways. Not only would the Singapore 
economy be more closely subject to the vagaries of demand in the international 
economy, it would also be shaped by the fluid requirements and perceptions of 
international capital. The continued success of the export strategy would depend 
heavily on the capacity of the state to respond to the changing needs and 
perceptions of international capital. The high profile of the state during the 
1960s, then, was by no means over. 
Upon reaching full employment, and with international capital beginning to 
explore avenues for higher value-added investment in Singapore, the PAP adopted 
a number of initiatives intended to promote higher quality investments. These 
included: changes to fiscal and tax incentives offered to investors, expansions in 
the quality and quantity of social and physical infrastructure; selective equity par­
ticipation in industry; announcement of an export credit scheme; and, of special 
importance, the introduction of more direct institutional control over wage levels 
and the harnessing of the trade union movement to support the government's 
changed economic emphasis. These last· two measures assumed even more 
importance when the 1974/75 global recession precipitated a return to a less 
selective investment drive. The economic volatility of the 1970-1975 period thus 
not only brought into focus the role of the state in generating the economic 
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conditions and inducements appropriate to higher value-added forms of production 
in Singapore. It also highlighted the range of political and social functions of the 
state in times of expansion and contraction of industrial activity. Indeed, 
incorporation into the new international division of labour affected more than the 
pace and nature of industrial development. It affected the entire political 
economy within which this production took place. Thus, although much of the 
PAP's repression of political opposition and general authoritarian rule had 
previously been rationalised on the grounds that a massive unemployment problem 
and economic crisis would otherwise result, there was no liberalisation of 
conditions once the PAP's political security was confirmed and unemployment 
eased. There was, however, a hardening of the P AP's resolve to curtail any 
dissent when the vulnerability of its externally-oriented strategy was exposed 
during the recession. 
We see below then that at an early stage in the development of the strategy, 
the PAP consciously attempted to foster a particular pattern of international 
capital investment which had begun to emerge. Objective conditions quickly 
changed, however, thereby bringing into question the appropriatness and 
effectiveness of this attempt. Thus, whilst the state very definitely played a 
fundamental role in shaping industrial structure, it did this with cognizance of the 
dynamics of the global economy and international capital. 
Adjustment to Industrial Strategy 
Although the EOI strategy was founded on the attraction of investments for 
largely unskilled, labour-intensive production, Singapore's policy-makers never 
in tended the economy to linger at this level of production longer than was 
necessary to solve unemployment. By the start of 1969, the government already 
appeared to be pondering the longer term prospects for industry in Singapore: 
As development proceeds, major emphasis must be adjusted to 
reflect the emerging situation and to provide new guidelines towards 
desirable directions of growth. At the beginning of the 
industrialisation programme, the most urgent task had been that of 
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solving the chronic unemployment problem - both of the backlog and 
of providing sufficient new jobs for school leavers. Policy was thus 
properly directed towards getting a diversity of manufacturing 
enterprises established quickly to get the programme off the 
ground. Now, there will have to be more attention paid to a 
qualitative approach rather than a mere quantitative approach. The 
main effort and encouragement will be diverted towards changing 
the essential structure of the industrial sector - particularly towards 
the type of operations that have the highest value added, provide 
most scope for the development of skill potential and require a 
greater science and technology content. These industries are 
essentially long term in concept and are capable of sinking deep 
roots. Such developments, however, must be closely related to 
relevant programmes for education, training and productivity con­
sciousness .1
Given that at the time of this statement Singapore's unemployment rate was 
still 7.3%, such a perspective may have seemed exceedingly ambitious. The pace 
of change had been so fast, however, that this projection of longer term economic 
possibilities was quite warranted. The rapid growth of the commercial, service 
and manufacturing sectors had already been such that the government had, in 
1968, relaxed its immigration laws to facilitate the entry of foreign labour in 
certain skilled and semi-skilled areas. Before long, shortages became more acute 
in unskilled areas, especially construction and manufacturing assembly. As 
employment options widened, Singaporeans increasingly shunned heavy manual 
jobs and other 'dirty' work. A 1969 report on labour force problems revealed that 
resignation rates of 10-20% per month in new factories were common.2 The
tremendous pace of Singapore's industrialisation, if continued, was only likely to 
accentuate the growing selectivity of Singaporeans in employment and the need to 
import foreign labour. 
By the end of 1969, the unemployment rate in Singapore had fallen to 6. 7% 
and, based on projected investment growth, full employment (in economic terms) 
was quite possible in the foreseeable future. Under these circumstances, the PAP 
government felt it appropriate to begin to be somewhat more selective in industry 
promotion. First official hint of this came in the 1969 Annual Report of the EDB 
published in early 1970: 
In evaluating new projects for the 1970s, however, more demanding 
criteria and critical examination will have to be applied to ensure 
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that growth is directed towards making use of resources and 
advantages. The main emphasis and priority will be given to those 
types of industries and operations that can make the most 
significant contribution in skill development with good potential for 
technological advance. The products must be marketable on a 
worldwide basis with propspects for future growth.3
In its Report, the EDB nominated various industries and products which belonged 
to the preferred areas for future investment. In broad industry category terms, 
these included: metal engineering and machinery; aerospace engineering; 
shipbuilding and transport equipment; optical instruments and lenses; 
engineering; scientific and medical equipment; electrical and electronic 
products; petrochemicals; plastic materials and fibres; jewellery. Reference 
was also made to the need to develop Singapore's service and commercial services, 
particularly the scope for Singapore as an international financial centre.4
The government's first concrete policy change towards promoting higher 
value-added production came in 1970 following a review by the Ministry of 
Finance of tax concessions to pioneer industries. The government enacted the 
Economic Expansion Incentives (Amendment) Act 1970 which significantly 
tightened up eligibility for benefits under the 1967 Act.5 In addition, tax relief
periods for export enterprises were reduced from 15 to five years for non-pioneer 
firms, and from 15 to eight years for pioneer firms. Another change was that 
capital allowances would now have to be taken into account by expanding and 
pioneer firms in computing their respective income exemption, something not 
required under the 1967 Act. This meant that less income would be tax exempt 
than previously estimated by firms. 
As a matter of interpretation, the alterations to incentives should be seen as 
an active encouragement to higher value-added production rather than as an 
outright discouragement to more labour-intensive, lower value added 
investments. The latter were still welcome in Singapore, but not as welcome as 
the former. The Singapore economy, however, was not yet at the point where 
investment per se could be turned down. There was still the spectre of 
unemployment posed by the final withdrawal of British military forces in 1971, a 
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point which Lee emphasised in late 1970. The loss of some 30,000 British families' 
spending power, the retrenchment of 16,500 employees, and the abandonment of 
over 3,000 locally enlisted uniformed personnel had yet to be contended with.6
Once this problem had been overcome, Lee assured: 
... we will spend more time and resources upgrading the skills and 
increasing the earnings of our workers. We must move into the 
middle brackets of technology. Then the average take-home pay 
will go u� because value-added in the manufacturing process is
increased. 
As evidenced in Lee's statement, an assumption underlying the government's 
strategy for future industrial growth was that increased workers' skills would give 
rise to greater productivity and, hence, a greater capacity by capital to pay higher 
wages. To this point, however, workers had been given no explanation of how this 
capacity necessarily translated into real wage increases. 
Over the next few years, the government's commitment to the promotion of 
higher value-added export-oriented investments was reinforced, particularly with 
the further tightening of the labour market. This was expressed in various ways: 
labour shortages in certain areas of industry; increased dependence upon foreign 
labour; and high job turnover rates. A survey conducted in July 1972 by New 
Nation identified Singapore's most labour-intensive industries of garments and 
textiles, electrical machinery, and shipbuilding and shiprepairing as the 
manufacturing sector's most adversely affected industries. According to the 
survey, these three industries were 9,000 workers short. Not only did this cause 
cutbacks in production, but it began to foster 'poaching' of workers by competing 
firms.8 Such circumstances had the potential to bring about significant wage
rises. In order to avert such a situation, and ensure maximum economic growth, 
the government permitted large increases in the importation of foreign labour. By 
1973, over 100,000 of Singapore's 817,400 total workforce was comprised of 
immigrant labour, mainly from Malaysia.9 In conjunction with this trend, the
government encouraged the increased participation of women in the 
workforce.10 This cheap, unskilled source was in particular demand in the low
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value production work in electrical and electronics assembly and the garments 
industry. In spite of these additions to the labour forc;e, however, in 1973 the 
Ministry of Labour reported cases of annual turnover rates of 95 % in electronics 
and 100% in one particular textiles plant.11 In response to this tendency, as from
June 1973 foreign work permit holders required permission from the Ministry of 
Labour to transfer to a new employer inside three years of starting a job. This 
was not just intended to curb turnover rates but to also encourage labour training 
by companies.12
If the tightening of the labour market persuaded the government to consider 
measures to reduce reliance upon low value, labour-intensive production, it was 
the newfound interest by a range of international companies in Singapore which 
gave the government the confidence to act. Actual and committed foreign 
investment in the period 1970-1972 included various projects in precision 
engineering products such as tools and dies, watch accessories, miniature ball 
bearings, machinery, optical instruments and cameras, as well as the 
establishment of a semi-synthetic penicillin plant and various forms of forward 
integration and diversification in the electrical and electronics industry. 
Indications were, therefore, that some elements of international capital had 
identified Singapore as a suitable production site for the manufacture and export 
of higher value-added products and processes than those on which the post-1965 
industrial programme had been based. The sort of technology involved may still 
have been modest by international standards, but the beginnings of a shift in the 
broad direction desired by the government did appear to be under way . 
. Aside from the favourable investment trends of the early 1970s, by the end 
of 1972 unemployment had dropped to 4. 7% and the military pull-out had taken 
place smoothly.13 The country's National Service graduates had also been
satisfactorily absorbed into the workforce. In 1972, then, Lee Kuan Yew declared 
that job creation was no longer the prime concern of the government: 
Today there is only frictional unemployment - workers on the move 
in search of better jobs. Now we have to take some fundamental 
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decisions on what kind of society we want to be. I say let 11s raise 
our sights, let us aim at quality and not quantity, (sic) From now on, 
we will choose industries which are more skill-intensive, more 
sophisticated in production, and can therefore pay higher wages.14
Lee was obviously satisfied that the once daunting challenge of unemployment had 
been defeated and appeared to be suggesting that more measures to affect 
restructuring were forthcoming. 
The government's intention to become more selective in investment 
promotion did not signify disillusionment with the Singapore economy's 
incorporation into the new international division of labour. On the contrary, the 
aspiration was that Singapore's position in this structure be slightly elevated. S. 
Rajaratnam's 1972 address to the Singapore Press Club, entitled "Singapore: 
Global City", in which even greater integration with international capital was 
advocated, exemplified the faith of the government in the path already followed. 
Rajaratnam expressed the optimistic view that, with the further inter­
nationalisation of production, Singapore stood the best chance of achieving a 
technological short-cut in its development.15
Wage Policy 
Despite government statements about the potential for increased wages with the 
advent of higher value-added production, it nevertheless realised that 
international wage competitiveness remained fundamental to Singapore's 
industrial strategy. As an export production site, potential investors would 
continue to compare Singapore with Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. The 
closing of the wage gap between Singapore and these regional rivals had been of 
particular significance to the success of the strategy so far. Before 1968, and the 
adoption of the low wage policy, Singapore had the highest wage levels of these 
four alternative production sites. However, by the end of 1971, Singapore's 
comparative wage levels had dropped to the point where it ranked behind Hong 
Kong's wage levels in manufacturing and the differential between South Korean 
wages and its own had been nearly halved.16 A study completed in 1972 by the 
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Stanford Research Institute on comparative labour costs in South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan also concluded that Singapore had by far the best 
record in maintaining wage cost stability.17 However, with Singapore's
competitors also intent on attracting higher value-added investments, and with 
wage costs still comprising a significant component of total production costs in 
such industry, these gains could not be sacrificed now. Rather, the problem for 
the government was how to ensure control over wages amidst new circumstances. 
Ironically, the new circumstances which rendered wage control a more 
difficult exercise derived from the very success of the government's low wage 
policy and broader strategy. So rapid was industrial growth that the resulting 
material benefits to the non-wage sections of Singapore society were both 
considerable and conspicuous. Workers' receptivity to appeals for sacrifice and 
restraint understandably weakened under these circumstances. In May 1971, the 
NTUC campaigned for a more equitable share of profits. Whilst emphasising the 
need for continuing discipline, NTUC Secretary-General Devan Nair vented the 
frustrations of labour when he questioned the justification for workers sacrificing 
improved wages indefinitely: 
To keep on tightening our belts when other sectors of society are 
loosening theirs (sic) ... is to expect the impossible. What trade 
unions have every right to expect is a rational and progressive policy 
on incomes, whereby workers are clearly seen to share fairly and 
justly, in the growing profits of trade and industry.18
As much as airing the feelings of workers, Devan Nair was cautioning the 
government about the limits to the NTUC's moderating influence over the 
workforce under such visibly inequitous conditions. Added to the question of 
inequality was the fact of inflation which increased by 1.8% in 1971, thereby 
eroding the real value of wages (see Table 18 in Appendix). 
Throughout 1971 workers' discontent with the wage policy was quite real and 
coincided with growing labour shortages and, therefore, a continually improving 
bargaining position. Out of the endeavour to attract scarce labour, some non­
unionised firms began offering higher wages to lure workers from unionised 
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firms. Where this was successful, staff turnover rates naturally increased.19
Some unions also found it possible to obtain wage increases without contravening 
the terms of the Employment Act. 
Despite the official continuation of the low wage policy, then, wages 
increased in 1971 by an estimated 10% in the private sector of the economy.20 In
early 1972, however, laboufs resolve to improve its position manifested in an 
unusual spate of industrial disputes which essentially centred around the claim for 
a fairer share of profits by way of bigger bonus payments than afforded under the 
Employment Act. The most interesting aspect of these disputes was the govern­
ment's non-involvement. By now the government had come to share the genuine 
fears of capital that a wage explosion was a real possibility but had also concluded 
that a total clamp on wages was not only impossible but counter-productive to 
wage control. Consistent with this reasoning, the government opted to ease the 
freeze on wages but, at the same time, to introduce more formalised institutional 
control over the process by which wage rises were arrived at. This would, 
hopefully, guard against any wage 'explosion'. 
The first official hint of a new process for determining wage levels came on 
19 June 1971 from the Finance Minister, Hon Sui Sen.21 Evidently, subsequent
trends reinforced the government's conviction that such a change was required and 
in February 1972 the National Wages Council (NWC) was formed. This 10-member 
tripartite body was comprised of equal representation of capital, labour and 
government and included an independent chairman who, in 1972, was Professor 
Lim Chong Yah, an academic economist.22 Representatives of capital were
drawn from the Singapore Employers' Federation (SEF), the National Employers' 
Council (NEC) and the Singapore Manufacturers' · Association (SMA). 
Representatives of capital thus tended to favour larger employers and, 
particularly, those belonging to international companies which were strongly 
represented in these bodies. Labour representatives were drawn from the NTUC, 
and the government's representatives from its own departments.23 Under this 
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structure, the government's h:-!fluence was quite pervasive since apart from its own 
direct representation, the PAP's cross-fertilisation with the NTUC, and the 
absence of any independent union representation, ensured that in practice the 
NWC would in effect reflect government policy. 
The stated threefold purpose of the NWC was to: formulate general 
guidelines on wages; ensure orderly wage developments to promote economic and 
social development; and help devise incentive schemes to improve national 
productivity. Through the NWC, therefore, wage rises were certainly envisaged. 
The more important point of the NWC, however, was to influence the way in 
which rises would occur. In an address to the NTUC in March 1972, Lee Kuan Yew 
asserted: 
We have the choice of controlled and steady wage increases and real 
growth, or of taking quick gains in artificially high and sudden 
increases in wage rates and bonuses, but thereby jeopardising future 
growth.24 
The government's intention was to increase wages to a point which would prevent 
either a resurgence of labour militance or a tendency for spasmodic, unpredictable 
wage rises. Neither scenario would have enhanced Singapore's attractiveness to 
capital, especially where investment decisions involved longer term 
considerations, as was the case with higher value-added investment. 
Although not mandatory, the NWC guidelines had the stamp of legitimacy in 
view of the apparent official tripartite support they enjoyed. Moreover, since 
disputes arising out of failed :q.egotiations over these guidelines would be settled 
by the IAC, which would invariably take account of government policy, these 
guidelines had very real implications for collective bargaining. Indeed, collective 
bargaining would be further weakened since the agenda for negotiations was now 
effectively a matter of central institutional determination. This did not mean 
that wage increases would necessarily mirror those recommended, nor that they 
would henceforth be uniform, but it did give unions and employers clear 
indications of the sorts of claims that would be tolerated as legitimate. 
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Aside from the concern to avoid wage increases which would undermine the 
competitiveness of Singapore's manufactured exports, the more formal control 
over wages was also intended to help address the question of labour utilisation. 
The government's economic adviser, Dr Albert Winsemius, had warned that the 
pursuance of a low wage policy after the realisation of full employment would put 
a break on economic growth by encouraging labour absorption ahead of labour 
replacement in production.25 Given that labour shortages were now widespread,
the government was therefore looking to improved productivity from traditional, 
low value-added industries such as textiles and garments, especially through 
mechanisation. There was some expectation that increased wages would force 
some of these manufacturers to make greater use of the improved training 
facilities and tax incentives available for the. development of more efficient 
technology. 
Confirmation that the government had softened its line on wage increases 
came in March 1972 with Lee Kuan Yew's announcement of average wage 
increases of 11.3% for all civil servants. The wage increase included a "thirteenth 
annual payment", an allowance equivalent to one month's pay, which Lee stressed 
was not a bonus. Unlike a bonus in the proper sense, this payment would be 
automatic and not subject to performance.26 This was the first step towards
bridging the gap between public and private sector wage rates.27
Subsequent to the government's announcement of civil service wage 
increases, the NWC made its 1972 recommendations for the private sector of a 
flat 8% wage increase. Additionally, in keeping with the concept of a "thirteenth 
annual payment" the NWC recommended that the traditional bonus system be 
integrated into an annual wage supplement system. Under this complex system, it 
was possible for a worker to get an annual 'bonus' payment equal to between one 
and three months' salary.28 This represented a major departure from the rigid
stipulation under the Employment Act of a maximum negotiable bonus equal to 
one month's wages. The NWC thus institutionalised bonus payments and annual 
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wage supplements as integral to the process of wage determination.29 Towards
the end of 1972, the government also amended the Employment Act to extend the 
overtime limit from 48 hours to 72 hours per month. SO
In 1973, the NWC recommended a flat increase of 9%, but on this occasion 
applicable both to the public and private sectors. The recommendations, again 
fully accepted by the government, provided for variable off-setting against 
increments which occurred due to pre-1972 collective agreements. However, 
owing to an inflation rate increase of 19.6% in 1973, this recommendation was 
supplemented in February 1974 with an interim monthly cost of living allowance 
of $25 for workers receiving less than $1,000 per month. This represented the 
first attempt to address the question of income distribution. Previous 
recommendations had, due to the flat increases, tended to widen income 
disparities amongst wage earners. The NTUC, however, had argued consistently in 
favour of redressing disparities.31 The subsequent 1974 NWC recommendations
called for an increase of $40 plus 6%, with no offsetting against wage increments 
for workers earning less than $1,000 per month, and a $40 lump sum plus 10% for 
workers with incomes above $1,000 per month.32 These recommendations, once
more accepted in full by the government, effectively meant a 26% increase for 
those earning around $200 per month and an 11 % increase for those earning above 
$11,000 per month. 33
The NWC's seemingly boldest recommendations were in 1974, advocating 
average wage increases of 16.2%. To some extent, this recommendation reflected 
the government's disappointment with a trend highlighted by Hon Sui Sen in his 
budget speech of the same year. Hon pointed out that 50,000 new jobs had been 
created in the Singapore economy in 1973, of which 24,400 were in the 
manufacturing sector. Hon observed that: 
Such a massive new job creation was, however, not in accord with 
our strategy of raising the productivity of labour ... despite having 
to pay the NWC increased wages in 1973, employers apparently did 
not feel sufficiently induced to economise on scarce labour.34
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At the same time as this job creation was taking place, there was also a strong 
growth in the number of investments in middle technology industries and in the 
overall value-added per worker in the manufacturing sector. 35 There was, thus,
an inadequate rationalisation of labour by certain industries. The disproportionate 
wage increases for those workers receiving the lowest incomes were therefore 
intended to hit the labour-intensive, low value-added industries hardest.36 But if
this third NWC decision was more agressive, it still did not represent a departure 
from the view expressed by Lee Kuan Yew in 1972 that skill levels would need to 
be raised and more sophisticated industries attracted before better wages would 
be possible.37 The commitment to the idea that wages could be increased as a
means of discouraging inefficient labour usage was still conditioned by other 
objectives. As Lee told a group of workers at the Sembawang Shipyard in 1974: 
In the end it must be a compromise which will compensate workers 
for their loss of real earnings through inflation, while maintaining 
the edge in our exports, and also continue to encourage further 
foreign investors in skill-intensive, middle technology 
manufacture. 38
Thus, at the height of the so-called 'high wage policy', Lee still had a qualified 
view on the extent to which wage increases could be used to assist restructuring. 
After all, wage increases might be effective in releasing some labour from 
inefficient manufacturers, but new industries would not be attracted without 
suitably competitive wage levels. 
Despite the qualifications about the government's relaxation of the wage 
freeze, the new policy did nevertheless represent an important recognition by the 
PAP government of the implications of changes in the domestic labour market for 
economic strategy. The official approval of wage increases amounted to 
recognition that Singapore's survival in the new international division of labour 
rested on the ability to respond to the new circumstances and compete for 
investment in middle technology. Market forces were such that wage levels could 
not be held down sufficiently to ensure international competitiveness in the most 
labour-intensive, unskilled areas of industry. As Table 19 in the Appendix shows, 
- ---�------� ------ - - - - -----------,---=�-------,-----� 
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NWC recommendations were consister1tly exceeded as the pace of economic 
growth outstirpped labour supply in the early 1970s and strengthened the latter's 
bargaining position. Singapore's prospects lay in raising skill and productivity 
levels to a point where it could compete for a greater share of the production 
traditionally confined to the advanced countries. In the long run, Singapore would 
have to graduate from its current position in the new international division of 
labour or be outdone by emerging cheaper production sites. 
Other Policy Measures 
In conjunction with the government's new approach to wages, a number of other 
measures were adopted to enhance the attraction and development of higher 
value-added industry. In particular, the government's already declared 
commitment to raising the productivity and skill levels of the workforce 
manifested in various educational and training reforms. In 1971, for example, the 
Ministry of Education decided to significantly expand technical education and 
industrial training, with the aim that eventually most secondary schools would 
have a technical stream at the General Certificate of Education (GCE) level, that 
is the final year of examinations.39 In the same year, vocational institutes were
reorganised under the Industrial Training Board CTTB) and a Manpower and Training 
Unit (MTU) was established within the EDE to operate as a supplement to existing 
technical education, administering training in areas of special emphasis as well as 
providing general technical assistance to firms involved in restructuring. An 
overseas training programme placed trainees with overseas companies,40 and the
EDE negotiated with foreign companies for the establishment of joint advanced 
training centres in Singapore for which the government set aside $8,700,000 in 
1973.41
One of the government's most comprehensive statements of its strategy for 
shifting towards higher value-added came in Hon Sui Sen's 1973 budget speech. 
Hon spelt out a 10-point programme in a speech entitled "The New Phase ·of 
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Industrial Development in Singapore". New incentives for capital-intensive and 
supporting industries were announced, including a five-year tax holiday for new 
firms with "the desired level of technology", with a possible 90% exemption from 
company tax on profits for an extended period. Hon specified that such criteria as 
capital to labour ratio, the degree of value-added per worker and the ratio of 
technical personnel and skilled workers comprising an industry's workforce would 
determine eligibility for such incentives.42
Possibly the most significant aspect of the 1973 budget speech was the 
announcement of a $100 million scheme for equity participation by the 
government in capital-intensive support industries. It was the government's 
intention to supply up to 50% of the required equity as an inducement to small and 
medium-sized specialist companies producing intermediate products or services 
required by large international manufacturing companies in Singapore. 
Of course, for some time the government had engaged in direct equity 
participation as a means of assisting restructuring. Evidence that this would be no 
less the case with the changing emphasis in strategy had already been 
demonstrated in the government's luring of the West German camera company, 
Rollei-Werke, in 1970. In the effort to attract Rollei, Lee Kuan Yew even flew to 
the company headquarters in Braunschweig to speak to Rollei's management. 
Rollei's attraction was symbolic. It represented exactly the sort of relatively 
skilled, precision operation involving higher value-added and modern technology 
which the government was trying to promote in Singapore. Rollei, which had been 
losing considerable market ground to Japanese competitors and was also suffering 
a dramatic labour shortage, was enticed by Singapore's trainable yet cheaper 
labour force which offered the company a chance to re-assert international 
competitiveness. Offered the assurance that no Japanese competitors would be 
allowed into Singapore, and with the government putting up 25% equity through 
the DBS, Rollei was sufficiently convinced to begin production in 1971 with three 
separate facilities for the manufacture of cameras, electronic flashguns and slide 
I ! 
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projectors. Later, Rollei embarked en a projed to perform high quality multi­
layer lens coating and a project to produce high precision telescopic sights.43
Evidently the Rollei experience had reinforced the government's thinking that 
there was an important role for government equity in ensuring the establishment 
of certain industries in Singapore. 
The government's proposed $100 million equity participation scheme was 
part of a growing complexity and range of government involvement in productive 
activities. One estimate was that by 1973 the government, through the Ministry 
of Finance Incorporated, completely owned 26 companies with an authorised 
capital of $670 million and partially owned 33 companies involving $200 million 
government equity capital. By December 1973, the government also had a 
further seven wholly-owned subsidiaries through the DBS and shares in another 50 
companies, with Intraco also having equity investments in 20 companies.44 Equity
participation through the EDB and DBS had risen from $42.9 million in 1969 to 
$152.4 million by the end of 1973. 45 Such was the expansion of government
participation in the economy that in June 1974 a wholly-owned holding company 
called Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited was incorporated with an authorised 
capital of $200 million.46 Another wholly-owned holding company, Sheng-Li
Holding Company (Pte) Ltd, was formed in January 1974 under the Ministry of 
Defence.47 Statutory boards also flourished, 12 being established between 1970
and 1974.48
Apart from the declared intention to engage in further equity participation, 
Hon Sui Sen also indicated in the 1973 budget speech that the government would 
eventually be introducing an export credit scheme, complete with insurance, to 
help maintain the international competitiveness of exports from Singapore. With 
an anticipated shift from consumer goods exports to durable and capital goods, as 
higher value-added production expands, the government saw a role for itself in 
assisting those exporting on credit terms.49
-- ---- - -�- - - - ----------,---��--------,---------
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Both in response to the rapid expansion of industry in general and as part of 
the effort to generate the required infrastructure for the development of higher 
value-added industry, government expenditure on economic development rose 
sharply in the early 1970s. Budget expenditure on economic development jumped 
from $332.8 million in 1969-70 to $1,106.5 million in 1973-74, an increase of 
232%. The capacity to outlay such sums had been enhanced by further increases 
in CPF contributions from both employers and employees and the establishment in 
1971 of the Post Office Savings Bank (POSE) to mobilise domestic savings for 
public development. 5o
In conjunction with the government's plans to promote higher value-added 
manufacturing investments, the broader plan for the development of the Singapore 
economy included the development of Singapore as a financial and service centre 
for the region. As part of the growing emphasis on technological sophistication, 
the government favoured the development of the so-called 'brain services' such as 
engineering and consultancy, marketing, physical planning, international sales and 
the full range of latest financial services. Towards the promotion of Singapore as 
a financial centre, in September 1970 the government established the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS). The MAS acted, in effect, as a central bank, being 
the banker and financial agent of the government, promoting monetary stability 
and credit and exchange policies which stimulated economic growth.51 The
government's commitment to the expansion of the services sector was reiterated 
in the 1973 budget speech by Hon Sui Sen. 
As we have seen above, then, the PAP government set about in various ways 
trying to facilitate the restructuring of industry and, indeed, the economy, 
towards higher value-added production. Particular energy was devoted to building 
up the workforce, but at the same time the government introduced new incentives 
and undertook to outlay considerable funds in equity as a means of securing 
desired investments. With unemployment apparently resolved and favourable 




clearly felt more resources could now be devoted to raising the quality of industry 
in Singapore. 
Political Developments, 1970-1973 
Though the rationalisation for the P AP's limited tolerance of political dissent was 
justified as being necessary for economic growth, the success of the government's 
industrial strategy did not lead to any newfound political liberalisation. On the 
contrary, the government continued to portray political liberalisation as an 
obstacle to economic growth. To the government's way of thinking, the attempted 
shift towards higher value-added production placed even more onus on it to 
provide long-term political stability. 
In keeping with the pattern which emerged in the 1960s then, the PAP 
government continued to extol the virtues of obedience and discipline ahead of 
critical thought and participatory democracy.52 However, the PAP's failure to
adopt a more liberal political stance in the wake of rapid industrialisation and 
reduced unemployment led to a certain amount of disillusionment and 
disappointment amongst the middle class, including some of the PAP's own 
supporters. The process by which the economic strategy was pursued had also 
produced resentment from those evicted from homes, shops and farms. Moreover, 
the locally-based bourgeoisie harboured some ill-feeling about the growing 
dominance of international capital in the manufact�ring sector. Locally-based 
manufacturing capital was simply not sufficient nor advanced enough to partake in 
an EOI programme in any significant way without state assistance, a problem only 
to be compounded by the shift into more technologically-based production. As 
was reflected in the government's decision to attract foreign-based support 
companies instead of building up local expertise, no such assistance was likely. 
The locally-based bourgeoisie also observed that the government itself had 
played an ever-increasing role as a direct participant in the economy. This 
tendency was resented by the locally-based bourgeoisie for the limit it posed on 
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opportunities for its own expansion. Moreover, in the financial sector, the area in 
which the local Chinese bourgeoisie was most strongly represented, the govern­
ment's extension of activities was viewed as unfair competition. For example, the 
DBS, unlike most companies, was not subject to limits on the type, size and 
security of loans it could make and the POSE, courtesy of the government, was 
able to offer tax-free interest to its depositors, again something not possible for 
local private banks. 
Whatever grievences there may have been about the government's policies, 
the PAP gave clear intention that it did not intend these to be aired so as to give 
the appearance, as it understood it, of political instability. In particular, Lee 
would not entertain the local press adopting a critical approach to his 
government's policies. To Lee's mind, between 1970 and 1971 there had been a 
disturbing tendency in this direction and he took decisive measures to correct the 
situation. Starting on 2 May 1971 with the imprisonment of four editors of the 
Chinese-:--language Nanyang Siang Pau,53 t
he government subsequently forced the
closure of two English-language newspapers, the Eastern Sun and the Singapore 
Herald by 28 May. 
In the case of Nanyang Siang Pau, Lee was sensitive to the possibility of the 
paper becoming the forum for disgruntled domestic entrepreneurs and advocates 
of less accommodation with Western culture. But the Singapore Herald's critical 
discussion of the PAP's policies provoked a special determination from the 
government, despite widespread domestic English-speaking middle class opposition 
and international condemnation of its actions.54 Lee emphasised the view that
the mass media in general had quite a different role to play in a developing 
country such as Singapore than that traditionally found in the developed Western 
democracies. 
The mass media can help to present Singapore's problems simply and 
clearly and then explain how if they support certain programmes and 
policies these problems can be solved. More important, we want the 
mass media to reinforce, not to undermine, the cultural values and 
social attitudes being inculcated in our schools and universities. The 
mass media can create a mood in which people become keen to 
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acquire knowledge, skills and discipline of people in advanced 
countries. Without these we can never hope to raise the standards 
of living of our people. 55
In other words, the media was expected to actively support the PAP in the 
realisation of its development objectives. As Lee understood it, this ruled out 
critical examination of its policies. This only stirred up trouble, gave rise to 
political instability and thereby undermined investment and economic growth.56
The end result of the government's clamp on the press was a period of 
enforced timidity by local newspapers. In 1974, the government also introduced 
the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act under which two classes of newspaper 
shares, ordinary and management, were created. Management shares, carrying 
greater voting weight, could only be owned by nominees of the Minister of 
Culture. Furthermore, newspaper editors would now have to be personally 
approved by the Prime Minister.57 This Act paved the way, therefore, for the
PAP to ensure more control over newspapers and editorial policy. 
Elections 
With the security of a parliamentary monopoly and the economic programme 
bounding ahead, in 1970 the PAP turned its attention more closely to the question 
of its self-renewal. The process of introducing 'new blood' into parliament, 
initiated in 1966, was thus stepped-up. Five of the Party's MPs tendered their 
resignations, four of whom had been in parliament since 1959.58 The five
candidates to successfully replace them in subsequent by-elections were notably 
young, with one exception, and of professional or technical backgrounds involving 
tertiary education.59 More than just bringing younger members into parliament,
the PAP was reaching for prospective cabinet materiai.60 The PAP's concern
with recruiting prospective Party elites was reiterated in 1971 at its December 
congress. Subsequently, another 11 candidates were recruited for the next general 
elections. 61 Again, the selection of recruits emphasised youth, with the average
age of the newcomers being just 35 years, and a strong preference for technocrats 
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and professionals. 62 Candidates with more traditional credentials, that is,
relating to the ability to mobilise Party support, continued to be chosen but, as 
Chan points out, in a society with increasing emphasis on education and expertise, 
the weight of political influence to be wielded by mobilisers would in likelihood 
decline in relation to that of technocrats.63
If the increased emphasis on 'rationality' in decision-making and policy 
formation within the PAP was likely to facilitate a more important role for 
technocrats and professionals, traditional Party mobilisers also had to contend 
with a growing concentration of power by public bureaucrats. The rapid growth in 
statutory boards and public companies in the early 1970s fostered a considerable 
increase in power by state managers. Not only did many of these bodies enjoy 
limited public accountability, but they tended to be managed by a small group of 
administrators.64 The interesting questions, therefore, were just how far the 
Party's existing leadership intended this shift towards greater power and 
recognition of technocrats to go and how far the less-educated mobilisers would 
allow this trend to go without challenge.65 It remained to be seen too, just how 
adept the young technocrats would prove to be in establishing political bases in 
spite of their non-political backgrounds. 
Although general elections were not required until mid-1973, Lee Kuan Yew 
decided it appropriate to call them for 2 September 1972. The PAP had become 
anxious about the criticism which had surfaced both within and without Singapore 
in the clash with the press. The primary concern of the PAP was the effect this 
might have on the island's image of political stability in the eyes of prospective 
investors, particularly those in areas of higher value-added production. On the 
election eve, Lee observed that Western industrialists were now facing either 
labour shortages or grave trade union problems. Under these circumstances, Lee 
argued, investments into Singapore could receive a "great impetus", but not 
without reassurance: 
Your massive support for the PAP will convince them that Singapore 
is the place to site their enterprises. It is crucial such people should 
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know that our workers and trade unions are wholeheartedly in 
support of our policy to attract manufacturing and banking capital, 
management know-how and marketing expertise. 66 
Hanna has also suggested that by calling the election early, the PAP would be able 
to bring its critics into the open and immediately assess their "capacities for 
manoeuvre and manipulation". 67
One of the most significant features of the 1972 election was the comeback 
of the BS to constitutional politics. This re-entry was arrived at, and gave rise to, 
internal confusion and division, with the Party's Vice Chairman Chua Chia Meng 
publically calling on members to boycott the elections.68 Matters were further
complicated by the MCP's call on its supporters earlier that year to continue the 
election boycott. 69 Whilst acknowledging the problems this posed for Party unity,
the BS committee explained the return to the ballot box as a response to changed 
historical circumstances. The PAP's monopoly of state power had afforded it an 
extraordinary capacity to disseminate its propaganda, thus necessitating the 
exploitation by the BS of any means, including parliament, "to do what we can in 
the undemocratic conditions in Singapore, to expose the political deceptions and 
diabolical machinations of the reactionaries on the one hand, and enlighten and 
educate the masses on the other". 7o
In all, five opposition groups contested the 1972 elections, involving a total 
of nine separate political parties. These included the BS, the People's Front (PF) 
and the newly-formed United National Front (UNF), which itself comprised the 
Singapore Chinese Party, the Justice Party, Persutuan Malayu Singapura and 
Angkatan Islam. They formed a loose alliance of the more left opposition 
parties.71 The Workers' Party (WP), which encountered problems in arriving at an
electoral understanding with the BS, ended up campaigning for the most part on 
its own. The other party to contest was the Singapore Malays' National 
Organisation (SMNO). 72 A feature of the opposition parties in 1972 was the lack
of a coherent and co-operative strategy to challenge the government. A not 
insignificant amount of energy was diverted to attacks on other opposition 
parties.73
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Despite the absence of any real co-ordination, there were nevertheless some 
issues and concerns thematic in the different parties' campaigns. One such 
concern was the extent of foreign investment in Singapore which, of course, was 
fundamental to the government's economic strategy. There were, however, 
differing levels of concern about, and understanding of, the implications of foreign 
investment. The UNF, for example, called for the curtailment or outright 
prohibition of foreign investment.74 By contrast, the WP chairman, Heng, called
for greater selectivity, expressing particular concern at the level of Japanese and 
US investment. He warned against allowing firms from the US and Japan being 
allowed to treat the Republic as their backyard and drew attention to the 
implications of uncritically accommodating their needs - low wages and severe 
restrictions of the rights of labour.75 The BS, however, offered the most
comprehensive challenge to the proliferation of foreign-based capital. Dr Liew 
Siew Choh asserted that the main plank of the BS's platform was a promise to 
fight "foreign economic domination", adding that those firms in the commanding 
heights of the economy should be in the hands of the government rather than left 
to private enterprise.76 Dr Lee also condemned the government's global city
concept from a nationalist standpoint: "This multinational thing is an abhorrent 
thing and we must fight against it. What we need is a city that looks after our 
own interests. If it is capitalistic then let it be our own capital" .77 According to
the BS manifesto, the industrial strategy of the PAP government expressed the 
sell-out to foreign interests which had long been the focus of its false 
independence thesis: 
... with their industrialisation programme 'the LKY puppet 
authorities' had spent millions of dollars, taxed from the sweat and 
toil of the people, to build large industrial estates for the 
convenience of foreign monopoly capital; Mr. Lee's government had 
enacted the anti-worker Employment Act and Industrial Relations 
Act to provide this foreign monopoly with cheap, docile labour; ... 
urban renewal was merely a device by which choice sites and 
strategic land was taken from the people and handed over to foreign 
monopoly capital and big business; ... The education system was 
designed to meet the needs of foreign monopoly capital, it did not 
serve the real needs of the Malayan people ... 7 8
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The UNF's Ventrivelu shared the BS's view that the foreign monopoly of 
Singapore's economy "made a mockery of the independence of the Republic 11• 79
Condemnation of the government's labour laws and its general repression of 
the labour movement was also thematic to the parties of the left and the WP. 
This was part of a broader attack on the government's suppression of civil 
liberties. The opposition parties universally rejected the PAP government's thesis 
that political freedoms, of necessity, had to take second place to economic 
growth.so 
As was expected, the 1972 poll resulted in a resounding victory for the PAP 
which again won all parliamentary seats. Surprisingly, however, nearly 30% of the 
votes cast were in favour of opposition candidates.81 This represented a marked
increase on the 1968 election. Of the opposition parties, the WP obtained the 
highest number of votes with 11.9% of the total, followed by the UNF (7.2%), the 
BS (4.5%), the PF (3%), the SMNO (1.3%) and the two independents (1 %).82 If
these total shares are considered in the context of how many candidates each 
party fielded, however, then the order of party success was SMNO, BS, WP, PF, 
UNF.83 This puts the BS's performance into a more realistic perspective. Based
on the performance of their 10 candidates, had the Party contested all 57 seats it 
would have captured 29. 75% of the total votes. 84 Despite the internal problems
plagueing the BS, this suggested that it still commanded significant support. 
Lee's own interpretation of the relatively heavy opposition vote was that it 
amounted to a protest against his government rather than a positive vote for his 
opponents. He recognised that dislocation brought about by industrialisation had 
played its part. The strongest 'protest' vote was in rural areas affected by land 
clearance schemes.85 Lee also attributed the exploitation of Malay chauvinism to
the highest opposition vote. 86 In all likelihood, however, Lee suspected a deeper
undercurrent of disillusionment amongst sections of the English-educated middle 
class who might have been attracted by the appeal for a more liberal political 
environment. However, post-election events suggest that Lee was determined to 
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undermine the ability of the opposition parties, the BS in particular, to harness 
this disillusionment. 
In an attempt to discredit the relatively weighty opposition vote, the PAP 
alleged foreign backing of these parties. 8 7 It subsequently called on all parties to 
open their accounts in future for inspection.88 This, of course, was intended to 
have more than the declared effect of exposing outside influences. As Chan 
points out, given the government's all-pervasive influence in Singapore society, 
local donors had to be either very committed or foolhardy to continue their 
financial support under such conditions.89 Another means of intimidating
opposition was through the imprisonment of outspoken opponents. One BS 
candidate was sentenced to six months' gaol for having referred to the Prime 
Minister as "a bloody scoundrel", "a gangster", a "kidnapper" and 11Singapore Public 
Enemy Number One 11 •90 In addition, a heavy fine imposed on the BS resulting
from a libel action brought on it by the government virtually crippled that 
party. 91 The general political atmosphere became more repressive in the wake of
the 1972 elections. 
Interestingly enough, although the Prime Minister had recently discredited 
the value of parliamentary opposition, on the morning after the election results 
had been declared, he mooted the idea of reserving seats in parliament for 
representatives from universities and colleges to foster an "intelligent and 
constructive opposition". 92 However, this notion did not enjoy anything like a
consensus within the PAP.93 Whatever Lee's intention in raising the possibility,
nothing ever materialised. If the proposal had been considered as a means of 
short-circuiting any foment of middle class support for greater political 
liberalism, the PAP appeared instead to have decided in favour of the more 
traditional approach of intensifying intimidation of those elements potentially 
capable of fueling such a movement. The government was not unduly worried 
about the 'protest vote', confident that its successful management of the 
economy on the one hand, and the repression of opposition on the other, would be 
295 
sufficient to ensure political stability. With this confidence, the government 
decided in 1972 that it was opportune to now introduce some of the promising 
second generation leaders into the Ministry, albeit in junior positions.94
Trade Unions 
In keeping with the redefined role of trade unions outlined at the "Modernisation 
of Labour" seminar in 1969, the early 1970s witnessed the implementation of 
measures to enhance the financial independence of unions and the associated co­
operative ventures which had been proposed. A 'check-off' system of enlisting 
union membership was introduced whereby membership dues were automatically 
deducted from salaries and paid into union accounts.95 Over the next few years, a
range of union co-operatives were established, mainly under the initiative of the 
NTUC and its largest affiliate SILO.96 This shift in orientation towards co­
operative ventures represented what C.V. Devan Nair referred to as organised 
labour's "rightful role and influence in society", 97 which not only meant expanding
material non-wage benefits to members, but engendering the spirit of affinity and 
co-operation between labour and capital and labour and government. As Devan 
Nair observed about the impact of the various projects of the labour movement: 
Trade unions and their members have therefore come to possess a 
sense of belonging to their society and their nation. They recognise 
that them are, in a very real and tangible sense, the co-owners ofsociety. 8 
These co-operatives, then, were intended not only to provide the funds for 
extensive education and training programmes consistent with the role outlined in 
1969, but to serve an ideological function as well. The PAP leaders hoped that the 
spirit of belonging would go some way towards averting any longing by workers for 
the "soft life" against which Lee had warned in his 1972 National Day speech.99
Efforts to expand union membership in the early 1970s achieved some 
success, with total membership rising from 120,053 in 1969 to 208,561 in 1975 and 
the NTUC share increasing from 71.3% to 94. 7% (see Table 17 in Appendix). The 
percentage of the total workforce which was unionised rose from 17.3% in 1970 to 
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25.0% in 1975.lOO A feature of the union structure which accompanied this
expansion, however, was an acute concentration of total membership in just a few 
unions. Two unions, SILO and PIEU, represented nearly 40% of all unionised 
labour in 1975.101 This concentration, a by-product of the nature of industrial
structure unfolding in Singapore, promoted a centralisation of financial and 
political resources within the trade union movement. 
Significantly, the new functions performed by unions necessitated a greater 
reliance upon technically and professionally-trained managers with specialised 
expertise. This coincided with a general increase in the introduction of career­
minded PAP cadres and associates into the NTUC and its various affiliates as full­
time officials. Developments here were an extension of those the Party itself was 
undergoing. The question was, however, whether such a trend might produce union 
leadership divorced from an appreciation of the concrete experiences and 
aspirations of the membership. In a rare but symbolic incident in May 1973, the 
PAP leadership was reminded that workers could act independently of their union 
leadership when they felt especially hard done by. Workers at the American­
owned Gulf Plastics factory, whose workload had been doubled with the 
introduction of new machinery but whose pay had increased by just US$0.20 per 
day, took strike and protest action even without support from their PIEU officials 
at union headquarters. Though the government crushed this spontaneous 
expression, it could not privately ignore the possibility that the union's 
management of the workers' grievances was less than satisfactory. Publically, 
however, it portrayed the incident as primarily the product of troublemakers from 
Malaysia, that is, guest labour.102
In general, the early 1970s saw efforts to expand the influence of the PAP, 
through the NTUC, over labour. Though by 1975 still two-thirds of the organisable 
workforce remained non-unionised, some ground had been made and the economic 
base for a strong organisational structure had been laid. The government was now 
fully committed to the expansion and broadening of trade unions as a means of 
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promoting economic and political stability.103 This commitment was naturally
enhanced by the establishment of the NWC which relied upon organised labour for 
its implementation. However, the more general function of sympathetically 
presenting government policies to members was no less important a role at a time 
when the government was attempting to ensure economic restructuring. The point 
was that by now the PAP had come to view trade unionism as an instrument of 
control, mobilisation, even education, of the workforce. Increased trade unionism 
was seen as a means of enhancing the administrative capacity of the state over 
workers and, hence, the economy. 
Industrial Progress and the Onset of the Recession 
We have seen so far how the EOI strategy not only produced rapid growth but soon 
witnessed attempts by the PAP to encourage qualitative gains in industry. The 
apparent resolution of the unemployment problem and the tightening labour mar­
ket suggested that a shift in emphasis towards the attraction of higher value­
added investments was opportune. Thus, the PAP government set about creating 
the economic environment likely to hasten the expansion of higher value-added 
investments. However, neither the general economic prosperity nor the new 
investment focus were associated with any easing of repression in Singapore. 
Relatively low labour costs and political stability still formed the basis of the 
strategy. Therefore, the PAP explored new means of institutionalising labour 
control and nullifying political opposition. The P AP's adjustments to economic 
strategy, however, and its attempts to cultivate a particular social and political 
environment in support of these adjustments, were guided by considerations about 
the dynamics of the new international division of labour. What we see in the 
following section of this chapter, however, is that there is an externally-imposed 
precariousness_ about participation in this structure over which even the most 
astute policy-makers in world export bases such as Singapore have very little 
control. 
------------- - - - - - -------------,----=��--------,-� 
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The rapid growth and industrialisation initiated in the late 1960s continued 
strongly into the early 1970s. Total GDP growth rates averaged 12.8% (at 
constant 1968 prices) between 1970 and 1973 before the effects of the world 
recession were felt in 1974, bringing the rate down to 6.3%. The manufacturing 
growth rate between 1970 and 1973 averaged 18.3% (at 1968 constant prices) 
before dropping to 3.8% in 1974 (see Table 8 in Appendix). This sector's share of 
total GDP rose from 20.5% in 1970 to 23.2% in 1973 (see Table 9 in Appendix). 
The general growth in manufacturing was accompanied by an increase in value­
added per worker from $9,100 in 1970 · to $17,100 in 1974 (see Table 7 in 
Appendix). Significantly, this period of expansion coincided with an accentuation 
of the export-orientation of the manufacturing sector and the contribution of 
foreign investment. Between 1970 and 1974, direct manufactured exports, as a 
share of total manufacturing sales, increased from 44.6% to 60. 7% and, as a share 
of total manufacturing output, from 44.2% to 59.8%.104 Foreign investment
increased by 306.9%, from $995 million in 1970 to $3,054 million in 1974 (see 
Table 10 in Appendix). Broadly, then, developments were extremely 
satisfactory. Certainly up until 1974, anyway, the decision to offer preferential 
treatment to higher value-added investments appeared to be a policy which could 
be afforded by the rate of economic growth in Singapore. 
During the period 1971-1974, the dominant contributors to manufacturing 
output and value-added were, in order, the already-established industries of 
petroleum and petroleu'm products, electronic products and components, transport 
equipment, non-electrical machinery, and electrical machinery. The petroleum 
and petroleum products industry also recorded the biggest increase in value-added 
per worker for the period of $167,300. The next most sizeable increases in value­
added per worker came from iron and steel ($46,600) cement ($44,000) paints and 
pharmaceuticals ($22,300), industrial chemicals ($12,900) and cigarettes and 
tobacco products ($12,400) (see Table 7 in Appendix). The fact that some of 
Singapore's dominant industries in value-added and output terms ranked behind 
! I 
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others in increases to value-added per worker did not mean, however, that such 
industries did not undergo important qualitative changes, a point which will 
receive closer attention later in this chapter. Some industries, however, lent 
themselves more easily to rapid improvements in productivity than others. 
Moreover, in those industries which had been founded on Singapore's cheaper 
labour, such as electronics products and components, improvements in value-added 
per worker. could only be expected gradually through the introduction of more 
sophisticated products and processes rather than any sudden wholesale 
displacement of labour. Such displacement would, after all, negate the advantage 
of lower cost labour. 
One of the satisfying trends for the government between 1971 and 1974 was 
the increasing contribution of capital-intensive and relatively skill-intensive 
production to the manufacturing sector's growing export orientation. As shall be 
discussed later, this trend owed much to the tendency in the early 1970s of 
international capital to identify Singapore as a suitable base for export 
manufacture of a range of products involving a higher technological content. As a 
result, there was a rise in the export/output ratio of the metal engineering group 
of non-electrical machinery (38.2 to 65.0), electrical machinery (56.9 to 72.5), 
instrumentation equipment, photographic and optical goods (62.4 to 87.6) and 
transport equipment (30.2 to 41.1) as all these industries became more dependent 
upon export production for expansion. Similarly, the paints, pharmaceuticals and 
other chemical products industry changed from being essentially an inwardly­
oriented one with an export/output ratio of 29.6 to one equally dependent upon 
exports with a ratio of 51.7.105 The interest in Singapore by leading international
pharmaceutical companies accounted for the bulk of this shift in orientation. 
Ironically, the pronounced external orientation in production achieved by the 
early 1970s not only brought rapid industrialisation but a capacity for sudden 
economic reversals as well. This was particularly so of the manufacturing sector 
which was heavily geared towards the markets of the USA and Europe. Thus, the 
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world recession of 19'7 4/75 necessarily affected Singapore more adversely than 
most other economies, giving rise to considerable production cuts and massive 
labour retrenchment. 
Changes in value-added and output give some indication of the sudden halt 
to Singapore's rapid manufacturing expansion which first began to manifest in late 
1974. Following an increase in output between 1970 and 1974 of 207.7%, output 
actually fell by 7.3% in 1975. Similarly, value-added fell by 3.7% in 1975 after 
having risen by 215.3% for the previous four years (see Table 1 in Appendix). The 
severity of the fall-off is even concealed to some extent by these figures since 
they include data pertaining to a mild recovery in late 1975. 
Although the downturn in production was not confined to export-oriented 
industries, these suffered disproportionately. This reflected in the reduction in 
the export/output ratio of the manufacturing sector from 59.8 in 1974 to 58.6 in 
1975 (see Table 2 in Appendix). The heavily export-oriented industries of 
petroleum and petroleum products, electronic products and components, electrical 
machinery, sawntimber and textiles all experienced sizeable declines in output and 
value-added.106 The petroleum industry was particularly hard hit, operating at
about 50% capacity in 1975. Within individual industries, specific product groups 
which were geared to the consumer markets of the advanced industrial economies 
experienced drastically reduced demand. 
The most important consequence of the recession for Singapore was the 
heavy loss of jobs which resulted from the downturn in activity by the economy's 
leading labour-intensive, export-oriented industries. 17,000 workers or 2% of the 
total workforce were retrenched in 1974, of which 12,200 belonged to the 
manufacturing sector .107 Almost all of these lay-offs occurred in the last six
months of that year. Retrenchments continued on into 1975, reaching a peak of 
around 20,000 for the total economy.108 The full social impact of these retrench­
ments was cushioned by the return of foreign workers to nearby Malaysia. 
Nonetheless, there were still significant domestic consequences owing to 
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retrenchments. The official rate of unemployment increased from 3.9% in 1974 to 
4.6% in 1975 (see Table 1 in Appendix). 
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The bulk of the retrenchments were in the broad electronics industry group 
(which covered parts of the electrical machinery industry).109 Approximately
two-thirds of the 20,000 retrenched workers in Singapore between July 1974 and 
December 1975 came from this industry group.110 These retrenchments were
notable not just for their magnitude but the fashion in which they occurred. There 
was little or no phasing out of employment. With little warning, a spate of 
retrenchments occurred between July and December 1974. During this time, 
Texas Instruments shed 1,000 workers, Fairchild 1,187 and National Semiconductor 
530 in July and a further 1,000 in December, including 85 management staff.111
These lay-offs continued well into 1975, by which time many of those employees 
who retained jobs were working a four-day week due to production cutbacks. 
Singapore, of course, was not the only country to suffer substantial labour losses 
in the electronics industry. Texas Instruments, for example, had sacked as many 
as 9,000 of its worldwide workforce of 78,000 in 1974.112 The problem for
Singapore was particularly acute, however, because of the unusual dependence of 
its economy on this industry for employment. 
An important observation by Lim about the massive retrenchments in the 
electronics industry was that, at least for some firms, these decisions represented 
more than just short-term measures to reduce capacity. Lim's survey of 
electronics firms revealed a distinction by respondents between jobs lost due to 
the recession and jobs lost due to upgradings and consolidation of the labour force, 
through mechanisation and automation for example. Some respondents cited high 
wages in Singapore, and particularly the influence of the NWC recommendations 
of 1973 and 1974, as prompting their firms to replace labour with capital.113 For
some firms, then, the recession provided a convenient context within which 
automation and mechanisation could be introduced.114
302 
Student/Worker Response to Retrenchments 
Sudden and sizeable retrenchments were not confined to the electronics industry 
but extended to various other export-oriented industries. This situation placed 
considerable pressure on the NTUC to ensure continued industrial peace and 
labour support for government policies. In particular, the contradictory position 
of government-affiliated unions was heightened as workers sought strong 
leadership to confront both capital and government for compensation and job sec­
urity. The inability of the NTUC to adopt such a position, however, provided the 
opportunity for the student movement, through the USSU, which organised a 
Retrenchment Centre to publicise the problems of dismissed workers and offer 
them advice, to involve itself in labour affairs. This co-incided with a general 
widening of the USSU's activities in 1974/75 to include other questions related to 
civil liberties.115
In one case, in 1974/75, union branch leaders and workers at American 
Marine, a shipyard• building luxury boa ts, had been dissatisfied not only with the 
way in which lay-offs had been carried out, but with the indifference and disdain 
of the PIEU to their plight. The workers, with the support of the USSU, 
confronted the PIEU over its inactivity. They requested that the PIEU Secretary­
General negotiate with the management for compensation during the lay-off. In 
what transpired, the authorities made it clear that such militance would not be 
tolerated and, more importantly, nor would any linking of student and labour 
politics. Resulting from the negotiations between the PIEU, the workers and their 
USSU aides, the USSU President, Tan Wah Piou, and two workers were accused of 
'rioting' and 'unlawful assembly'. The subsequent trial, which came in for legal 
criticism as an unfair one,116 found all three guilty with Tan Wah Piou receiving
one year's gaol sentence and the two workers one month each.117 On 22 January,
the committee members of the PIEU resigned en masse and the branch committee 
instigators of the workers' action were all sacked.118
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The American Marine case evidenced how comprehensively the Singapore 
trade union system discouraged branches acting primarily in response to their 
members' definition of their needs rather than the officially-directed notion from 
above. It also underlined the government's sensitivity to student/labour links.119
The government's determination to blunt the effectiveness of any student/worker 
alliance gave rise in November 1975 to the University of Singapore (Amendment) 
Bill which brought about a reconstitution of the USSU. The USSU now came under 
the direct control of the Education Minister and the University Council. The 
statute of the reconstituted USSU allowed only the Political Association of the 
USSU, to which only Singapore citizens would now be allowed membership, to 
make pronouncements of a political nature. Discretion in deciding what 
constituted politics was the sole domain of the University Council.120 The intent
of the government's legislation was clearly to neutralise the political 
effectiveness of the USSU. The Home Affairs and Health Minister, Chua Sian 
Chin, claimed that the USSU had aimed at the creation of a "highly centralised 
power machine" for political struggle.121 The PAP, however, saw no legitimate
political function for the USSU, especially at a time when economic fortunes had 
suffered a setback. S. Rajaratnam went so far as to equate USSU involvement in 
various social issues with "non-communist subversion" .122
Policy Response to Recession 
Though the government took measures to minimise the extent to which the 
negative social effects of the recession could be converted into political mil�age 
by its critics, the dramatic retrenchments obviously demanded an economic policy 
response. By now, Singapore's policy-makers were irreversibly committed to an 
EOI programme but events at least warranted a re-examination of the finer 
details of this strategy. Towards the end of 1974 and early 1975 various public_ 
statements foreshadowed the temporary abandonment of wage rises. First Labour 
Minister Ong Pang Boon revealed that the unemployment rate had risen to 4.5% 
- ------- - -----------:-------
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and warned of more serious rises failirig some action. Soon after, C.V. Devan Nair 
made it clear that such action would include a revision of the existing wage 
policy,123 a point which Lee amplified in March 1975: "If our economic activity is
not to diminish and unemployment not to increase this year, any wage increases 
must be modest and moderate compared to 1974".124 Thus, after the adoption of
the most substantial wage increases since the establishment of the NWC, the 
government found itself compromising its programme to promote higher value­
added production. In the effort to maintain and encourage economic activity per 
se, the policy of actively promoting labour displacement through wage pressure 
was relaxed. 
In keeping with the leadership's predictions, and in view of the lower 
inflation rate, the 1975 NWC recommendations were 'modest and moderate', 
being just 6% with full offsetting of normal annual increments. This was subject 
to a 3% minimum after offsetting, with no offsetting for employees without 
annual increments.125 Apart from the obviously lower increase endorsed, the
move to include bonuses and other payments in the annual increase represented a 
significant toughening of conditions for employees. Under the Employment 
(Amendment) Act of 1975 employees were also prohibited from asking for the 
payment of any money, and employers prohibited from paying such, which was 
additional to the annual wage supplements or annual bonuses. When introducing 
the Bill into Parliament in February 1975, Ong Pang Boon explained the freeze on 
bonuses as intended to avert a "free for all" in wage demands and reiterated the 
importance of such wage curbs to improving Singapore's investment climate.126
The continuing retrenchments during the first half of 1975 obviously 
hardened the resolve of the government to continue to put the brakes on wages. 
By late 1975 the government began to express a concern that even more needed to 
be done. Again, as is indicated in Table 19 in the Appendix, actual wage increases 
exceeded those prescribed by the NWC. When figures on foreign investment 
commitments for 1975 became available they also showed a drop of nearly 61 % 
! I 
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over the previous year, from $678 million to $267 million. On the basis of these 
figures, Devan Nair argued to workers in February 1976 that there was likely to be 
a significant shortfall in jobs created in 1976 and 1977. Devan Nair calculated 
that existing investment commitments would only directly generate 10,000 new 
jobs in the manufacturing sector and possibly 20,000 through the multiplier effect 
over the next two years. Further assuming that another 20,000 jobs would be 
generated in the construction, transport and public service sectors, he estimated 
that approximately 40,000 new jobs would be created in 1976 and 1977, 
representing just half of the required 84,000.127 Though Devan Nair's estimations
were open to challenge, 128 his address certainly reflected the most immediate
concern of the government: how to reverse the fall-off in projected foreign 
investment. Whilst conceding the influence of some external factors, Devan 
Nair's major argument was that declining foreign investment derived in large part 
from the diminishing rate of profit within Singapore and the rising labour costs in 
its manufacturing sector .129 After tax profits for 1973 and 1974 were
satisfactory at 15% and 18% respectively but during 1975 fell to a rate of 
12.5%.130
There could have been a variety of reasons to explain the falling rate of 
profit cited by Devan Nair.131 Devan Nair, however, concentrated on the
contribution of labour costs. Unit labour costs were said to have risen at a faster 
rate in Singapore than in Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan in recent years, a 
position attributed to the NWC, the appreciation of the Singapore dollar and the 
increased rates in CPF contributions. Singapore's reduced international 
competitiveness was, according to Devan Nair, evidenced in the wages of 
assembly workers which were, after taking account of benefits and tax costs, 
higher than any of its East or Southeast Asian rivals.132 The message from the
government was clear: domestic labour costs must be lowered in comparison with 
its competitors'. 
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The government's intention of holding down wages did not signify the end of 
efforts to attract higher value-added investments. In the 1975 Budget, $100 
million was allocated for the already-announced Capital Assistance Scheme (CAS) 
and additional funds were allocated for purposes of workforce training. As an 
adjunct to the CAS, the government also introduced a Joint-Venture Bureau to 
assist in finding suitable partners for companies seeking to set-up in Singapore. 
Pioneer status amendments were also introduced in 1975 which extended the 
exemption periods from five to 10 years for those firms making multi-product 
investments using technologies new to Singapore which required substantial initial 
capital outlays and involved long gestation periods. As an encouragement to small 
but high quality product industries, the previous requirement that a company must 
incur a fixed capital expenditure of not less than one million dollars was 
removed.133 A further encouragement to small, middle-level technology
companies was introduced in May 1975 when the MAS opened rediscounting 
facilities for certain export and pre-export usuance bills to assist exporters obtain 
cheap export finance. In October, this scheme was liberalised so that 
documentary bills drawn under irrevocable letters of credit would qualify for re­
discount.134
Although the government responded to the recession by offering even 
greater incentives to higher value-added, particularly smaller, firms, it also 
introduced a number of measures directed at manufacturing capital in general. 
The attitude was that investment per se was the top priority; if it also happened 
to be in high value-added production then so much the better. Thus, 
discrimination against labour-intensive investments introduced in the 1970 
Economic Expansion Incentives (Amendment) Act were relaxed in 1975. 
Previously only select industries qualified for the export incentive of 4% 
corporate tax on income from export sales but in 1975 this was extended to non­
qualifying exports. There was also a general de facto relaxation of many other 
strict conditions placed on investment. 
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The MAS also adopted measures to stimulate investment. These included 
the lifting of all controls on credit expansion by banks and finance houses, the 
lowering of the prime rate, reducing the minimum and reserve ratio as well as a 
cut in the MAS rediscount rate for export and pre-export bills.135 MAS's
liberalisation of foreign exchange controls included the removal of restrictions on 
the import and export of currency notes of all countries.136 The thinking behind
these moves was to maximise the availability of finance at a time when many 
investments might be otherwise deterred. 
A central aspect of the government's response to the recession was to exert 
greater influence over the economy through the budget, not just through prime­
pumping, but the improvement of infrastructure for the anticipated recovery 
ahead. As is calculated from Table 21 in the Appendix, there was an increase in 
government development expenditure of 35. 7% in 1975/76 of which 73.5% went in 
loans to statutory bodies. The main recipients of these loans were the HDB and 
the JTC. Loans to the HDB rose by 27.8% in 1975/76 to $584 million.137 Capital
expenditure by the HDB increased by 25. 7% in 1975/76 to $648 million.138 HDB
development played a crucial role in stimulating economic growth. Although also 
intended to stimulate economic growth, allocations to JTC related primarily to 
the government's preparation for the next phase in Singapore's 
industrialisation.139 In 1974, $161 million in fixed assets were invested by JTC,
representing a $68.7 million or 74.4% increase over 1973 (at current prices), of 
which $127 million was provided through government loans. This made possible 
the preparation of 299.65 hectares of industrial land.140 In 1975, total JTC
development expenditure reached $384.4 million, 116.4% higher than for the 
previous year, representing the biggest annual increase up to that point.141 A
total of 423.7 hectares were developed in 1975 by JTC.142 In the same year, JTC
obtained the government's approval to develop Sembawang Industrial Estate 
which, eventually, would comprise 607 hectares and offer extensive water 
frontage for marine-oriented industries.143
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The policy of using the recessionary period to gear Singapore for the next 
anticipated phase of industrialisation was a general one. Increased efforts, for 
example, were directed towards the raising of technical skills and the extension of 
capacity in schools, colleges and university.144 The high government profile then 
was no less evident in time of economic downturn. Rather, the government 
revealed a confidence in its vision of even greater expansion ahead and remained 
fully committed to its EOI strategy. The negative effects of Singapore's economy 
being so closely incorporated into the world economy were seen as short-term and 
tolerable. They were no grounds for reconsidering the validity of the basic 
strategy. 
International Capital, 1970-1975 
As has been pointed out earlier, there were significant qualitative developments in 
Singapore's manufacturing sector in the early 1970s. In particular, there was a 
shift towards the introduction of some relatively sophisticated technology, a shift 
which contributed to the increased value-added per worker during this period. As 
we shall see below, however, it was again international capital which was largely 
responsible for this development, with export production at lower cost providing 
the main motive for investment. Indeed, in the first half of the 1970s, Singapore 
was identified as a suitable export base not just for a wider range of 
manufacturing products and processes, but for a broader cross-section of 
international capital. 
Between 1970 and 1975, foreign investment (in gross fixed assets) rose from 
$995 million to $3,380 million, an increase of 239. 70%. This included a fall-off of 
$605 million in 1974 over the previous year owing to the world recession (see 
Table 10 in Appendix). Similarly, foreign investment commitments rose 
significantly, by 43.4%, to reach $224.1 million in 1973 before dropping by 24. 7% 
in 1974 and then recovering to reach $246.8 million in 1975 (see Table 13 in 
Appendix).145 It was certainly true that by 1975 the momentum of foreign
! ! 
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investment had slowed after· spectacular gains in the earliest years of the 
decade. However, the relative importance of foreign investment to the 
manufacturing sector in general and export production in particular continued to 
rise. In 1975, wholly foreign-owned firms had a ratio of direct exports to total 
sales of 67 .6 compared with that of wholly locally-owned firms of 28.3.146
EDB data on foreign investment on an industry basis show that in absolute 
terms the biggest gains between 1970 and 1975 were recorded by the two already 
dominant foreign-controlled industries of petroleum and petroleum products and 
electrical and electronic machinery, apparatus, appliances and supplies. Their 
respective increases were $871 million and $272 million. Much of the investment 
in these two industries was characterised by upgrading and diversification by 
existing firms. 
The increased investment in the petroleum and petroleum products industry 
between 1970 and 1975 derived mainly from expansion in capacity and 
diversification by existing international companies in Singapore, Esso, Mobil, 
Caltex, British Petroleum, Shell, Amoco and Oceanic Petroleum. The increase in 
the capacity of the industry was such that by 1974, Singapore became the third 
largest refining centre in the world. 
By 1975, capacity stood at just over one million barrels per day.147 During
the period, Shell proceeded with a $135 million project to build a thermal-cracking 
unit, a platformer and an upgrading facility for refining products.148 Esso also
diversified into the production of hydrocarbon solvents and base lubricants, 
committing itself to a $25 million project.149 Another important development in
the industry was the interest shown by some companies in the Singapore 
government's plans for a $2,000 million integrated petrochemical complex. The 
Singapore government succeeded in luring a commitment to participation from the 
Japanese group Sumitomo. It was proposed, however, that the project also involve 
considerable Singapore government equity participation.150
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Significant as developments were in the petroleum and petroleum products 
industry between 1970 and 1975, investment in this capital-intensive industry was 
still primarily motivated by Singapore's favourable geographic position as an 
export base to the region and Singapore's own sizeable domestic demand. As for 
the proposed petrochemical project, the Singapore government obviously hoped 
that by developing advanced processing facilities Singapore's regional dominance 
would be enhanced. 
Between 1970 and 1975, foreign investment (in gross fixed assets) increased 
by $272 million or 331. 7 % in the electrical and electronic industry (see Table 11 in 
Appendix). Al though many new investors were attracted in this period, the 
upgrading and diversification of operations by existing, mainly US-based, 
companies comprised much of this investment. 
The upgrading of operations within the electrical and electronic industry, 
both through new and existing firms, took various forms. In the area of 
semiconductor manufacture there was forward integration whereby firms 
advanced from the assembly to the testing of integrated circuits. Forward 
integration was also expressed in the move towards higher value-added finished 
products. The introduction of such products as industrial control equipment, 
electronic measuring equipment, complex communication equipment and computer 
peripheral equipment during this period, for example, gave rise to an industrial 
electronics sector. Electronic calculators in particular quickly assumed 
prominence and by 1974 Singapore was a major international exporter of this 
product. Hewlett-Packard and Omron were the earliest assemblers of calculators 
but they were quickly joined by a weal th of other leading international 
companies.151 The shift towards higher value-added products also took place in 
consumer products. For example, Philips moved from the assembly of radios to 
cassette recorders, and Toshiba from black and white to colour televisions. 
Diversification also occurred with some firms introducing the assembly of 
refrigerators and air conditioners. 
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More than just boosting the value-added content of the electronics industry 
in Singapore, the increased forward integration by semiconductor manufacturers 
represented a qualitatively new perception by international capital of Singapore's 
place in the international division of labour. In the short term labour scarcities 
lead to slowdowns in investment in semiconductor manufacture.152 However, it
soon became apparent to investors that, even with sufficient guest labour, lower 
cost labour was now available elsewhere. Nearby Malaysia was developing free 
trade zones and investment incentives to attract such production and offered 
more plentiful and cheaper labour.153 Some companies decided, therefore, that
the most labour-intensive production would have to increasingly be located outside 
Singapore. 
Two companies which were at the forefront of this relocation of activities 
were Hewlett-Packard and National Semiconductor. Hewlett-Packard opened up a 
plant in Penang around 1972/73 to take up additional 'capacity because of 
projected labour shortages and rising labour costs in Singapore.154 Meanwhile,
the same company was introducing the manufacture of such finished products as 
calculators and analogue meters to Singapore. National Semiconductor was also 
expanding its assembly operations at Malacca and Penang at the same time as it 
was laying-off workers at its Singapore plant in 1974. At that time, starting wage 
rates for assembly operators in Penang and Malacca stood at $3 or less per day 
whereas in Singapore the figure was $4.24 (prior to the implementation of the 
1974 NWC recommendations).155 National Semiconductor had decided Singapore
would be the preferred Southeast Asian base for quality testing of semi­
conductors assembled at its other plants in the region, a decision which Fairchild 
had also put into effect by 1975.156 Singapore's position in the international
division of labour was undergoing elevation, then, as production processes, such as 
quality testing of semi conductors, now deemed inappropriate for yet higher wage 
cost sites in the US, were transferred to Singapore. These replaced the most 




If the pattern of foreign investment in the electronics industry suggested 
that some elements of international capital had begun to identify Singapore as a 
suitable site for slightly more sophisticated production, the pattern in the 
fabricated metal products and precision equipment industries indicated that this 
perception was broadly shared by international capital. From a total foreign 
investment (in gross fixed assets) of $34 million in 1970, the fabricated metal 
products industry had attracted $258 million by 1974, a 658.0% increase. The 
precision equipment industry, virtually non-existent in 1970, also made 
spectacular gains in foreign investment, from a total of $26 million in 1971 to 
$142 million in 1975, a 446.15% increase (see Table 11 in Appendix). The vast 
array of relatively capital and skill-intensive investments accounting for such 
increases was cause enough for government satisfaction. Given that the bulk of 
these investments were geared towards production for international markets, 
however, this pattern also confirmed the scope for continued expansion under the 
export strategy. 
A detailed analysis of investments in the fabricated metal products and 
precision equipment industries between 1970 and 1975 is not possible in view of 
the range and volume of investments involved. As can be seen from the list below 
in Table 13, however, many of the world's leading manufacturers set up operations 
in these industries in Singapore in the period under review. The more significant 
of these investments included Seiko's $22 million project to manufacture mech­
anical movement watches. Like Rollei, Seiko had been a target company for Lee 
Kuan Yew who had attempted to persuade Seiko to set up in Singapore following 
his visit to the company's plants in Takatsuka and Kameido in 1973. Every watch 
produced had a 70% to 80% higher value than the component metal and parts 
before actual assembly so this investment obviously fitted well with the Singapore 
government's plans for industry. Seiko, through the company Singapore Time, 
became Singapore's first mechanical watch plant when it began assembly in 1975 
of all but the watch dial and case.157 Other noteworthy investments included a
--- -- ------ - --- -------:---------,----�=---� 
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$25 million project by Timex for the manufacture of precision tools and dies for 
use in Timex plants throughout the world; a $50 million investment in the 
manufacture of textile machinery components and ball bearings by SKF, the 
world's largest bearing manufacturer; and a $5 million investment by the Swiss­
based Wild Heerbrugg in the production of theodolites and optical survey 
equipment.158 These examples were constantly cited by the EDB and the
government as proof of the island's suitability for production involving middle­
level technology. 
Table 13: New Investments in Fabricated Metal and 
Precision Engineering, 1970-1975 
Company Products 




Cameron Iron Works 
Cincinnati Milacron 
Copal 
Corona (SCM Corporation) 
FMC 
GEC - Elliot 
Hilgeland 
Hitachi 









Nippon Miniature Bearing 
North American Rockwell 
Oberg 
Okamoto 




optical instruments and spectacle lenses 
tools and dies 
optical instruments and components 
precision steel balls 
oil field equipment 
plastic process in machinery; twin screw 
extrusion machines and support equipment 
precision parts 
portable electric typewriters 
offshore wellhead equipment 
control valve plant 
cold-headed fastener machines 
anti-pollution equipment; vacuum cleaners 
fabrication of basic metal dies for 
components in electronics industry 
sophisticated precision springs for such 
products as cameras, typewriters, electric 
appliances and apparatus, business machines 
and computers 
precision metal products 
engine lathes 
oil drilling rigs and marine engineering 
precision stamping, carbide tools 
photographic instrument equipment 
precision tools and dies for watch 
manufacturing 
precision ball bearings 
roller chains and machinery 
carbide tools and dies, precision stampings 
precision machines for the mining 
twist drills 
tools and production machinery and medical 
x-ray and other specialised equipment
precision machine tools 












Van der Horst 
Varta and Henckels 
Viteo 
Vollmer-Werke 




vacuum and scraped shell crystallizers and 
other specialty heat and mass-heat transfer 
equipment 
electronic flash units, slide projectors, 
cameras, optical lenses 
mechanical movement watches, stop watches 
and machine tools 
10-speed gear, bicycle components
precision screws
fabrication of anti-pollution pipes for
dredging 
textile machinery accessories and bearings 
glass mould for sunglasses 
ship propellers, stern gears and industrial 
castings 
constant speed drive units for aircraft jet 
engines 
precision tools and dies 
watches and watch parts, precision tools and 
dies for use in Timex plants 
chrome plating, nickel plating and precision 
grinding 
nickel cadmium rechargeable cells 
oil field equipment 
machinery 
precision electro-mechanical devices, 
instruments such as theodolites and other 
surveying equipment 
high quality stainless steel plated cutlery and 
holloware 
Source: Economic Development Board, Annual Reports, 1970-1975/76. 
Whilst in some respects official propaganda may have exaggerated the 
significance of the inflow of investments in these industry groups, since much of 
the production still only involved assembly of parts and components (albeit of 
higher value-added products) the investment pattern did nevertheless represent a 
qualitatively new stage in Singapore's EOI programme. Of special significance 
was the trend towards investment in Singapore to produce finished products in 
large volumes for the international market, as illustrated in the cases of Rollei 
and Nippon Miniature Bearings. Though transportation costs of finished products 
would in some instances place limits on the suitability of assembly in Singapore, 
the pattern of investment between 1970 and 1975 demonstrated that so long as 
cost advantage could be maintained, Singapore could attract a large range and 
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volume of investments in middle technology products. Finally, it should be 
pointed out that not all of the investment in this period was as heavily oriented 
towards international markets. There was a significant, even if less sizeable 
· group of companies which was also attracted to Singapore by the opportunity to
provide supporting services or capital equipment for regional activities.159
It would be a simplification to suggest that lower wages alone accounted for 
the growth in foreign investment in the fabricated metal and precision equipment 
industries. Cost advantages by manufacturing in Singapore were derived in 
various ways, many being peculiar to the technology involved. However, the lower 
wage costs of Singapore, compared with production sites in advanced industrial 
countries, were generally a key consideration of investors who were usually trying 
to counter rising production costs in traditional sites. For example, Sunstrand 
Pacific's decision in 1974 to manufacture constant speed drives in Singapore was 
intended to overcome rapidly increasing machinery and tooling costs at its 
Rockford and Colorado production plants in the U.s.160 Rollei, too, as discussed
earlier, moved to Singapore to exploit lower wage costs. Both companies were 
examples of the technology aspired by government strategists, yet both, like the 
earlier lower value-added investments characterising Singapore's industrialisation, 
were also in search of lower labour costs. The fundamental attraction of 
Singapore had not altered, even though the level of technology sought and 
attracted had risen slightly. 
Of the remaining industry groups, foreign investment expanded fastest in the 
wood and cork, plastics and transport equipment categories. Investments in the 
wood and cork group were largely accounted for by upgrading in the timber and 
plywood industry. The integration of such operations as kiln drying, surfacing and 
moulding facilities as well as the venture into higher value-added areas of fancy 
veneers, pre-finishing and pre-fabrication through greater automation were 
important developments in the industry. In the plastics products industry, much of 
the growth and diversification in foreign investment was in plastic moulding as a 
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support for the fast-growing electronic, machinery and instrument industries. In 
the transport equipment industry, foreign investment continued to be 
concentrated in shipbuilding and shiprepair, with increased investments by 
Japanese-based companies in particular. Work on two new shipyards involving 
Japanese-based capital in joint-ventures began in this period - Hitachi Zosen 
Robin Dockyard in 1970 and a 400,000-ton capacity drydock facility by Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries (MID) in 1973.161 There were also investments by foreign-based
companies in smaller craft, such as that by Vosper Thornycraft in oil rig supply 
boats and fast patrol craft as well as American Marine's pleasure craft 
investment. 
Not only was there a widening of the range of products and processes 
attracted to Singapore in the 1970-1975 period, there was also a broadening of 
interest by capital of different national origins. In absolute terms, US-based 
capital invested most heavily again in this period, $775 million in gross fixed 
assets (see Table 12 in Appendix). As would be expected, the largest shares of this 
were invested in the petroleum and electrical and electronics industries where US­
based companies were at the fore of the developments already discussed. In the 
petroleum industry, Mobil, Esso, Ocean Petroleum and Caltex all made significant 
investments in the period, as did General-Electric, Fairchild, Hewlett-Packard, 
Sperry Rand and National Semiconductor in the electrical and electronic 
industry. US-based investment was also central to the development of the 
fabricated and precision equipment industries, through SCM, Sunstrand Pacific, 
Cinciannati Milacron, Le Blonde, Richard M. Armstrong and American Optical 
Corporation for example. US-based companies were by far the dominant investor 
in the oil related equipment areas of industry too, Vetco Offshore and Cameron 
Iron Works being two such examples. 
Extensive as US-based capital was between 1970 and 1975, it was not at all 
the fastest-growing investment. Japanese-based investment expanded at more 
than twice the US rate, increasing by $386 million or 567. 7% (see Table 12 in 
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Appendix). Much of the explanation for the resurgence of interest by Japanese 
investors in Singapore was the erosion of manufacturing competitiveness in 
Japan. Wage rises in Japan had been continuous and the yen was revalued at the 
end of 1971 and again in February 1973. Japanese labour-intensive industry thus 
found it more difficult to maintain market shares against its foreign 
competitors.162 There was, as a result, a general exodus of Japanese-based
capital in export-oriented, labour-intensive production in the early 1970s, from 
which the Singapore economy benefited. Although only a modest proportion of 
total Japanese-based invest�ent in the Asian region,163 Japanese investment in
Singapore was significant in absolute terms for the Singapore economy. 
According to data compiled by the Japan Trade Centre (JETRO) in 
Singapore, the number of manufacturing establishments by Japanese-affiliated 
companies in Singapore increased from 38 at the end of 1970 to 105 by the end of 
1975. The 67 new companies included two in food and beverages, one in textiles, 
16 in ferrous and non-ferrous metals, eight in chemicals, 21 in electrical and 
electronics, six in transportation equipment and four in industrial machinery 
industries.164 In terms of paid-up capital, however, the transportation equipment
industry, notably shipbuilding and shiprepair, continued to be the most important 
area of investment. The continued concentration in this area of industry, a 
pattern established in the 1960s, was still tied in with the lower production costs, 
especially labour, of Singapore and the nature of the regional requirements of 
Japanese ships.165
The more interesting feature of the pattern of Japanese-based investment in 
the period was the spurt of investments in the electrical and electronics 
industries. Large international companies such as Fujitsu, Hitachi, Matsushita, 
Sanyo, Yokogawa and Asahi all established new plants in a range of labour­
intensive assembly operations. Japanese-based companies, then, had belatedly 
followed the lead of their US-based competitors in using Singapore as an offshore 
production site for electrical and electronics goods. Though the wage differential 
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between the US and Singapore had been greater than that between Japan and 
Singapore, the wage differential between Japan and Singapore widened and 
assumed greater importance in the 1970s. The sheer volume of overseas investors 
in search of lower production costs also brought Singapore into sharper focus. 
Though Japanese-based companies were less significant than US-based 
companies in the development of higher value-added production between 1970 and 
1975, there were nonetheless some important contributions made. Numerically 
this was reflected in the figure of 16 new companies in ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals and four in industrial machinery industries in the period. Some of the more 
technologically sophisticated investments included Seiko's mechanical movement 
watches and machine tools and dies, Nippon Miniature Bearings in precision ball 
bearings, Copal in precision parts, Mitsui in tools and dies and NAC in 
photographic instrumentation equipment. Japanese-based capital was also active 
in the chemical industry with Singapore Polymer Corporation's PVC and compound 
resin manufacturing operation and Hymold's manufacture of plastic parts for the 
local electrical and electronics consumer goods industry.166
As a group, capital based in EEC countries increased investment in 
Singapore between 1970 and 1975 by $706 million in gross fixed assets, 
representing a 173.9% increase (see Table 12 in Appendix). In relative terms this 
was less impressive than the increases by US or Japanese-based capital but this 
collective figure conceals some divergent patterns by capital from individual 
countries. The three leading sources of capital from the EEC in this period were 
the Netherlands with $290 million in gross fixed assets, Britain with $282 million 
and West Germany $104 million (see Table 12 in Appendix). However, in relative 
terms, the first two's shares of total foreign investment in Singapore dropped from 
20.0% to 14.2% and 18.4% to 14.0% respectively while West German-based 
capital's share increased from 0.3% to 3.2.%. 
As has been established in the previous chapter, a considerable portion of 
Netherlands and British-based capital was concentrated in the petroleum industry 
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through the Shell group. Again, expansions by this group accounted for much of 
the total new investment by these two categories between 1970 and 1975. 
However, the trend towards greater exploitation of Singapore as a base for labour­
intensive export-oriented industry for the markets of developed countries by 
Japan, for instance, was not generally shared by British or Netherlands-based 
capital. There were some exceptions. The British-based Beecham Pharmaceutical 
company invested $32 million plant for the manufacture of synthetic penicillin for 
export to its international markets, the first such plant in Southeast Asia.167
Plessey of Britain and Philips of the Netherlands also outlayed large sums in 
projects in electrical and electronics products for purposes of export to their 
world markets. 
By comparison with British and Netherlands-based capital, investment by 
West German-based companies showed a greater overall interest in export 
production in Singapore. Rollei was clearly the dominant of such investments but 
other precision engineering companies such as Karl Hopt, Vollmer-Werke and 
Hilgerland also set up plants in Singapore. West German-based investors were 
thus also characterised by a relatively high value-added content. Another 
important European country whose capital was also involved in similarly 
sophisticated technology was Switzerland. SKF's investment in textile 
machineries and bearings, exported to Europe, the US and Japan, was one of the 
Republic's most prized investments. Another example of a relatively high quality 
investment was that by Wild Heerbrugg in precision optics and surveying 
equipment. 
To generalise about EEC-based investment between 1970 and 1975, then, 
despite the declining overall share of investment in Singapore from 40.80% to 
32.90%, certain EEC countries, notably West Germany, played an important role 
in the development of more skill-intensive industry. Clearly though, amongst 
international capital as a whole there was general, if not uniform, shift towards 
higher value-added investment. 
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Conclusion 
We have seen in the discussion above that between 1970 and 1975 the pattern of 
international capital investment in Singapore underwent a qualitative change. 
This was not a dramatic change but rather a subtle shift in certain areas of 
production towards the introduction of more sophisticated technology. This did 
not necessarily mean that the actual production processes carried out in Singapore 
were commensurate with the technology of the product. Rather, in many cases 
labour-intensive assembly operations were still involved. However, the value­
added content of the product being assembled was higher than that of the products 
which formed the initial basis of the industrial programme. There were other 
instances where higher skills were involved and the technology employed by 
workers was quite sophisticated. Putting things into perspective, however, it 
could only be claimed that in this period a start had been made in the introduction 
of middle level technology to Singapore. 
Even with this qualification the shift in emphasis did signify something quite 
important about the perception of Singapore as a production site by sections of 
international capital. A clear distinction was being made between Singapore and 
some other export bases in the region. Many companies introduced products and 
production processes to Singapore which they had not located at any other 
offshore site. Such decisions, however, were still tied-in with calculations of 
labour-cost savings. 
The government's policies were not responsible for instigating this new 
investment pattern of international capital investment, but at the same time 
without these policies it is doubtful that such a pattern would have unfolded. 
Certainly the government exploited the rapidly improving economic conditions to 
favour the development of higher value-added production. Significantly, this did 
not only involve a host of infrastructural provisions, both social and physical, and 
the provision of various fiscal and tax inducements, but the maintenance of wage 
control once deteriorating economic conditions lead to massive retrenchments and 
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reduced investment. Under these circumstances the Singapore government no 
longer felt it could afford to selectively promote higher value-added investments 
and relaxed conditions on the less skilled, labour-intensive investments. This 
highlighted the ultimate constraint on the government's plans to promote higher 
value-added production. Such plans had to be consistent with the logic of 
international capital investment. 
Finally, throughout the entire 1970-1975 period the PAP government gave 
ample evidence that its resolve to ensure a docile and compliant labour force had 
not weakened. Equally, the generally improved economic conditions did not see 
any relaxation of the PAP's efforts to frustrate and obstruct political opposition. 
On the contrary, the slowdown in investment only confirmed in the minds of the 
Party leaders just how essential the PAP's continued political ascendancy was. By 
this time then, the authoritarian rule of the PAP appeared to be part of the 
ongoing economic and political management of the state and not a temporary 
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Investment Recovery and the Unfolding of Contradictions 
in EconomicStrategy, 1976-1978. 
Having undergone a severe economic setback due to the world recession, 
Singapore's economic planners were preoccupied between 1976 and 1978 with the 
task of creating the conditions for a sustained economic recovery. This entailed a 
wide range of measures to attract investment. Wage control through the NWC 
was especially important. Without this control no other measure was expected to 
be effective. Equally, the government insisted that without political stability and 
labour discipline Singapore would be unattractive to international capital in these 
fiercely competitive times. Indeed, so apprehensive was the government about 
the capacity to attract sufficient capital from abroad that the first really 
concrete steps were taken to promote the locally-based industrial bourgeoisie. 
This promotion was, however, not altogether unrelated to the primary objective of 
attracting international capital. 
Aside from the uncertainty of Singapore's economic recovery, two important 
political questions would have to be answered in the next few years. When the 
recessionary effects hit Singapore in 1974/1975, protest from workers and 
students was harshly dealt with. What form then, if any, would opposition to 
government policy take in future? Further, given that the PAP had to face an 
election in the next few years, how would the electorate assess the PAP's handling 
of the economy and indeed, its opponents and critics? 
Given the setback of the recession to the government's strategy to promote 
Singapore's shift towards an intermediate technological stage of industrialisation, 
economic recovery per se became the overriding priority in the 1976-1978 
period. The government continued to pursue its restructuring objectives but this 
was done in conjunction with policies to promote manufacturing growth in 
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general. As we shall see in this chapter, however, such an approach not only 
fostered the desired economic recovery, it also produced fundamental 
contradictions in industrial strategy. The recovery and expansion of Singapore's 
traditional labour-intensive industries, which had been particularly hard hit by the 
recession, began to generate serious constraints on the capacity of the economy to 
support higher value-added manufacturing production. At the same time, a 
number of external factors also forced the government to seriously reconsider its 
economic objectives and means of achieving them. 
Wage Control and Labour Policy 
In keeping with the policy adopted in 1975 of curbing wage increases, NWC 
recommendations in the years 1976-1978 emphasised wage restraint as an 
encouragement to investment and job creation. Thus, in 1976 the government 
accepted recommendations for a 7% increase with full offsetting of annual 
increments for both the public and private sectors. Unlike in previous years, 
however, offsetting was to be calculated on a group rather than an individual 
basis.1 It was also recommended that the list of quantum and fringe benefits
provided for in collective agreements should not be extended or enlarged beyond 
the expiry of the existing agreements and that new companies be very moderate in 
their provision of fringe benefits.2 This emphasis on fringe benefits represented
an attempt to place constraints on the total wage bill, rather than just wages. 
Given that there was a decrease of 1.9% in the CPI in 1976 (see Table 18 in 
Appendix), these recommendations might on the surface appear generous. 
However, there was a significant qualification to these recommendations. They 
need not be implemented, in either part or full, by export-oriented industries with 
a high labour content where such industries were facing competition from lower 
wage countries.3 This reflected the government's concern that Singapore might
lose out to Taiwan and South Korea, in particular, in the attraction of 
investment.4
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Again in 1977, the NWC addressed the problem of containing increases in the 
total wage bill. A flat 6% wage increase was recommended, but this time with 
offsetting calculated not just on annual increments but all other forms of 
remuneration, such as merit and promotional increments. Further, the real value 
of those increases within the guidelines was eroded by a 3 .2 % increase in the CPI 
in 1977 (see Table 18 in Appendix). In any case, Singapore's lowest paid workers 
tended to be employed in precisely those industries which were again exempt from 
any obligation to implement the guidelines - the labour-intensive, export-oriented 
manufacturing industries.5 Even though by now there had been some recovery in
the Singapore economy, the government's projections were still pessimistic and 
wage restraint would, in its view, need to prevail. 
Whilst again calling for wage moderation in 1978, the NWC guidelines 
recommended some important changes to the formula for arriving at wage 
increases. The guidelines provided for a flat $12 increase plus 6%, with offsetting 
on the same basis as for 1977 except that promotion increments would not be 
included. The significance of the $12 was that it represented an official 
acknowledgement of the gross wage differentials in the Singapore economy, 
though by no means greatly redressing this inequality. 6 The problem was in any
case directly related to the government's policy of holding down wages most 
tightly in the labour-intensive, export-oriented industries. 
The more significant feature of the 1978 NWC recommendations was the 
revision of group offsetting to ensure that wage adjustments were more closely 
related to individual worker productivity. Employers were advised to adopt one or 
both of the following schemes to distinguish between different levels of worker 
productivity: (i) a demerit scheme based on penalties for absenteeism, 
unpunctuality, failure to observe safety rules and generally unsatisfactory 
performance - all offences leading to denials in part or full of the annual 
increments; (ii) a merit scheme based on measurable increases in productivity.7
Though employees would soon make the point that the implementation of such 
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schemes was fraught with difficulty, the focus on individual productivity was 
ominous. Whilst the government had been productivity conscious since the early 
1970s, the 1978 NWC recommendations were intended to institutionalise this to a 
greater extent. Future NWC recommendations would see even further emphasis 
on productivity. 
By the time of the 1978 NWC recommendations, Singapore's economic 
climate had undergone important changes. Official unemployment had fallen to 
3.6% and labour mobility had become at least as great a concern as 
unemployment. This was reflected in the 1978 NWC recommendations that wage 
adjustments not be paid to employees with less than twelve months' service unless 
they have been retrenched, were new labour recruits or either their company or 
themselves had cause to relocate address.8 To the policy-makers, increased
productivity consciousness would promote better work attitudes and, hence, less 
'job hopping'. 
Evidence available suggests · that the NWC's recommendations enjoyed 
significant compliance by employers during the period from 1975 to the end of 
1978. Chew and Chew cite survey data showing a range in the degree of 
implementation in both the manufacturing sector and economy in general of 
between 70% and 89%.9 Official data also show that average hourly earnings in
the manufacturing sector increased from $1.94 in August 1975 to $2.48 in August 
1979, an increase of 27.8%.10 This suggests that increases approximated those
recommended by the NWC which called for average annual increases of 27.3% 
from 1975 to 1978 inclusive. 
We have seen in earlier chapters that since adopting an EOI strategy wage 
policy had been heavily conditioned by the need to attract international capital. 
In the period following the 1974/1975 recession, this connection became 
paramount to the PAP government's attempts to ensure a sufficient share of the 
limited investment by international capital. Through the direction of the NWC, 
and with the support of the NTUC, the government successfully implemented 
337 
wage control which gave manufacturers in Singapore an opportunity to remain 
competitive with exporters from other production sites in the region. The support 
of the NTUC leadership for the wage policy was reiterated in October 1977 at a 
four-day seminar which it organised, entitled "The Next Ten Years - Job Creation 
or Job Loss". This support was fundamental to the success of the wage policy of 
producing a decline in the monthly earnings of Singapore workers relative to those 
of Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong workers during the period 1976-1978.11
Locally-Based Capital 
Although the government's immediate concern during the recession had been to 
address the decline in foreign investment, the 1975 budget also contained 
measures to stimulate capital in general. Despite these measures, however, by 
1976 a clear trend had emerged towards an absolute and relative decline in the 
contribution of locally-based manufacturers to total investment. The contribution 
of locally-based capital to total manufacturing investment. commitments had 
fallen from $123.1 million or 42.17% in 1974 to $59.5 million or 19.43% in 1975 
and $42.80 million or 14.11 % in 1976 (see Table 13 in Appendix). This trend was 
not only disappointing for the government in view of its efforts to raise 
investment levels per se, it also raised questions about the place of local 
manufacturers in any future restructuring of industry. Domestic capital continued 
to be concentrated in finance and trade, and to a lesser extent in the naturally­
protected import-substitution manufacturing industries, with no evident interest 
in diversification. Dr Goh Keng Swee had announced in 1975 that the most 
desirable growth strategy would involve the upgrading of domestic, low­
technology industries with the simultaneous promotion of higher technology, 
capital-intensive but small firms as growth leaders.12 Figures on investment
commitments suggested that locally-based manufacturers were either indifferent 
to this strategy or incapable of partaking in it. 
---------- - - ---- -----,--------,----------------:---
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Towards promoting the development of locally-based companies, in 1976 the 
government introduced the Small Industries Finance Scheme (SIFS). In essence, 
this was an extension of the CAS to Singapore's small, locally-based companies. It 
provided lower than commercial rate loans for the establishment of viable 
enterprises and the diversification and integration of manufacturing operations of 
existing companies.13
The new interest in promoting locally-based manufacturing capital did not 
represent any revision of basic economic philosophy. The government was 
certainly not motivated by nationalism. On the contrary, it continued to subscribe 
to the view that only capital which could withstand market competition deserved 
to survive. Rather than trying to assist local companies in competition with 
international capital, the government's intention was to encourage greater integ­
ration between the operations of local and international companies.14
Particularly in the electronics industry, international capital stood to benefit from 
the building up of a more fully integrated industry. Not only would efficient 
locally-based firms help to cut transportation and production costs, and thereby 
enhance the competitiveness of the industry, but their increased content would 
also render more international firms eligible for trade privileges under the Gen­
eral System of Preferences (GSP).15 As protection became more an obstacle to
exports from Singapore, international capital became more anxious to ensure the 
building-up of support industries.16
Despite the introduction of the SIFS, little progress was made over the next 
few years in either promoting local investment or fostering greater integration 
between locally-based arid international capital. In 1978, local investment 
commitments still only amounted to $46.7 million, just 5.75% of total 
commitments (see Table 14 below). By mid-1978, loans under SIFS had been 
approved to small companies producing television cabinets, ice-making machines, 
plastic injection mouldings, electric power cords and a range of other products 
which totalled $11.19 million.17
-------------- -- -��-- - - -------,-----------�--=-�---
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168 .8 (57 .8 %) 123.1 (42.2%) 
246.8 (80.6%) 59.5 (19.4%) 
260.5 (85.9%) 42.8 (14.1 %) 
362.6 (91.5%) 33.8 (8.5%) 
765.7 (94.3%) 46.7 (5.7%) 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 
1983/84, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1984, Table 6.II, p.104. 
The failure of SIF'S to attract a sufficient volume of successful applicants 
was attributed by Singapore's domestic-based manufacturers to the defensive 
attitude of commercial banks which were said to have considered the margin on 
interest from the SIF'S loans unattractive. Borrowers were required to submit 
excessive collateral.18 Similarly, banks tended to be - very cautious in the
administering of both the pre-export and export financing offered by MAS, again 
to the detriment of small firms. Money was simply going to the best credit risks, 
the multinationals.19 
In recognition of the failure of the government's measures to affect any 
substantial development of locally-based manufacturing capital or industrial 
integration, in 1978 the Product Development Assistance Scheme (PDAS) was 
introduced. This was intended to develop local applied research and product 
capability and indigenous technology. Under the scheme, a dollar-for-dollar grant 
of up to $100,000 was available for approved product or process development 
projects carried out by local companies. 20 The grant could be used for either in­
house research or work carried out at outside institutions such as SISIR or the 
Applied Research Corporation (ARC). Again, this measure was designed to 
develop the capacity of local capital to integrate with and service the needs of 
international capital. Had the government wanted to boost investment by locally-
340 
based capital for the sake of developing this fraction of capital, far more positive 
discrimination in its favour would have been required. This, however, was 
antithetical to the government's philosophy, counter productive to its economic 
strategy and negated by the basic political mistrust of the local business 
community by the PAP. 
Budgetary Measures to Promote Growth 
In keeping with the government's policy of prime-pumping the economy to 
compensate for dampened demand for Singapore-manufactured goods, 
development expenditure by the government increased significantly between 1976 
and 1978. Total development expenditure rose from $1,548.5 million in 1975/76 to 
$1,890.0 million in 1977 /78. Loans to statutory bodies and enterprises continued 
to dominate these outlays, comprising $1,138.7 million in 1975/76 and $1,180.0 
million in 1976/77 (see Table 21 in Appendix). Again, the chief beneficiaries of 
these loans were the HDB and the JTC. 
Total capital expenditure by the HDB for the years from 1975/76 until 
1977 /78 amounted to $2,716 million. Of this, $2,408 million was provided by the 
government in loans.21 Between April 1977 and March 1978, a record number of
30,547 units of flats and shops had been completed by the HDB, bringing progress 
on the Fourth Five-Year Building Programme (1976-1980) ahead of schedule. As a 
result, an estimated 1.4 million people, or 60% of the population, were living in 
estates managed by the HDB. 22
The economic recovery anticipated by the JTC in its 1974 Annual Report 
took longer in materialising than originally projected. Naturally this affected 
demand for industrial land. In fact, in 1976 85.5 hectares of land were 
relinquished by industrialists through premature termination of leases. At the end 
of that year there were as few as 10 applicants on the waiting list for 6.8 hectares 
of land.23 Expansions in land preparation continued, however, in keeping with the
policy of maintaining an adequate supply to meet future demand. Total capital 
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expenditure on land preparation in 1976 amounted to $296.2 million of which 
$209.4 million was provided through government loans, with a further $137.9 
million out of JTC's $195.8 million capital expenditure for 1977 /78 again from 
such loans. This made possible the preparation of 1,346.2 hectares of industrial 
and other land during this period.24 Utilising a time of slack demand to expand
facilities proved a wise policy. When demand suddenly picked up, JTC was able to 
allocate record numbers of factory buildings in 1977 and 1978.25 By the end of 
March 1978, a total of 1,751 industrial establishments under JTC's management 
employed 143,412 workers representing about 62% of the total manufacturing 
labour force. 26
Political Developments 
From the time that the PAP became the sole political party represented in 
parliament, international curiosity in the Singapore political system was assured. 
PAP leaders were particularly sensitive to suggestions that this situation was 
undemocratic and pointed to the fact of free, compulsory elections. To the PAP's 
irritation, however, a growing critical interest developed amongst Western 
journalists, scholars and political activists in, what they saw as, the systematic 
obstruction and intimidation of opposition which rendered elections a superficial 
measure of political freedom. The PAP's treatment of the press in the early 1970s 
had done much to prompt sympathy outside Singapore for this view. What 
outsiders viewed as repression, however, was explained by Lee Kuan Yew as firm 
but necessary measures to curb the omnipresent, if greatly reduced, communist 
threat. In particular, criticism of detention without trial under the ISA was 
rejected by the PAP leaders who contended that their critics had no appreciation 
of the security problem posed by the MCP which was now committed to the 
overthrow of government by force. So persistent were the criticisms, however, 
that the PAP eventually felt the need to develop a more systematic and 
comprehensive justification of its position, linking its style of government to 
Singapore's economic needs and performance. 
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Despite the government's rationalisation of the use of detention without 
trial under the ISA, by early 1976 formal international concern manifested in the 
publication by the Federation of United Kingdom and Eire Malaysian and 
Singapore Students' Organisations (FUEMSSO) of Singapore: Behind the Economic 
Miracle, and an 86-page briefing paper by the London-based international human 
rights organisation .Amnesty International.27 The former comprised a series of
articles highly critical of the PAP's record on civil liberties and included reprints 
of statutory declarations by detainees attesting to the allegedly harsh and 
inhumane treatment and torture of political prisoners.28 The Amnesty report,
which caused even greater embarrassment owing to the organisation's reputation 
for non-partisanship, claimed that as many as 40 political prisoners were being 
held under the ISA.29 It went on to contend that the use of detention without
trial was part of the PAP's broader repression of legitimate non-violent political 
opposition: 
Political detainees include those who have criticised the government 
for curtailing the application of the rule of law, restricting freedom 
of the press and of speech, and denying opportunities for normal 
trade union activity, for free political activity and for the 
establishment of a true parliamentary opposition.30
Amnesty also raised the question of prisoner treatment, pointing out the 
government's failure to even take up the recommendation by the Chief Justice of 
the Constitutional Commission of 1966 to amend the Singapore Constitution to 
provide guarantees against torture. 31
As if the FUEMSSO and Amnesty reports were not sufficient indictment of 
the PAP, these were soon followed by plans to expel the Party from the Socialist 
International which it had joined in 1966. Expulsion moves were formally initiated 
by the Dutch Labour Party (DLP) in a memorandum circulated to members of the 
Socialist International and supported by all Western social democratic parties. 
The memorandum called for the unconditional release of all political prisoners, 
and raised such questions as the violation of workers' rights to organise. 32




In the wake of the PAP's resignation from the Socialist International an 
extensive attack on the Party's critics was conducted. Typically, Lee Kuan Yew 
portrayed the charges from the Socialist International as part of a wider 
conspiracy and alleged that the Socialist International had "wittingly or 
unwittingly become a vehicle to further the communist cause in Singapore" .34
The NTUC's Second Triennial conference in mid-April 1976 was also presented 
with a 64-page report from Secretary...:.General Devan Nair which was essentially a 
polemic against the British and Dutch Labour parties and the Socialist 
International. Devan Nair levelled severe criticism at the "ultra-liberal lunatic 
fringe" of Western democratic socialist parties, otherwise referred to as the "New 
Left" .35 The government's attempts to dispel its critics' charges culminated in
the publication of a 268-page work entitled Socialism That Works ... The Singapore 
Way, edited by Devan Nair.36 This comprised articles by leading Party figures
and functionaries and documents pertaining to the activities of subversives in 
Singapore. Western liberals and social democrats came in for special ridicule and 
condemnation, not just for allegedly aiding and abetting the MCP, but for the 
general moral decadence which they represented to PAP leaders. 
Whatever outside elements contended about the PAP's exercise of security 
laws, the Singapore authorities continued to pursue perceived communist 
activities with vigilance.37 No doubt there were genuine MCP attempts at 
infiltration and subversion, but whether these were as widespread as the Singapore 
government claimed and whether they took all the forms which attracted ISD 
harassment is not possible to verify. However, the political utility to the PAP of 
keeping alive the appearance of widespread communist subversion was all too 
obvious to the government's domestic political opponents and external critics. 
Thus, Amnesty International remained unconvinced that detention without trial 
could be justified and released a second briefing paper in February 1978. In 
contrast to the previous report, however, this one aroused little government 
response.38 The experience of the last few years had proven that these
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allegations did not necessarily weaken the PAP's domestic political position nor 
the appeal of Singapore to international capital. 
1976 General Election 
Although a general election was not due until September 1977, on 6 December 
1976 Parliament was dissolved with 13 December set as Nomination Day and 23 
December as Polling Day. In announcing the election date, Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew referred to the difficult times anticipated in 1977 and the need to get 
the election over with so that preparations could be made to deal with the 
problems ahead. These problems included a possible new recession, oil price 
increases and the pressure to be applied on the US President-elect Jimmy Carter 
for a speedy settlement of the Middle East dispute.39
There was no expectancy that the PAP could lose office in this election, but 
it would be of interest to gauge the effect of the charges by the DLP and Amnesty 
International on the PAP's domestic popularity. A skilful exploitation of this issue 
might provide the basis for some gains by opposition parties. Aside from the civil 
rights question, there had also been some rumblings of discontent by the middle 
class earlier that year after the government's New Year's Eve decision to 
substantially increase road taxes and motor vehicle registration and area licencing 
fees. Following unusually vocal public protest, including two motorcade protests, 
significant revisions were made to the proposed charges.40 The government's
modernisation and redevelopment of the city centre and remaining rural areas also 
continued to cause dislocation to thousands of businesses and families, thereby 
risking some electoral backlash.41 Finally, it remained to be seen how Singapore's
working class was accepting the new hold on wage levels. Rising costs of 
transportation, food, utilities and government services such as health, education 
and housing obviously had greatest impact on this class. The gross inequality of 
income distribution in Singapore meant that despite the high per capita GNP, 
many people still received very low wages.42
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By the time of the 1976 election, the P AP's policy of ushering in promising 
new second generation leaders to prepare for the eventual phasing out of the Old 
Guard had gained momentum. In June 1975, three younger generation recruits 
were appointed senior ministers.43 These senior ministers of state were also the
first in the Party to be given the power to exercise full ministerial functions and 
attend cabinet meetings.44 The Party fielded 11 new candidates, the average age
of these being in the mid-thirties and most of them having tertiary education 
backgrounds, two of them possessing Ph.Ds and another an M.A. Nine of the 11 
had been educated in English.45 The close relationship which had developed
between the government and other levels of the state was re-inforced through the 
choice of candidates too. Two of these candidates were top level executives of 
government-controlled corporations. They were Suppiah Dhanabalan, Executive 
Vice President of the DBS, and Goh Chok Tong, Managing Director of National 
Orient Lines, the national shipping company. Two other candidates, Dr Lau Teik 
Soon and Dr Ow Chin Hock, were lecturers at the University of Singapore. Their 
entry to Parliament would increase the PAP's direct representation at the 
University of Singapore to five, two of whom would be departmental heads.46 The
already pervasive PAP influence thus continued to be cemented and extended 
throughout the Singapore state. 
In contrast with the previous general election, in 1976 the opposition parties 
managed to achieve some degree of co-operation so that a three-cornered contest 
took place in just two constituencies.47 Towards a more effective maximisation
of the opposition's limited resources, a Joint Opposition Council (JOC) was 
formed, a loose federation of parties comprising the BS (six candidates), the 
Singapore United Front (SUF) (15 candidates), PKMS (two candidates) and the 
Singapore Justice Party (SJP) (two candidates). The Workers' Party (22 
candidates) and the United People's Front (UPF) (six candidates) also merged at 
the last moment so that the opposition parties were broadly grouped into two 
separate but not antagonistic coalitions. Two Independents also contested the 
election. 
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Despite the improved co-operation between opposition parties, there were 
still many underlying difficulties which rendered this co-operation superficial. 
The whole opposition campaign lacked unity. Thus, while the combined platform 
of the JOC called for the abolition of the ISA and the immediate release of all 
political detainees, a position also shared by the UPF, the WP argued that the ISA 
should be retained but the "indiscriminate detention" which characterised the 
ISA's execution should be abolished. 48 The WP called for greater executive
accountability.49 Similarly, whereas the JOC platform sought the revocation of
"unjust anti-workers (sic] laws like the Employment Act and the Industrial 
Relations Act", the WP sought better conditions for workers. 5o
As had been the case in previous elections, opposition parties encountered 
problems in obtaining an accurate and adequate media coverage.51 By contrast
the PAP exploited its favoured relationship with the media to saturate the 
electorate with its propaganda. In general, the PAP leaders treated their 
opposition with contempt and dismissed their suggested reforms as 
irresponsible.52 Lee Kuan Yew attacked the opposition parties on the grounds
that: "Most of the opposition want to give everything away". He added: 
They want lower taxes, lower rates and lower public utilities rates. 
We stand for the security of Singapore which, unfortunately, means 
that hard-core detainees who refuse to abjure the use of violence 
will have to be detained. 53 
The PAP slogan, "Towards a Safe Future with the PAP", became synonomous with 
arguments about the pending economic difficulties and the insidious communist 
forces, both which could be kept at bay only with continued tough leadership and 
the success of the PAP's economic strategy. According to the PAP, if the 
opposition won any seats at all foreign investment would consequently drop and 
thereby threaten this strategy and, hence, the entire security of Singapore.54
Election results once again gave the PAP a landslide victory, taking all 69 
seats. Of the total votes cast, the PAP gained 72.4% and the opposition parties 
25.32%. 55 The so-called 'protest vote' had dropped about 5% since the last
general election. The improved PAP vote owed much to greater support from 
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constituents in the northern rural districts who had grievances in 1972 over land 
appropriation by the state and felt generally neglected. Since then, however, 
compensation rates for appropriated land had increased and opposition parties, 
beset with financial and organisational limitations, found it increasingly difficult 
to campaign in remote areas. Significantly, though, the PAP lost some marginal 
ground in middle class constituencies which had previously provided the backbone 
of PAP support. Presumably this had something to do with the increased charges 
to which this class had been subjected. The middle class was also the most likely 
to harbour resentment over PAP and state authoritarianism in general. Despite 
the WP's reduced share from 12.2% to 11.5% of the total vote, Jeyaretnam 
registered the highest opposition vote with 39%, but the biggest surprise of the 
losers was the 31 % vote gained by Independent Chiam See Tong. Chiam, a lawyer 
with no previous political experience, contested the Minister for Communications 
and National Development, Lim Kim San, in the Cairnhill constituency and in so 
doing reduced the Minister's 1972 margin by 13%.56
Despite some evidence of marginal middle class alienation with the 
government, the clear message of the 1976 elections was that the PAP's record of 
economic achievement entitled the Party to a mandate for any difficult times 
ahead. The considerable economic growth over which this government had 
presided had provided real material benefits for the domestic-based bourgeoisie 
and the working class, albeit to different degrees. Both classes held legitimate 
gripes but the gains they had made far outweighed other considerations. 
Significantly, the working class showed no apparent concern for the question of 
civil liberties. If there was any concern it was tempered by a more fundamental 
aspiration for economic security and material improvement which the PAP had a 
record of providing. This unhappy verdict for the opposition was later repeated in 
a by-election in the predominantly working class constituency of Radin Mas in 
May 1977 when WP candidate Jeyaretnam was defeated by the PAP's Bernard 
Chen Tien Lap after making human rights the central focus of the campaign.57
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Chen, a civil servant in his thirties who was recruited for this by-election by the 
PAP, made the seemingly politically correct observation which Singapore's 
opposition parties could only accept with considerable reluctance: 
Let me tell you what human rights, basic rights or fundamental 
rights are - what they mean to the people. They are the rights to a 
better life: the right to work, to stay in a decent home, the right to 
education, medical facilities and law and order in the country. 
These are the real fundamental rights of the people, not the empty 
words of the opposition. 58 
The BS fared no better in another by-election in late July 1977.59 The negative
international publicity the PAP received in 1976 had thus not harmed the Party 
domestically and any hope that such publicity might have, indirectly, led to a 
relaxation of repression was therefore delivered a setback.60
As we have seen above, the vigilence of the authorities in suppressing 
suspected subversive activities in the student and labour movements continued 
over the next few years. The media too came in for closer official scrutiny with 
the arrest of several journalists.61 As a follow up to the 1974 Newspaper and
Printing Press Act, the government also introduced new legislation to curb the 
influence of the privately-owned, notably Chinese, domestic press. The 1974 Act 
was intended to restrict the influence of outsiders on local politics through press 
ownership but it still remained possible for local individuals to wield significant 
control so long as they commanded sufficient management shares. Thus, in July 
1977, amendments to the Act were introduced which limited individual holdings in 
publishing companies to 3% of the shares, with the rest being offered on the open 
market to small investors. 62 Clearly the government was sensitive to the fact
that the two Chinese newspapers, Nanyang Siang Pau and Sin Chew Jit Poh, were 
in the hands of two powerful families, namely the Au and Lee families. 63 Both
these families had been accused of power broking and exploiting their media 
control for political ends, that is, the promotion of Chinese chauvinism. 64 The
breaking up of these newspaper empires was yet another step in the PAP's 
systematic elimination of any actual or potential capacity of the press to exert 
any political influence other than that sanctioned by the PAP. 
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The government's introduction of amendments to the Newspaper and 
Printing Act did not mean that the PAP anticipated any strong revival of Chinese 
chauvinism. The move was primarily a precaution. In fact, in February 1978 the 
government abolished the Suitability Certificates for entry to tertiary institutions 
which was, after all, particularly intended to screen suspected MCP supporters 
and sympathisers from Chinese-language secondary schools. Over time, however, 
the government's institutional control and the greater utility of an English­
language education in employment contributed to the declining influence of 
Chinese-medium education. The government had also been successful in the 
general curbing of leftist influence throughout Singapore society. As a result, the 
Suitability Certificate was no longer considered necessary by the authorities.65
Instead, the government concentrated on rounding off the defeat of Chinese 
consciousness by introducing a joint campus scheme in 1978 whereby students 
from Nanyang University would attend lectures in English with their counterparts 
at the University of Singapore.66 Amongst other things, the purpose of the
exercise was to advance the more politically acceptable Singaporean identity at 
the expense of the Chinese cultural consciousness promoted by Nanyang's 
medium.67
In summary then, the period 1976-1978 represented one of political 
consolidation for the PAP. Not only did the PAP again secure a strong mandate 
for its economic programme, which involved sacrifices from the masses, but it 
also continued its uncompromising attitude towards dissent from labour, students 
and press. The ISA also continued to be enacted without any significant negative 
electoral consequences. Thus, despite the resort to the ISA, Singapore projected 
an image of political stability. The government had been at pains to emphasise 
that this was fundamental to the attraction of international capital in these 
competitive times. As we shall see below, this political stability did coincide with 
an impressive economic recovery. However, this recovery brought with it a new 
set of problems for the government's economic strategy which, if not addressed, 




M�ufacturing Development and International Capital 
At different points above, reference has been made to manufacturing 
developments and, in particular, the investment tendencies of international 
capital between 1976 and 1978. Here, however, we examine these more 
thoroughly, drawing out the important qualitative developments in Singapore's EOI 
strategy. We see that the PAP's measures to arrest declining investment were 
successful not just in addressing unemployment, but in promoting a new phase of 
rapid industrialisation which involved significant technological upgrading. 
From the beginning of 1976 to the end of 1978, the Singapore economy 
underwent considerable expansion, especially given that the global economy had 
not yet fully recovered from the effects of the 1974/75 recession. Singapore's 
total GDP for the period grew by 26.0% (at 1968 market prices). In this time, 
manufacturing GDP grew by 33.4% (at 1968 market prices). This manufacturing 
expansion was largely fueled by a recovery in export demand. Domestic 
manufactured exports grew by 75.4% from the end of 1975 to the end of 1978, 
facilitating an increase in the export/output ratio for the sector from 57.1 to 64.2 
in the same period. As a proportion of total manufacturing output they rose from 
57.7% to 63.9% (see Table 2 in Appendix). 
In absolute terms, the leading contributors to increased manufactured 
exports in the period 1976 to 1978 were, not surprisingly, the petroleum refineries 
and petroleum products and the electronic components and products industries, 
followed by the food, apparel, transport equipment and sawntimber industries (see 
Table 5 in Appendix). Relative increases, however, were most rapid in the furn­
iture and fixtures industry, followed by the iron and steel, apparel,. electronic 
components and products, plastic products and food industries. Included amongst 
the absolutely and rel.atively fast-growing export industries then were some 
industries involving a high labour component. As a result, the manufacturing 
sector provided 52,196 more jobs by the end of 1978 than it did at the same time 
in 1975, of which 34,121 had been created in the heavily export-oriented 
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electronics and apparel industries (see Table 6 in Appendix). Export expansion 
thus made an important contribution to the reducing of official unemployment 
from 4.6% in 1975 to 3.6% in 1978 (see Table 1 in Appendix). 
Given the already established dominance of international capital in the 
Singapore manufacturing sector, especially in export production, the economic 
recovery of this period understandably owed much to foreign investment. Indeed, 
the recovery strategy was, as we have seen, geared around the attraction of 
foreign investment. The government's success in this regard was reflected in 
various measures. Whereas foreign investment accounted for 73. 7% of total gross 
fixed assets in manufacturing in· 1975, by the end of 1978 it accounted for 
78.5%.68 Wholly foreign-owned companies also accounted for 52.3% of all 
manufactured exports for the years 1976-1978 and companies with at least 51 % 
foreign ownership 87.4%.69
Of particular satisfaction for the government was the growth in actual and 
committed foreign investment in the years 1976-1978. Total actual investment in 
gross fixed assets increased by $1,862 million or 55.1 % and investment 
commitments by $518.9 million or 210.3% (see Tables 10 and 13 in Appendix). In 
both cases, however, the pattern was for steady increases in 1976 and 1977 and 
then quite dramatic increases in 1978. 58.9% of actual foreign investment and 
77. 7% of committed investment increases for the period occurred in 1978. 1978,
then, marked a watershed in the strategy to revive foreign investment. 
The biggest increases in actual foreign investment in the period 1976-1978 
occurred in the petroleum and petroleum products ($266 million), non-electrical 
machinery ($237 million), transport equipment ($117 million) and precision 
equipment ($70 million) industries (see Table 11 in Appendix). The fastest growth 
in foreign investment, however, was recorded by the non-electrical machinery 
industry which expanded by 94.8%, followed by the electrical and electronics 
industries at 75.1 %. Of the committed investment, the most substantial gains 
were made by the electrical machinery industry ($279.1 million higher at end of 
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1978 than at end of 1975) followed by the petroleum ($195.0 million higher) and 
precision equipment ($32.6 million higher) industries (see Table 13 in Appendix). A 
more meaningful understanding of these developments, however, necessitates an 
examination of investments within individual industries. 
The most significant development in the petroleum industry in this period 
was the increasing interest in secondary processing activities which raised the 
value-added of refined crude. Shell's $135 million project to produce low sulphur 
fuel oil, diesel oil and other light petroleum· products made further progress in this 
period. 70 Then, in 1978, Shell announced its intention to build a hydrocracker
costing $330 million for the upgrading of lower value oil products. This plant 
would be only the second such unit built by Shell outside North America.71 In the
same year, Mobil commissioned a $57 million reformer plant, a $300 million 
hydrocracker project and embarked on a $200 million visbreaker project.72 
Upgrading, then, made further progress in this industry. 
The period 1976-1978 was one of exceptional recovery for the electrical 
machinery and electronic industries. The electrical machinery industry expanded 
output by $195.6 million or 36.8% whilst the larger and more export-oriented 
electronics industry increased output by $825.8 million or 47.9% with exports up 
by 47.7% (see Tables 3 and 5 in Appendix). The pattern of foreign investment also 
underlined the confidence in the ability of this recovery to be sustained. Not only 
was there a total of $226 million invested by international capital in these 
industries, but also a 143.1 % increase in foreign investment commitments between 
1977 and 1978 (see Tables 11 and 13 in Appendix). Though both industries 
attracted much foreign investment, including significantly improved technology, 
overall productivity increases in these industries remained modest, value-added 
per worker rising by $3,800 in the electrical industry and $1,700 in the electronics 
industry (see Table 7 in Appendix). This was due to the uneven distribution of 
productivity increases within these industries. 
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Productivity increases in the electrical industry in period 1976-1978 were 
mainly brought about by the continued introduction of higher value-added 
products. A great many of these products, involving backward and forward 
integration, had been committed before 1976, but the value and range of products 
increased further during the period under review. Thus, such items as switch 
gears, analogue meters, motors, compressors, air conditioners, refrigerators, 
vacuum cleaners, coffee makers, clocks, hair dryers and various components and 
accessories were invested in. The more significant foreign investors attracted 
included Matsushita, which began the manufacture of precision motors, Crompton 
Parkinson, which set up a project to manufacture electrical meters, and 
Meidensha, which began production of high tension distribution transformers. 
Expansions and diversifications were also carried out by the already established 
Union Carbide for the manufacture of alkaline batteries, Varta for silver oxide 
button cells and Sanyo for various household appliances. 73
The poor productivity performance of the electronic components and 
products industry in the period 1976-1978 conceals the fact that important 
qualitative upgradings did take place. Inefficient applications of labour by some 
firms tended, however, to cancel out the effects of investments in more complex 
products and processes or in greater automation or mechanisation by other firms. 
Pang suggests that labour shortages in electronics assembly work may have given 
rise to reduced worker quality and discouraged skill upgrading through training. 7 4
Foreign investment in consumer electronics, inherently the most labour­
intensive section of the industry, was characterised by both forward and backward 
integration in the period 1976-1978. Examples of backward integration were the 
introduction of flourescent digital display tubes by NEC, liquid crystal displays by 
Siemens, cassette tape mechanisms by Copal, colour television sub-assemblies by 
Luxor, monochrome and colour television sub-assemblies by Philips, colour 
television picture tubes by Hitachi and precision switches by Isostat. The range 
and value-added of consumer products invested in by international capital were 
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also boosted by projects including radio-cassettes and hi-fi amplifiers by JVC and 
electronic television games by Nikko. There were also significant expansions of 
existing product lines by all the established big international companies in Singa­
pore. Electronic household appliances, radios, electronic watches and clocks and 
black and white television sets were particularly popular lines for investment 
expansion. 7 5
In the generally more capital-intensive electronic components sector, the 
trend towards greater forward integration gathered momentum in the period 1976-
1978. This was reflected not just in the extension of semiconductor testing 
facilities, with Siemens, for example, following the lead of other international 
companies, 76 but in the introduction of a range · of new products and processes.
The trend towards the transfer of the least sophisticated, most labour-intensive 
processes out of Singapore also gathered pace, with those highly labour-intensive 
processes which were retained increasingly subject to automation and 
mechanisation. 
New investments raising value-added introduced by semiconductor firms in 
the period included the tin plating of integrated circuits by Siemens, and tin, gold 
and silver plating by SGS-Ates and the manufacture of metal oxide components by 
Texas Instruments. 77 Fairchild also announced that it would be introducing the
more complex integrated circuit, the 64-kilobit MOS random access memory 
(RAM), once its plants had been appropriately upgraded.78 Though this product
had been superseded as the most advanced of circuits, the technology was 
completely new to Singapore. The pattern of investment by international 
semiconductor firms in Singapore was becoming clearer. Production in the parent 
company home plants would be concentrated on the most recent technological 
developments while, where possible, other technology was employed in subsidiary 
plants at lower cost sites. In this division of labour, however, Singapore attracted 
much more sophisticated and more recent technology than many other such sites. 
Other foreign investments involving forward integration included investments by 
: l 
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Mitsumi in magnetic tape heads, Murata in multi-layer ceramic capacitators and 
FEC in ferrite cores and antennae. Matsushita also committed itself to the 
raising of value-added with the automation of its semiconductor assembly 
operations in 1978. 79
Though accounting for just 2% of the total output of the electronics industry 
by 1978, the inflow of foreign investment in industrial electronics in the period 
1976-1978 suggested that this sector would grow quickly in the future. Hewlett­
Packard, which already had significant investment in the manufacture of pocket 
calculators, began the manufacture of hand-held printing calculators and data 
cartridges for computer peripherals in 1977 and followed this with an investment 
in the manufacture of oscilloscopes for testing other electronic products. 
Singapore was intended to become the only Hewlett-Packard plant producing these 
oscilloscopes which were, at the time, manufactured in West Germany and the 
us.
80 Other significant investments in this high value sector were Matsushita's
project in micromotors, I'IT's in telecommunication equipment, Elekrisk Bureau's 
in microwave links and field telephones, and smoke detectors and flash tube units 
for copying machines by Siemens. 81
In her study of the electronics industry in Singapore and Malaysia, Lim 
argued that shifts towards higher value-added production took place in response to 
the changing nature of technology, which constantly redefined what production 
was suitable for Singapore, and pressures caused by the international product 
market. Thus, the most rapid shifts took place in the dynamic semiconductor 
sector while changes to components involving more standardised products and 
lower technology were less substantial. Lim also argued that increased 
automation was generally implemented to raise productivity and the timing and 
extent of this automation had much to do with the technical requirements and 
possibilities pertaining to the technology of the particular product or process 
involved.82 The general dynamics of the industry then were seen to be largely
beyond the control of Singapore's policy-makers. However, Lim concedes that 
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such factors as wage costs help explain the transfer of labour-intensive processes 
to other countries, even though productivity considerations are also involved.83
Helpful as Lim's analysis is to the understanding of change in the industry, two 
other points must · be emphasised. First, even though technological changes 
fundamental to the industry's development necessitated adjustments to the 
international divisions of labour of firms, it still remained that Singapore's 
domestic factors of production would influence any decision about where 
technology would be located, that is, where Singapore fitted into this modified 
division of labour. Second, we should be careful not to take for granted the role 
of the state in shaping these factors of production. 
The pre-1976 tendency of international capital showing interest in Singapore 
as a base for the manufacture for export of products and components in metal 
working industries continued in the 1976-1978 period. Not only did commitments 
in non-electrical machinery, transport equipment, precision equipment and 
fabricated metal industries come on-stream, expansions of existing investments 
and the introduction of new products and processes by other investors broadened 
and upgraded the base of metal working operations in Singapore. 
Of the metal working or engineering group, non-electrical machinery 
recorded the biggest increases in foreign investment in the 1976-1978 period, $237 
million (see Table 11 in Appendix). This sum included expansions by some recently 
established companies, such as MNB, Le Blond, Wild and Koyo Seiko. 84 Much of
the investment, however, involved new companies. Examples included Walbro's 
investment in non-automotive carburettors, 85 Traub's investment in single spindle
automatic lathes and Morimoto's investment in industrial sewing machines.86
Committed projects also included Japan Steel Works' $6.5 million investment in 
plastic injection moulding machines, Nachi Fujikoshi's investment in precision 
cutting tools and hydraulic control systems and Textron Adcock-Shipley's 
investment in machine tools.87 Though the bulk of investments in this industry
were intended for parent company and worldwide market demands, the potential 
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growth in Southeast Asian demand was becoming more relevant to these 
investment decisions. 
The starts made by international companies in the automotive _and aircraft 
components industries before 1976 received a fillip in the 1976-1978 period. The 
two most significant investments in automotive components were by General 
Motors and Repco. General Motors began implementing a project to produce 
automotive electronic components and sub-assemblies for world export, a project 
which was expected to eventually involve $20 million investment.88 Repco's $16
million project involved the manufacture of universal joints and was motivated by 
the need to cut production costs not only to hold export markets but to withstand 
import competition in the company's home base in Australia. 89 The most
important new investments in the aircraft component industry were by Normalair­
Garrett and Vac-Hyd. The former diversified beyond its repair and overhaul of 
turbo engines and auxiliary power units to implement an investment castings 
project which would enable it to supply induction hardened parts to other Garrett 
plants in Europe and the US. When fully implemented, the project was expected 
to cost $15 million.90 Vac-Hyd also implemented a project for heat treatment of
aircraft engine components.91 In conjunction with Sunstrand's investment in
constant speed drives, these investments represented impressive gains in middle 
level technology for Singapore. 
Of the $53 million new investment in fabricated metal industries in the 
1976-1978 period, the oil tool industry was the main investment focus. New 
investments included: the establishment of a specialty tools and equipment project 
by Tri-State Tools, a subsidiary of the US company Baker International; a $7 
million project by Hydril to manufacture threaded pipes and tool joints; a $10 
million pipe coating and inspection plant by AMF Tubescope; and a tool joints and 
drill bits project by Hughes Tool. 92 These investments confirmed Singapore's
status as the oil drilling and servicing centre of Southeast Asia. 
358 
Given the small investment base of the precision equipment industry, the 
$70 million of foreign investment in this period had a significant impact on the 
industry. Some of the more important such investments which increased product 
range and quality were by Avimo, Sandvik and Rollei. Avimo introduced the 
assembly of laser rangefinders for worldwide export, 93 whilst Sandvik introduced
the manufacture of woodband saws.94 In 1978, Rollei also manufactured its first
fully electronic camera in Singapore and expanded its product range to include 
both reflex and pocket-size cameras. 95
Of course, there were other foreign investments in export production which 
testified to the strength of the trend towards higher value-added manufacturing. 
At the same time, there were also expansions by lower value-added, more labour­
intensive areas of production, such as apparel, and even within some of the 
industries discussed above, such as electronics. The point was, however, that by 
1978 the volume and nature of new investments indicated that the opportunity 
existed for Singapore's policy-makers to more vigorously explore means of 
accelerating the shift towards higher value-added production. 
As has been seen in earlier chapters, there has been no investment pattern 
common to capital of all national origins. The 1976-1978 period was no 
exception. In absolute terms, the largest investment increases came from US­
based capital ($486 million), followed by Netherlands ($431 million), Japan ($347 
million), and the UK ($310 million) (see Table 12 in Appendix). Once again, 
however, Japanese investment grew at a faster rate than US investment, 76.4% 
compared to 43.2%,96 in keeping with the 1971-1975 pattern. In terms of invest­
ment commitments, Japanese-based capital was also $134.8 million higher at the 
end of 1978 than at the same time in 1975, compared with the US increase of 
$101.3 million (see Table 14 in Appendix). Commitments by Japanese-based 
capital grew at more than twice the US rate in this period. 
The dominant manufacturing industries featuring in US investment continued 
to be the capital-intensive petroleum refining industry and electronics, in which 
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upgrading and diversification continued. According to US Embassy surveys, 
investment in petroleum refining and storage grew from S$40 million by five firms 
as of January 1975 to US$501.5 million by five firms at the start of 1978. 
Investment in electronics grew from $194 million by 19 surveyed firms to 
US$359.l million by 15 surveyed firms for the same period.97
Table 15: Selected Ratios of Contribution of Direct 
Foreign Investments in Singapore's Manufacturing 
Industry by Major Sources of Capital, 1978 
Ratio U.S. Japan U.K. 
Value Added 41,351 15,241 59,842 
per Worker (8$) 
Output per 196,682 47,937 161,558 
Worker CS$) 
Renumeration per 7,964 6,421 12,021 
Worker CS$) 
Capital Expenditure 7,328 4,779 3,401 
per Worker (S$) 
Direct Exports to 84.3 70.4 75.4 







Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Report on The Census of Industrial 
Production 1978, Tables 11 and 6, pp.19 and 15 in Kwan Kuen Chor and 
Lee Soo Ann, "Japanese Direct Investment in Singapore's Manufacturing 
Industry", Paper presented at ASEAN-Japan Conference, 5-6 December 
1981, Singapore, p.24. 
Owing to the heavy concentration of US-based investment in the petroleum 
refining industry, and its upgrading and diversification of investments in the 
electronics industry, the average valu�-added per worker of US investment at the 
end of 1978 was, as we see in Table 15 above, $41,351. This was nearly double the 
overall average value-added per worker in Singapore's manufacturing sector of 
$21,179 (see Table 2 in Appendix). The Singapore government placed considerable 
reliance on US investment for the suc·cess of its plans to move into higher 
technology industries and products. Thus, in April 1977, Finance Minister Hon Sui 




intensive investment promotion: aircraft manufacture and related industries, 
communications equipment, special chemicals, medical equipment and industrial 
and consumer electronics.98 Some starts had already been made by US
companies in these areas, though mostly in electronics. The Singapore 
government was looking for an acceleration in the diversification of US invest­
ment. 
The continued increase in Japanese investment was again related to the 
appreciation of the yen, rising production costs in Japan and the desire to more 
fully develop and exploit regional m�rkets.99 In the 1976-1978 period, however,
there were some interesting changes of emphasis in Japanese-based investment. 
According to JETRO surveys, a total of 43 Japanese companies were established 
in Singapore's manufacturing sector between the start of 1976 and the end of 
1978. ·This figure was made up of 25 in electrical/electronics, 10 in ferrous and 
non-ferrous metals, eight in chemicals, four in industrial machinery and three in 
transportation machinery, with another 10 in a variety of industries.100
The rapid growth in the number of electrical/electronics establishments by 
Japanese-based companies did not constitute a new phase in sophistication of 
investment. Many of the investments were actually in the manufacture of 
products which had long been produced in Singapore by American and even other 
Japanese companies. For instance, in 1978, newly-established companies were 
manufacturing car stero tape players (Nippon Rokki and Roadstar Electronics), car 
radios (Shintom Electronics), electrical components (Singapore Noble Electronics, 
Matsushita Denshi, FEC Singapore), semiconductor components (Sumida 
Electric).101 This did not preclude some higher value-added investments, such as
Chiyoda Felt's investment in industrial felts, Hitachi Electronic Devices' 
manufacture of picture tubes and NEC's flourescent indicator panels venture. 
The number of Japanese establishments in chemical and metal industries had 
been steadily rising since the early 1970s. During 1976-1978, however, there were 
some significant higher value-added investments in these areas. Koyo Seiko's $20 
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million investment in the manufacture of ball bearings came on stream, Precision 
Watchcase invested $20 million in a watch case plant, Singapore Kitamura invest­
ed in electroplating of semi-integrated circle lead frames and in chemicals there 
was the $16 million joint-venture of the Petrochemical Corporation of Singapore 
to manufacture olefins, BTX CA and other petrochemicals.102 Tsurumi's
manufacture of transport machinery and Asian Machine's manufacture of moulds 
and dies were examples of higher value-added investments in other industries. 
In spite of the overall increase in Japanese investment in the 1976-1978 
period, as well as the introduction of some higher value-added invest'ments, it was 
still concentrated in lower value-added production. This is brought out in Table 15 
where we see that the average value-added per worker of Japanese investment 
compared most unfavourably with that of Singapore's other major investors. 
Of the Netherlands investment for this period, the bulk of it was accounted 
for by the expansions and diversifications of Shell and Philips in its various 
domestic appliances, consumer electronics and precision tools and dies 
operations. UK investment, by comparison, was accounted for by a larger number 
of investors, including expansions by Beecham in pharmaceuticals, lOS Vosper
Thornycraft in patrol crafts and new investments by Reyrolle Parsons in electrical 
measuring instruments and Albright and Wilson in detergent intermediate chemic­
als.104 The rest of the new investments by EEC countries making up the $797
million increase in the period was spread out, most from West Germany, France 
and Italy. Active West German investors in this period included Siemens in flash 
tubes and semiconductors, Traub in automatic lathes and Rollei in photographic 
equipment. The most significant new French investors were Isostat in push-button 
switches and Thomson Brandt in television parts and components while SGS-Ates 
was the leading Italian investor. In keeping with the pattern which emerged in the 
early to mid 1970s, European-based companies contributed to the broadening of 
Singapore's industrial base with a number of relatively high quality projects. 
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In summary, the period 1976-1978 witnessed steady and significant 
quantitative and qualitative gains in foreign investment in Singapore. In 1978, 
these gains accelerated and the increase in investment commitments suggested a 
strong continuation of this trend in the immediate future. With unemployment 
now under control the government could afford to once again focus its investment 
promotions on higher value-added production. The opportunity to be more 
selective, however, was not just a matter of choice. As we shall see in the 
following, various pressures combined to persuade the government that more 
decisive measures had to be taken to accelerate the shift towards high value­
added production which was now firmly established, if uneven throughout the 
manufacturing sector. 
Protectionism 
Although there was a strong recovery in the export of domestic manufactures in 
the 1976-1978 period, the competitiveness of these exports aroused a defensive 
response from policy-makers in the markets in which these exports were sold. In
particular, the rapid increase in the export of low-value, labour-intensive 
manufactured goods under GSP privilege caused irritation in the EEC and US 
markets. There had been a 55% increase in total domestic exports under GSP 
concessions between 1975 and 1976, from $645 million to $1,001 million, due 
mainly to the introduction of such concessions to Singapore by the US in January 
1976. In spite of this, the EEC absorbed half of all exports under GSP from 
Singapore and remained the most important market for plywood, calculators, 
flashlights and cameras, transistor radios and electronic watches.105
As a direct result of the successful penetration of EEC markets at a time 
when the domestic manufacturers of these countries were suffering labour and 
production cost problems, giving rise to significant unemployment, pressure soon 
mounted to halt the inroads of exports from lower production cost sites. Thus, in 
August 1976 the EEC decided to impose a 14% import duty on Singapore-made 
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electronic calculators. Though this arrested the growth of such exports to some 
extent, expansion was still significant. As a result, a new quota was implemented 
in January 1977 under which Singapore-made calculators to the EEC were limited 
to a maximum of $20 million worth, exports above this being subject to the 14% 
import duty.106 Singapore-made capacitators were also to become subject to
3.5% import duties imposed by the EEC following the expiry of GSP quotas in June 
1977. This represented a severe setback since more than half of Singapore's total 
domestic exports of capacitators in 1976 went to the EEc.107
The electronics industry was not the only one to suffer the effects of 
protectionism. In the Singapore Department of Trade's 1976/77 Annual Report it 
was pointed out that protectionism had adversely affected textiles, garments, 
shoes, plywood, television receivers as well as an assortment of electronic 
products.108 Singapore was not being especially singled out for these protective
measures. Rather, developing countries in general were finding such obstacles to 
trade increasingly severe.109 That Singapore was able to expand its exports so
much in spite of this protectionism in the period was a measure of the republic's 
competitiveness. How long this could be maintained, however, was problematic 
with so many lower wage cost production sites in the developing economies of the 
region also pursuing export programmes based on labour-intensive manufactures. 
Some electronic calculator manufacturers in Singapore had demonstrated 
that it was possible not only to reduce the impact of protection but to also greatly 
enhance returns by upgrading products. Hewlett-Packard, which had suffered due 
to a substantial cut in world prices for pocket calculators and rising protection in 
1976, llO responded by diversifying into printing calculators and programmable
calculators. These were of a higher unit value than the previous line. Following 
Hewlett-Packard's lead, other smaller manufacturers moved into higher value 
calculators. As a result, even though world prices for basic calculators continued 
to slump in 1977, these companies were still able to flourish. In 1977, domestic 
calculator exports amounted to $124 million, 15.9% higher than for 1976. This 
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was achieved in spite of the fact that just 1.67 million calculators were exported 
in 1977, compared to 2.44 million in 1976.111 As government pronouncements and
policies were to soon emphasise, this was the sort of direction to be encouraged as 
a means of countering the effects of protection. 
The government's reaction to the increased protectionism of the developed 
countries was clearly outlined in the 1978 budget speech by Hon Sui Sen. The 
Minister's outlook was pessimistic, seeing an exacerbation of protectionism unless 
unemployment could be significantly arrested in the developed countries. The 
answer to this, however, was to accelerate the restructuring of the manufacturing 
sector away from the cheaper, lower-skilled, mass consumer products which 
aroused so much trade sensitivity. Textiles and the lower value electronics 
products were clear examples of the industries most susceptible for which Hon 
saw no future in Singapore. Hon identified product groups in which he believed 
Singapore enjoyed "an inherent advantage" which were also less sensitive to trade 
barriers. These included: industrial electronics and telecommunication equipment, 
precision engineering, aircraft components, medical instruments and fine 
chemicals. Subsequently, the EDB intensified its promotion of Singapore as a 
suitable site for investment in such product groups.112
Labour Shortages and Structural Pressures for New Policies 
As we have seen earlier, in spite of rising protectionism, by 1978 the 
manufacturing sector was expanding rapidly and the level of foreign investment 
entering Singapore had reached new heights. Ironically, the most serious 
constraint on further expansion by now was a shortage of labour, and not a 
shortage of foreign investment as was the case in the mid-1970s. By 1978, jobs in 
the Singapore economy were being created at an average of about 40,000 per year 
while the workforce was expanding at an average of about 30,000-32,000 per year, 
leaving a substantial shortfall of approximately 8,000-10,000 annually.113 Since
their heavy retrenchment in 1974 and 1975, foreign workers had again been drawn 
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on to fill vacancies, but the growing scarcity of readily accessible foreign labour 
and the increased cost and difficulty of obtaining it threatened to constrain future 
investment growth. 
Industries most severely affected by labour shortages in manufacturing 
included electrical/electronics, textile, garments, leather, wood and products, 
footwear and transport equipment industries.114 The problems of the garment
and electrical/electronics industries were particularly serious. The National 
Employers' Council study in the first half of 1978 indicated that there were 
shortages of between 7,500 and 10,000 workers in the garment industry.115
Estimates of the shortages in the electronics industry varied considerably, which 
may in part have been the consequence of the rapid and unexpected build-up in 
orders during 1978. The Singapore Industrial Labour Organisation was reported in 
July as having estimated that there were shortages of 3,000 female workers.116
One estimate was as high as 14,000.117 The shortages in electronics were in
operation and other line workers.118
Of special concern for the government was the suggestion by various 
electronic companies that planned expansions and upgradings may have to be 
abandoned or postponed in view of labour shortages.119 Since many of the
companies being affected by shortages were actually embarking on the assembly 
of higher value-added products, or at least moving in that direction, these 
bottlenecks posed a threat to restructuring. 
A symptom of the labour shortages which soon aroused employer and 
government concern was the practice of 'job hopping'. In the electronics industry 
this prompted employers, wherever possible, to employ more workers than was 
actually required. This labour hoarding was intended to minimise production 
bottlenecks caused by sudden staff losses or quick increases in orders.120 The
labour turnover rate for the electronics industry was especially high and 
employers called for the introduction of a work card system which listed the job 
record of the holder as a way of identifying, so as to avoid the most mobile 
workers.121 The government, however, rejected the proposal.
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Of course, another problem which was only exacerbated by the greater scope 
for job mobility was the growing preference of Singaporeans to avoid hard or 
'dirty' manual labour. This manifested in shortages in the shipyards and the 
construction sectors of the economy. The government's 'Use Your Hands' 
campaign of June 1976 had enjoyed at best limited success in re-educating 
domestic workers about the attractiveness of work in these areas.122
In the endeavour to attract and maintain labour, firms began introducing a 
variety of inducements. Some firms increased wages, additionally offering such 
benefits as beauty courses, secretarial courses, subsidised lunches, transport and 
shift allowances, or even cash allowances upon the completion of probation or in 
recognition of good attendance.123 Foreign workers were also sometimes
provided with accommodation.124 After months of unsuccessfully searching for
new workers through advertising and recruitment trips to Malaysia, Luxor 
Singapore, a subsidiary of the Swedish-based manufacturer of colour televisions, 
offered new colour television sets to each of its production workers serving the 
firm for at least three months. The workers were able to keep the sets so long as 
they were working for the company.125 Although this measure met with success,
it exemplified the competition between employers for scarce labour and the 
difficulty of maintaining a stable workforce. 
The government's response to the labour shortages was to liberalise the 
conditions of entry for foreign workers. Much difficulty in obtaining foreign 
labour, however, had resulted from the drying up of the supply from Malaysia 
where the domestic labour force had expanded considerably because of 
industrialisation.126 Thus, in early 1978, the Singapore government gave some
local textile and electronic companies permission to recruit workers from 
Thailand.127 Subsequently, in June and July, the government introduced a new
work permit system for the importation of foreign labour: a daily work permit 
which enabled employers to transport workers from Johore Bahru; and a block 
permit which allowed for the employment of any number of workers from ASEAN 
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countries, Sri Lanka and India for an indefinite period.128 This liberalisation of
entry, which was quickly exploited by garment companies in particular, 129 was
essentially a short-term response to the problem. 
For a variety of reasons, any long term escalation of the number of foreign 
workers in Singapore was unacceptable to the government. By 1978, foreign work 
permit holders amounted to 40,000 according to the government, although 
economists generally identified 80,000 as a more realistic estimate of total 
foreign workers. The Selangor Graduates Society, however, claimed there were as 
many as 120,000 Malaysians alone in Singapore.1130 Apart from the sheer strain
on health and housing facilities resulting from an ever-increasing intake of foreign 
workers, the government was also reluctant to take in too much labour from 
beyond Malaysia. For one thing, PAP leaders, Lee in particular tended to regard 
certain non-Chinese races as lazy by comparison with Singapore's 75% Chinese 
population.131 PAP leaders did not wish to develop a reliance upon people with
bad work habits and officials made no secret of their preference for Chinese 
rather than non-Chinese foreign workers.132 For another thing, the government
also wished to avoid social and political problems of the sort experienced by 
European countries which had resorted to imported labour. It was sensitive to the 
possibility of pressure for greater cultural recognition of minority groups and the 
fact that these workers were products of different social systems, with different 
attitudes to and relationships with government. Assimilation was, then, equated 
with Chinese culture, which was not only understood by the PAP to be supportive 
of diligence but also characterised by deference to authority. Reliance on labour 
from non-traditional sources (NTS), that is, beyond Malaysia, was, therefore, not 
an acceptable long term solution to the labour problem for the PAP. 
The heavy recruitment of foreign labour since the late 1960s was not only 
intended to fill job vacancies and facilitate economic growth in Singapore, but 
also to hold down wage levels, especially in the more labour-intensive, lower 
value-added industries. The availability of foreign workers to accept the 'dirtier' 
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and monotonous assembly work, with the associated low wages, was partially 
successful in taking the pressure off employers to introduce wages sufficient to 
attract domestic labour (see Table 19 in Appendix). 
It was the occupational and industrial concentration of foreign workers 
rather than their sheer numbers which afforded them an influence over wages and 
labour employment patterns. Officially, Malaysian guest workers comprised only 
4. 7% of the workforce in 1977, although the actual figure was probably somewhere
between 8% and 9%. However, seeing as 55% of these workers were employed in 
the production sector, the effect was quite significant.133 Thus, Malaysian guest 
workers accounted for 24% of all workers in wood preparation, 17% of spinners 
and weavers, 14% of shoemakers and other leather workers, 13% of tailoring and 
dressmaking workers, and 11 % of chemical processing workers.134
Significantly, the sorts of occupations filled by Malaysian guest labourers 
were not only concentrated in production work, they were also occupations 
traditionally dominated by females. It was, indeed, the heavy concentration of 
female Malaysian workers in the lower value-added industries such as textiles and 
leather, and wood and wood products which enabled manufacturers to remain 
internationally competitive. In his examination of the Ministry of Finance's 1977 
Labour Force survey, Drysdale pointed out that the median gross monthly incomes 
of males and females in the production sector were $325 and $168 
respectively.135 Importantly, Drysdale's examination of the correlations between
educational qualifications, age and sex suggested that the explanation of the wage 
discrepancies could not be accounted for by educational qualifications. Central to 
the discrepancy, however, was the importation of foreign, largely female 
labour.136
The role of foreign labour in the Singapore economy in general, and 
manufacturing sector in particular, began to pose important questions by the end 
of 1977. Although, as we have seen, considerable ground had been made in 
initiating a shift towards emphasis on middle technology in production, the overall 
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productivity of the manufacturing sector was not rising anywhere near as fast as 
might be expected. Value-added per worker for the period 1971-1974 increased by 
76.3% but for the 1975-1978 period by only 19.1 % (see Table 2 in Appendix). 
Significantly, the gains by the low value-added, labour-intensive industries were 
generally modest. On the one hand there were the furniture and fixtures, rubber 
products and electronics industries which all recorded below average rises, then, 
on the other, there were the wearing apparel and textiles industries whose above­
average rises in productivity were still quite modest when their low value base 
was taken into account (see Table 7 in Appendix). A closer study of the pattern of 
productivity growth in the 1975-1978 period also reveals considerable variation 
and volatility within particular industries. If it is possible to extract any theme 
from the figures, however, it is that the more consistent and substantial gains 
prevailed in higher value-added industries and product groups.137
The explanation for the slowdown in productivity growth after 1975 has 
much to do with the availability of cheap, especially foreign, labour. Pang argues 
that the main sources of economic growth from the mid-1960s to 1974 were 
productivity gains and capital accumulation. Since 1975, however, labour force 
expansion as a contributor to economic growth had been rising. Pang concludes 
that, whilst labour hoarding may account for part of the increased ratio of 
workers to capital, 138 the policy of small wage increases between 1975 and 1978
probably acted to discourage labour displacement.139 We may add the point that
foreign labour provided a special discouragement to such displacement.· The 
particular problem for the Singapore economy, however, was that some of the 
industries which were most heavily reliant. upon increased labour absorption for 
expansion were precisely those industries which the government no longer saw as 
central, such as wearing apparel and textiles, for instance. In the context of the 
government's plans for restructuring, it was untenable that certain sections of the 
electronics industry were considering shelving plans for lack of labour while other 
much lower value-added projects were accounting for much of the limited labour 
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available. It was also becoming increasingly clear that even these lower value­
added projects would face growing difficulty in finding sufficient labour and, as 
we have seen, this could only be provided by looking afar for more guest labour. 
Thus, with the Singapore economy experiencing a tightening labour market, 
the government was confronted with the question of whether it was time to take a 
more committed stance in favour of higher value-added production. In the past, it 
had operated on the assumption that lower and higher value-added production 
could develop side by side. Now, however, the limited labour supply suggested 
that one's expansion might negate the other's. Such a contradiction could only be 
resolved by rationalising Singapore's labour supply. Apart from the government's 
desire to see higher value-added production predominate, it was also keen to avert 
the excessive and growing dependence upon foreign, especially N'IS labour for 
economic expansion. The considerations then of what policies might be 
appropriate to resolve the emerging contradiction were political as well as 
economic. The strong recovery in 1978 in economic growth and foreign 
investment, which showed a confidence by international capital in Singapore as an 
export base for middle technology production, provided an opportune climate for 
the adoption of more aggressive policies designed to rationalise labour in 
Singapore and address these economic and political considerations. There was 
never any contemplation of accepting a slower rate of economic growth as a 
means of avoiding a growing dependence upon foreign labour. Apart from the 
PAP's ideological commitment to rapid economic growth, the PAP's rationale for 
its political supremacy had long been founded on its ability to generate maximum 
economic growth. 
In addition to the pressures to rationalise labour, Singapore's policy-makers 
were aware of the growing list of lower wage regional competitors in the export 
of low-skill, labour-intensive manufactures. The ASEAN countries, Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka had all, to differing extents, made commitments to such 
programmes. The likely emergence of China as an exporter of light industrial 
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manufactures also loomed as a longer term threat to Singapore's international 
competitiveness in this area. Another realisation the government had made was 
that, owing to its relatively high per capita income, sooner or later Singapore 
would successfully be stripped of its 'developing country' status by the World Bank 
and thereby lose its GSP trade advantages in a host of labour-intensive 
products.14° Furthermore, the appreciation of the Singapore dollar was likely to
continue to reduce the competitiveness of Singapore's most labour-intensive, low 
value exports. 
As Singapore entered 1979, then, the government had cause to seriously re­
examine its strategy for the manufacturing sector. The response to the new 
circumstances was, as we shall see next chapter, decisive and comprehensive. 
Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter that the government adopted a range of measures to 
enhance economic revival after the downturn caused by the world recession in 
1974/75. Chief among these was wage control as the government centred its 
attention on the task of attracting whatever investment by international capital it 
could. At the same time, other more specific measures were introduced to entice 
further higher value-added investments. These measures were successful enough 
so that not only was the feared escalation of unemployment averted, but labour 
shortages became a serious problem by 1978. At this point, the very basis of 
Singapore's successful industrialisation since the late 1960s, cheap labour, was 
actually beginning to pose a threat to the planned shift towards a more 
technologically sophisticated, higher value-added manufacturing sector. So long 
as labour costs were so low as to negate any advantage from increasing the 
organic composition of capital, an accelerated restructuring of the sector was 
unlikely. Furthermore, for the socio-economic reasons identified above, the 
government had a definite preference for moving away from an economy which 
depended upon labour force expansion for its growth. In short, the government 
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had cause to re-examine Singapore's position in the international division of 
labour. 
If there were doubts in 1975 about the capacity of Singapore's leaders to 
resurrect Singapore's economy to its pre-recessionary dynamism, there were also 
related questions about how Singapore's workers would respond to the belt 
tightening which underpinned the government's strategy for recovery. As we have 
seen, however, the government's domestic political supremacy was not to be 
shaken as a result of imposing new sacrifices on workers. Past successes by the 
PAP in significantly improving the material conditions of the masses had 
apparently given the government's measures a degree of legitimacy. Equally, the 
PAP's position was not adversely affected by the international pressure which 
surfaced over the question of human rights in Singapore. The sorts of practices 
which came under attack as repression had long been rationalised by the 
government as necessary to create a favourable climate for international 
investment. Again, the electorate appeared to accept this reasoning and 
investment patterns during this period in no way contradicted the argument. 
Nevertheless, the likely expansion of the Singapore middle class as the economy 
progressed had the potential of bringing the question of the P AP's 
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PART IV : THE < SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM 
With an especially favourable upturn in international investment in Singapore in 
1978, Singapore's policy-makers acted with resolution in 1979 to resolve the 
contradiction between labour-intensive and capital-intensive production and 
address the rapid intake of foreign labour. In what amounts to the most 
imaginative and aggressive strategy by any developing country to exploit the 
structure of the new international division of labour, the PAP government 
embarked on the so-called 'Second Industrial Revolution'. The purpose of the 
strategy was to accelerate Singapore's transition to a more sophisticated tech­
nological base, thereby taking it out of competition with lower wage countries and 
lessening its reliance on labour expansion for economic growth. 
The most significant feature of the new strategy was the radical turnaround 
in wage policy. State intervention was employed to raise wage costs to discourage 
low-skill, labour-intensive investments. This was the first time the state had 
exercised its control in this area to pressure employers to move in a preferred 
direction. Other measures to discourage low value-added production included 
tariff revisions and restrictions on imported labour. Simultaneously, a range of 
initiatives were adopted to induce a substantial shift in investment towards more 
capital-intensive, higher value-added production. Extremely generous tax and 
fiscal incentives were provided for appropriate new investments, dramatic 
expansions and improvements were made to social and physical infrastructure, and 
the government employed direct capital investments with considerable 
imagination to stimulate and/or initiate favoured forms of production. 
In conjunction with the various forms of economic intervention by the state 
to usher in a greater degree of industrial sophistication, the PAP also introduced 
important refinements in social and political control, particularly over labour. 
The dismembering of the omnibus union structure was paramount to these 
refinements. Apart from weakening the power base of organised labour and 
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thereby minimising the capacity for any spontaneous resistence to the disruption 
of industrial restructuring, the new industry-based structure was designed to 
facilitate more effective social management of labour in the necessary training 
and retraining of the workforce. At the same time, the PAP's new strategy placed 
significant demands on capital, notably through the wages policy. Here, however, 
the ability to impose such conditions derived from the PAP's relative autonomy 
from capital which had been consolidated over the years. The private sector had 
become increasingly structurally dependent upon the paternalistic PAP state to 
provide the preconditions for accumulation. 
Whilst state intervention has been thematic to Singapore's industrialisation, 
following 1979 this entered a qualitatively new phase. The degree and nature of 
intervention represented a conscious attempt by the PAP to test the limits to the 
influence state policy can exert in determining Singapore's upward mobility in the 
new international division of labour. 
Though Singapore's initial experience under the strategy has involved some 
success in luring higher value-added investments, the 'Second Industrial 
Revolution' has also precipitated the emergence of a number of domestic political 
contradictions as well as contradictions of a more economic nature pertaining to 
the new international division of labour. These have been heightened, but not 
initiated, by the deepening of the global recession in 1985, thereby raising serious 
questions about the long term viability of the new strategy and already prompting 
some significant policy changes by the government. The most recent pattern of 
international capital investment in Singapore also raises questions about how far 
Singapore can go up the technological hierarchy associated with the new 
international division of labour. For the first time, then, we may be witnessing 
Singapore beginning to reach the objective limits of rapid and increasingly 
sophisticated industrialisation through the new international division of labour. 
Should such objective limits be starting to assert themselves, the economic and 
political implications for Singapore would be serious and throw open a number of 
fundamental questions about the EOI model. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE NEW ECONOMIC STRATEGY: SlNGAPORE� 'SECOND 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION' 
Introduction 
As we have seen in the last chapter, towards the end of the 1970s the PAP 
government had cause to re-examine the economic plan for Singapore and the 
means by which this could be achieved. The commitment to the promotion of a 
more technologically sophisticated manufacturing sector was not in doubt, but 
some thought had to be given to what particular areas of industry Singapore would 
be best to pursue and, more importantly, how a shift in such a direction might be 
most speedily promoted. What materialised was a comprehensive plan for 
development which not only comprised broad objectives but a bold new strategy 
through which the government hoped to significantly influence the allocation of 
resources. As had always been the case with the PAP's intervention in the 
economy, however, this strategy was primarily intended to create the conditions 
conducive for international capital to take the lead in the proposed economic 
restructuring. Indeed, this new strategy, the so-called 'Second Industrial Revolut­
ion', amounted to a re-affirmation of the government's faith in the 1960s decision 
in favour of EOI under the aegis of international capital. The task now, however, 
was to ensure that the restructuring of industry already initiated by international 
capital was greatly accelerated, thereby elevating Singapore's status in the new 
international division of labour. 
Although the government's proposed 'Second Industrial Revolution' entailed 
a comprehensive plan, the full statement of intent and strategy did not unfold 
neatly. A radical turnaround in wage policy signalled the birth of the new 
strategy. Subsequently, various other policies were introduced which the 
government explained as part of a consistent and concerted attempt to promote 
restructuring. These included a revision of tariffs, a re-assessment of the role of 
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guest labour, the introduction of new concessions and incentives to capital, 
expansions to physical and social infrastructure and even measures to foster 
certain pref erred areas of industry through direct government investment where 
necessary. Whilst state intervention per se in the economy was nothing new to 
Singapore, this new strategy certainly marked a new phase in the state's pervasive 
influence. In short, the assumption of the PAP was that if state intervention was 
fundamental to the success of Singapore's low value-added, labour-intensive phase 
in export oriented industrialisation, it would be even more so to the higher value­
added phase. Particularly in the initial stages of this phase, the state was 
expected to play an important role in helping to define Singapore's comparative 
advantage. In any case, the restructuring sought was all too vital to Singapore's 
political economy to be left to chance. Ironically then, though the PAP's policy­
makers extolled the virtues of market forces in shaping economies, and even 
portrayed their new strategy as a reflection of their commitment to this 
philosophy, in fact they deliberately set out to raise production costs in some 
industries and lower them in others. 
Before proceeding to outline the policies introduced by the PAP since 1979 
to foster restructuring, a brief comment on the capacity of the PAP to adopt such 
policies is appropriate. Earlier in this thesis some effort was devoted to 
emphasising that the historical circumstances out of which the PAP arose 
afforded the Party a degree of separation from the various class interests in 
Singapore society which was quite unusual for a political party. In particular, the 
PAP did not rely upon the bourgeoisie for electoral survival nor was its Party 
machine dominated by any business elite. On the contrary, the dominant 
characteristic of the P AP's leaders was their technical or professional 
backgrounds, a characteristic which reflected in the P AP's conception of 
government as primarily an administrative rather than political process. At the 
same time, the PAP's historic roots were in the labour movement but here, again, 
the Party was never subordinate to the movement. Rather, as has been 
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demonstrated throughout, the PAP leadership has been able to control the labour 
movement and harness it for its economic and political objectives. 
The peculiar separation of the PAP from the control of either labour or 
capital had been reinforced over the years by two processes. First, the Party 
exploited state power to perpetuate and consolidate a paternalistic state. 
Through this the PAP was able to largely define the survival of labour and capital 
in such a way that both were dependent upon the state asserting its relative 
autonomy. Second, the fact that the PAP had presided over prosperous times for 
both capital and labour went a long way towards legitimising the relative 
autonomy of the PAP state and the technocratic rationality which supported it. 
Thus, come 1979, the PAP was in a position to adopt measures which invariably 
meant some sacrifices from both capital and labour. It did this with the 
confidence not only that such measures could be successfully implemented, but 
that there would be at worst only limited immediate negative political 
consequences as a result. 
c Corrective' Wage Policy 
Although the government's economic advisor, Dr Albert Winsemius, had alerted 
the government in the early 1970s to the counter-productive effects of pursuing a 
low wage policy after full employment,1 the government had al�ays been reticent
about allowing wage levels to rise for fear of jeopardising investment. The sudden 
fall-off in capital investment and consequent rise in unemployment due to the 
1974/75 recession only reinforced this cautious approach. As a result, the 
government was slow to relax its clamp on wages in the period of economic 
recovery after the recession. As we have seen, however, by 1979 the Singapore 
government had come to the conclusion that there were economic and political 
costs in trying to sustain high economic growth rates through labour force 
expansion. It was in such circumstances that it looked to its wage policy to 
generate labour rationalisation. The government thus adopted what was referred 
- -----�---� ------�- --- - - - --;-------------,-�--�---� 
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to as the 'corrective' wage policy, so named because it was assumed that the 
holding down of wages in previous years had distorted the genuine market value of 
Singapore's scarce labour. This had artificially propped-up production in which 
Singapore no longer enjoyed any comparative advantage. 
The corrective wage policy formed a crucial component of the new strategy 
for Singapore's economic development. In particular, it was intended to facilitate 
the upgrading or phasing out of low value, labour-intensive production. In the 
following account of this policy we will look closely at both the nature of the 
wage increases involved and the reasoning underlying such increases. Some 
cursory observations will be made about the effect of the policy in promoting the 
desired changes, but greater attention is afforded this in Chapter 11. The focus 
here is primarily on explaining why and how the government so radically altered 
its wage policy. 
The first indication of a serious revision of the wage policy came from the 
then Minister for Trade and Industry, Goh Chok Tong, addressing a gathering at 
the Japan Steel Works on 8 June 1979. Goh talked about the need for a "shake 
out" of inefficient users of labour by raising wages to such a level as to induce 
replacement of labour with productivity-raising machinery. This was intended to 
prevent a potential bottleneck. 
We should formulate such a wage policy, supported by a national 
productivity improvement scheme to ensure the availability of 
trained manpower for higher valued, higher skilled and better paying 
industries. 2
Labour is in high demand today and it is not enough to support 
existing and higher skilled investment which Singapore would like to 
attract.3
It was explained by Goh that Singapore's dependence on foreign labour simply 
perpetuated a vicious cycle: 
It (foreign labour) helps to sustain low-skilled, low productivity and 
labour intensive industries. These industries in turn can afford to 
pay only low wages which in turn, cause them to depend on more 
imported labour to keep their wage cost down. 4
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Goh of course was not just stating personal views but giving notice of policy. Soon 
a chorus of support for this line was taken up. This included a call by the NTUC 
President, C.V. Devan Nair, for such a policy to usher forward a 'Second 
Industrial Revolution'.5 In due course then, the 1979 NWC recommended
considerable increases. These included a basic monthly pay increase of $32 for all 
workers plus an additional 7% of the existing worker's wage.6 It also
recommended that employers pay an increased 4% per worker in the compulsory 
national superannuation scheme, the Central Provident Fund (CPF) and proposed 
the establishment of a special fund, the Skills Development Fund (SDF), to aid 
upgrading. The SDF was to be financed by imposing a levy of 2% or $5 for each 
employee receiving $750 or less per month. These recommendations were 
accepted in full by the government. 
The dramatic increases affected employers to varying, but in all cases 
substantial, degrees. Owing to the sizeable base increase of $32, employers 
offering the lowest wages were required to increase wages by the greatest 
percentage. Based on the average monthly wage rate at the time of $600, 
employers' total wage costs would rise by 21 %. 7 There were industries though,
such as textiles, garments and electronic assembly, in which workers were 
receiving between $250 and $350 per month. Here pay rises alone could amount to 
20 % . 8 It should be kept in mind that after allowing for the costs incurred to
employers, such as increased CPF contributions and the SDF levy, as well as the 
increased cost of living, the actual wage increases to workers were less 
dramatic. For the average worker, the real increase would be around 11 %. Real 
increases were substantial, but, as was indicated by the make-up of the 
recommended increases, the emphasis was on increased employer costs. 
The government felt no need to be apologetic to employers about the size of 
the NWC recommended wage increases. It reasoned that in a fast-changing and 
competitive international economy, either Singapore changed along with it or fell 
further behind. Not only was this message expressed in the NWC guidelines 
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submission, it was reiterated by C.V. Devan Nair who warned that failure to take 
drastic action now would make Singaporeans "dead ducks" by the end of the 
eighties. 9 He argued that the steep increases were guided by "hard-headed,
simple, economic logic" which necessitated that Singapore either improve its 
position in the international division of labour or be swamped: "And where are 
we? In the overcrowded, overcompetitive third league. So what do we do, but to 
move up into the second league".10 The dramatic wage increases, then,
represented the government's unequivocal commitment to the difficult and risky 
task of moving up the ladder into the 'second league'.11 For those that found the
demands of this sudden transition too difficult, they could simply relocate or move 
into a more appropriate line of production.12
The initial response from employers to the 1979 NWC recommendations was 
shock, for although they knew increases were on the way the actual magnitude 
took them by surprise. Most vocal complaints came from representatives of 
domestically-based capital who saw their position as precarious in view of their 
relative lack of resources and funds to upgrade, automate or mechanise, and the 
unsympathetic treatment received to date from financiers and government.13
Shock aside, employers were unclear how these wage increases would necessarily 
give rise to capital investment without a host of support policies. The government 
had, however, anticipated this criticism and Goh Chok Tong soon unveiled plans 
which included: a revision of tax rules on plant depreciation; setting up long-
term financing for local industry; upgrading available computer services; 
establishing a venture capital fund, with provision for the government to take the 
lead in establishing joint-ventures in higher value-added industries.14
Some employers also argued that the government could achieve the desired 
effect by simply prohibiting the increased inflow of foreign workers by "turning 
off the tap" .15 This suggestion was disregarded for the time being on the grounds
that it was too gradualist an approach. The government was-not prepared to wait 
for labour inaccessibility to translate into wage increases and then, in turn, into 
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increased automation and mechanisation. Instead, Goh served notice of further 
substantial wage bill rises for the next couple of years.16
Consistent with this forecast, the 1980 NWC guidelines called for further 
steep increases, although the complexion of these guidelines suggested 
acknowledgement of some protests and criticisms from employers. In particular, 
the point was accepted that there was a lack of incentive under the previous 
guidelines for workers themselves to partake in upgrading. As a result, it was 
recommended in the 1980 guidelines by the NWC that a $33 plus 7.5% increase per 
month be granted for 'ave�age' performers. A 2% increase in the employer's SDF 
contribution was also recommended. The NWC estimated that the average total 
wage bill for employers would be 19% under these guidelines.17 This would mean
average real wage increases for employees of 8.5% (not counting CPF 
contributions). 
In declaring its acceptance in full of the 1980- NWC recommendations, the 
Ministry of Labour expressed satisfaction with the progress of the restructuring 
strategy. It reported that the intake of foreign labour had fallen from 23,000 in 
1978 to 16,000 in 1979. Investment patterns were also seen as showing a "definite 
shift" towards industries of skill and capital intensity. The introduction of the 
two-tier system, however, in effect recognised that productivity increases had not 
matched expectations. Overall productivity growth had fallen from 4% in 1978 to 
2.6% in 1979, although for the manufcturing sector growth had risen from 2.6% to 
5.7%.18 Employers had turned their attention to workers' attitudes in attempting
to explain this. The Minister for Labour, Ong Pang Boon, had also scolded workers 
for poor attitudes: 
The years of high growth and full employment have eroded work 
attitudes considerably, to the extent that employers have to resort 
to paying punctuality and attendance bonus incentives just to get 
workers to come to work on time and to work regularly when these 
are expected norms of work.19
Whilst the two-tier system was welcomed by employers, employees had good 
reason to be concerned about the move away from standard increases for all 
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workers doing the same job, regardless of individual performance (however 
measured). Even Secretary-General of the NTUC, Lim Chee Onn, expressed some 
reticence since he understood that the NWC had been established precisely to 
mitigate the excesses of the market: 
While we subscribe to free competition and open pricing, it may not 
be advisable for the purposes of collective bargaining to rely 
exclusively on the doctrine of a market economy.20
Not surprisingly, the phrase 'above average worker' also provided a few problems 
for employers at the level of implementation, in spite of attempts by the National 
Productivity Board (NPB) to clarify this concept.21 Employers argued too that
the recommendations failed to take into account the considerable variation 
between sectors of the economy in the scope for labor displacement and 
productivity raising.22
Despite the criticism from the private sector, especially domestically-based 
companies, the government was convinced of the capacity of employers to cope 
with the rises. It pointed to the negligible retrenchments since 1978, which it 
claimed demonstrated that labour still had not become expensive enough to invite 
capital replacement.23 A Labour Ministry survey in October 1979 also showed
that 83% of the 489,000 eligible employees had directly benefited from the 1979 
NWC recommendations (though not all had received the full amount 
recommended).24 Although confident of the ability of employers to pay the rises
though, the government did not totally disregard the general concern of employers 
and offered the reassurance in 1980 that in all likelihood there would only be one 
more year of high wage increases. After such time, it was explained, the backlog 
of wage increases suppressed between 1975 and 1978 should have been 
recouped.25 Although this statement implied that the government had made some
sort of calculation as to what constituted the difference between the wage 
increases which had occurred in the past and those which should have occurred, no 
such calculation was ever identified. Arriving at the 'market value' of wages then 
involved a degree of arbitrariness. If the government had any clear or fixed 
I ! 
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notion of what levels wage costs needed to rise to, the relative moderation of the 
1981 NWC guidelines suggested that it had either revised such a notion or 
compromised on it. 
Though again calling for large wage increases, the 1981 NW C was significant 
for both the fall-off in the magnitude of the recommended increases and the new 
element of flexibility characterising the guidelines. The recommendations, again 
accepted in full by the government, were for a flat $32 per month for all workers 
plus 6%-10% on each wage. An additional 2% of the group monthly wage bill of 
June was to be distributed among 'meritorious performers'. As Smith has pointed 
out, this new flexibility in the range of increases to be granted by employers 
represented a compromise.26 Whilst the government would have liked average
increases of about 20% again, by now the pattern of foreign investment had 
indicated that whilst international capital had identified Singapore as a suitable 
site for higher value-added production, this was not a generalised response. For 
reasons to be discussed in Chapter 11, Japanese-based capital's interest in 
Singapore had waned since the advent of the new wage policy. For some invest­
ors, increased wage costs rendered Singapore unsuitable for labour-intensive 
production without necessarily prompting any commitment to Singapore as a site 
for more sophisticated production. On the other hand, there were those firms 
which had responded to the wage policy in the manner intended by the 
government, upgrading their investments, only to be rewarded with further cost 
increases.27 The 1981 NWC, which included increased representation from
international capital,28 balanced the concern about investment fall-offs and
delays with the government's commitment to carry further the restructuring 
effort. The 1981 proposals by the NWC worked out to be increases of between 
14% and 18% in total wage costs for the average employer.29 For workers, this
meant real wage increases of between 5.8% and 9.8%. 
Although the 1981 NWC rejected the call by employers for separate 
guidelines for each sector of industry because of the negative effects this would 
! : 
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have on "the optimisation of labour utilisation in all sectors of the economy",30 by
providing for a range of increases it was now possible for sectoral-specific 
considerations to influence wage negotiations. Theoretically, this also provided 
for greater discrimination between industries, firms and, indeed, workers on the 
basis of productivity. The government emphasised that this formula symbolised 
the government's intention to promote collective bargaining as the future mode of 
negotiation: 
The range of wage increases recommended will allow for greater 
flexibility in wage negotiations. This is a move in the right direction 
as we must increasingly allow market forces a greater role in the 
determination of wage increases. The true cost of labour is best 
determined by free market forces. It is the individual company 
together with its union and workers who should determine, through 
collective bargaining, the actual wage increase. 31
The government was not so much motivated by commitment to market forces per 
se. Rather, it was convinced that a strengthening of collective bargaining would 
make the dependent relationship between wage levels and productivity more 
visible. It was an important ideological exercise. 
The 1981 NWC was in no doubt about the success of the corrective wage 
policy. It pointed to the more efficient use of labour and the increased 
significance of capital-intensive investment: a 71 % rise in fixed investment per 
worker (excluding petroleum projects) for new investment commitments and a 
28% increase in value-added per worker. The NWC also pointed to the reported 
drop of 37% in the number of new jobs created in the first quarter of 1981. 32 This
was supposedly an indication that jobs were being replaced by capital investment, 
but given the very brief period the NWC was referring to, its assertion was 
perhaps a little bold. A significant omission from the Council's analysis of wage 
policy was an examination of its effects on foreign labour. As we shall see later 
in Chapter 11, problems were being experienced in trying to reduce dependence 
upon foreign labour. 
After three years of the corrective wage policy, the total recommended 
wage bill increases for employers amounted to between 54% and 58% on average. 
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Of this, employers were required to pay 4% to CPF and 4% to SDF. Another 4% 
of the total wage bill increase was paid by employees in increased contributions to 
CPF. Thus, the recommendations meant an increase of between 42% and 46%, on 
average, in the actual wages received by employees. Two obvious considerations, 
however, were just how many employers adhered to the recommendations and 
what effect did cost of living increases have on those rises which did occur. 
Survey data cited by Chew and Chew indicate that the degree of implementation 
of the NWC's recommendations was quite high for the period of the corrective 
wage policy in the manufacturing sector, ranging between 80% and 90% (see Table 
20 in Appendix). Data from the Ministry of Labour support these survey findings, 
since the average hourly earnings for the manufacturing sector rose from $2.12 in 
May 1978 to $3.05 in May 1981, an increase of 43.9%. For the same period the 
increase for the total economy was $0.92 or 41.3%.33 Against this, however,
there was a 20.7% increase in the CPI for the three years of the corrective wage 
policy (see Table 19 in Appendix). Evidence suggests therefore that there were 
generally significant real increases in wages for employees. There were, however, 
even bigger wage bill increases for employers. Furthermore, the flat monthly 
increases of $32, $33 and $32 for the respective years was likely to have 
compressed wages slightly and ensured that the hardest hit employers, in relative 
terms, were those most reliant on the cheapest labour. 
Since 1981 we have seen a return to the policy of wage moderation, the 
government believing it has gone as far as it can with the high wage strategy. In 
1982 the NWC recommended a fixed increase of $18.50 plus 2.5%-6.5% per month, 
followed by calls in 1983 for $10.00 plus 2.0%-6.0% and then $27 .00 plus 4%-8% 
(with increases of 2% by both employers and employees in CPF contributions) in 
1984.34
Interestingly, in the wake of the corrective wage policy the government has 
attempted to withdraw somewhat from the dominant role it has played in wage 
determination. In October 1982, the Minister for Labour, Ong Teng Cheong, 
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called on companies to negotiate their wage rises without awaiting the NWC 
negotiations. However, discussions generally only began after the government 
approved the NWC guidelines in 1983.35 This initial reluctance on the part of
employers and unions to take the initiative is of course completely under-
standable. The NWC was established precisely to condition the terms of 
collective bargaining and has always closely mirrored government policy. Both 
employers and unions have come to learn that disregarding government policy 
carries certain perils. Not surprisingly, then, both have become dependent upon 
the NWC guidelines for direction. Therefore, it will not be easy for the state's 
role to diminish over-night. In order to assume a lower profile in wage 
determination, since 1983 the government has attempted to assume the role of 
another employer rather than the representative of the state.36 How successful
the government will be in its endeavours is naturally yet to be determined. What 
we can say, however, is that the dominance of the PAP over organised labour 
suggests that state influence over wage determination will continue to be 
fundamental, even if less direct. Also, the attempted shift away from such direct 
state control is principally an ideological or political exercise rather than an 
economic one. The government is keen that the wage/productivity nexus is 
internalised by workers and considers it is much more likely to occur through 
collective bargaining. The PAP seems convinced that appreciation of this nexus is 
especially important to the 'Second Industrial Revolution'. 
Regardless of the future form of wage determination, we have seen above 
that the government significantly intervened in the economy through its 
corrective wage policy to promote higher value-added production. This policy was 
grounded on the assumption that wage levels did not adequately reflect the 
genuine scarcity of labour in Singapore. Instead, before this policy artificially low 
wages had acted as a disincentive to raise productivity and keep low value, labour­
intensive production competitive. Ironically, the government decided that wage 
levels which more accurately reflected market value could best be arrived at by 
more and not less intervention in wage determination. 
395 
The Broader Plan 
Subsequent to the 1979 introduction of the corrective wage policy, the 
government adopted other measures intended to significantly alter conditions 
affecting investment. One of the first such measures was the declaration in 
August 1979 that preferential tariff treatment enjoyed by local vehicle assemblers 
would be abolished. The decision stemmed from consideration of the industry's 
failure to develop a linkage between assemblers and component manufacturers, 
and the declining competitiveness of the industry.37 Importantly though, the
government regarded this low skill, labour-intensive industry as an inefficient user 
of labour. Withdrawal of protection led to the closure of all foreign companies 
assembling cars in Singapore and also caused the closure of the country's sole tyre 
manufacturer, Bridgestone.38 Though the labour released was not expected to
contribute much to solving labour shortages, folding up those industries symbolised 
the new direction of government policy and the belief that certain production had 
simply outlived its usefulness in Singapore. As an unsympathetic EDB official 
remarked about the closures: 
We have warned these industries for years that we would not allow 
our consumers to prop them up indefinitely. We have told them to 
reduce prices to be competitive with other countries but when they 
could not do this, that was it. They have recovered their investment 
and made their money and now it is time to call it a day.39
The future of the automotive industry in Singapore was to lie in the manufacture 
of higher value-added components geared towards world markets, such as those by 
Repco in universal joints and General Motors in automotive electronics which have 
been discussed in the last chapter. Indeed, the government viewed the emerging 
concept of the 'world car', whereby the manufacture of any given automobile was 
carried out through detailed international sourcing rather than complete or near­
complete manufacture in one or two countries, as a positive development for 
Singapore. It subsequently set about trying to entice such investments with tax 
incentives. 
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In the 1980 Budget, Goh Chok Tong, the Minister for Trade and Industry, 
announced a more general reduction of protective duties, with the exception of 
those pertaining to the ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA). Duties on 
such imported products as sugar, biscuits, plastic raincoats, rubber tyres, 
underwear, air conditioners and a variety of other goods were either abolished or 
substantially reduced. Protecting such industries was, in the government's view, 
an anachronism, belonging to a stage in Singapore's past industrialisation.40
It was, however, in the 1981 Budget that the broader plan into which the 
wage policy and tariff measures fitted was given its most coherent expression. 
Singapore, Goh stated, was to be "developed into a modern industrial economy 
based on science, technology, skills and knowledge".41
The anticipated pace of the restructuring under the government's 10-Year 
Plan, alluded to in the budget speech, was indicated by the target of real annual 
growth in GDP of between 8% and 10% for the decade. Such a rate would give 
Singapore a per capita income of S$15,000 (at 1979 prices) by 1990, equivalent to 
the 1979 Japanese per capita GNP. According to the target, productivity rates 
are also to rise between 6% and 8% per annum. In the process, the manufacturing 
sector is expected to increase its share of GDP from 22% to 31 % by 1990 and its 
share of total exports to 60%. Value-added is also expected to rise between 11 % 
and 13% annually for the sector.42
To achieve the desired expansion in the manufacturing sector, some shifts in 
emphasis were considered necessary. Apart from the need to place more emphasis 
on parts and component manufacture (such as aircraft and automotive components 
and precision equipment), the government emphasised Singapore's strategic 
location as a basis for further higher value-added industrial expansion. This could 
be achieved through industrial servicing and agricultural machinery or medical 
equipment, for example, or by exploiting Singapore's position at the centre of the 
waterways and air-routes in the region. This shift in emphasis was one which, 
according to the government, could only be enacted under the aegis of 
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international capital, although it was envisaged that locally-based manufacturers 
could play a crucial role in providing support industries. This point Trade and 
Industry Minister Tony Tan later emphasised: 
Ultimately it is their [support industries'] competence in supplying 
parts and components which will determine the competitiveness, in 
terms of price, quality and reliability, of the final products produced 
here.43
The list of industries earmarked for the 1980s included: automotive 
components; machine tools and machinery; medical and surgery apparatus and 
instruments; specialty chemicals and pharmaceuticals; computer, computer 
peripheral equipment and software development; electronic instrumentation; 
optical instruments and equipment; precision engineering products; advanced 
electronic components including wafer fabrication; hydraulic and pneumatic 
control systems; and key supporting industries for the above. As the list of 
targeted industries suggests, Singapore would still be seeking to produce for the 
markets of the advanced capitalist countries, but increasingly in much higher 
value-added areas. However, as a complement, Singapore would to a larger extent 
become a regional supplier of middle technology products and services. 
Al though the focus of this thesis is the manufacturing sector, the 
government's overall economic plan is much broader and includes ambitious 
objectives for the services sectors. These sectors have long been the backbone of 
the Singapore economy, still contributing 76% to Singapore's growth in GDP (at 
1968 factor cost) throughout the 1970s.44 Singapore's strategic location at the
crossroads of international air and sea transportation routes and 
telecommunications networks has provided the basis for much of this growth. 
Transportation and communication was the leading growth sector in the 1970s, 
accounting for 25% of GDP (at 1968 factor cost) and enlarging its share of total 
GDP from 12% in 1970 to 19% in 1979.45 The state has played a key role in this
growth, both through the expansion of its own national airline and shipping 
companies as well as through substantial infrastructural boosts and 
improvements. This area will continue to expand in the 1980s but, under the new 
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plan, special emphasis will be placed on Singapore's so-called brain services or 
software. In particular, the government hopes to develop Singapore into a 
'financial supermarket', a regional centre for sophisticated financial services. 
Towards this, the government has found it necessary to introduce a variety of 
taxation concessions and reforms to promote international loan syndication and 
offshore fund management activities. It has also intervened to regulate the gold 
market. At the same time, the government is committed to the development of 
necessary infrastructure such as advanced telecommunications equipment and 
general software requirements of the finance sector. 
Apart from clarifying the pace and direction of restructuring being sought, 
the government's Ten-Year Plan included clarification of the relationship between 
the corrective wage policy and the broader strategy: 
Higher wage increase is, however, only one policy instrument for 
economic restructuring. It must be supplemented by fiscal and other 
incentives to encourage the use of more capital in production. But 
only increasing the relative price of labour to capital to bring about 
restructuring is like trying to cut with one blade of the scissors. The 
other blade is the skill of our workers. Both blades must cut in 
unison. Thus training must be stepped up to enable our workers to 
acquire new skills and refine old ones.46
Towards the end of manpower development then the government set about 
boosting the volume and quality of skilled labour. Additionally, it introduced an 
array of incentives and assistance to facilitate a wider adoption of labour 
replacement production techniques. A considerable expansion and upgrading of 
the physical infrastructure necessary for the growth envisaged was also initiated. 
The overall strategy then basically boiled down to actively discouraging low skill, 
labour-intensive production on the one hand, whilst providing the necessary 
preconditions and inducements for higher value-added production on the other. 
This latter aspect of the strategy has seen the level and quality of the state's 
involvement in the economy reach new heights and expense. 
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Manpower Development 
In order to carry out the plans to significantly raise the technological level of 
production in Singapore, urgent priority had to be given to the building up of 
Singapore's supply of skilled labour. Hold-ups in some projects were already being 
experienced due to the shortage of skilled labour, particularly engineers. This 
would not be an easy task. With a declining rate of population growth, and hence 
a declining growth of school leavers likely for the eighties, there were obvious 
constraints confronting the government and the economy. To the government, 
however, the problem was by no means insurmountable. Rather, it called for 
immediate and comprehensive measures to ensure a considerable expansion of the 
existing and future skilled labour force. While these measures were taking their 
due course, shortfalls in the present skilled labour supply were being met by 
increased overseas recruitment by the EDB.47
Attempts to generate an adequate quality and quantity of skilled labour to 
support the restructuring strategy involved the government in efforts to expand 
education at all levels, but particularly at the tertiary and technical levels. 
Government development expenditure on education rose from $32.75 million in 
1978/79 to $374.68 million in 1982/83, an increase of 1,044%.48 Not only were
enrolments expanded at existing institutions in technical vocations and disciplines, 
a range of new institutions were established to meet the specific demands of this 
new phase of industrial expansion. In this latter respect, the government took the 
initiative in ensuring that manpower development was closely tailored to the 
needs of private companies engaged in, or moving towards, higher value-added 
production. It also outlayed significant sums in direct and indirect subsidisation of 
capital's restructuring costs. Toward the generation of a more skilled labour 
force, the government has paid particular attention to engineers. Total 
enrolments of students in universities and colleges rose by 49.4% and 7.5% in 
technical and vocational institutes from 1979 to 1983. For the same period, 
enrolments in engineering courses rose by 2,104 at the National University of 
Singapore and 10,232 at the Singapore Polytechnic.49
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Apart from mpidly expanding the output of engineers, the government has 
established a number of institutes of technology to teach specialised and 
sophisticated skills on a higher technological plane than provided by existing 
institutions. These have been set up with the collaboration of the German, 
Japanese and French governments. In February 1982, two new institutes began 
operations, the German-Singapore Institute of Production Technology (GSD and 
the Japan-Singapore Institute of Software Technology (JSIST). The farmer's 
purpose is to produce practice-oriented technicians combining a working 
knowledge of production technology and industrial automation with operational 
skills. The latter's function is to produce computer professionals for the software 
industry and generally support the computerisation effort in industry. In August 
1983 another institute began operations, the French-Singapore Institute of 
Electro-Technology (FSD. FSI trains technicians for the electronic and electrical 
manufacturing and servicing industries. In another development, Singapore's 
fourth JITC which was established in November 1979, the Japan-Singapore 
Training Centre, was upgraded in June 1983 to become the Japan-Singapore 
Technical Institute. It concentrates on the training of maintenance personnel 
who, it is anticipated, will be in big demand once restructuring picks up, especially 
by companies with highly automated and microprocessor-controlled machines.50
Computerisation is integral to the government's manpower· development 
programme. Amongst other initiatives, a Software Technology Centre is being 
built in the new Singapore Science Park being developed to house Research and 
Development-oriented enterprises. In February 1983 the Computervision-EDE 
CAD /CAM Training Unit (CECTU) also began operations and, 51 subsequently, the
EDB has set up another two institutes in conjunction with private companies to 
generate highly specialised technicians.52 Further, in 1981 a National Computer
Board was established, through which the government plans to spend over $170 
million on computer education for Singaporeans between 1982 and 1986. 53
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Manpower development has also been supported by the government through 
its various schemes administered by the SDF, easing costs to employers engaged in 
training the workforce and upgrading equipment. Apart from the Training Grant 
Scheme providing between 30% and 90% of training costs for skill development in 
preferred areas, the Interest Grant for Mechanisation Scheme and the 
Development Consultancy Scheme involved outlays as at March 1984 of $493.7 
million.54
One of the obstacles confronting the government in trying to generate a 
larger supply of skilled labour is the fact that many workers have inadequate 
education to facilitate easy retraining. Not only have many workers only attended 
elementary school, they have also not been taught in English. 55 Towards
addressing this problem, in July 1982 the NTUC introduced the Basic Education 
Skill Training (BEST) programme which was revamped and expanded by the 
government later that year.56
As the descriptions above detail, the state has assumed a crucial role in the 
raising of workers' skills to accelerate industrial restructuring. We have seen that 
there has been a rapid rise in the number and range of training schemes and 
institutes. Not only has this been due to the initiative and capacity of the 
government to co-ordinate such developments, but also to the clear commitment 
of the government reflected in the substantial outlays of funds. Pang argues that 
in many cases the government is simply funding training which firms would have 
undertaken anyway.57 The point, however, is that obviously the government
intends that through the stimulus of subsidisation such training will occur at an 
earlier stage than otherwise, and thus so will restructuring. It is attempting to 
ensure that those firms which have the capacity to upgrade to or invest in higher 
value-added production are not held back for lack of suitably skilled workers or 
the funds to generate such. 
! I 
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Incentives and Concessions 
As we have seen, even before 1979 the government offered investors significant 
incentives and assistance in the establishment of higher value-added production. 
These included exemption from the 40% company tax for between five and ten 
years for companies granted Pioneer Status and the provision of long term loans at 
below market and fixed rates for desired projects. After 1979, however, these 
schemes were given greater promotion and joined by a range of other measures 
intended to stimulate investment. 
Amongst the government's new measures since 1979, incentives for R & D 
have been particularly comprehensive. R & D of course is necessary if the 
technology pertinent to Singapore's priority industries is to be transferred to the 
Republic. The following incentives were thus announced in the 1980 Budget: 
double tax deductions for R & D expenditure; an investment allowance of up to 
50% of the capital investment in R & D; capitalisation and writing-off of lump 
sum payments for manufacturing licensings for a period of five years; and the 
extension of existing schemes for accelerated depreciation allowances for 
machinery, plant and building to R & D.58
The 1980 Budget also contained announcements of liberalised capital 
allowances for plant and machinery, making for speedier depreciations which 
would enable firms to invest more after tax earnings on mechanisation and 
automation. This measure was complemented in 1982 with the announcement that 
firms introducing robots or other automated equipment leading to significant 
labour saving could be depreciated over one year and granted an investment 
allowance of up to 50%. This incentive was directed mainly at those companies 
having relied on guest labour but hoping to still manufacture in Singapore, most of 
whom would not have qualified for incentives under the Economic Expansion 
Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act. 59
Generally the government made much greater finance available for firms 
upgrading or restructuring after 1979. Government funding of public R & D 
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institutions rose from $10 million in the 1981 Budget to $50 million in 1982; 60 
funds for the Product Development Assistance Scheme doubled to $2 million in 
1981;61 funds for the Capital Assistance Scheme were raised from $100 million to 
$150 million in 1980, and then to $300 million the following year. 62 Moreover,
these funds were being put to use more readily than before. Thus, whereas by 
1980 just $44.7 million in equity and loans under the CAS had been committed 
since the scheme's inception in 1975, a year later this total had risen to $137.8 
million.63 The incentives offered under the CAS became a major plank of EDB's
promotions after 1979 in the effort to attract key international manufacturers to 
Singapore, especially the availability of long term, low interest loans� 
In accordance with the government's earlier-expressed concern about the 
capacity of locally-based manufacturers to provide the support industries required 
by international capital, a series of measures were adopted to enhance the ability 
of locally-based firms to upgrade. In 1982, the maximum loan under the Small 
Industries Finance Scheme was raised from $1 million to $1.5 million and interest 
reduced from 9.5% to 9.0%. In the same year, the maximum interest grant 
available through the Interest Grant for Mechanisation Scheme (IGMS), introduced 
in 1980 to subsidise mainly local, small companies' interest payments on new 
capital equipment purchases, was raised from 7% to 9%. A company taking out a 
loan and qualifying under the SIFS and the IGMS would thus effectively be paying 
only 4.5% interest.64 Other measures directed specifically at locally-based
manufacturers included the setting up of a Small Industries Technical Assistance 
Scheme and a Materials Technology Application Centre.65
Though here we are only concerned with the manufacturing sector, it should 
nevertheless be noted that the use of various tax and financial incentives and 
assistance were also introduced to stimulate other sectors of the economy central 
to the government's Ten-Year Plan. This has particularly been the case with 
regard to the financial and service sectors, culminating in the amendment of the 
Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act in October 1984 
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which made it possible for the provisions of that Act to apply to non­
manufacturing sectors. 66
In providing the various incentives and assistance, the government has had to 
outlay significant sums and forego revenue. In the context of its plan to promote a 
qualitatively new phase in Singapore's industrialisation, however, these costs and 
losses are accepted. The long term benefits are seen to outweigh the short term 
costs. The government was under no illusion that the provision of these incentives 
and assistance would of themselves be sufficient stimuli to achieve the desired 
restructuring of industry. Nevertheless, it still saw such measures as integral to a 
broader package which would collectively entice appropriate companies to 
Singapore to set up new, technological processes and assist those existing 
companies in the Republic to shift speedily towards higher value-added product­
ion. It was precisely because these stimuli beionged to a broader strategy for 
restructuring that the government was so heavily committed to cushioning the 
costs of capital in establishing or upgrading operations. 
Industrial Estates 
In conjunction with the government's plans to accelerate industrial restructuring, 
the Jurong Town Corporation embarked on massive expansion plans. It devised its 
own Ten-Year Master Plan (1980-1990) to improve the standard and supply of 
industrial buildings, land and supporting infrastructure. The Plan also called for 
greater decentralisation of industrial estates and the continuing improvement of 
commercial services and amenitites within the estates. This was in part directed 
at raising the percentage of women in the workforce and the percentage of the 
workforce living in Jurong Town itself.67 The Plan also called for the provision of
special facilities, including the creation of several priority estate projects such as: 
the reclamation and development of Southern Islands as an international petro­
chemical manufacturing and distribution centre; the development of Loyang as 
the first centre for aviation industries, and as an engineering base to support 
405 
offshore oil and mineral exploration; the development of Seletair Air Base for 
aviational and aeronautical industries; 68 and the construction of the Singapore
Science Park to accommodate industrial and scientific R & D enterprises. 69
Planned expansions in industrial estates were massive and, according to one 
estimate, would cost well over $2.5 billion in the 5-7 years following 1981. One of 
the planned projects, the Sembawang Industrial Estate, would upon completion in 
1992 cover 526 hectares and cost an estimated $800 million. 70
Progress towards JTC's objectives and increases in required expenditure 
have been rapid since 1979. A total of 240 hectares of industrial land was 
prepared in the 1979 /80 period alone, followed by another 375 hectares over the 
next four years.71 By March 1984, JTC was managing 22 industrial estates and
another 13 were in various stages of development. 72 Such development involved
JTC in considerable cost, especially as some of the work included ambitious and 
lengthy reclamations.73 JTC's development expenditure has thus risen from $127
million in 1978/79 to $435 million in 1982/83, an increase of 243%.74 Owing to
the recessionary effects on Singapore's economy in 1983/84, development 
expenditure was reduced to $277 million, but this was still a significant sum which 
was directed at providing increasingly specialised facilities for higher value-added 
industries. 75
The expansions undertaken by the JTC have been heavily reliant upon loans 
from the government. Of the total development expenditure of $1,568.1 million 
from 1978/79 to 1983/84, as much as $992.5 million or 59% has been provided 
through government loans and a much lesser amount in government grants.76 
Future expansions will continue to reflect this reliance. 
In recognition of the difficulties the latest recession has posed for capital 
wishing to upgrade or expand, the JTC has recently introduced a number of 
incentives. Buyers and tenants of three estates, Tuas, Woodlands East and 
Loyang, have been offered the following: 20% discount on rents; the cost of 
stamp duties and preparation of agreements to be borne by the JTC; a 15% 
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reduction in the downpayment of the purchase/lease price; and the cost of 
installations up to 10% of the selling price of the factory to be met by the JTC.77 
Obviously expansions, improvements and greater specialisations in physical 
infrastructure are fundamental to Singapore's projected restructuring. They are 
also costly. Not only are the more specialised and better quality provisions 
appropriate to a higher level of technology more expensive, Singapore's space 
problems have also necessitated costly reclamations in order to facilitate 
expansions in estates. As we have seen, however, the government has accepted 
the role of ensuring the JTC has sufficient funds to carry out the necessary 
work. It accepts that the ready availability of low cost, good quality industrial 
land and infrastructure is a precondition for its own economic plans. 
Direct Government Investment 
As has been pointed out earlier, the government itself has been an important 
investor in both the manufacturing sector and the Singapore economy in general 
since the 1960s. The pattern has been for government investment to expand and 
diversify over time. As can be seen from Table 22 in the Appendix, by 1983 the 
government had invested in 58 diverse companies with a t�tal paid-up capital of 
$2.9 billion. Of these 58 companies 23 were wholly government-owned. The 
majority of investments, however, were channeled through the government's three 
wholly-owned holding companies, Temasek, Sheng-Li and MND, whose total paid­
up capital amounted to approximately $237 million in 1983. 
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The motivations for direct government investments vary. One point which 
has been underlined since 1979, however, is that the government sees direct 
investments as a way of stimulating private capital in higher value-added areas. 
Finance Minister Goh Chok Tong was quite clear about this from the outset of the 




We will continue to go in for big business where the private sector 
finds it difficult to go into. We will also go into business where the 
market is international like a shipping line, or airline. If its 
international why should we worry about the government taking 
part? What we meant by reviewing our role was that we should 
divest ourselves of some shares in companies in which we no longer 
see important roles for ourselves. We may even sell off 100%. 
But that does not mean we will not invest in new companies. In fact 
my recent remarks about a new venture company (to be set up by 
the government and to finance promising but high risk ventures) 
indicated that we would invest in more companies. But once these 
companies succeed, we should in fact divest ourselves of their shares 
... and we'll move into something else, my own view is that we'll 
grow bigger and bigger. 79
Since this statement the government has not hesitated to use direct investments 
to either initiate developments in higher value-added production or to consolidate 
trends by private capital. 
One of the clearest examples of th� government directly investing to ensure 
the development of a priority industry has been the incorporation in 1982 of 
Singapore Aircraft Industries (SAD, a holding company belonging to the Sheng-Li 
Group. In all, SAI is to comprise six subsidiaries engaged in various aspects of the 
aerospace industry. One of the most significant enterprises is Singapore 
Aerospace Manufacturing (SAM) which manufactures aircraft equipment and 
parts, the area of special importance to the government's long term plans for the 
industry. The other companies, however, are engaged in a range of 
complementary servicing, overhaul and maintenance activities so that collectively 
these investments amount to a coherent and concerted attempt to promote the 
aerospace industry. 80
Through its Sheng-Li holding company, the government has also been 
involved in more generalised attempts to promote higher value-added production. 
In 1983, six Sheng-Li-owned companies were grouped together to form the 
Singapore Technology Corporation (STC).81 The intention of STC was to pool
resources to develop and market Singapore-made high technology products. STC 
was established with a $200 million capital base and 4,500 employees (including 
800 of which were engineers, technicians and executives). This made it 
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Singapore's largest locally-based company and it could therefore afford to purch­
ase the latest technology and develop products in those areas of high technology in 
which its respective group members had expertise - defence equipment, 
automotive engineering and computer software.82
Probably the above examples of government investment represent the more 
conspicuous of illustrations. There are many less dramatic instances of the 
government's various investment arms actively trying to shape Singapore's 
industrial restructuring. The DBS, for example, is one of eight Singapore-based 
companies to have set up a venture capital company called Venture Investment 
(Singapore) in April 1984. This company intends to invest its $14 million of pooled 
capital in industries such as computer hardware, peripherals and software; semi­
conductor products and equipment; telecommunications services and 
equipment; agro-industry; and health and health care products and services.83
Intraco also partnered the US company Scien-Tech to form Scien-Tech Intraco 
Automation in January 1983 with a paid-up capital of $1 million. This company is 
engaged in the production of high technology automation equipment such as 
educational and industrial robots and computer systems. It made the first 
programmable robot in Singapore. 84
One of the more interesting developments in the government's direct 
investments since 1979 has been the establishment of the Government of 
Singapore Investment Corporation (GSIC) in 1981. The GSIC was set up 
specifically to manage Singapore's massive foreign reserves, officially declared at 
$15.84 billion (at cost value) at the time,85 a task previously handled by the
MAS. MAS had come under fire for allowing surplus reserves to accumulate 
beyond that necessary to meet its legal obligations. Thus, the GSIC was to more 
effectively maximise the investment potential of these reserves and it 
immediately began scouting for opportunities abroad, identifying the US, Japan 
and Australia as prime targets. 86 The GSIC was considered so important that Lee
Kuan Yew himself was its founding Chairman, with Goh Keng Swee, the then First 
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Deputy Prime Minister, its Director. The point to keep in mind about the setting 
up of such a corporation, with a view to developing a highly profitable 
international investment portfolio, is that it has taken place precisely at a time 
when the state is facing increasing financial commitments as part of its 
restructuring of industry and the economy. Apparently in this context the 
Singapore government has felt a greater need to put its reserves to work. 
At one stage the government indicated that the GSIC would be investing 
abroad in some of the world's leading high technology companies as a means of 
bringing them to Singapore. The GSIC invested some of its reserves in Mitel, a 
Canadian telecommunications equipment company, as well as in such world­
leaders as IBM and Hewlett Packard. The idea being considered was to obtain 
seats on the boards of big corporations and mount takeover bids.87 This bold
scheme, however, appears to have been abandoned and p.ow the GSIC generally 
limits its holdings in any one company to below 5%. As Goh Keng Swee explained: 
"The last thing we want to do is ruffle anyone's feathers 11 • 88 On second thoughts
then, the strategy under consideration ran the risk, in Goh's assessment, of being 
counter-productive by instilling fears in those companies with the technology 
sought by the Singapore government. Nevertheless, the fact that such a strategy 
was ever conceived emphasised the government's conviction that it had a definite 
role to play in speeding-up Singapore's industrial restructuring. 
Government Spending 
Many of the previously-outlined policies adopted in support of Singapore's 'Second 
Industrial Revolution' have involved the government in considerable expense. 
Outlays through the government's special Development Fund have increased from 
$1,890.0 million in 1977 /78 to $5,154.7 million in 1981/82, representing an 
increase of nearly 173% before dropping to $4,997.8 million in 1982/83 (see Table 
21 in Appendix). Meanwhile, development expenditure as a proportion of 
government budget spending has risen from 36.6% in 1979/80 to a projected 55.3% 
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in 1982/83 (see Table 16 below). Of course, there are other increases in 
government spending resulting from the new economic strategy which are 
reflected in normal recurrent expenditure, such as that on educational personnel 
and other aspects of social infrastructure. Recurrent expenditure on education, 
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Source: Ministry of Finance, Memorandum on the Budget for Financial Year 
1983/84, Table III, p.5. 
In addition to ensuring the necessary funds for the upgrading and expansion 
of social and physical infrastructure for a higher stage of industrialisation, the 
government has also assumed responsibility for maintaining high growth rates in 
spite of the effects of the latest recession. The targeted growth rate in fixed 
capital formation for the decade of 11 % per annum is 3% higher than that 
achieved for the period 1970-1978.90 Towards achieving this the government has
poured large sums into public housing construction.91 A deepening of the 
recession has also seen the government finally go ahead with its long-discussed 
proposal for a mass-rapid-transit (MRT) rail system, a measure clearly intended 
to, amongst other things, compensate for falls in private capital investment.92 
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Any further economic slowdown resulting from the global recession would most 
likely see the relative importance of non-industrial development expenditure 
increase. Quite obviously, however, for either or both of the government's 
objectives of rapid economic growth and restructuring to occur the government 
will be involved in heavy expense, recession or not. 
Conclusion 
As we have seen above, the government's plans to hasten industrial restructuring 
since 1979 have involved considerable intervention in the economy. The most 
blatant form this has taken has been through the corrective wage policy. By 
imposing steep increases in wage costs on capital, the government has attempted 
to pressure employers to upgrade production techniques and raise productivity. 
These increases, the government has explained, were necessitated by its pursuance 
of an overly cautious wage policy in the 1970s. Having supposedly restored wages 
to market levels though, the government has since sought to play a lower profile 
in wage determination.· It is confident that this will facilitate Singapore's 
graduation to a technologically higher position in the international division of 
labour in manufacturing. The new emphasis on collective bargaining, however, 
even if successfully implemented, should not be seen as the end of state influence 
in wage determination. On the contrary, the state continues to exert a powerful 
influence over organised labour which restricts the latter's capacity to act as a 
free agent in the market place. Apart from legislation circumscribing matters for 
negotiation, the PAP-NTUC symbiosis ensures that the interests of labour are 
never practically divorced from those of the Party. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, new policies have been introduced since 1979 to secure this relationship 
in the restructuring period. 
Aside from the corrective wage policy, there have also been considerable 
government expenditure increases in the provision of expanded and improved 
social and physical infrastructure and the introduction of various fiscal 
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incentives. The nature and expense of such intervention is to some extent the 
consequence of embarking upon a qualitatively higher phase of industrialisation. 
Higher skill levels and more specialised infrastructure are obvious pre-requisites 
for a more technologically advanced economy and these involve large capital 
outlays. Equally, the sophisticated machinery the government is encouraging 
employers to invest in is not only expensive but often quickly superseded. Long 
gestation periods and more consequential risks are also characteristic of this new 
phase of industrialisation. In these circumstances, greater re-assurances and 
incentives have been employed to attract the desired investment. The state has 
thus adopted the role of alleviating the impact of some of the additional costs for 
employers. In effect, the state has intervened to help define Singapore's 
comparative advantage in higher value-added production by absorbing many of the 
costs involved in upgrading operations and investing in higher technology. 
In conclusion, then, in spite of the government's espoused faith in market 
forces, the period of the 'Second Industrial Revolution' has been characterised by 
a basic practical mistrust of market forces. Intervention has been the hallmark of 
the new economic strategy, with the government exploiting numerous avenues to 
protect investors from the full force of the market. The government wants the 
manufacturing sector to take a certain direction and it is prepared to do what is 
necessary to enhance and secure that direction. This active state role has long 
been integral to Singapore's industrialisation, but the new phase of 
industrialisation has seen some changes in the extent and means by which the 
state has attempted to influence the allocation of resources. 
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CHAPTER IO 
SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF THE 
.:SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
Introduction 
Starting in 1979, the Singapore government attempted to induce a shift in the 
pattern of capital investment in the manufacturing sector through its wages 
policy, tariff removals, direct investments, increases in social and physical 
infrastructure, and the provision of low interest finance and various investment 
incentives. These measures, however, required a favourable social and political 
context for capital accumulation if they were to achieve the desired effects. 
Though the state had long played the role of ensuring labour discipline, the 
transition to a higher stage of industrialisation was seen by the government to 
require certain refinements in the control over labour to facilitate the smooth 
restructuring of capital. This view was not just based on the political 
consideration of labour's capacity to resist or assist restructuring, but also on the 
technical consideration of how the workforce might be most cost-effectively 
organised for capital. As a result, significant changes to the structure of trade 
unions were introduced and the PAP stepped-up its placement of Party personnel 
in key NTUC positions. At the same time, the government embarked on a 
concerted and all-embracing campaign to create a general ideological acceptance 
of capital restructuring by workers as a complement to the new structural 
controls over labour. 
Although the PAP's new measures to ensure social and political control of 
labour were linked to the perceived needs of capital in the restructuring process, 
consideration was also given to the PAP's own long term political security which 
was seen as integral to successful restructuring. The PAP had for decades seen 
itself as the natural instrument of Singapore's social and economic progress. To 
the PAP leadership's way of thinking, the Party's mission was above politics. The 
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PAP was the embodiment of the nation's collective aspirations and, what is more, 
it was the only institution capable of realising those aspirations. The PAP took it 
for granted that its unquestioned political supremacy was fundamental to the 
success of the restructuring programme for the 1980s. It soon discovered, 
however, that not all shared the PAP's ideological convictions. In 1981, the PAP 
lost the by-election in the constituency of Anson to the Workers' Party candidate 
J.B. Jeyaretnam who became the first opposition member of parliament since 
1968. To the PAP this loss symbolised a more general attitudinal malaise among 
the general public which also reflected in deteriorating work attitudes, 
subscription to Western and materialist values, and insufficient reverence for 
authority, that is, the PAP. This suspected malaise was believed to be especially 
prevalent amongst Singapore's younger generation and this did not augur well for 
the future of the PAP or, hence, restructuring. The PAP has thus set about the 
task of ensuring its own long term political security by ensuring the reproduction 
of Party ideology through Singapore's various social institutions. This has involved 
legislative measures as well as the promotion of certain Confucian ethics which 
are supportive of the PAP's hegemony. 
What we see clearly in the discussion to follow is not only that the PAP has 
been engaged in pervasive social engineering to support the economic policies 
outlined in the previous chapter, but that it has tried to secure its long term 
monopoly of state power at the same time. Without the latter, the Party 
leadership could not possibly envisage any successful future for Singapore at all, 
let alone the transition to a modern industrial economy based on science, technol­
ogy, skills and knowledge. 
Trade Unions 
Although the PAP had since the 1960s emphasised the necessity of a trade union 
movement which was responsive to government policy, in the period of the 
'Second Industrial Revolution' new measures were taken to ensure that the 
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'symbiosis' between the NTUC and the government remained firm. Lee Kuan Yew 
was fully a ware that the large-scale changes associated with the new economic 
strategy would require an especially co-operative union movement. Whilst there 
were no immediate indications that the labour movement might question this 
relationship, Lee was concerned that the growth in the wealth and power of 
Singapore's larger unions represented a potential threat which had to be dealt 
with.1 In the period of substantial restructuring, Lee was emphatic that the
primacy of the PAP was more vital than ever and warned against any challenge to 
the Party's supremacy: 
Now, however, in the nature of union organisations, as compared to 
that of political parties, a curious contradiction has arisen between 
the PAP and the NTUC; it is one which has the seeds of potential 
conflict if the present PAP-NTUC relationship is not 
institutionalised and made durable before a younger generation of 
leaders has taken over charge of both organisations. Because of the 
check-off system the PAP in government allowed since 1970, the 
NTUC is growing stronger financially every year; because of full­
time staff which stronger finances enable it to recruit, the NTUC is 
also growing stronger organisationally every year. This is the case 
in several industrial countries. Unions are wealthier and stronger 
than political parties. And because union objectives appeal directly 
to the pockets of workers, plus the grouping of members in offices 
and factories, it is easier for union leaders to mobilise their 
supporters, than for political party leaders to mobilise theirs (sic). 
In Singapore, only the overriding authority of political leadership 
saves the country from unnecessary conflict; for if challenged the 
union leadership knows it must face the consequence of a collision of 
wills; few union leaders can doubt the outcome of such a clash. 
Lee's concern about the potential political power of unions, and the implications 
of such for the government's planned economic restructuring, was probably 
heightened, if not aroused, by the strong grassroots support developed by Phey 
Yew Koh in the 1970s. In 1979 Phey was at the helm of Singapore's two largest 
unions, SILO and PIEU, controlling 90,000 workers, as well as the 10,000 member-
strong Singapore Air Transport Workers' Union (SATU). Phey had been 
disappointed at being overlooked for the top NTUC position in that year in favour 
of Lim Chee Onn and had reportedly vowed to oppose Lim at the NTUC delegates 
conference in late 1979. Before this could eventuate, however, Phey was charged 
with the misuse of co-operative funds and fled the country while on bail.4 Though
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Phey was never able to put his substantial grassroots power base to the test for 
Lim's job, Lee apparently concluded that the existing structures of control over 
NTUC-affiliated unions needed to be tightened. Through the subsequent 
restructuring of trade unions, the government took decisive steps to guard against 
even the remote possibility of power bases developing amongst organised labour 
which could pose any challenge to the PAP's hegemony in general or its economic 
plans in particular. 
Indications that significant changes in the structure of trade unions were to 
take place first came at a NTUC seminar in November 1979. Newly-appointed 
NTUC Secretary-General Lim Chee Onn outlined proposals at the seminar for the 
dismembering of Singapore's two largest unions, SILO and PIEU, to make way for 
smaller, industry-based unions. Lim's reasoning was that such a restructuring 
would enable individual unions to develop expert knowledge of the industry they 
represent and improve their relationship with management as a result.5 Though
not openly acknowledged by Lim, the move would also weaken the :power base of 
the union movement since the restructuring invariably meant an end to the 
numerically large unions previously possible. Challenges to either the NTUC or 
the PAP would thus be made even more difficult than they already were. At the 
same time, the workforce could be more easily re-organised to meet industry­
specific needs of capital in the restructuring process. 
The plans for industry-based unions were quickly put into effect. In 
February 1980, the executive councils of SILO and PIEU voted in favour of their 
dissolution and by July 1981 nine industry-based unions with a total membership of 
79,000 had been formed.6 Under the new constitutions and ties of these unions to
the NTUC, activities have come under closer government scrutiny. The executive 
councils of these unions are monitored by a 24-member advisory council, each of 
which contains at least one government MP, highly loyal union cadre members and 
'founder members' who are either PAP members or closely associated with the 
Party.7
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As an adjunct to the changes described above, the government has also 
promoted the establishment of various in-house or house unions. It was no co­
incidence that six of the first seven house unions between 1981 and 1983 were 
initiated by workers at wholly or significantly government-owned enterprises.8 By
late 1984 there were 13 of these new house unions. 9 House unions are a logical
extension of industry-based unions, further weakening the organisational capacity 
of labour and making it possible for company-specific needs to be more easily 
realised. Lim Chee Onn's successor, Ong Teng Cheong, not only acknowledged the 
implications of house unions for the power of organised labour, he went so far as 
to contend that the erosion of this power was in labour's own interests: 
... it is recognised that the establishment of house unions could 
possibly erode the power base of the larger craft, industrial and 
general unions. However, in the interests of our national economy 
and the long term benefits to the workers and management, they 
must be willing to submerge their sectional interests for the national 
good.lo 
Apart from the weakened organisational capacity of labour resulting from house 
unions, they also serve an ideological function. As Ong has explained: "In a house 
union, the workers are better able to identify themselves with the company, and 
to see clearly the nexus between their own well-being and the success of the 
enterprise. "11 House unions, then, represent the ultimate in the reconstitution of
organised labour to aid the restructuring of capital. 
At the outset of announcing plans to introduce house unions, the government 
indicated that this was a long term objective which would probably be introduced 
gradually. One of the government's considerations was the need to find adequate 
leaders to facilitate such a decentralisation of control.12 It also recognised that
it would have to spend some time explaining to workers the benefits of house 
unions. It was not long however before the government became impatient with 
debate over the question and indicated in no uncertain terms that opposition to 
house unions would simply not be tolerated. In November 1981, the executive 
council of the 2,798 member-strong United Workers of the Petroleum Industry 
(UWPD decided to oppose splitting the union into various house unions, contending 
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that this was a naked attempt to weaken the membership and reduce its clout.13
Delegates at the UWPI's biennial conference in July 1982 sanctioned a resolution 
which empowered the executive council to dismiss any member seeking to 
undermine this position. Subsequently, the executive council threatened to expel 
its British Petroleum branch committee for advocating the introduction of a house 
union.14 This prompted a strong reaction from the PAP, with Ong Teng Cheong
warning that " ... the NTUC will not accept and tolerate any such oppressive 
resolutions".15 The end result was a back down by the UWPI which rescinded its
resolution. In the same month, Ong declared that the question of house unions was 
"no longer an issue" .16 In 1984, the Singapore Shell Employees' Union (SSEU) was
formed as a house union, thereby weakening the UWPI by 1,177 members.17
Despite the firm position adopted by the government and the NTUC, and the 
defeat of the UWPI, the question of house unions appears to nevertheless remain a 
contentious rather than a non-issue. Events in 1984 suggest that some pockets of 
resistence still remain. Following recommendations from the NTUC, on 7 May 
1984 the executive council of the Singapore Air Transport Workers' Union (SATU) 
decided to fragment SATU into three house unions.18 In the wake of this decision,
however, there were protests from SATU members that the SATU executive 
council had failed to secure a mandate for such a move.19 On 14 June, three
SATU officials also filed a writ of summons with the Supreme Court for an 
injunction to stop the fragmentation of SATU, the plaintiffs claiming the 
executive council had exceeded its authority under the union's constitution.20 The
next three months marked an intense internal struggle which culminated in the 
ratification in August of the executive council's decision by delegates of a SATU 
conference.21 It would seem then that in spite of the government's refusal to
debate the question of house unions, some unionists are still reluctant to surrender 
their power bases. It is clear, nonetheless, that the future path of organised 
labour will be house unions. Those unionists who challenge this direction have 
little or no chance of success; for in a "collision of wills" with the government, 
"few union leaders can doubt the outcome of such a clash".22
425 
The new union structure, particularly house unions, should make for more 
effective administering of the technical changes necessary for rapid capital 
restructuring. It will facilitate maximum flexibility in the training and retraining 
of workers and the enforcement of discipline to accept the direction of technical 
change, in spite of the possible negative consequences for labour, such as 
redundancies and other inconveniences. The weakening of the union base, and thus 
the potential for the mobilisation of worker opposition, is clearly inter-related 
with the enhanced technical management of the labour force. Thus, when the 
government introduced the Employment (Amendment) Act of July 1984 which 
significantly increased the scope for employers to schedule working time, a move 
intended to allow employers to use their expensive high-technology machinery 
around the clock, and tied annual leave to the length of service, it did so with the 
confidence that there could be no effective obstruction of the Act even if labour 
was unhappy about its implications.23
Having set about restructuring trade unions to implant a more effective 
means of labour management, the government has tried to promote an expansion 
of the number of workers which can be reached through organised labour. In 1979, 
just 249,710 workers representing 24% of the total workforce belonged to unions. 
By 1982, this figure had dropped to 214,337 or 19% (see Table 17 in Appendix). 
This should come as no surprise, however, since we have already seen that the 
weakening of labour's power and autonomy in the late 1960s was followed by a 
sharp decline in union membership. Since then, the paternalism of the state and 
the limitations placed on the union role have acted to further discourage 
membership. The restructuring of trade unions of late only extends PAP influence 
over unions and restricts the capacity of unions to reflect grassroots sentiment. 
Putting the new structure in place is one thing, affecting any substantial change in 
worker attitudes to unionisation may be quite another. 
If there were any doubts about the implications for unions of their 
reconstitution, the legislative changes to the Trade Union Act went a long way 
! l 
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towards addressing any such uncertainty. Arguably the redefinition of the role of 
trade unions in Singapore through the Act simply represented acknowledgement of 
what had become a fact of life anyway. Nevertheless, so as to hammer home the 
government's emphasis on "co-operation rather than confrontation", a new 
definition of the objectives of unions was passed in December 1982. The new 
objectives were to: promote good relations between workers and employers; 
improve the working conditions of workers or enhance their economic and social 
status; and achieve increases in productivity for the benefit of workers, employers 
and the economy of Singapore.24 The Act also stated that any proposed new trade
union would only be recognised if its constitution was "not oppressive or 
unreasonable", the definition of which was to be left to the discretion of the 
Labour Minister. Considerable control over the management and auditing of union 
funds was also afforded the registrar of trade unions.25
These legislative changes were in tended to maximise the co-operation of 
unions in the restructuring process, not just by simplifying control over union 
activities but also by helping to create an ideological sympathy towards the 
government's objectives. This is what Lee meant when he said that unions "must 
play a positive role in reshaping attitudes and objectives, supporting management 
and government in a joint effort to realise our full potential".26 It was towards
the objective of realising 'full potential', that is, achieving the highest possible 
material productivity, that individual union leaders were expected to devote their 
energies.27 The task confronting union leaders in the 1980s in Singapore was to
help create "better work attitudes and higher skills",28 The message which the
union was to get across was that any changes which raised productivity would 
ultimately benefit labour. 
The government's de facto control of unions had effectively existed for over 
a decade. The government's amendment to the Trade Union Act must therefore 
be seen to have at least in part been prompted by a slight uneasiness about the 
future. There is little doubt that the Singapore International Air Pilot's 
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Association (SIAPA) work to rule in October/November 1980 largely contributed 
to this uneasiness. The SIAP A industrial action seriously disrupted SIA flights and 
aroused scathing government remarks. 29 SIAPA was eventually deregistered. 30
It was thus not a complete surprise when the government identified the "need to 
build a modern industrial society founded on sophisticated economic activities and 
a new relationship between management and labour" as the most urgent task 
facing the new parliament in 1981. 31 The dispute was a very symbolic one and the
government went about clarifying in no uncertain terms that the idea of unions 
operating as sectional interest groups could not be tolerated in Singapore. As 
Singapore entered the 1980s, unions were expected to be gearing themselves 
towards a new era of 'co-operation'. In the wake of the SIAPA dispute, 
government ministers and the NTUC head spared no opportunity to publically 
expound the primacy of the PAP-NTUC symbiosis and the paramount 
responsibility of labour to raise productivity.32 Industrial disputation was
anathema to the new high in co-operative spirit which the PAP was insistent upon. 
The wider responsibility of orienting labour towards national obligations, 
which was officially entrusted the NTUC through the redefinition of the union role 
and aided by the restructuring of unions, was of course first mooted .as far back as 
1969 at the "Seminar on Modernisation". 33 The essence of the union role then has
not changed. Rather, a new level of co-operation is being demanded, one which 
the PAP considers appropriate to a higher stage of industrialisation. In what has 
been anticipated as an unprecedented period of rapid technological change, the 
PAP sees the need to ensure worker flexibility, receptivity to training and 
retraining, acceptance of shift work and the inevitable redundancies and various 
other changes. Through the initiation of BEST, the NTUC demonstrated the co­
operative spirit sought by the government. Facilitating the upgrading of skills, 
however, is not so difficult as the other expectation of NTUC leaders: instilling 
motivation and discipline amongst workers. As we have seen above, however, 
towards securing the support and discipline of labour in this new phase of 
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industrialisation, the PAP has modified some of the forms and mechanisms of 
labour control. 
Towards enhancing and reproducing labour control, the PAP adopted the 
strategy throughout the 1970s of filling key positions in the NTUC with Party 
members or sympathisers. Recently, however, the PAP has attempted to 
significantly increase its representation in the NTUC, particularly through the 
new union structure. Lee has referred to this process as 'cross fertilisation', a 
necessary measure to "increase understanding between the government 
leaders" .34 This 'increased understanding', which actually amounts to a more
effective transmission of government policy from the PAP leadership through to 
the workforce, has involved increasing numbers of trained technocrats assuming 
NTUC leadership roles. These technocrats have generally little or no background 
at shop-floor level. The appointment of Lim Chee Onn as NTUC Secretary­
General in 1979 marked a new high in this trend. Lim, also Minister without 
portfolio in the government, was a member of the so-called Second Generation of 
leaders who had no trade union experience prior to his appointment. 
It has been explained in earlier chapters that the increasing appointment of 
technocrats to the NTUC runs the risk of widening the gap between the leadership 
and the rank-and-file membership. Naturally it also arouses some resentment 
from the older, longer serving union leaders of working class background . .  It 
appeared, however, that the PAP thought that 'cross fertilisation' needed to be 
stepped up to guarantee the maximum support of and control over the NTUC in 
the restructuring period. It was not long, however, before this policy encountered 
problems. In April 1983 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew announced the dismissal of 
Lim Chee Onn from his post as NTUC Secretary-General. In Lee's published letter 
concerning Lim's dismissal, he referred to the discontent of NTUC executives of 
rank-and-file backgrounds who felt that under Lim's leadership they had been 
brushed aside. Further, Lim had appointed various young technocrats to high posts 
who had no experience in union affairs.35 Lee explained that "the process of
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meshing in scholars and professionals with rank-and-file union leaders was not 
progressing well 11 • 36 However, rather than re-examine this process itself, Lee
concluded that another technocrat of different personality and temperament could 
do the job. Thus, Lim's successor was 47-year-old Ong Teng Cheong. Ong, an 
architect by profession and another member of the Second Generation of leaders,. 
left his government portfolio of Communications and Labour to take the post. 
Though initial developments suggest that Ong's style of leadership may be more 
suited to the task, the underlying contradiction between the technocrats and the 
rank-and-file has the potential to manifest in the longer term. Eventually, of 
course, the older, rank-and-:file leaders will be superseded to a far greater 
extent. There will be few leaders from the rank-and-file to emerge from the 
more placid and tightly controlled 1970s and 1980s who will have the capacity or 
inclination to arrest the trend. It could be, however, that the growing alienation 
of the rank-and-file from NTUC leadership is reflected in the declining 
membership of NTUC. If this is the case, the PAP will need to address the 
contradiction if it is to realise its objective of expanding the number of workers to 
be reached through its new union structure. 
Ideological Conditions 
Through institutionalised and legislative changes the government defined new 
expectations of trade unions and attempted to enhance its ability to enforce 
changes considered necessary for rapid restructuring. At the same time, it was 
recognised that an ideological acceptance of the methods for, and objectives of, 
economic restructuring would need to be instilled in workers. In late 1980, then, 
the PAP leadership started to focus very closely on the ideological conditions 
considered necessary to the 'Second Industrial Revolution'. 
For some time the government had been addressing itself to, what it saw as, 
the problem of poor worker attitudes. It had been concluded by various employers 
and the government that the widespread practice of job-hopping signified that 
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many workers lacked suitable application to work and or loyalty to their 
companies. However, towards the end of 1980 a significant change in emphasis 
occurred when Singapore's leadership increasingly began to conceptualise the 
problem at a more abstract level, calling for a qualitatively new approach to 
industrial relations. In a pre-election speech in December 1980, Lee Kuan Yew 
identified the Japanese system of industrial relations, characterised by a close co­
operative spirit between employer and employee, as a suitable model for 
Singapore to emulate.37 In the years to follow Singaporeans were to hear and
read much from the government about this model. 
It was no coincidence that the government's campaign to 'learn from Japan' 
was initiated in the wake of the SIAPA-SIA dispute. The resort to industrial 
action by the SIAP A symbolised an approach towards management which Lee 
considered the antithesis of the spirit required of workers during the 1980s. 38
Carrying on the theme of greater co-operation between employer and 
employee, Lee told Singaporeans in his 1981 May Day Speech that: "Greater team 
spirit is the secret of success in our next stage of economic development 11 •39 The
better work attitudes being sought amounted to a collective dedication towards 
greater productivity. Lee was asking workers to see their interests as inseparable 
from their employers', and indeed their fellow workers'. 
The time has come for us to make a qualitative change in work 
attitudes. The Singaporean is an individual achiever. The 
Singaporean must now learn to be a team achiever. He must realise 
that he achieves more for himself by working smoothly in a team to 
help the team succeed. Greater team spirit is the secret of success 
in our next stage of economic development. Whether it is in the 
manufacturing or in the service, it is co-operation amongst fellow 
workers, and between workers and management, which will increase 
productivity. This is the meaning of good work attitude.40
Lee's speech was followed by a comprehensive and tireless campaign to cement in 
the population's consciousness the close nexus between team work and 
productivity and the fundamental importance of developing worker/employer 
relations which reflected this consciousness. It was this 'team spirit' which 
supposedly, more than anything else, epitomised the lesson of Japan's impressive 
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industrial success. Lee emphasised this point in his 1982 May Day Message to the 
NTUC: 
High productivity, or more output per worker with similar capital 
investment, depends on the philosophy of management and the 
attitude of workers. The concept of productivity must penetrate the 
mind of every manager, supervisor and worker in Singapore. It must 
be understood and grasped by all teachers in schools, VITE, 
Polytechnic and University, so that it can be transmitted to every 
student. In essence, it boils down to good human relations. Team 
spirit and co-operation among workers, in QC circles or zero defect 
circles, depend on good humanrelations.41
In peculiarly Singaporean fashion, the campaign to promote awareness of the 
need for greater productivity through team spirit was orchestrated with cohesion, 
thoroughness and relentless monotony. At every level, and almost every 
opportunity, Singaporeans were called to adopt an attitude of 'team work', the 
path that inexorably leads to greater productivity and a 'bigger piece of the cake' 
for all.42 As Chua Beng Huat wrote: "Singapore has been literally blitzed with
ideological discourse of team work". 43 In April 1981, a Committee on
Productivity was established, later to be superseded by a National Productivity 
Council in September, which, amongst other things, added another appendage to 
the state's machinery to advance acceptance of these concepts. 
In August 1982, a survey which had been commissioned by the National 
Productivity Board (NPB) was conducted by the Times Organisation. The survey 
of 590 people showed rather mixed results and was a matter of concern for the 
government. An alarming 70% of those interviewed expressed the view that 
increased productivity would be primarily to the company's benefit and not the 
worker's. This view was equally as common amongst the better educated as those 
with little or no formal education.44 The survey also found that few were
interested in actively participating at their places of work in promoting 'team 
work'. For example, 89% expressed the view that small group work activities 
could raise productivity, but just 17% indicated a willingness to participate in 
them.45 This did not augur well for the government's proposals to introduce
management techniques which involved worker participation techniques such as 
quality control circles (QCCs) and work improvement teams (WITs). 
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That workers did not make an instant and passionate commitment to 'team 
work' should come as no surprise. After all, both through the government's own 
efforts and due to the inherent nature of the capitalist economic system, 
contradictory attitudes had been fostered over the previous decades in 
Singapore. The government had gone a long way towards encouraging 
individualism with its promotion of the 'rugged individualism' ethos emphasising 
self-sufficiency over collectivism. Such an ethos or national personality had been 
considered important to Singapore's survival in a fiercely competitive world. This 
competition, Singaporeans had been told, brought out the best in individuals, and 
indeed companies for that matter. Competition, both as a supportive ideology and 
a concrete reality, was still very much alive in Singapore and, as in other 
capitalist societies, permeated all levels of the social structure. Through NWC 
guidelines the government has also increased material rewards for the 'more 
meritorious' workers. Observers have been quick to point out the obvious 
contradiction between 'team work' and 'meritocracy', with group unity and 
affinity being undermined by disproportionate rewards for workers doing the same 
job. Aware of this apparent contradiction, the following attempt to reconcile the 
two concepts was offered by Goh Chok Tong: 
In Singapore, we rightly emphasize meritocracy as the key factor in 
building a better organization and a better country. Meritocracy is 
not at variance with the Japanese concept of consensus by 
compromising or placing group interests before self. It is our 
application of the meritocratic system which is at fault. We equate 
meritocracy with individual ability, regardless sometimes, of the 
individual's ability to lead a team or work as a member o:f a team. It 
is this misunderstanding of the meaning of meritocracy that has 
caused some scholars and high-flyers in the civil service and private 
sector to develop crass, selfish, egoistic attitudes. The ability to 
work as a member of a team is a virtue that must be taken 
cognizance of in any assessment of an individual for promotion or 
increment. 46
Goh's qualification suggests that the ability to mobilise workers should be 
deserving of greater reward. It does not explain, however, why those whom 
leaders are trying to mobilise should want to co-operate to ensure leaders' 
disproportionate rewards. 
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Apart from the campaign to promote a general awareness and acceptance of 
'team work', the government examined concrete ways in which aspects of the 
Japanese model embodying this spirit could be incorporated in Singapore. Three 
clearly identifiable objectives were to unfold: to promote the establishment of a 
greater number of house unions; to apply such Japanese-style management 
techniques as Quality Control Circles and Work Improvement Teams;47 and the 
adoption of some form of company welfarism. The thinking behind house unions 
and the moves already made in that direction have been discussed earlier. As for 
the Japanese-style managerial techniques, efforts to promote them have been 
largely assumed by the National Productivity Council (NPC). The NPC has 
conducted seminars and disseminated information on such techniques. By March 
1983, a total of 341 QCCs, comprising 2,582 workers in 44 organisations had 
registered with the NPB.48 Important as such management techniques are to the
government's new industrial relations plan, however, it has been the declared 
commitment to company welfarism which has represented an even more 
fundamental attempt to reshape the attitudes of workers. 
Lee Kuan Yew's preoccupation in the 1981 May Day Speech with the 
relationship between welfare programmes and productivity, by way of a 
comparison of China, Germany and Japan, was the first indication that he had 
become seriously concerned about the extent of Singapore's own welfare 
programmes. Lee argued that whilst governments generally had a role to play in 
subsidising certain essential services, such as medical services and housing, any 
public welfare system which protected people from all risks of hardship or 
deprivation would inevitably lead to declining productivity.49
Later, when speaking at a National Day rally in August 1981, Lee lauded a 
recommendation by the American Business Council (ABC) to the NPB's Committee 
on Productivity (COP) which also called for a re-examination of the government's 
role in welfare. Lee quoted directly from the ABC submission: 
The Singapore government, in its desire to provide for its citizens has 
developed wage policies and social programmes such as the CPF, which 
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cause a worker to feel his future and security is dependent on the 
government rather than the employer. 50
The ABC's observation was indeed something which the government by now had 
come to accept as accurate and worrying. Manifestations of this dependence 
were, according to the government, not just excessive job-hopping, but the 
reliance of workers and companies on the NWC to set wage levels.51 A more
germane manifestation was the apparent perception by Singaporeans of subsidised 
public housing as an inalienable right or entitlement of citizens. The PAP had 
come to see their defeat in the 1981 Anson by-election as in large part the 
consequence of failing to satisfactorily fulfil this expectation. Such an attitude 
not only placed the P AP's political survival on a demanding contract, it also 
evidenced, in the eyes of the government, an obstacle in the plan to cement the 
worker/company bond and raise productivity. Lee spelt out the importance of 
moving towards the Japanese system of company welfarism as a means of 
addressing this problem: 
We must gradually switch to the Japanese system, where workers 
look to the company's success for their medical and welfare 
benefits. As long as welfare is provided by legislation, with political 
parties bidding against each other as in auction at election time, the 
worker does not see why his work and his company's success is 
important. On the contrary, the worker squeezes all he can get out 
of his employer. He believes that if the company collapses, the 
State social welfare must look after him ... Gradually, Singaporeans 
must become aware that the government can only provide the broad 
framework of good administration for social stability and for equal 
opportunities in education and basic medical services and housing for 
the poor. The extras, welfare benefits, holidays, higher standards of 
life must depend on the success of the companies they work for. 
Japan has avoided the pitfall of excessive State welfare. The 
personal interest of managers for their workers leads to excellent 
industrial relations. Company welfarism gives Japanese managers 
and workers their deep sense of loyalty to and identification with 
their company. I am keen to discover which parts of the Japanese 
system can be adapted to suit Singapore circumstances. I believe 
team spirit is crucial for group success. 52
Given the PAP's concern about its shock defeat in the October 1981 Anson 
by-election and the implications of that defeat, the promotion of company 
welfarism was thus not solely motivated out of a desire for closer 
worker/employer relations, hence greater productivity. It was also seen as a way 
435 
of guarding against potential political problems by shifting the electorate's 
judgement of the PAP's performance away from its ability to provide ongoing and 
expanded social welfare programmes. Although the government had adequate 
funds, it also preferred to relieve itself of the increasing welfare burden to 
concentrate its spending on the infrastructural provisions of capital and other 
areas. 
Following the COP's recommendation that company welfarism be introduced 
using the CPF as a source of funds, the National Productivity Council was charged 
with the responsibility of working out the guidelines for the introduction of the 
Company Welfarism From Employers' Contributions (COWEC) Scheme.53 Under
the guidelines drawn up, employers who produce acceptable schemes can retain 
10% of their contribution to the CPF to set up a trust fund to provide welfare 
benefits.54 To make COWEC attractive to workers and to ensure it is directly
related to company loyalty, members are entitled to a certain proportion of the 
difference between the returns of the COWEC investments and the CPF 
equivalent interest rates, ranging from 50% for those with five years' service to 
100% for those with 15 years' service or more to a company.55 To pioneer the
COWEC Scheme, the NPB has established a pilot scheme under which selected 
companies will be tried out for three to five years, after which wider application 
will be considered.56 Seven companies were selected in the NPB's initial batch of
applicants, and a further eight later in 1985.57
In the government's promotion of the Japanese model, it is significant that 
only selective aspects have been highlighted. Through this selectivity the 
government appears to have conjured up a somewhat idealised conception of the 
Japanese system. This has served to obscure the implications for labour of the 
shift to company welfarism in Singapore. With workers' benefits tied to service 
with a given company, the freedom of workers to exercise occupational and job 
mobility could be significantly curtailed. From the employer's viewpoint, this has 
the advantage of arresting job-hopping and making training and retraining easier 
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and more feasible owing to the more stable workforce. This amounts to an 
enforced and blatantly pragmatic nexus between worker and employer rather than 
a close ideological bond between the two. Should such a bond develop, this would 
constitute additional, self-imposed labour discipline. 
A further consequence of companies assuming welfare responsibilities is an 
inevitable widening of disparities in worker benefits. Benefits can only be 
provided according to a company's ability and quite obviously this is an extremely 
variable factor. This would be further compounded should house unions be 
introduced on any large scale in Singapore. The bargaining strength of unions 
would diminish with company size. This is a side of the Japanese reality which the 
PAP has conveniently played down. Emerson points out, for example, that wages 
and fringe benefits in Japan's smaller automobile companies can be as little as 
50% of those received by workers of the major companies.58 A further oversight
by the PAP in its exhortation of the Japanese system is that recourse to strike 
action is common, indeed integral, to the bargaining strength of unions in Japan. 
Such action has effectively been outlawed in Singapore and is seen as antithetical 
to at least the PAP's understanding of 'team spirit'. The closer we examine the 
implications for labour of concrete policies embodying 'team spirit', the less 
attractive the concept appears for labour. 
Apart from the possible problems simply involved in the implementation of 
COWEC on a large scale, there may be other problems which the government will 
have to confront. It has been pointed out that wide social and cultural differences 
exist between Japan and Singapore. The peculiar loyalty of Japanese workers to 
their companies and devotion to national objectives is in no insignificant way 
related to a cultural heritage of Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintoism, all of 
which stress the domination of the hierarchy and group. The government stands 
above the individual. 59 This contrasts with the Singaporean emphasis on
individual and family. Therefore, company welfarism is as much a consequence of 
shared or traditional values as it is an instigator of them in Japan. Will company 
welfarism thus necessarily evoke the same loyalty in the case of Singapore? 
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Finally, the government's shift towards company welfarism is also related to 
concerns about the costs to the state in providing welfare. This is suggested by 
the recent government moves to diminish its responsibilities for public health 
care. The government expressed concern in its Blue Paper, or preliminary report, 
on health care in February 1983 that the Ministry of Health's running costs had 
risen from $59 million to $257 million in the ten years from 1971. 60 With a
rapidly ageing population, running costs are likely to escalate steeply in the 
future.6
1 Resulting from this concern, the government has introduced a new
hospital care plan, known as Medisave, under which enforced workers' savings 
from the CPF will be used to cover hospital costs. The government will continue 
to incur the capital and equipment costs and train the necessary skilled 
manpower. Under Medisave, which will ultimately see the end of any government 
subsidisation of hospital care, 6% of each worker's CPF contributions will be set 
aside for a special account to cover that worker for hospitalisation. 
An obvious effect of Medisave is that it will be especially adverse for lower 
income earners. At the time of its introduction, 75% of hospital costs were 
subsidised by the government. Under the new arrangement, however, hospital 
costs will not vary according to income. While the privileged and middle class will 
be able to afford personal or corporate health insurance, the poorer Singaporeans 
who are not otherwise covered through COWEC will have limited health care.62
Possibly one of the intentions of Medisave is to coerce workers into supporting 
COWEC as a means of addressing this insecurity. At the same time, the move is 
also related to the PAP's view that state enterprises should pay their way. 
Political and Social Considerations 
Given the extensiveness of the government's campaign to address worker 
attitudes, onlookers could be excused for presuming that a serious problem 
existed. Interestingly, though, the government's concern was disproportionate to 
that of employers. For certain there had long been complaints by employers about 
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excessive job-hopping, but this labour mobility could reasonably be seen as 
workers taking legitimate advantage of the market rather than demonstration of 
poor work attitudes. In 1981, the NPB conducted a survey to gauge employers' 
views on .worker attitudes.63 Members of the Singapore International Chamber of
Commerce (SICC), representative of the republic's most important employers, 
indicated in the survey that they considered work attitudes favourable. SICC 
Chairman, R. W. Lutton, made it clear that Chamber members generally did not 
share the officially-inspired concern about worker attitudes, implying that 
isolated cases of poor attitudes reflected as much on management's own ability: 
We do not share the oft heard jeremaids about the inadequacies of 
the Singapore worker. There is naturally scope for improvement, as 
there always is in any human activity, and it is a prime management 
responsibility to give the right leadership and to display the right 
attitudes which will encourage this improvement.64
Lutton pointed out that the Chamber's own surveys had found that there was no 
clear pattern of complaint amongst manufacturers. Later in the same year, an 
American resource firm, Business Environment Risk Information (BERD, released 
its results of a 45-country examination of international investment suitability.65
It was concluded that Singapore had the best labour force from the viewpoint of 
the international investor, with a particularly high rating under the category of 
'worker attitude' and the best rating of all countries for 'relative productivity' in 
the manufacturing sector. 66
Not only did employers therefore seem unconvinced that any urgent problem 
of worker attitudes existed, but some local economists also pointed out that the 
government's emphasis on the relationship between worker attitudes and 
productivity was over-emphasised. 67 Particularly in the more capital-intensive
areas of industry, improvements in productivity derived largely from technological 
changes to the production process and increased investment in capital 
equipment. Dr Tony Tan acknowledged these criticisms in his 1983 Budget Speech 
and, although he did not take the opportunity to debate the point, he made it plain 
that the government was insistent on the fundamentality of worker attitudes: 
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I do not intend to debate the correctness or otherwise of such views 
but it is pertinent to remember that m·achines have to be operated, 
monitored and controlled by human beings. It is the accretion of 
small contributions in human efforts that determines the 
competitive edge of nations. We therefore have to continue with 
the drive to inculcate better work attitudes and understanding of 
productivity among our workers.68
As a matter of emphasis, however, it nevertheless appeared as though the 
government had paid undue attention to supposedly poor work attitudes, even to 
the point where some observers warned that potential investors might be scared 
off. 69 This emphasis, however, needs to be understood in the context of much
wider considerations by the PAP, considerations of a political nature. 
Apart from seeking maximum labour co-operation in the restructuring 
process, another fundamental concern with worker attitudes was to ensure that 
the PAP's own political security would not be threatened in the years ahead. In 
view of the P AP's virtual stranglehold over state power, and its long-standing and 
impressive electoral support, such a concern may seem unwarranted. 
Nevertheless, starting in the 1980 general elections, there were indications of 
some disaffection with the PAP and, although this was most unlikely to manifest 
in any real threat to PAP dominance in the short term, the PAP seemed deeply 
concerned about the longer term possibilities. The emergence of disaffection, 
however slight, was ominous for the PAP since the 1980s was projected as a 
decade of rapid economic and social change. The preparedness of the electorate 
to accept the government's initiatives and the hardships these could bring some 
people in the short term, might therefore need to be boosted by addressing not 
just perceptions of work but those of government and authority generally. 
If the 1980 general election raised questions about which PAP leaders had 
become concerned, it was the loss of the seat of Anson in the October 1981 by­
election to Jeyaretnem which accelerated the Party's worry and prompted a stern 
response. Although this loss gave the opposition parties but one member in 
parliament, the first since 1968, it was the symbolic significance of Jeyaretnam's 
victory and the awareness that the PAP leadership did not enjoy absolute 
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electorate approval which was totally unacceptable. In what appeared an over­
reaction, various measures were taken to guard against any more serious challenge 
to PAP dominance being posed. 
As early as the February 1979 by-elections in which the PAP fielded seven 
new recruits and won all seven seats,70 the ruling party suspected indications of
some unease from the electorate. In two constituencies the PAP did less 
satisfactorily than it had come to expect. WP's J.B. Jeyaretnam managed to 
attract 38.1 % of the vote in the Telok Blangah contest, compared to 60.2% to the 
PAP's Rohan Kanis's. In Potong Pasir, the PAP candidate, Defence Minister Howe 
Yoon Chong, attracted 65.4% of the vote whilst 32.4% was attracted by the 
Secretary-General of the recently-established Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), 
Chaim See Tong.71 The full significance of these results, however, did not fully
dawn on the PAP at the time. However, in the December 1980 general election, 
in which another 18 new candidates represented the PAP, a similar pattern 
emerged.72 Overall, the PAP won 75.55% of the total votes cast, compared with
72.4% for the 1976 general election. In the same two troublesome electorates, 
however, Jeyaretnam made considerable ground to take 46.3% of the vote whilst 
the share dropped to 52.2% for Kanis. Meanwhile, Chiam improved his vote to 
40.3% with a drop to 58.1 % for Howe.73 Attempts at explaining the sustained and
improved performances of these opposition candidates naturally addressed a 
number of factors. A significant characteristic of these two electorates, 
however, which would have been of concern to the PAP was the high percentage 
of newly enfranchised youths in these predominantly middle-class constituencies. 
It was tempting to conclude that the younger and better educated Singaporean 
youth, who did not share the same historical experience of political instability as 
the previous generation, viewed the PAP in a more critical light than their 
parents. In particular, the authoritarian style and repressive political measures of 
the PAP might well have seemed unwarranted in stable Singapore. 7 4 The
immediate PAP response to the 1980 results was calm, but some sole searching no 
doubt took place behind closed doors. 
441 
The dominant explanations for the PAP's loss of the Anson seat focused on 
two main aspects. First, the hip-pocket nerve of the electorate, one which is 
predominantly of low income, was seen as important. Rising bus fares, Public 
Utilities Board (PUB) charges, food prices, double-digit inflation and the 
escalation of prices for HDB flats had hit some of the poorest pockets of 
Singapore society.75 Second, most analysts attributed at least some of the
support for the Workers' Party in Anson to a demonstration of resentment at the 
style of PAP leadership. Arrogance and intimidation was a blatant feature of the 
Anson campaign by the PAP. Not only did the PAP field an inexperienced 
candidate in Anson, Pang Kim Hin, it also warned constituents that they could not 
expect to benefit from government policies as much if they were to elect an 
opposition candidate.76 The authoritarian nature of the PAP was also seen to
have alienated certain educated, middle class elements. 
The PAP's own postmortem on Anson identified rising prices and housing 
problems as the main factors accounting for the shock loss. Lee Kuan Yew 
publically attributed the loss to the planned eviction of 1,179 Blair Plain voters 
without priority in resettlement, hefty prices confronting 4,576 voters on the HDB 
waiting list, and the proposed resettlement of 750 voters from Kampong Bahru. In 
each case home ownership was jeopardised.77 Lee avowed the government's
determination to ensure every Singaporean would, in future, be able to afford a 
home despite rising costs. 78 Lee, however, also levelled a large share of the
blame for the Party's defeat on the Second Generation leaders who had been given 
full command of the campaign. 79 He saw the loss as a reflection of the
ineffectiveness of the younger generation leaders to communicate with the 
electorate, and the poor grassroots level organisation. The younger generation 
was seen as unable to establish rapport with ordinary people: "Young leaders must 
learn to put hard facts in simple terms ordinary people can understand". 80 Lee's
reference to the Anson defeat as "an unfortunate misadventure, not without 
several blessings" was not the least inspired by his belief that it afforded the 
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chance to critically assess the capacity of its younger generation of leaders and 
consider appropriate corrective action.81 As we shall see later in Chapter 12,
however, either Lee failed to comprehend the alienating effect of his own 
preferred style of leadership or he was incapable of addressing it. 
Despite Lee's reference to the ironical blessings of the Anson defeat, there 
was no doubt that the loss touched a very sensitive nerve. The PAP reacted to the 
loss with a resolve that there would be no more Jeyaretnam's. The message was 
spelt out plainly that Singapore had no place for a political opposition; a message 
conveyed both through extensive public denunciation of political systems char­
acterised by strong oppositions and concrete measures to tighten the PAP's 
political control as a means of obstructing any serious opposition forming in 
Singapore. Lee was particularly concerned that the younger generation of 
Singaporeans might subscribe to the liberal notion of an opposition as important to 
keeping a government accountable: 
In the next few years, they (the younger generation) will learn that 
an opposition, if we are lucky, makes no difference to good 
government. 
Unfortunately, they may well discover, at great cost, that if we are 
unlucky, like most developing countries, an opposition can make for 
confusion by raising false expectations of unattainable benefits from 
greater welfare spending, as in Britain and in so many Third World 
countries. 
Instead of sound planning and hard work to achieve the progress of 
their countries, these opposition �roups raise false hopes of easy 
giveaways from an imaginary pie. BZ
Second Deputy Prime Minister Sinnathamby Rajaratnam reiterated this 
theme in a speech in February 1982, going so far as to turn the liberal argument 
on its head: 
No opposition enters parliament to help a government govern well. 
Were an opposition to succeed in its declared objective, then there 
can be no doubt of the outcome in a subsequent election ... put 
bluntly, the role of an opposition is to ensure bad government. 83
Both Lee and Rajaratnam associated poor economic growth with political systems 
featuring significant oppositions, the implication being that Singapore could ill-
afford the luxury of an opposition. Jayaretnam's rough and intimidatory 
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treatment by the PAP, both inside and outside parliament, further underlined the 
Party's contempt for any form of political opposition.84
Following the defeat in Anson, there were a number of significant moves by 
the PAP leadership to tighten political control - both over the Party itself and 
over wider structures of Singapore society. In February 1982, the government 
appointed S.R. Nathan, a career civil servant and one-time Defence Ministry 
Secretary Chief, to head Straits Times Press Limited85. The government had
made no secret of its dissatisfaction with the media coverage of the Anson by­
election, believing it had promoted support for Jayaretnam. 86 It also affected
comprehensive changes to the ownership and structure of the local press which are 
depicted in Figure 1 below. In early 1982 the government-proposed Singapore 
Monitor Limited was established, ostensibly to provide competition for the Straits 
Times.87 By mid-1982, however, the government announced that the Straits
Times Press group would lend the name of its afternoon tabloid, New Nation, to 
Singapore Monitor Limited in exchange for a three-year guarantee that Monitor 
would not publish a morning paper. In the same year, the two rival Chinese­
language dailies, Nanyang Siang Pau Singapore Limited and Sin Chew Jit Poh 
(Singapore) Limited, .were merged into a single holding company, Singapore News 
and Publications Limited. Singapore Monitor Limited was also a subsidiary of 
Singapore News and Publications Limited whose management included senior 
government officials and was chaired by the DBS President Chua Kim Yeow.88 
From March 1983, the traditional Chinese dailies were replaced by two new dailies 
- Lian He Zao Bao (United Morning News) and Lian He Wan Bao (United Evening
News). The government's scheme was completed in July 1984 when Straits Times 
Press Limited and its sister printing and publishing giant, Times Publishing Berhad, 
merged with Singapore News and Publications Limited to form Singapore Press 
Holdings (SPH). Capitalised at US$660 million, SPH embraces seven major daily 
newspapers in three languages and has an advertising stranglehold in 
Singapore. 89 Not only did it constitute a completed media monopoly but it
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formed the largest industrial group and sixth largest listed company in 
Singapore. 90
Figure 1: Reorganisation of Singapore Press, 1982-83 
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Source: John A. Lent, "Restructuring of Mass Media in Malaysia and Singapore -
Pounding in the Coffin Nails", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 4, 
1984, p.29. 
Official explanations of the media restruC?turing have focused on two related 
points. First, it has been claimed that the merger avoided a circulation battle 
which would have cost an estimated $20-$30 million. 91 Second, the added
financial strength and combined resources enables SPH to diversify into high­
technology communications.92 Impo_rtant as these considerations may have been,
the long-term political consequences of a highly competitive local press had also 
occurred to the government and were foremost in its thinking. In the rivalry which 
was developing between publishers for circulation, the recruitment of journalists 
had become a central feature of the battle. The competition to attract the best 
graduates from university had not only begun to manifest in attractive salaries for 
journalists, it had also threatened to elevate the social esteem of the profession 
and introduce a new degree of quality and imagination to local reporting.93 This,
of course, ran counter to Lee's plans for the 1980s, especially the desire to 
maintain a very tight clamp on the reporting of electoral politics. The resulting 
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merger put an end to competitive reporting and arrested the potential for a more 
analytical press. 
Lee's worry about the aloofness of PAP's younger generation leaders and his 
concern that the government's policies were not being properly explained at 
grassroots level prompted a new campaign to improve the PAP's community 
relations. Centrally controlled local community organisations, long an important 
instrument of the P AP's political machinery, 94 were to assume a more overt
political function. 95 Previously these organisations concentrated on local issues
exclusively. As from 1982, however, the Citizens' Consultative Committees were 
to lead discussions on such matters as wage policy, productivity and defence. 
These committees were not just to favourably portray government policy, but also 
to gauge the likely response of electorates to policy decisions - something which 
had been miscalculated in recent years.96 Both processes, it was also hoped,
would enhance the political education of the younger leaders, sending them 'back 
to the people'. 
Owing to doubts about the political acumen of the younger generation of 
leaders, there was some question of whether the pol.icy of ushering in new leaders 
might need to be temporarily halted.97 Certainly it appeared as though at least
some of the Old Guard had been persuaded to hang on a little longer than they 
might have hoped to. 98 However, at the PAP's 1982 Biennial Conference, the
ushering in of the Second Generation leaders resumed, with the first changes in 
the 12-member central executive since late-1980. Members to step down were 
Deputy Prime Minister Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, Toh Chin Chye, Lee Khoon Choy 
and Goh Keng Swee.99 New committee members were Ch'ng Jit Koon, Ho Kah
Leong, S. Jayakumar and Lee Yiok Seng_ lOO After much thought, Lee appeared to
have concluded that only through greater exposure, albiet under very watchful 
eyes, would the Second Generation leaders develop greater political acumen.101
Decisions of even greater significance which were taken at the 1982 Biennial 
Conference related to the Party constitution. Of special significance was the 
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redefinition of the PAP and its objectives, which involved an elevation of the 
Party to the status of 'national movement'. As a national movement, the Party 
was to be "dedicated to the service of our nation and to the advancement and 
well-being of our people" .102 The following explanation for this redefinition was
submitted in the editorial of Petir, the official Party organ: 
The task of running a nation of 2.4 million people of diverse races, 
religions and languages located in a small territory with no 
significant natural resources is no trivial matter, it is an awesome 
responsibility. No fly-by-night political parties, committed only to 
the politics of dissent, which are devoid of capable leaders and 
credible alternative policies, can run the country. Only a Party 
which can move an entire people can govern Singapore.110
What this meant, in effect, was that only the PAP was capable of, or had a right 
to, governing the country. Obviously the PAP would ideally like people to identify 
the Party as a national movement, though invariably this redefinition contained 
the suggestion of an official one-party state. However, as Smith has pointed out, 
the government appears to have aroused this suspicion precisely to dismiss it.104
So, whilst on the one hand making it very clear that only the PAP could or should 
govern, on the other hand the PAP reaffirmed its commitment to democratic 
elections.105 The PAP's confirmation of its faith in democratic elections was
calculated to give the appearance of a party supporting democratic principles. 
Free elections, however, do not in themselves represent tolerance of opposition. 
Opposition can be very effectively eliminated or curtailed by more systematic 
means prior to elections. Thus, the statement of support for democratic 
elections made by Dr Tony Tan at the Conference should be seen primarily as an 
attempt to give the more important point of the Party's redefined role and status 
greater legitimacy. The essence of the Conference message was that Singapore 
could not afford to entertain the idea of any government which was not the PAP. 
Other decisions at the Conference were taken which would enhance the 
power of the Party elite to control internal dissidence. Although the PAP had 
never been a mass-party, the removal of the right of its members to attend 
conferences and vote on proposed resolutions marked a new high in elitism. The 
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mandatory biennial Party congresses were now to be held only according to the 
agenda determined by the central executive committee.106 This increased
centralisation of power has been explained by Smith as designed to ensure that a 
tighter rein on younger generation leaders and members can be secured whilst 
they are gradually educated in the grassroots organisations and required to prove 
their capacity.107
The worry of the core PAP leadership about the Second Generation has been 
a thematic one since the early part of 1980. It was further highlighted by the 
apparent turnaround by Lee at the 1982 Biennial Conference on the question of a 
parliamentary opposition. It was then that Lee spoke of an opposition as a 
positive thing, albiet in a peculiarly utilitarian regard: 
Younger PAP leaders need opposition members in parliament as 
sparring partners to keep them fit and agile ... I have come to the 
conclusion that we might have to ensure that several better and 
more intelligent opposition members are in 13._arliament. We may
have to make some changes to bring this about. 08 
Although Lee did not elaborate on just how he envisaged this scheme being 
effected, one which had of course been mooted before, Second Deputy Prime 
Minister Rajaratnam subsequently outlined a three-point plan which was under 
consideration.109 As we shall see in more detail in Chapter 12, the PAP's revision
on the opposition question culminated in amendments to Singapore's constitution 
in July 1984 which provided for 'non-constituent' parliamentary seats. Under the 
amendments, a minimum of three opposition MPs was assured, with up to the 
three highest opposition losers in general elections being offered non-constituent 
seats carrying limited voting rights. llO
The change of thinking by the PAP leadership by the end of 1982 can be 
explained by two factors. First, it appeared as though heavy public attacks on 
Jeyaretnam had proved counter-productive for the PAP, evoking sympathy for the 
opposition MP and exposing the intolerance of the PAP. It had become clear that 
there was a general public sympathy for the idea of an opposition per se. Second, 
the government had come to the conclusion that it should be examining ways of 
---- - ----- - - - --,-------------,-------=----,-------
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institutionalising opposition in such a way as to influence the form and nature of 
it. In so doing, the PAP hoped to safeguard its own dominance. The same 
approach had been successfully employed with organised labour. Of course, 
amongst other things, the adoption of non-constituent parliamentary seats was 
correctly perceived by the various opposition parties as a form of patronage which 
could only reduce the authenticity of parliamentary opposition. The PAP had thus 
not revised its intolerance of opposition, only the means of addressing it. 
The support for opposition candidates in the 1980 general elections and then 
in the PAP's loss of the Anson seat in the 1981 by-election not only prompt�d 
constitutional and organisational change by the PAP. The leadership had taken 
these events so seriously that quite profound conclusions were drawn about the 
population's perception of the Party. In particular, the PAP leadership sensed 
currents of an underlying set of values which could ultimately challenge the 
legitimacy of the PAP, or at least reduce its hegemony. Principally the 
government was worried that Western materialist values threatened to minimise 
the degree of sacrifice forthcoming from the population. Further, the government 
concluded that the relatively comfortable existences of the younger generation 
Singaporeans impaired its appreciation of the PAP's contribution to today's living 
standards, especially since many of these people either had no memory or 
experience of pre-PAP-ruled Singapore.111 To temper these wider attitudinal
problems, the PAP sought to cultivate a stronger ideological affinity between the 
population and the Party. This would serve the inter-related functions of securing 
PAP hegemony and fostering a more favourable climate for the structural changes 
ahead. This climate was to be sought through the promotion of Confucianist 
values which conveniently emphasise respect for leadership and authority. 
In February 1982, it was announced that Confucian ethics would in future 
(from 1984) be taught in schools as an option under the compulsory religious 
knowledge programme. Dr Goh Keng Swee explained the move as an attempt to 
address the "less desirable aspects of Western culture" which prevailed in 
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Singapore society.112 By this he not only meant materialism and individualism.
More particularly, he appeared to be referring to the relationship between 
government and people. Goh explained that Confucianism provided a code of 
conduct by which such relationships were most satisfactorily executed: 
"Confucius believed that unless the government is in the hands of upright men, 
disaster will befall the country. By the way, in this respect, the P .A.P also 
believes the same thing" .113 Goh went on to argue that the economic successes
of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore were possible because of the 
Confucianist tradition of these countries which developed a peculiar character in 
their peoples. For Goh, the Confucianist ethic provided the code of personal 
conduct by which Singapore could achieve greater economic success in the years 
ahead.114 Evidently, as the above quote seems to suggest, this involves respect
for those honourable PAP leaders who have served the country well. According to 
Confucius, if a government was competent and trustworthy it should not be 
questioned but respected and obeyed.115 Of course, subscription to such a
contract would, in the case of Singapore, conveniently rule out the need for any 
political opposition in view of the PAP's past performance. 
The P AP's new emphasis on Confucianist ethics was particularly geared 
towards reversing the attitudes of the younger generation. Lee saw the young 
increasingly attracted by Western lifestyles and values. This was, according to 
Lee, in part the influence of Western television programmes but also a by-product 
of less effective transmission of traditional values through the family. Working 
mothers were unable to devote the necessary time to countering the intrusion of 
Western values. In this respect, Lee saw the restoration of the three-generation 
family as a crucial consideration: 
The three-generation family is a rarity in Western Europe and in 
America. Yet it is still common in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan or 
Hong Kong, despite their industrialisation and modernisation. It is a 
question of family structure, of social framework, of filial ties and 
bonds, which hold family units together. Our strong family structure 
has been a great strength for continuity in bringing up of the next 
generation. The family has transmitted social values more by 
osmosis than by formal instruction. We must preserve this precious · 
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family structure if our society is to regenerate itself without loss of 
vigour, compassion and wisdom.116
Lee seemed to think that the extended family structure provided an 
important medium through which Confucian ethics could be transmitted, and in 
which they were epitomised. At the same time, the government saw the revival 
of the three-generation family as one means by which the pressure for public 
housing could be relieved. Towards this end, the government introduced measures 
which gave applications for public housing involving extended families special 
priority.117 The government's promotion of filial piety was certainly to some
extent motivated by the expected short-fall in land available for public 
housing.118 It provided a convenient justification too for the government's
attempts to curtail welfare spending and allow it to concentrate on expanding 
economic development expenditure. 
Apart from the decadence of the young in their subscription to Wes tern 
values, Lee was also worried about, what he saw as, a "disbelief in the durability 
of change we have wrought in Singapore" .119 Lee talked of the need to stem the
impatience of the young whom he saw as trying to "get their share of the cake 
before the boom slowed down".120 This attitude was completely counter to what
Lee saw as necessary for the 1980s. Only through a belief in the inevitable long 
term benefits to the whole nation resulting from 'team work' could Singapore 
realise the ambitious goals being set: 
The more impatient the young are in wanting their share of the 
cake, the more they will check the pace and the permanence of our 
growth. 
The more Singaporeans, young and old, conduct themselves on the 
assumption that this transformation requires a sustained long­
termed effort, the more quickly we shall maintain high growth 
through the 1980s and 1990s.121
It is in the context of this long term vision of the PAP's leaders that the 
government's concern over attitudes must be seen. There was by no means any 
immediate problem posed by Singapore's younger generation. 
Through Confucianism, it was hoped that the primary concern for self­
interest amongst the country's workers might be replaced with a greater sense of 
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national identity. This would enhance social cohesion and a feeling of social 
responsibility towards decreed national goals.122 It is likely that the government
placed some hope in this responsibility curbing impetuosity at the political level as 
well as creating a more compliant attitude towards restructuring and a greater 
tolerance for welfare cuts. 
Though not recognised by the government, the supposed 'decadence' of 
Singapore's younger generation was as much a consequence of the government's 
suppression of political culture as it was a by-product of affluence. After all, 
Singaporeans had been systematically discouraged from critically assessing the 
values underlying their own society. They had peen persuaded to equate good 
government with the ability to raise material standards of living or, more 
abstractly, increased GDP. The government's legitimacy was premised on the 
ideology of rapid economic growth and the immediate interest of all Singaporeans 
to achieve this. The government had represented material benefit as a trade-off 
for an active and critical political culture. It was one or the other. The elitist 
decision-making process of the PAP and the lack of any deep-seated values beyond 
the ideology of economic growth characterised the government. Commitment to 
the PAP was thus, not surprisingly, based on pragmatism rather than any higher or 
more abstract principles; and it was upon this basis that the Party earned its 
legitimacy. Self-interest and materialism were logical attitudes for Singaporeans 
to develop in such a context. 
The government's perceived need to promote Confucianism has raised a 
number of questions and problems. In the first place, there is the question of 
whether the sort of obedience and respect for authority associated with 
Confucianism is appropriate to the development of a higher stage in Singapore's 
industrialisation. As a didactic code, Confucianism leaves no scope for critical 
analysis, a quality which is arguably already in short supply in Singapore.123
Certainly it is no coincidence that Japan's rapid post-World War Il industrialisation 
has gone hand-in-hand with the decline of Confucianism and the rise of liberal 
democratic practices. A certain amount of public debate and the critical 
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exchange of ideas plays a role in promoting creative capacities useful to capital 
and industry. Creativity and imagination will be called upon more so in Singapore 
if industry is to become engaged in the innovative production of goods and 
services in higher technology. The government may be seeking to implement 
values pertinent to a stage in social and economic development quite different 
from that now being sought for Singapore. 
The primary concern which prompted the promotion of Confucian ethics, 
with emphasis on filial piety and obedience to government, was the PAP's long 
term legitimisation. It was hoped that this would work at two levels: first, by 
instilling appropriate attitudes of reverence for the government; and second, by 
alleviating housing problems which had a proven capacity to manifest politically. 
The PAP has always seen its complete dominance of formal power as a necessary 
pre-requisite for the industrialisation of Singapore, a perception which helps 
explain the apparent over-reaction to the PAP's loss in Anson in 1981. This 
reaction, however, emphasises another feature of the PAP - its belief in dealing 
with perceived political problems when they are in their infancy. 
Conclusion 
It has been explained in the discussion above that the government's active 
encouragement of capital restructuring extends well beyond immediate economic 
policies. It has, amongst other things, involved a reconstitution of trade unions to 
establish a structure of control over labour more consistent with the needs of 
capital in a higher stage of industrialisation. The utilisation of unions for social 
engineering, however, also requires a capacity and willingness from union 
leadership to exploit this structure in the way intended. Therefore, increasingly 
the PAP has made its domination of key NTUC posts a priority. The government 
has emphasised that in times of rapid capital restructuring in the 1980s, labour 
discipline becomes even more crucial if Singapore is to attract the sorts of 
investments desired. Ensuring that discipline, however, has engaged the govern­
ment in an address of wider ideological, political and social considerations. 
I I 
--- ------- --:-- -- ----,-- --------;--�--=-=-----,---
453 
Domination of the NTUC and a restructuring of trade unions does not, in 
itself, guarantee a willing commitment from workers to capital restructuring. In 
conjunction with these changes then, we have seen a concerted, if not too subtle, 
attempt by the PAP to create an ideological acceptance of rapid restructuring. 
Productivity, as a concept, has been promoted as a national goal, towards which 
some short term sacrifice or inconvenience might be required. In recognising that 
ultimately increased productivity is for everyone's benefit (without any necessary 
structural change to influence the distribution of rewards), workers have been 
called upon to adopt the highest possible level of co-operation with capital in 
raising productivity. Singaporeans have been urged to work as a team, and reject 
as irrelevant and mischievous notions of class or sectional interest. 
In the above, we have also seen that the PAP feels that if its own political 
hegemony can be assured on a long term basis then successful economic 
restructuring is likely to follow. Without PAP hegemony, however, there can be 
little prospect for Singapore. As a result, workers' attitudes to capital and the 
electorate's .attitudes to the PAP are seen to be closely related and deserved of 
simultaneous address. Political and social stability in Singapore can only be 
maintained by the population suitably appreciating this nexus between the PAP 
and industrialisation and, indeed, economic growth generally. As we have seen, 
towards instilling such an appreciation, and thereby avoiding any long term 
challenge to this nexus, the PAP has introduced various 'carrot and stick' policies 
and has even resurrected Confucianism as a guiding philosophy towards this end. 
In conjunction with the promotion of the ideological notion of productivity as a 
technical process which embodies the interests of all classes, the government has 
been busy trying to foster the internalisation of various other ideological notions 
in support of its own political hegemony. Although much of this ideology suggests 
the opposite, the government itself seems by its actions to be fully aware that 
capital restructuring is an intensely political process. 
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PROGRESS OF THE NEW ECONOMIC STRATEGY 
Introduction 
Having spent the last two chapters outlining the government's economic strategy 
since 1979 and the various social, political and ideological measures adopted in its 
support, it remains to examine the subsequent response of investors. From the 
outset, however, it must be emphasised that the following discussion is not intend­
ed to prove or disprove the validity of the government's strategy. Investment 
patterns obviously represent a response to a complex variety of factors, of which 
state policy is one. State policy-makers are, of course, fully aware of this and the 
intention of any economic strategy is usually to exploit these factors wherever 
possible. The task of isolating the effect of specific state policies is thus by no 
means easy and, indeed, to some extent obscures the important point that the 
relationship between state and capital is a dialectical one rather than cause and 
effect. Nevertheless, whilst acknowledging this, it is assumed in this chapter that 
through a study of international capital in Singapore since 1979 we may at least be 
able to clarify some of the considerations which have influenced investment 
decisions in this period. 
Whilst the government's new economic strategy aims at Singapore assuming 
a more technologically sophisticated position in the new international division of 
labour, one of the official reasons for urgent restructuring is the need to arrest 
and, in turn, alleviate the economy's dependence upon guest labour. Thus, by the 
government's own definition the progress of the strategy also needs to be 
measured by the degree to which such dependence has been broken. As we shall 
see immediately below, it appears the strategy has been less successful in this 















Table 17: Manufacturing Sector, 1979-1983 
Value Added* Direct* Foreign** 
Per Worker Exports Investment 
$000 $M (Gross Fixed Assets) 
$M 
23.8 16,203.0 6,349 
29.9 19,172.9 7,520 
34.5 22,375.3 8,593 
34.0 21,858.7 9,607 
36.2 22,640.8 10,514 
Sources: * Department of Statistics, Singapore, Report on The Census of 
Industrial Production 1983, Singapore: Singapore National 
Printers, 1984, Table 1, p.1. 
** Singapore Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1983/84, 
p.10.
Phasing out Guest Labour 
As we shall see in greater detail later, significant increases in productivity did 
occur in the manufacturing sector following 1979. Value-added per worker 
increased from $23,800 in 1979 to $34,500 in 1981, an increase of 44.96%, before 
slowing in 1982 due to the recession when employers held on to labour in spite of 
production cutbacks. In 1983, value-added per worker stood at $36,200 (see Table 
17 above). As pointed out earlier, it was intended that increased productivity, 
which the government tried to enforce through its corrective wage policy, would 
lead to reduced dependence on foreign labour.1 However, despite productivity
gains, the rapid pace of economic growth in the Singapore economy witnessed 
continued use by employers of the liberalised work permits for foreign workers. 
Details on the increase in foreign labour are not available since such 
statistics have only been collected in the 19.70 and 1980 censuses. According to 
the 1980 Census of Population there were 80,000 non-residents working in 
Singapore, an increase of 56,000 over the official 1970 figure.2 On top of this,
there was probably at least another 20,000 illegal guest workers. Whatever the 
exact extent of growth in the number of foreign workers entering Singapore after 
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1979, there had apparently been a sufficient increase in the number of workers 
from non-traditional sources (NTS) to prompt a significant government response. 
Having warned employers that liberalised foreign work permits were only a short 
term measure to reduce the problems involved in raising productivity, in January 
1982 Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew announced plans to forceably phase out all 
NTS guest labour receiving a monthly income of below $500 by 1984. Exception 
was made for workers required in the construction, shipbuilding and repair, and 
domestic service industries for which the deadline was the end of 1990.3
Just as the plan to phase out foreign labour through higher wages 
encountered problems, so too did the attempted enforced phasing out. The permit 
restrictions soon acted against the government's objective of realising economic 
growth rates of between 8% and 10% for the decade. Various companies, 
including many which had responded to the government's call for greater 
automation and mechanisation, were having to shelve plans for expansion for lack 
of labour. The policy led to a general uneasiness by employers about the future.4
As a result, in late 1982 the government decided to introduce minor concessions 
on the entry of NTS guest workers. Under the concessions, which were to take 
effect from January 1983, employers were allowed to extend the stay of NTS 
workers who were due to be repatriated by December 1984 by another one to two 
years. The number of NTS workers for whom extensions of permits would be 
made, however, was not to exceed 5% of a company's workforce and was subject 
to a ceiling of 50 NTS workers.5
Despite the minor concessions on NTS work permits and the relaxation of 
the original deadline for phasing out all NTS workers in Singapore, these proved 
insufficient to allay employers' fears once manufacturing demand improved in 
1983. In these circumstances, the government found it necessary to introduce 
further concessions. In November 1983 major concessions were extended to 
companies deemed 'deserving', that is, those which had engaged in, or planned for, 
increased automation and mechanisation. Such companies were able to retain up 
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to 60% of their NTS workers or a number equivalent to 5% of their total 
workforce (whichever were the more favourable) until 1986. There would be no 
granting of new permits for NTS workers but extensions could be obtained for up 
to 6,500 existing permit holders, exactly half the total number of NTS workers 
who were due to be repatriated by the end of 1984.6
The government's resort to the enforced phasing out of NTS guest workers 
and the subsequent relaxations of policy suggest that significant reductions in such 
labour might not be achieved without problems. A smooth phasing out is 
dependent upon productivity increases significantly arresting employment 
growth. These will need to be quite remarkable to totally avoid bottlenecks; 
Since 1979, when the total domestic workforce of Singapore was 1,035,000 and 
grew by 6.14% over the previous year, it has generally slowed in growth to 
1,186,400 in 1983, an increase of 3.05% on 1982. 7 This trend can be expected to
continue since it is a function of Singapore's declining population growth which has 
fallen from 4.4% in 1957 to 1.5% in 1980.8 There is, therefore, a structural
constraint on the scope for domestic labour force expansion. The government's 
plan, of course, is that the reduced domestic workforce expansion will be offset by 
the rising productivity and restructuring of industry which requires less labour for 
the same production. The problem is, however, that employment growth in the 
Singapore economy has been outstripping the growth in Singapore's domestic 
labour force in spite of significant increases in productivity. This is the 
consequence of rapid economic growth. Another obstacle to the government's 
plan of phasing out foreign labour is that, even though there has been a significant 
reduction in the number of people employed in the manufacturing sector lately, 
down from 285,250 in 1980 to 271,106 in 1983, 9 this has not directly translated
into a proportionate cutback in foreign labour. Some manufacturing jobs, which 
cannot be completely eliminated by moving into higher value-added production 
and increased productivity, remain unattractive to Singaporeans. Unemployment 
or, in the case of women, leaving the workforce is often preferable to assembly 
467 
work. It should be acknowledged too that the reduced employment in 
manufacturing of late is not just a function of increased productivity but the 
downturn in the world economy. An improved world economy, and consequent 
increased demand for Singapore's manufactures, would thus further test the dom­
estic workforce capacity. 
Although the government has made some concessions to employers over 
guest labour, it is emphatic that low-wage NTS labour will be phased out as 
quickly as possible. In announcing the concessions, the Acting Minister for 
Labour, Professor J. Jayakumar, stated the government's political concern about 
guest labour in the clearest possible terms. He argued that NTS guest workers 
represented a potential destabilising force in Singapore's industrial relations: "You 
see, they came from countries where they are used to confrontation with 
employers, instigation, taking up cudgels, which is contrary to our policy of 
promoting harmonious labour-management relations 11 •10 The PAP apparently sees
a strong correlation between such potentially threatening approaches to industrial 
relations and workers from non-Chinese-dominated cultures. 
This distinction between workers from Chinese and non-Chinese-dominated 
cultures was further emphasised in the government's January 1984 decision to 
remove restrictions on guest workers from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao and South 
Korea who can, as a result, stay in Singapore until 1991. Thereafter they will be 
eligible to apply for Singapore citizenship. This concession, the extending of the 
Individual Work Permit Scheme to workers from the above-mentioned NICs, is 
intended to increas·e the pool of skilled foreign labour.11 A government-sponsored
study published jointly by the Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore, an 
affiliate of the National University of Singapore, and the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry had concluded that Singapore would need an additional 2,000 workers per 
year up to 1990 for the government's projected 8% to 10% economic growth rates 
to be achieved. Even this estimated labour requirement was based on an 
optimistic assumption of productivity increases of 7% to 8% a year until 1990.12
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It has become increasingly accepted by the government, therefore, that increased 
foreign labour will be necessary if higher value-added industries are to expand as 
expected. The government maintains, however, that the more skilled workers 
from Asia's NICs would, due to cultural similarities, be easily assimilated into 
Singapore.13
General Manufacturing Development 
Although the trend in guest labour since 1979 has not completely matched the 
expectations or objectives of the government, broad developments in the economy 
and the manufacturing sector have been more satisfactory. Gross domestic 
product (GDP) for the total economy has risen at an annual average of 8.6% (at 
1968 market prices) from 1979 to 1983. Growth rates for the manufacturing 
sector have been slightly lower owing to the slackened demand for its exports, 
upon which it is heavily dependent, resulting from the global recession which hit 
Singapore in 1982. Still, with average annual GDP increases of 7.4% (at 1968 
market prices) for the period, there has been quite significant development. 
However, due to the lower than average growth rate, the manufacturing sector's 
contribution to total GDP has fallen from 22.6% in 1978 to 20.4% in 1983, after 
having risen to 24.1 % in 1980 (see Table 18 below). The sector will, therefore, 
require a considerable relative improvement in its growth rate if the government's 
original target of a 31 % contribution by manufacturing to total GDP by 1990 will 
be achieved. As we shall see below, however, falling behind this target has not 









Table 18: Gross Domestic Product, 1978-1983 
All Sectors Manufacturing 
Total Growth Total Growth 
$M % $M % 
11,074.0 2,507.1 
12,114.1 9.4 2,873.3 14.6 
13,366.5 10.3 3,215.9 11.9 
14,695.2 9.9 3,531.5 9.8 
15,627.5 6.3 3,358.3 -4.9
16,869.0 7.9 3,437.2 2.4








Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 
1983/84, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, n.d., Table 4.3, p.72. 
The growth of the manufacturing sector from 1979 to 1983 was not 
accounted for by any radical turnaround by particular industries within the 
sector. The dominant contributors to value-added and output growth were the 
already-established petroleum refineries and petroleum products, electronic 
components and products, fabricated metal products, and non-electrical 
machinery industries (see Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix). In addition to these, 
however, there were other industries with exceptionally high relative growth rates 
which came into prominence in the period. The structural cement and concrete 
products industry was the fastest expanding industry in relative terms, with value­
added increasing by 515% and output 529%.14 The boom in the construction of
public housing and industrial infrastructure naturally stimulated this industry. The 
paints, pharmaceutical and other chemical products industry was the next fastest 
in relative terms, value-added expanding by 121 % and output by 106%.15 Another
rapidly growing industry in this period was the printing and publishing industry 
which expanded value-added by 112% and output by 93%.16
There is a limit to what can be deduced from the above without a more 
detailed examination of the nature of expansion within individual industries. This 
will be largely left to the subsequent section of this chapter which deals with 
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patterns of investment. A couple of cautious observations here are nonetheless 
appropriate. For one thing, the fast growth of the structural cement, paints, 
pharmaceutical and other chemical products, and the printing and publishing 
industries represented the continuation of the broadening of Singapore's industrial 
base which had begun before 1979 but was now gathering momentum. For 
another, it is significant that these industries are for the most part high value­
added ones. The paints, pharmaceutical and other chemical products industry 
value-added per worker was three-fold that of the total value-added per worker in 
the manufacturing sector in 1983.17 The structural cement and concrete products
industry was 44% higher. The printing and publishing industry was only marginally 
lower in value-added per worker than that of the overall sector in 1983 (see Table 
7 in Appendix). 
Interestingly, at the same time as the above developments, the traditional 
low value-added textiles industry suffered a significant decline in growth. Value­
added dropped by 32% and output by 36% from 1979 to 1983. Another low value­
added industry, the sawntimber and other wood products (except furniture) 
industry, suffered a 37% drop in value-added and a 41 % drop in output.18 Whilst
both industries were particularly badly hit by the global recession, as much as any­
thing else their declines reflected the general diminishing of competitiveness of 
Singapore in low wage, low value-added production. This decline was accentuated 
but not caused by the recession. 
The above discussion suggests that in broad industry category terms the 
pattern of manufacturing growth from 1979 to 1983 was in keeping with the 
government's objectives. Of course, this observation is somewhat superficial. Not 
only is there the question of developments within industries, but it is the general 
raising of productivity of industry which must accompany economic growth for the 
government's strategy to be successful. 
Productivity increases in the manufacturing sector have been quite 
substantial from 1979 to 1983. Value-added per worker has increased by 51.1 % in 
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this period, with an average annual growth of 13.0% (at current market 
prices).19 This includes an actual decline in value-added per worker in 1982 when
there was a much faster reduction in production than in the number of workers 
employed. In this year, Singapore was feeling the full effects of the global 
recession but employers were reluctant to lay off any more workers than neces­
sary for fear of insufficient labour in the event of an upturn in demand. 
On an industry basis, the most substantial absolute gains in value-added per 
worker in the 1979-1983 period were recorded by the cement (up $94,700), 
petroleum refineries and petroleum products (up $83,000), cigarettes and other 
tobacco products (up $68,800) and paints, pharmaceutical and other chemical 
products (up $49,700) industries (see Table 7 in Appendix). In relative terms, the 
most substantial gains were recorded by cigarettes and other tobacco products (up 
199%), structural cement and concrete products (up 116%), paper and paper 
products (up 113%), and cement (up 108%).20 We have to be careful as to what
significance we attach to these increases, since substantial increases in industries 
with small bases need not have a great impact on the manufacturing sector at 
large. Bearing industry bases in mind, then, the above average increases in value­
added per worker by the fabricated metal products (up 61 %) and electronic 
products and components (up 53%) industries was an impressive achievement. 
One of the trends in the 1979-1983 period which has been especially pleasing 
for the government has been the increased productivity of some of Singapore's 
traditional, low value-added industries. Through increased automation, 
mechanisation and product upgrading, the paper and paper products (up 113%), 
furniture (up 56%), wearing apparel (up 54%) and textiles (up 49%) industries have 
made significant gains in value-added per worker.21 The increased productivity of
the textiles industry, in spite of substantial overall declines in value-added and 
output, reflects the considerable rationalisation and restructuring characterising 
the industry since 1979. Through automation and mechanisation and the shift in 
emphasis to high fashion, the industry is becoming more narrowly focused but 
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better placed to maintain international competitiveness. This, of course, is the 
sort of direction which the government's strategy implies for all low wage, low 
value industries. Data on productivity, however, suggest that there are still some 
industries in which such upgrading is happening far too slowly for the government's 
liking. These include the leather (up 27%) and footwear (up 41 %) industries which 
in 1983 still had value-added per worker levels of just $13,100 and $14,500 
respectively (see Table 7 in Appendix). 
As we shall see in greater detail later, the improved manufacturing 
productivity from 1979 to 1983 reflects a vast range of upgradings by industry. It 
has been pointed out in earlier chapters that this upgrading process actually began 
gathering momentum in the early 1970s. Of late, however, the pace has picked up 
considerably. This is partly reflected in the increase in capital expenditure by 
industry, up by 48% from 1979 to 1983. This compares with a 32% increase in 
capital expenditure from 1974 to 1978. The government's strategy did not initiate 
these increases, however, since between 1978 and 1979 there was a 73% increase 
in capital expenditure.22 Indeed, this was one of the factors which gave the
goven1ment the confidence to implement its strategy. Since then, however, we 
have seen a consistently high proportion of capital expenditure devoted to 
increasing the organic composition of capital. In 1983, for example, of the total 
capital expenditure in the manufacturing sector of $2,113,351,000, as much as 
$1,198,974,000 or 57% went into new machinery and equipment.23 This trend will
need to be sustained throughout the decade, of course, for the large scale 
restructuring of industry in Singapore. 
Though the government's new economic strategy sought a shift in emphasis 
to the production of higher value-added manufactures which were less sensitive to 
protectionism, the strategy was still founded on export-orientation. In the period 
1979-1983, domestic exports of manufactures have expanded by 39. 7%, from a 
value of $16,202,989 to $22,640,771 (see Table 5 in Appendix). In spite of this, 
however, the export/output ratio of the sector has fallen from 64.2 in 1979 to 60.8 
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in 1983 (see Table 2 in Appendix). This is obviously in large part due to 
recessionary effects, but it also reflects the matura,tion of the domestic market. 
Despite this relative decline in exports, in absolute terms exports have continued 
to largely define the pace and direction of Singapore's industry in the 1979-1983 
period. 
In absolute terms, the major domestic exports from 1979 to 1983 were, in 
order, from the petroleum refineries and petroleum products (up $1,212 million), 
electronics (up $2,810 million), non-electrical machinery (up $957 million), 
transport equipment (up $118 million) food (up $289 million) and electrical 
machinery (up $283 million) industries (see Table 5 in Appendix). In conjunction 
with these increases, there were some smaller industries which underwent consid­
erably rapid increases in exports. These included the paper and paper products (up 
393%), non-metallic mineral products (up 264%), paints, pharmaceuticals and 
other chemical products (up 149%) and non-electrical machinery (up 134%) 
industries. Interestingly, the growth in exports by the paper and paper products 
industry involved a significant re-orientation towards the Asean market, its 
contribution to exports up from 8.2% in 1979 to 25.4% in 1983. By contrast, the 
paints, pharmaceuticals and other chemical products industry export expansion 
involved a re-orientation towards non-Asean markets, up from 76.6% of total 
exports for the industry in 1979 to 82.7% in 1983.24 Overall, however, export
growth in manufacturing during this period did not involve any shift in the 
destination of exports. The ratio of non-Asean to Asean-destined exports changed 
marginally from 78.8 in 1979 to 78.5 in 1983. 25
International Capital 
General Pattern 
As has already been explained in Chapter 9, the strategy for a more capital and 
technology-intensive EOI programme was centred around the attraction of 
international capital. Unlike the circumstances in the 1960s, however, when the 
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labour-intensive phase was promoted, in 1979 international capital was firmly 
entrenched in the manufacturing sector, being primarily responsible for its shape 
and direction. In 1979, companies with at least 50% foreign equity accounted for 
67.3% of total value-added, 57.5% of all workers and 85.2% of all direct exports 
of manufactures.26 International capital had also led the qualitative advances in
industry to this point, with wholly foreign-owned companies' value-added per 
worker being $34,779 compared to $16,676 for wholly locally-owned 
companies.27 After 1979, not only did international capital consolidate its
dominance of manufacturing with further substantial investment increases, it also 
rapidly accelerated the introduction of more sophisticated technology and higher 
value-added products. As a result, by 1983 wholly foreign-owned companies' 
value-added per worker had risen to $48,995, with that of wholly locally.:..owned 
companies reaching $24,381.28
Between 1979 and mid-1983, actual foreign investment (in gross fixed assets) 
increased from $6,349 million to $10,514 million (in current prices), an increase of 
65.6% (see Table 10 in Appendix). 1980 was a record year with $1,171 million 
being invested. Foreign investment commitments also grew remarkably. The 
total value of net foreign investment commitments grew from $823 million in 
1979 to $1,776 million (in current prices) in mid-1983, an increase of 115. 7%. 29
This included substantial sums committed in 1980 and 1983 in the petrochemical 
complex, accounting for as much as $521 million or 63.3% of the total increase for 
the period. Understandably, commitments suffered due to the global recession. 
From the EDB's data on the fixed assets per worker and expected value-added per 
worker of total new investment commitments (both foreign and local), it appears 
that a fast-growing skill and capital intensity characterised investment 
commitment between 1979 and 1983. The expected fixed assets per worker rose 
by 113.7% and expected value-added per worker by 116.8% (in current prices) for 
these commitments.3° Foreign investment obviously accounts for the bulk of
these increases since it represented an annual average of 68% of total investment 
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commitments.31 It is clear from the data available then that the period 1979-
1983 was not only one of record expansion of actual and committed foreign invest­
ment, it was also one in which the quality of foreign investment picked up 
considerably. 
In broad industry category terms, the majority of foreign investment 
entering Singapore from 1979 to mid-1983 was concentrated in petroleum and 
petroleum products ($1,426 million), electrical and electronic machinery ($998 
million), industrial chemicals ($553 million), non-electrical machinery ($532 
million) and non-industrial chemical products ($261 million) (see Table 11 in 
Appendix). In relative terms, greatest gains were made by the industrial 
chemicals (up 576.0%), non-industrial chemicals (up 169.5%), non-electrical 
machinery (up 118.8%), electrical and electronic machinery (up 106.4%) and food, 
beverages and tobacco products (up 86.7%) industries.32 Of course, even before
1979 foreign investment had been largely concentrated in the three industries of 
petroleum and petroleum products, electrical and electronic machinery, and non­
electrical machinery. Post-1979 developments then suggest a consolidation of the 
dominance of these three industries, with electrical and electronic machinery 
increasing its contribution to total foreign investment from 14.8% in 1979 to 
18.4% in 1983 and non-electrical machinery's contribution increasing from 7 .1 % to 
9.3%.33 Primarily due to the exceptional growth in foreign investment in these
two industrial categories, the relative contribution of petroleum and petroleum 
products has declined from 41.4% in 1975 to 38.6% in 1983. This decline in 
relative, though certainly not absolute, terms has been a gradual one over the last 
decade, the industry accounting for 55.8% of total foreign investment in 1970.34 
Significantly, the two industrial categories whose growth from 1979 to 1983 
represented more of a rise to prominance than a consolidation of dominance in 
foreign investment were industrial chemicals and non-industrial chemicals - both 
technology and capital-intensive industries. The farmer's contribution to total 
foreign investment rose from 1.5% to 6.2% and the latter's from 2.4% to 4.0%.35
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In contrast with the consolidation and emergence of foreign investment in 
some of Singapore's more capital and technology-intensive industries between 
1979 and 1983, there was a simultaneous decline in foreign investment in some of 
Singapore's comparatively lower value-added, labour-intensive industries. Foreign 
investment in textiles declined by $108 million (down 52. 7%), wearing apparel by 
$65 million (down 47.5%), leather and rubber by $16 million (down 30.2%) and 
wood and cork by $98 million (down 44.6%) (see Table 11 in Appendix). These 
industries are precisely those upon which the government intended its corrective 
wage policy to have greatest impact. Thus, as Singapore's comparative labour 
cost advantage has been eroded in the least skilled, labour-intensive areas of 
production, the interest of foreign investors in such industries has significantly 
waned. 
It should be remembered that many of the actual investments by 
international capital from 1979 to 1983 were committed before 1979 and 
therefore reflect decisions made prior to the introduction of the government's new 
strategy. Investment commitments, therefore, represent an even more up-to-date 
representation of the response of investors since 1979. We have already learned 
that there have been impressive increases in the expected capital and skill­
intensity of these commitments. We can also see from Table 13 in the Appendix 
that the most heavily committed industries between 1979 and 1983 were, 
generally, the electrical machinery and appliances and petroleum categories. In 
absolute terms, however, the electrical machinery and apparatus industry was 
consistently the most heavily committed, with the exception of 1982 when the 
effects of the global recession were most acute for the industry. As we shall see 
in greater detail later, many of the most significant qualitative developments 
since 1979 comprise these commitments. Apart from the heavy commitments by 
Singapore's two most dominant industries, the 1979-1983 period is also character­
ised by high but sporadic commitments in other leading industries. Commitments 
in non-electrical machinery were high, particularly in 1981 and generally until 
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1982. Commitments in transport equipment also came into prominence in 1981 
and 1982, as did fabricated metal products and food and beverages in 1983. 
There is of course a limit to what can be deduced from foreign investment 
data based on broad industry categories. We know from data on productivity 
improvements in what industry categories the most substantial qualitative 
improvements have generally occurred, but the important differences within 
individual industries are not highlighted by such data. An appreciation of the most 
significant developments requires an examination of investments, both actual and 
committed, within industries. Table 19 below provides a list of the most signif­
icant higher value-added projects committed from 1979 to mid-1983. This allows 
for a superficial appreciation of the breadth of technological sophistication 
characterising foreign investment since 1979. Towards a more comprehensive and 
explanatory account of such developments, the discussion below will outline intra­
industry investments in greater detail. 
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Reed Rock Bit 
computer equipment and parts 
precision optical instruments 
blood administration sets 
specialty pharmaceuticals 
lasers and quench tubes 
oil rig elevating mechanisms 
powdered metallurgy products 
microwave links 
vertical pumps 
switching regulated power supplies 
for computers 
pneumatic controls 
plastic injection moulding machines 
aircraft blades· and vanes 
food processing research and 
development 
microcomputers and disk drives 
floppy disk drives 
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Hunt Chemical Asia/Pacific 
TRW-Reda Pump 
directional drilling equipment 
car air-conditioner compressors 
copper-clad laminates 
computer disk drives 
microcomputers 
lubricating oil additives 
glass-making machine components 
high-energy density lithium batteries 
electrical instrumentation 
aircraft gear components 
aircraft gear components 
marine diesel engines 
ball bearings 
additives for lubricating oil 
Winchester disk drives 
computer equipment 
Winchester disk drives 
computer workstations 
portable microcomputers 
surgical tables, electro-surgical 
instruments 
communication equipment 
engineering design/technical service 
centre for agro-based process 
industries 
magnetic heads for computer disk and 
tape drives 
cartridge tape drives for computers 
assembly and test of minicomputer 
systems and computer software 
development 
design and manufacture of robotic 
welding work-stations 
cocoa butter equivalents 
ink-jet printers, personal computers 
and peripherals 
photo-chemicals 
oil-field submersible pumps 
Source: Economic Development Board, Annual Reports 1979/80 - 1983/84. 
Petroleum Refining and Processing 
Of the $1,426 million (in gross fixed assets) in the petroleum refining and 
processing industry in the 1979-1983 period, a relatively small component of this 
went into the expansion of primary processing capacity.36 The more substantial
component went into the upgrading and diversification of secondary processing. 
Special attention has been paid to the need for improved operating efficiency and 
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flexibility in the face of changing market conditions since 1979. Owing to the 
substantially increased refining capacity of Indonesia in particular, together with 
generally depressed demand caused by the global recession, Singapore has found 
itself in a position of considerable excess refining capacity.37 With projects also
under way by traditional customers in the Middle East to expand refining 
capacity, 38 international companies in Singapore have concluded that long term
survival depends upon a rapid shift in emphasis to secondary processing.39
Moreover, further diversification of crudes would need to be of high quality and 
competitive prices to compete with the anticipated Middle East products.40
Under pressure to generate new areas for expansion, there has also been a 
diversification into oil trading and oil terminalling, areas of less value-added then 
refining. 41
In addition to the developments in refining described above, in February 
1984 the $2 billion petrochemical complex which has been under detailed planning 
since 1978 was opened at Palau Ayer Marbau. Not only was this the first fully 
integrated petrochemical complex in Southeast Asia, it was also the biggest single 
industrial investment in Singapore's history. The complex is comprised of an 
'upstream' company which processes natural gas, naptha and other hydrocarbon 
f eedstocks into intermediate chemicals, and four 'downstream' companies 
transforming these chemicals into a variety of final products. The upstream 
company is the Petrochemical Corporation of Singapore (PCS), a joint-venture 
made up of 50% Singapore government equity, 10% Japanese government equity 
and 40% equity by a consortium of 34 private Japanese companies led by 
Sumitomo Chemical Corporation.42 The downstream projects in the complex are
The Polyolefia Company (Singapore) Pte. Ltd (30% Singapore government equity), 
Phillips Petroleum Singapore Chemical (Pte) Ltd (30% Singapore government 
equity), Denka Singapore Pte. Ltd (20% Singapore government equity) and Ethyl­
ene Glycols (Singapore) Pte. Ltd (approximately 28% Singapore government 
equity).43 The government has various private Japanese and US-based partners in
these downstream projects.44
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The capacity and range of production of the petrochemical complex is quite 
considerable for an economy the size of Singapore. 45 Putting the long-awaited
complex into place, however, was not achieved without some apprehension, even 
pull-outs, by international capital.46 Since planning the project, a dramatic
worldwide downturn in demand for petrochemical products, excessive global 
capacity, and the emergence of competition from Middle East countries have all 
raised questions about the project's commercial viability.47 Nevertheless, the
huge investment in the complex necessitates that its participants constantly 
upgrade into higher value-added downstream products in order to be 
competitive.48 For its symbolic value alone, heralding the arrival of a new level
of technological sophistication, the petrochemical project was viewed by the 
Singapore government as integral to its new economic strategy. Now that 
international capital has been successfully wooed to partner the government, 
however, it is the global market which appears to be the fundamental determinant 
of the form and extent of international capital investment. 
Electrical/Electronic Machinery 
Behind the petroleum and petroleum products category, actual foreign investment 
between 1979 and mid-1983 was most heavily concentrated in the electrical and 
electronic machinery, apparatus, appliances and supplies category, a sum of $998 
million (in gross fixed assets). Many of these investments were the outcome of 
decisions made just prior to 1979 when substantial commitments were made. 
However, with the electrical machinery and apparatus category also being the 
most heavily committed for the period from 1979 to mid-1983, it is justified to 
assert that this group of industries has been the most responsive in the period of 
the new economic strategy. Added to this, the group's strategic importance to the 
Singapore economy, and indeed the 'Second Industrial Revolution', warrants a 
detailed examination of the pattern of foreign investment here since 1979. Of 
course, in contrast to the previously-discussed group, electrical and electronic 
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machinery group involves predominantly labour-intensive operations and has 
therefore been more directly affected by the various policies of the new economic 
strategy, particularly the corrective wage policy. 
Of the considerable actual and committed investment in this group for the 
period, the overwhelming majority has been concentrated in the electronics 
industry. Realised fixed investment commitments in 1980 of $316 million have 
been followed by a record $417 million in 1981 and a further $283 million in 1982 
and $306 million in 1983.49 The average value-added per worker of investment
commitments in electronics has also increased from $19,000 in 1979 to $149,000 in 
1982, and average fixed assets per worker from $11,400 to $83,000 (in current 
prices) in the same period.50
A characteristic of much of the foreign investment outlayed and committed 
from 1979 to 1983 in the consumer and component sectors of the electronics 
industry has been the increasing mechanisation and automation of existing 
production facilities. Such investments have largely been in automatic component 
insertion machines in consumer electronics and automatic pattern recognition 
equipment and automated testing equipment. in semiconductors.51 Other
significant developments in forward integration have included the moves by 
National Semiconductor and Siemens to follow Fairchild's lead and assemble the 
64 K RAM, the value-added of which is ten-fold that of the 16 K RAM more 
commonly assembled in Singapore. 
Important as these cases of forward integration were, they generally 
represented extensions of processes begun before 1979. However, the successful 
luring of the Italian-based SGS-Ates to establish a semiconductor wafer diffusion 
plant represented a qualitatively new development. Backward integration 
through the technologically sophisticated wafer diffusion process has generally 
been retained by international companies in their home countries or in the 
markets of the advanced industrial countries. The EDB described the investment 
by SGS-Ates as representing a "quantum leap" for Singapore's electronics 
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industry.52 Managing Director of SGS-Ates, Guido Zargani, explained the move
primarily in terms of market considerations. With declining sales in Italy and 
Europe, the company wished to locate in the Asian region where the potential 
growth in sales over the next decade was seen as very promising.53 Zargani
contended that the incentives offered SGS-Ates by the Singapore government also 
constituted a significant lure. SGS-Ates received a ten-year tax holiday, a 
substantial interest free loan from the EDB, and subsidised training costs from the 
Skills Development Fund. 54
The successful attraction of computer manufacturers to Singapore is 
probably the highlight of the post-1979 pattern in foreign investment. Starting 
from virtually nothing, by December 1981 about $100 million of foreign 
investment had gone into computer hardware.55 A year later, this had already
doubled. 56 These investments made a substantial contribution to the increase in
domestic exports of industrial electronic equipment of $939 million, or 337%, in 
1983. In 1983, domestic exports of computer systems and sub-assemblies grew by 
a phenomenal 631 %, up from $74.9 million in 1982 to $547.3 million. Computer 
peripheral exports also increased more than four-fold to reach $550 million in 
1983. This resulted in the contribution of industrial electronics to total direct 
exports of electronics increasing from 5.9% to 18.8%.57
Apple was the first foreign-based company to manufacture computer 
components in Singapore. It began manufacturing operations in July 1981, with 
initial operations involving the manufacture of logic boards and encoders. The 
plans, however, are for the assembly of printers and disk drives and, finally, the 
complete assembly of Apple computers.58 By December 1982, the Singapore plant
was providing 75% of the worldwide printed circuit boards for Apple 
computers.59 As with most other US-based computer companies, the decision to
invest in Singapore by Apple stemmed from a concern that the expansion of exist­
ing facilities in the US had become too costly. Thus, in search of an alternative 
site, Singapore was most attractive for a variety of factors which collectively 
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amounted to a very favourable business climate. As Apple's Managing Director, 
John Sanders, explained: We found that no country can provide the 
combination of infrastructure, technical ability, supporting industries and 
Governmental agency efficiency, support and incentives that Singapore offers" .60
For at least some computer companies, the regional markets have been 
important to the decision to invest in Singapore. Sord Computer, Japan's second­
largest microcomputer company, followed Apple's lead and set up a $16 million 
operation to assemble its M 23 Mark II model microcomputer.61 Sord's President,
Mr T. Shiina, envisaged a strong regional role for the plant and, ultimately, a key 
role in global exports: " ... in the next 5 to 10 years we can develop a very strong 
microcomputer industry in Singapore. I would like to use Singapore as a base to 
export our products to Southeast Asia, the U.S., Japan and Europe 11 •62 The Sord
operation, however, was closed down in mid-1983 - apparently because there just 
was not the demand sufficient to justify the capacity of the Singapore plant. The 
misadventure of Sord may suggest that whilst the long term scope for regional 
markets is promising, it is currently insufficient alone to support any major 
computer investment. 
The most outstanding feature of the investment boom in computers in 
Singapore has undoubtedly been the recent spate of plants set up by US disk drive 
companies. Since 1981, when the first disk drive manufacturer, Micro Peripherals, 
declared its intention to establish a plant in Singapore, other US-based disk drive 
manufacturers have followed suite. 63 Singapore has already become a major
world supplier of disk drives. 
An important theme behind the explanation of the different disk drive 
companies setting up in Singapore is the attractiveness of the government 
incentives. Beyond this, however, there are some interesting factors, some 
thematic others not, accounting for their presence. In the first place, the 
fundamental reason for growth in such plants (regardless of where they have been 
located) has been the urgent need to quickly expand capacity to keep up with the 
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tremendous boom in demand. As to why Singapore has been so popular a choice as 
the particular site for such expansion, a few brief case studies may be helpful. 
Floppy disk drive manufacturer Micro Peripheral was reportedly established 
in Singapore because company officials were impressed with the skilled and 
disciplined labour force and, especially with a view to the future, the political 
stability of Singapore. But probably more importantly, the company lacked the 
cash required to expand and was able to secure a 50-50 joint venture with the 
local Robin Holdings (Pte) Ltd.64 The Company was also offered an eight-year
tax holiday. 
In the wake of this move came Tandon Corporation, already a world leader 
in the floppy disk drive market. Tandon moved to Singapore for the purpose of 
final assembly and testing of its disk drives. Managing Director, Hari Apte, 
explained that one of the company's considerations was to locate in a place where 
the investment could be implemented in the minimum possible time so that the 
existing, but volatile, market could be captured while it still existed.65 Though
other sites in the region were considered, the capacity of the Singapore state to 
keep red tape to a minimum was important; after just three months from the time 
of the investment commitment the first exports were sent to the US. The single­
most important reason for choosing Singapore, however, was the cost advantage of 
materials to be derived from being there. For a start, Singapore's duty free status 
meant that the many parts which needed to be imported from the region, and 
particularly Japan, could be obtained cheaper than they would if being purchased 
whilst still in the US. Furthermore, importing parts from Japan when based in 
Singapore avoided the cost of purchasing through intermediaries, as in the US, 
since sales were made directly with the company. Finally, seeing as the export 
sales by Japanese suppliers to Tandon entitled those suppliers to export benefits 
from the Japanese government, Tandon was able to secure more favourable prices 
for its supplies; having negotiated on the basis that the large sales to Tandon made 
the benefits possible and Tandon should therefore be entitled to special 
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consideration. On three grounds. then material costs could be reduced. This was 
very significant since Tandon's Singapore operations are very material-intensive. 
As much as 85% of production costs are accounted for by material costs, and 
labour as little as 4%. Labour costs were thus not so important a consideration. 
Tandon also secured a ten-year tax holiday, an incentive which Apte says simply 
could not be obtained anywhere else, and a 50% subsidy for worker training 
costs.66 Clearly then, there were a number of reasons for Tandon choosing to
assemble disk drives in Singapore. With its most labour-intensive operations (that 
is, the assembly of heads and stepper motors) done by Tandon India at sources of 
cheaper labour,67 Tandon was able to reap cost advantages from assembly in
Singapore in spite of the relatively high wages. 
In contrast to Tandon, some of the companies to have subsequently 
established plants have committed themselves to somewhat more labour-intensive 
operations, including head assembly. Seagate Technology, for example, decided in 
August 1983 that the combined advantages of lower labour, material and overhead 
costs in Singapore (compared with the US) would give it a cost advantage in the 
total assembly of Winchester disk drives.68 More recently, Maxtor Corporation
has announced its intention to start-up with the production of sub-assemblies for 
use in the XT 1000 series of its disk drives and to subsequently embark on 
complete manufacture. Maxtor's Director of International Operations, Joseph 
Dibere, placed much importance on the four-fold cheaper labour costs of 
Singapore (compared with those of the US) in explaining the investment, but said 
that this was viewed in conjunction with Singapore as a "total business 
environment". This included the fact that 80% of Maxtor's required components 
could be obtained within Singapore.69
It can be seen from some of the explanations above that different disk drive 
manufacturers have placed differential weight on the cost advantage of 
Singapore's labour. Certainly for all companies the material cost advantage of 
Singapore is a key attraction. Equally, the various cost-cutting government 
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incentives are universal attractions. It is worth noting too, however, that there is 
an element of inertia often created when leading international companies begin to 
locate offshore in any line of production. The disk drive industry is no exception, 
as the comments by Seaquest Technology's President, Syed Iftikar, about his 
company's move to Singapore to assemble the world's first removable cartridge 
Winchester disk drive suggest: "We did not look at Taiwan (Singapore's greatest 
competitor in the computer manufacturing field) and we did not want to waste 
time looking for a site. So we followed the leaders and came here. "7o
Nevertheless, underlying all these investment decisions is the obvious confidence 
in the broad social, political and physical environment within which business is 
conducted in Singapore. In particular, in an industry so prone to rapid changes in 
the size and nature of demand, and where speed of delivery is crucial, the 
infrastructure of Singapore and the capacity and willingness of the state to 
quickly mobilise resources and implement investments makes Singapore very 
attractive. It would appear that the unexpected proliferation of disk drive 
companies indicates that certain mechanisms and structures exist within Singa­
pore· which may render it a suitable site for certain forms of relatively 
sophisticated and rapidly changing technologies. 
Al though the electronics industry has been the major focus of foreign 
investment expansion since 1979, the electrical industry has also received healthy 
increases in both the quantity and quality of investments. Largely due to the 
introduction of higher value-added products and greater automation by 
international capital,71 productivity in the industry has increased from a rise of
just 1.6% in 1982 to 21.3% in 1983. 72 One of the by-products of the rapid growth
in disk drive assembly has been the establishment in Singapore of a host of 
foreign�based manufacturers of precision stepper and spindle motors required by 
disk drive manufacturers. 73 Thus, though lower production costs, basically labour
costs, remain the main attraction for international capital in the electrical 
industry, the development of the industry in Singapore is opening up new 
opportunities to exploit this advantage. 
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Chemicals 
Foreign investment growth in both the industrial and non-industrial chemical 
groups between 1979 and 1983 was sizeable, $553 million and $261 million 
respectively (see Table 11 in Appendix). The strong interest by international 
capital in industrial chemicals was spread throughout the various growth areas of 
the industry. Specialty chemicals were in particular demand owing to the 
backward integration of the local electronics industry.74 Another area of foreign
investment expansion was in petroleum-related chemicals, a logical compliment to 
developments in the petroleum refining industry. Exxon Chemicals invested $80 
million in a lubricating oil additives project, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia, 
to supply the Asia Pacific region. 75 Most of the remaining foreign investment
was lured by the demand of the regional oil exploration and production activities 
for greater and more sophisticated volumes of highly specialised chemicals. 76 In
general then, the expansions by international capital in industrial chemicals were 
primarily motivated by market opportunities in Singapore and the immediate 
region. 
The activities of the non-industrial chemicals group were largely defined by 
the pharmaceutical industry, particularly by its three main foreign-based 
companies, Beecham, Glaxochem and Kanegafuchi. During the 1979-1983 period, 
not only did Beecham expand existing operations, it also began constructing a $30 
million plant to manufacture a new range of compound penicillins, called 
Augmentim. Glaxochem also increased its investment by $10 million to expand 
capacity in its rantidine hydrochloride (anti ulcer drug) plant, the only one of its 
kind in the world. 77 Kanegafuchi, which commenced production of amino-acids in
1979, also widened its product range to include valine and phenylglycine 
(intermediate material for the production of antihistics) in addition to expanding 
capacity in existing product lines. 78 These three companies had initially been
attracted to Singapore as a base for world export by the cost advantages of its 
cheaper but sufficiently skilled labour. The expansions and upgradings since 1979 
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suggest that that cost advantage over production in the home country remains in 
spite of the corrective wage policy. 
Non-Electrical Machinery 
The non-electrical machinery group of industries recorded the fourth largest 
increase in foreign investment in the 1979-1983 period, a sum of $532 million (see 
Table 11 in Appendix). Though this group includes a range of industries, such as 
machine tools and industrial machinery, tools and dies, and precision engineering, 
there were some . common themes to foreign investment. The most obvious of 
these was the rapidly increasing investment in more sophisticated capital equip­
ment, especially computerised and computer-related equipment. Investments in 
technologies such as numerically controlled (NC) and computer numerically 
controlled (CNC) machine tools, industrial robots, and flexible manufacturing 
systems and electrical discharge machines (EDMs) have grown exponentially since 
1979, contributing to a substantial upgrading in the quality and efficiency of 
operations. 
Another theme to foreign investments has been the acceleration of 
industrial integration, including the actual manufacture of computerised 
equipment. The feasibility of these investments has been facilitated by both the 
general growth and maturation of Singapore industry. This, in turn, has made it 
more cost-efficient for the global export of increasingly sophisticated machinery 
parts and components. Thus, in this period such foreign investment projects to 
have come on-stream include Emhart Industries' glass-making machine 
components, Netstal's injection moulding machine components, and Asian 
Machine's pick-and-place robotic arms. Investments in more technologically­
advanced toolings have also been made by Bridgeport through the complete 
manufacture of two lines of milling machine heads as well as the assembly of 
another CNC milling machine.79 Le Blonde also introduced CNC vertical milling
machines.80 All the above-cited investors intended to export globally. There
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was,. however, a growing interest in regional markets for machinery and tools 
which also attracted the interest of international capital. Durametallic, for 
example, set up operations to service the rapidly expanding Far East markets for 
engineered machinery needs. 81
In addition to the above developments, a new emphasis on process 
engineering by international capital has been evident since 1979. 82 These 
investments are regionally-oriented and in line with the government's desire to ,j 
foster knowledge-based industries in which Singapore can maintain regional 
supremacy. 
As well as the upgradings through foreign investment, there have also been 
sizeable expansions of capacity by such established international manufacturers as 
NMB, Singapore Time (Seiko) and SKF. The continuing growth of these operations, 
in conjunction with the above cited upgradings, suggests that, as in the 
pharmaceuticals industry, international capital has been quick to introduce more 
advanced technology wherever possible to exploit Singapore's comparative 
advantage in labour costs in these areas. 
Another member of the non-electrical machinery group, oilfield equipment, 
has also received boosts in foreign investment between 1979 and 1983. Though 
growth in regional oil exploration ensured continued investment in the support 
equipment industry, there was also a marked diversification and increased 
technological content and specialisation characterising new foreign investment, 
including technical services. Naturally, the regional market continued to be the 
orientation of most such investments.83 In line with the developments in process 
engineering, there have also been a number of significant investments by 
international companies in the knowledge-intensive, high value-added service 
areas of the oilfield equipment industry.84 
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Aerospace 
One of the priority industries under the new economic strategy is the aerospace 
industry. In particular, it is the government's objective that Singapore become the 
region's major aircraft servicing centre as well as a major component 
manufacturing export site. Towards this objective, a bilateral airworthiness 
agreement was signed with Federal Air Authorities of the United States in 1980 
which was expected to give component exports a boost. 
Following 1979 considerable progress was made in the industry. Output 
value in aircraft equipment, repairing and servicing increased by 108.59%, value­
added by 106.25% and exports by 137.42% between 1980 and 1983. Although the 
government's role in the repair, overhaul and servicing side of operations in 
particular has been important to these developments, international capital has 
responded very positively to the government's special incentives and 
infrastructural provisions. Above all other considerations, however, with labour 
costs estimated at around half the equivalent cost in Europe or North America, 
even in the wake of the corrective wage policy, international capital has been able 
to exploit the relatively skilled labour of Singapore.85 Apart from expansions in
capacity by component manufacturers Sunstrand and Garrett, the major 
investments by international companies between 1979 and 1983 were in 
overhauling and servicing. 86
Other Investments 
In the above we have examined those industries in which the most substantial sums 
of foreign investment have been concentrated since 1979. Of course, even outside 
these areas there have been significant qualitative developments. In the 
automotive components industry, for example, some success has been realised in 
the promotion of Singapore as a site for international sourcing and by 1983 
Singapore had earned the status as· an export base for automotive electronic 
components. 87 In medical equipment, Baxter Travenol was joined by Japan
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Medical Supplies in the manufacture of medical disposables (in this case blood 
administration sets) whilst Eschmann, a member of the UK-based Glaxo group of 
companies, invested in surgical tables and electro-surgical instruments and 
Scientquip invested in the assembly of benchtop laboratory centrifuges.88 Two 
important investments in the food industry included Nestle's $25 million R & D 
project, known as Eastreco, in product development and process improvement and 
Fuji Oil's $24 million plant to produce cocoa butter extruder and specialty 
fats.89 In precision equipment, the US-based FJW Industries invested in precision
optical instruments whilst Wild diversified into stores microscopes and new 
electro-optical products. 90 Indeed, examples could be found from nearly every
industry of qualitatively significant foreign investments. 
What we have seen above, then, is that whilst international capital has been 
particularly active in raising value-added in certain industries, without necessarily 
in traducing 'high technology', this process has been extended to nearly all 
industries to varying degrees. As we have also seen, however, the motivations 
behind these different investments have not been identical. In some cases, 
regional market opportunities have prompted investors to upgrade their products 
and facilities. In other cases, investors have decided that labour cost advantages 
can be gained by more fully exploiting Singapore's relatively skilled labour force. 
Needless to point out, there are many variations between and beyond these 
themes. Significantly though, in spite of substantially increased wage costs in the 
period of the corrective wages policy, labour cost advantage remained paramount 
to a considerable volume of post-1979 foreign investment. Such cost advantages 
were arrived at, however, by increasingly moving into areas of middle-level 
technology in which Singapore's labour costs were still more favourable for capital 
than those of alternative production sites. Naturally investors take into account a 
wealth of factors in conjunction with labour cost, such as its skill level, the 
industrial relations climate, availability of fiscal incentives, transportation costs 
and the capacity of the bureaucracy to swiftly process its proposals. 
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It could be argued that the above developments confirm the neo-classical 
argument. After all, the pattern of direct foreign investment has clearly been 
away from production in which unskilled labour costs are a higher share of value­
added to one in which they are less and the skill content of labour is more 
important. Does this not reflect Singapore's changing comparative advantage? 
Indeed it does. The problem with this sort of interpretation, however, is that it 
does not recognise that this shifting comparative advantage and the capacity to 
exploit it_ is the product of an array of policies and structures developed over a 
long period of time. Skill levels, for instance, have risen in large part because of 
the direct investments and subsidisations by the state in social and physical 
infrastructure. Thus there is real difficulty in separating state and market - the 
relationship is extremely ambiguous. What we have seen above though, is that 
'non-market' considerations such as fiscal incentives and the rapidity of 
bureaucratic processes and political stability have, in instances, been important 
in determining whether investors take advantage of Singapore's lower labour costs 
in relatively skilled areas. Though the above survey of direct foreign investment 
does not provide conclusive evidence, it does suggest that investment decisions in 
higher value-added production might increasingly take account of these 
considerations. Detailed sectoral analyses would be useful for any more confident 
observations about changes in the state's bargaining power with international 
capital in the period of the 'Second Industrial Revolution'. Such studies are not 
necessary, however, to sustain the general argument made above. 
Investment by Country of Origin 
In absolute terms, the largest foreign investment increases came from US-based 
capital, $1,662 million, followed by Japan-based capital with $1,050 million and 
Netherlands-based capital with $443 million from 1979 to 1983 (see Table 12 in 
Appendix). In relative terms Japan-based capital grew at a slightly faster rate 
than that of the US, 100% compared to 91 %. As we have seen in previous 
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chapters, this has been the pattern throughout the 1970s. However, as a yardstick 
of investor response since the new economic strategy was introduced, these 
figures are somewhat misleading. Much of this actual investment reflects 
decisions made prior to this strategy. Interestingly then, despite the impressive 
volume of actual investment by Japan-based capital in the 1979-1983 period, there 
was a simultaneous fall-off in investment commitments. Whereas commitments 
stood at $319 million in 1979, they had fallen to just $72 million in 1982 and stood 
at $160. million in 1983 (excluding petrochemical .commitments). Meanwhile, US­
based capital generally maintained steady commitments, rising from $260 million 
in 1979 to $566 million in 1983 (excluding petrochemical commitments) (see Table 
14 in Appendix). Thus, the rapid relative gains by Japan-based capital against that 
of the US appeared to have been halted following 1979. 
Table 20: Selected Ratios of Contribution of Direct Foreign 
Investments in Singapore's Manufacturing Industry 
by Major Source of Capital, 1983. 
Ratio U.S. Japan U.K. Switzerland 
Value-Added 48,453 27,891 65,705 52,776 
Per Worker 
Output Per 168,647 87,760 131,887 126,642 
Worker 
Remuneration 9,711 7,401 13,886 10,730 
Per Worker 
Capital Expenditure 11,686 5,316 9,527 8,559 
Per Worker 
Direct Exports 68.10 67.49 74.99 86.20 
to Total Sales 
NOTE: Data for Netherlands unavailable. 
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Report on The Census of Industrial 
Production 1983, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1984, Tables 6 
and 11, pp.5,9. 
As can be seen from Table 20 above, there are evidently some important 
differences in the use to which capital is put by investors of different national 
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origins. Many of these characteristics have been identified and explored in earlier 
chapters. Suffice to say here that though US-based capital did not boast the 
highest ratio amongst foreign investors of value-added to workers in Singapore, it 
was still well above the total manufacturing ratio of $36,200 and well above the 
Japanese level. That US-based capital had the highest ratios of output and capital 
to workers amongst foreign investors, in spite of not having the lead in value­
added per worker, reflected the volume of assembly work in lower value-added 
production with the use of highly productive and expensive capital equipment. At 
the same time, however, the value-added of such operations rose considerably 
after 1979, as we have seen. Moreover, US-based capital also led the field in a 
variety of skill and capital-intensive projects which have been fundamental to the 
general increase in the value-added of Singapore industry and, indeed, the 
emergence of specific priority industries. The most conspicuous such contribution 
has been in industrial electronics, notably computer hardware. However, through 
such companies at TRW and General Electric in aerospace, Rockwell International 
and General Motors in automotive components, Le Blonde and Reed Rockbit in 
non-electrical machinery, Exon in chemicals, Phillips Petroleum in petro­
chemicals, Mobil and Caltex in petroleum refining, Airpan and Applied Motion 
Products in electrical products, Baxter Travenol in medical equipment and F JW in 
precision optical instruments, US-based capital has been at the fore of qualitative 
developments in most industries since 1979. 
Though EDE data do not provide a breakdown of foreign investment on a 
country of origin basis for individual industries, surveys conducted by JETRO 
provide a good indication of the trend amongst Japan-based capital. From the 
start of 1979 to the end of 1982, a total of 66 new Japanese companies established 
manufacturing operations in Singapore according to JETRO surveys. Of these, 
however, 39 were established in 1979 and thereafter there was a rapid decline, 
with 16 in 1980, eight in 1981 and just three in 1982. Of the 66 new companies in 
the period, 24 were in the category electrical and electronic products, 13 in 
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chemical products (which included petrochemicals), nine in ferrous and non­
ferrous metal products. 91
Of the 24 new electrical and electronic products companies, few involved 
processes either new to Singapore or belonging to priority areas. The majority of 
them represented expansions of labour-intensive assembly and manufacturing 
processes long-established in Singapore, in such lines as radios, cassettes, stereos, 
tape recorders and printed circuit boards. There were some reasonably 
sophisticated, though not new, processes introduced involving precision springs, 
crystal quartz units, polyester film capacitors and neon glow lamps. 9
2 There was
also, however, the investment by Sord in micro computers and peripherals which 
represented new technology for Singapore but this was shortlived. 
There have, of course, been some significant higher value-added investments 
by Japan-based companies established since the 1982 JETRO survey. These 
include those by Japan Servo and Nippon Densan in stepper motors and computer 
fans. Moreover, there are many Japan-based companies already established in 
Singapore which have been active in upgrading operations. Some of these include 
Yokogawa Electrical Works and Ace-Daikin who diversified their product range 
and JVC, Toshiba, Shintom and Asahi who embarked on projects to automate 
production facilities. It nevertheless remains, however, that by comparison with 
US-based capital investment in the electrical and electronics industries, Japan.:... 
based capital was overwhelmingly concentrated in lower value-added areas. 
Certainly the biggest contribution by Japan-based capital to higher value­
added production has been in the chemical industries, notably petrochemicals. 
The most significant investments were from Denka Singapore and The Polyolefin 
Company in major downstream projects in the Pulau Ayer Merbau complex. In 
other developments, Sanwa Chemicals began producing polyamite resin, Nissan 
Chemicals plastic raw materials and high purity chemicals, Sun Ace-Kakoh PVC 
stabilizer, Nippon Pigment plastic colour compound and concentrate, Singapore 
Kensai zirconium and Iwatani Noa Gas set up a plant for industrial and specialty 
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gases. In pharmaceuticals, Kanegafuchi not only began production of amino-acids 
but quickly diversified into other intermediate chemicals.93
Investments by Japan-based capital in ferrous and non-ferrous metals 
included some reasonably sophisticated technology. Two examples were Nachi 
Industries' precision cutting tools manufacture, regrinding and heat-treatment 
plant and Hitachi Powdered Metals' project to manufacture and process powder 
metallurgy products. 94 Other new companies tended to invest in fairly well
established product lines. 
Although there were examples of Japan-based capital investment in higher 
value-added production in the 1979-1983 period, certainly compared with 
Singapore's other dominant investor, the US, the overall response was rather 
cool. The explanation for this centres primarily on the contradiction between the 
Singapore government's new strategy and the global interests of Japan-based 
capital. In blunt terms, Japan looked to the SEA region to provide opportunities 
for low cost labour manufacture and was still able to accommodate the higher 
value added production within Japan. In particular, the corrective wage policy 
had an especially sobering effect on Japanese investment in Singapore. Following 
the introduction of this policy there was an immediate and substantial drop in 
investment commitments. The 1980 level of investment commitments was 56% 
lower than for 1979 (see Table 14 in Appendix). The Japanese Embassy 
Commercial Attache to Singapore, Hideo Nagashima, interpreted this as evidence 
of a general re-assessment of Singapore by Japan-based capital and pointed out 
that rising wages and labour shortages would not inexorably lead to investment in 
higher value-added production: 
There is little prospect of more sophisticated ventures being 
established in Singapore ... Japanese firms keep their business in 
Japan unt_il they lose their competitiveness. Then, they move out to 
take advantage of lower wages or to establish export markets 
abroad.95 
Nagashima's observation is of course borne out by the figures in Table 20 where 
we see that the value-added per worker of Japanese investments was just 58% 
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that of the US and only 42% that of the UK in 1983. Whereas US-based capital 
has tended even before, but particularly since, 1979 to move into higher value­
added production in Singapore, Japan-based capital has tended to direct its more 
skill and capital-intensive overseas investments to the US and Europe.96 This has
primarily been motivated by the desire to ensure market access, a constant worry 
owing to the strength of protectionism and the competitiveness of Japanese 
industry. This consideration is so important to the Japanese that they are often 
prepared to forego marginal cost advantages from producing elsewhere, especially 
when advanced equipment and automation can increase efficiency and minimise 
labour costs in Europe and the US. Thus, as Singapore's labour costs have risen 
Japan-based capital has redirected much of its low value-added, labour-intensive 
investments to Hong Kong, which overtook Singapore in 1980 as a recipient of 
Japan-based capital, 97 without any commensurate shift in emphasis towards
higher value-added production in Singapore. 
The comparatively negative response of Japan-based capital since 1979 was 
not anticipated by the Singapore government and in 1981 two EDB missions were 
sent to Japan to identify the specific needs of Japanese capital. Amongst other 
things, the slowdown in Japanese investment interest emphasised the complexity 
underlying investment decisions. Moreover, it cautioned against presuming that 
comparative advantage had any necessarily universal meaning to capital. The 
EDB has no doubt recently come to a greater appreciation of some of the 
contrasting implications its strategy has for the attraction of capital of different 
national origins. Indeed, it has not by any means given up on yet luring a 
significant volume of higher value-added investments from Japan-based 
companies. 98 This will have to be approached, however, with an
acknowledgement of some of the objective and perceived interests of Japan-based 
capital in order to achieve even moderate success. 
As had been the case in the 1970s, the growth of European-based investment 
was characterised by a relatively high value-added content in a range of 
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industries, with special emphasis on engineering. Though not always large 
investments, these companies continued to make a very important qualitative 
contribution to Singapore's restructuring effort. This is brought out to some 
extent by Table 20 where we see that both UK and Switzerland-based investment 
enjoyed higher value-added per worker levels than the US. 
In absolute terms, the leading European investors in the 1979-1983 period 
came from capital based in the UK, with $622 million, the Netherlands, with $443 
million, Switzerland, with $109 million, and West Germany with $70 million (see 
Table 12 in Appendix). The growth in UK investments derived mainly from British 
Petroleum's involvement in the newly-established Singapore Refining Company's 
catalytic reformer and hydrocracker projects. Additional investments of signif­
icance in the period included upgradings by Beecham and Glaxo in pharmaceuticals 
and new investments by Hunton International in automotive and Eschmann in 
medical equipment. Investment by Netherlands-based companies was again 
dominated by Shell which, as we have seen, was very active in upgrading its 
refining facilities, and expansion of capacity by member of the Philips group. 
Major new Swiss investments were initiated by Nestle, SKF, Emhart and Tetra 
Pak. Increases from West German companies came from Siemens, Brown-Boveri, 
Varta and Festa, going some way towards cushioning the effect of Rollei's closure 
in Singapore in 1981. 
Finally, although in the context of this chapter we are fundamentally 
concerned with the response of international capital in the period of the new 
economic strategy, it should be noted that some progress has been made by 
locally-based capital. Excluding the petrochemical project in which the 
government has a sizeable stake, local investment commitments increased more 
than three-fold from 1979-1983 and the contribution of these commitments to 
total commitments increased from 12.7% to 29.3%.99 Particular progress has
been made in the supporting industries and electronics and electrical industries, in 
line with the government's aim of a more integrated industrial base. In supporting 
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industries, heat treatment services and the production of engineering plastic 
moulds and fine blankings gained impetus and many companies upgraded their 
investments through CNC machinery and other automated equipment. In the 
electronics and electrical industries there has been a spate of investments by 
locally-based companies in various computer software projects and other areas of 
new technology, often in joint-venture with international capital.lOO 
Conclusion 
In the discussion above, it has been argued that, in terms of general manufacturing 
growth, there has been considerable progress in Singapore since 1979, especially 
taking into account the effects of the global recession. Moreover, much of this 
growth has involved a shift towards the production and application of more 
sophisticated technology. However, the greater productivity of the manufacturing 
sector, and the economy in general, has not reduced dependence upon guest labour 
to the extent anticipated by the government. It is apparent not only that rapid 
economic growth to some extent cancelled out the labour savings accruing from 
greater productivity, but that the shift towards higher value-added production 
generated a greater demand for skilled labour than could be provided by the 
domestic workforce. Nevertheless, in dealing with the problems associated with 
reducing dependence upon guest labour, the government has shown quite clearly 
that it is concern over the political implications of guest labour of particular 
national origins which is uppermost. 
We have also seen in this chapter that the generally positive response of 
international capital in this period has largely facilitated what industrial 
restructuring has taken place. On the one hand, there has been an increased 
preparedness by international, particularly US-based, capital to invest in higher 
value-added production. On the other, there has been a significant reduction of 
investment in the more traditional, lower value-added labour-intensive 
industries. Whilst we have seen that the motivations of international capital in 
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investing in higher value-added production in Singapore are diverse and even 
company-specific, it is nevertheless evident that there are some dominant 
themes. A significant portion of higher value-added investments in the period 
sought to exploit regional market opportunities or were in response to market 
pressures which deemed different products and processes appropriate for 
Singapore. These were the predominant considerations in the more capital­
intensive industries which upgraded their operations. However, the bulk of 
investments by international capital in production geared for the export markets 
of Europe and the US continued to be primarily, though not exclusively, attracted 
by the cost advantages of Singapore's labour. Despite labour cost increases due to 
the corrective wage policy, Singapore's labour costs are still lower than those of 
Wes tern Europe and the US. Coupled with a suitably-skilled labour force and 
excellent infrastructure, for which the Singapore state has primarily been respons­
ible, this has enabled firms engaged in middle-level technology to cut production 
costs by locating in Singapore. Thus, by moving out of direct competition with 
lower wage countries for investment in lower value-added, labour-intensive 
production, and into competition with higher wage countries in areas of middle­
level technology, during the period under review Singapore remained a viable site 
from which international capital could derive labour cost advantages. 
One of the more interesting points to emerge from the above study is that 
the rapid post-1979 growth in investments in computer hardware, particularly disk 
drives, owes much to the speed and efficiency with which the Singapore state was 
able to mobilise resources in support of such investments. It appears that in fast­
changing technologies, the capacity of the state to perform this role assumes 
considerable importance. As considerations behind investment decisions become 
more varied and complex with the general increase in the technological content of 
Singapore industry, presumably this capacity will be of even further significance. 
Such a capacity, in the case of Singapore, derives from a broad set of social, 
administrative and political conditions, or structures, which have their origins in 
I 
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the historical circumstances of Singapore's earlier industrialisation. Over time, 
these structures have been consolidated and refined. These are the structures 
which are inferred by investor references to the 'total business environment' 
which, of course, largely determines the extent to which comparative labour costs 
can be fully exploited. 
What I have not tried to do in this chapter is measure the actual extent of 
state influence over direct foreign investment. The purpose has been more 
primary: to examine the broad response and considerations of investors to a 
climate which has been significantly affected by state policy. 
Having argued that the response of international capital has been for the 
most part very positive in the post-1979 period, the reticence of Japan-based 
capital to make any serious commitment to the restructuring of Singapore 
industry has important implications. Not only does it alert us to the analytical 
importance of the differentiation of international capital, it also underlines the 
need to avoid any reification of the concept of comparative advantage in 
explaining the new international division of labour. Both of these theoretical 
points have obvious practical implications for policy. 
Though it has been argued above that there has been an accelerated shift 
towards higher value-added production between 1979 and 1983, it is worth 
emphasising that the restructuring process began well before this period. This has 
been documented in previous chapters. What the government did in 1979, in 
effect, was to acknowledge this by setting about the task of more effectively 
facilitating the development of this process. According to the government's 
reading of the economy the time was right for a more concerted restructuring 
effort. Subsequent developments have tended to support this reading. This is not 
to suggest, however, that this was simply acting in response to the market. Given 
that the whole post-1959 history of Singapore's industrialisation has been 
characterised by state intervention to shape the various factors of production, it 
is analytically tenuous to make a clear separation of state from market. It would 
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be safer and more accurate to interpret the relationship between state and market 
as a dialectical one. After all, the restructuring which had begun before 1979 was 
the product of circumstances over which the Singapore state had exerted a 
significant influence. 
Finally, we should be cautious what projections we make about Singapore's 
long term prospects for technological upgrading in the light of the 1979-1983 
period. Whether the transition to middle-level technology can be consolidated 
and, in turn, transcended to an ever higher level in the international division of 
labour is problematical. The very logic of an international division of labour 
implies a stratification based on unequal degrees of technological sophistication. 
Being successful in graduating to the ' middle league' is no guarantee of further 
mobility. Furthermore, the very structure of the international division of labour 
is dynamic, being sensitive to such unpredictable factors as technological change 
in the production process. In the 1979-1983 period, however, the government's 
strategy of exploiting the opportunities available under the existing structure 
achieved some important economic results. 
503 
FOOTNOTES 
1. See Goh Keng Swee's Eve of National Day Message 1979 in Singapore
Economic Bulletin, September 1979, p.9.
2. "Over 3-Fold Rise in Number of Foreign Workers", Singapore Economic
Bulletin, June 1981, p.46.
3. "Target: Wholly S'pore Workforce", Straits Times, 1.1.82.
4. See James Leung, "Singapore Firms Worried by Plan On Foreign Labor",
Asian Wall Street Journal, 12.8.82.
5. "Scheme to Allow Further Extension of Work Permits for Non-Traditional
Source (NTS) Workers", Singapore Economic Bulletin, January 1983, pp.38-
39.
6. "Phasing-Out of Foreign Workers: Another Concession", Straits Times,
3.11.83.
7. Department of Statistics, Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics Singapore
1983/84, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, n.d., Table 3.1, p.46.
8. ibid., Table 2.1, p.27.
9. Department of Statistics, Singapore, Report on the Census of Industrial
Production 1983, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1984, Table 13,
pp.12-13. 
10. "Jayakumar Tells Why Foreign Workers Must Go", Straits Times, 7.11.83.
11. See "Extending Individual Work Permit Scheme to Workers from Hong
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Macau", Official Statement, Ministry of
Labour, 13 January 1984, in Singapore Economic Bulletin, February 1984,
p.24.
12. James Leung, "Singapore Moves to Deepen Labour Pool", Asian Wall Street
Journal, 16.1.84.
13. ibid.
14. As calculated from Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix.
15. As calculated from Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix.
16. As calculated from Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix.
17. As calculated from Tables 4 and 6 in Appendix.
18. As calculated from Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix.
19. As calculated from Table 7 in Appendix.
20. As calculated from Tables 4 and 6 in Appendix.
21. As calculated from Tables 4 and 6 in Appendix.
22. Department of Statistics, Singapore, Report on The Census of Industrial
Production 1983, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1984, Table 18,
pp.20-21. 
23. ibid., Table 35a, pp.56-57.
504 
24. As calculated from Department of Statistics, Singapore, Report on The
Census of Industrial Production 1983, Singapore: Singapore National
Printers, 1984, Table 48, pp.119-125 and Report on The Census of Industrial
Production 1979, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1980, Table 46,
pp.116-121. 
25. As calculated from ibid.
26. Department of Statistics, Singapore, Report on The Census of Industrial
Production 1979, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1980, Table 9,
p.16.
27. As calculated from ibid., Table 4, p.12.
28. Department of Statistics, Singapore Report on The Census of Industrial
Production 1983, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1984, Table 9, p.8.
29 Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1983/84, p.12.
30. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1983/84, p.12, Annual Report
1982/83, p.13.
31. As calculated from Table 14 in Appendix.
32. As calculated from Table 11 in Appendix.
33. As calculated from ibid.
34. As calculated from ibid.
35. As calculated from ibid.
36. The Singapore Refining Company (SRC), government-controlled but
containing foreign interest, increased refining capacity by 100,000 barrels
per day (bpd) by the end of 1980. Mobil also increased its primary refining
capacity through a $90 million programme which involved the revamping
and expansion of a crude processing unit from 20,000 bpd to 45,000 bpd
capacity. See Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1981/82, p.11
and Errol de Silva, "Redefining Growth", Singapore Business, July 1982,
p.27.
37. In 1982 capacity was between 70% and 80% of average actual capacity and
some predictions were that by the end of the decade it would be down to
50-60%. See Patrick Smith, "Build-Up to a Bust", Far Eastern Economic
Review, 10.9.82, p.74.
38. See ibid., p.26 and "Singapore Refining Industry Seeks New Directions",
Asian Wall Street Journal, 8.8.84.
39. See Economic Development Board, "Shell Opens $600 Million Hydrocracker
on Bukom", Singapore Investment News, July 1983, p.1.
40. See Patrick Smith, "In the Wrong Capacity", Far Eastern Economic Review,
10.9.82, p.75; "Mobil Upgrades Yet Another of Its Refinery Units\
Singapore Economic Bulletin, March 1984, p.29; Patrick Smith, "In the
Wrong Capacity", Far Eastern Economic Review, 10.9.82, pp.74-75; and
505 
Economic Development Board, "BP & Partners to Build Singapore's Second 
Hydrocracker", Singapore Investment News, May 1984, p.4. 
41. See Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1982/83, p.15.
42. James Leung, "Singapore Petrochemical Complex Starts Up With Prediction
of Loss", Asian Wall Street Journal, 20.2.84.
43. Frieda Koh, "Launch Late and Lose", Far Eastern Economic Review,
24.9.82, p.138.
44. "$200m Resin Plant to Start in Two Years", Singapore Economic Bulletin,
June 1980, p.25.
45. SPC has an annual production capacity of 300,000 metric tons of ethylene,
160,000 tons of propylene and more than 170,000 tons of such intermediate
products as butadine, benzene, toluene and xydlene. The expected capacity
of the downstream companies includes an annual production of 120,000 tons
of low-density polythelyne, 80,000 tons of high-density polythelyne, 87,500
tons of ethylene glycol, 100,000 tons of polyprophlene and 5,200 tons of
acetylene black. See A.J. Tron er, "Singapore Oil Works Plans Long
Closure", Asian Wall Street Journal, 31.17.84.
46. First Nissa Petrochemical Industries Company and later Mitsui
Petrochemical Industries Limited pulled out of the Ethylene Glycols
(Singapore) Pte. Ltd. Unit. See "Five New Partners Found for Petrochem
Project", Singapore Economic Bulletin, November 1982, p.25.
47. In particular, the entry of Middle East producers poses a serious long term
threat since the rising value of oil gives countries which produce their own
oil and petrochemical feedstock a decided competitive advantage. See
Najeeb Jashom and Ronnie Wai, "Keeping One's Chin Up in the Face of
Great Odds for $ Billion Petrochemical Plant", Sunday Times (Singapore)
13.12.81.
48. A.J. Traner, "Singapore Oil Works Plans Long Closure", Asian Wall Street
Journal, 31.7.84.
49. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1981/82, p.25, Annual Report
1982/83, p.27, Annual Report 1983/84, p.29.
50. ibid.
51. Asahi Electronics, GE Consumer Electronics, GE Television and Appliances,
JVC, Toshiba and Shintom all either completed or initiated projects to
automate production processes in consumer electronics. In the electronics
component sector, Astec International, Advanced Micro Devices, Fairchild,
Honeywell-Synertek, National Semiconductor, NEC, SGS-Ates and Texas
Instruments all invested in the automation of assembly and/or testing of
integrated circuits. See Economic Development Board, Annual Report
1982/83, Annual Report 1983/84.
52. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1980/81, p.22.
53. SGS-Ates reportedly expected to boost Asian sales of its semiconductors by
at least 50% per year. See Andrew Tanzer, "Cashing in on Chips", Far
Eastern Economic Review, 21. 7 .83, p.66.
506 
54. See ibid. and Stephen Duthie, "Economic Problems Plague Singapore", Asian
Wall Street Journal, 21.5.85.
55. "Software to Get the Hard Sell", Asian Business, December 1981, p.46.
56. "Computing for the Future", Asian Business, December 1982, p.65.
57. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1983/84, p.33.
58. "Computing for the Future", Asian Business, December 1982, p.65.
59. ibid.
60. As quoted in Economic Development Board, "Apple Computer Starts
Manufacturing Operations in Singapore in July", Singapore Investment
News, May 1981, p.1.
61. "Bedok to Get $16M Microcomputer Plant", Straits Times, 24.12.81.
62. · As quoted in "Computing for the Future", Asian Business, December 1982,
p.65.
63. These include: Tandon, Seagate, Sequest, Mantor and Computer Memories.
Digital Equipment and Apple have also indicated they intend to move into
disk drive manufacture.
64. Lee Han Shih, "Computer Turnabout", Business Times (Singapore), 24.8.83.
65. Source: interview.
66. Andrew Tanzer, "The Indian Connection", Far Eastern Economic Review,
18.8.83, p. 72.
67. Most of the assembly work for recording heads is subcontracted to Tandon­
Indic, a separate company owned by relatives of Sirjang Lal Tandon (the
founder of Tandon Corporation). See ibid.
68. "Seagate to Assemble Winchester Disk Drives", Straits Times, 22.11.83.
69. Economic Development Board, "Maxtor Invests $20 Million in Advanced
Disk Drive Plant", Singapore Investment News, May/June 1983, p.3.
70. As quoted in Lillian Chew, "Exports of $500M Disk Drives by 1984", Straits
Times, 26.2.83.
71. The range of electrical products has been expanded and upgraded through
such projects as BBC Brown Boveri's production of low voltage switchgear,
Chloride's sealed recombination electrolyte batteries, Yokogawa Electric
Works' electrical instrumentation and . Ace-Daikin's split-unit air­
conditioners and high-efficiency fincoils. Two members of the giant US­
based General Electric group, GE Housewares and GE Hermetic Motors,
have also invested heavily in automated equipment in the production of
appliance components, fractional horsepower motors and hermetically
sealed motor plants. The Japan-based Sanyo has also automated its
production of air conditioners and microwave ovens. See Economic
Development Board, Annual Report 1983/84, p.37, Annual Report 1982/83,
p.33.
507 
72. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1983/84, p.35.
73. US-based companies Airpax and Applied Motion Products and Japan-based
Japan Servo and Nippon Densan have all invested in such operations. The
two Japan-based companies have also invested in the production of
computer fans. See Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1982/83,
p.33.
74. The most significant foreign investments in specialty chemicals were:
Dynachem Singapore which expanded its capacity for epoxy moulding
compounds; Hunt Chemical Asia/Pacific which began manufacturing photo­
imaging chemicals; and National Oxygen, a joint-venture of Japanese and
Singapore partners, which began the production of basic and specialty gases
for the electronics industry. See Economic Development Board, Annual
Report 1983/84, p.17.
75. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1982/83, p.15.
76. Nalco SE Asia, for example, expanded and upgraded its facility to
manufacture a more diverse range of water treatment and oilfield
chemicals. See Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1983/84,
p.17.
·77 Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1982/83, p.17; Economic 
Development Board, Annual Report 1981/82, p.17. 
78. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1982/83, p.17.
79. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1982/83, p.19.
80. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1983/84, p.21.
81. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1980/81, p.21.
82. Examples of such investments include: Esab's design and manufacture of
robotic welding work stations; Fairchild Test System's establishment of a
system integration centre for automation testing equipment; Paxall's
technical servicing, engineering design and assembly of packaging
machines; an engineering design/technical service centre for Agro-based
process industries. See Economic Development Board, Annual Report
1983/84, p.23.
83. Baker Sand Control and Screen Products thus both not only began the
production of well screen products for regional markets but introduced
geothermal gate valves as well. In this period, the Reed Rockbit Company
of Houston also established a US$17 million rockbit plant as a means of
more cost-effectively reaching fast-growing marekts in the Asia Pacific
region by virtue of Singapore's strategic location. Employing computerised
tools, the plant was expected to generate a value-added per worker of
$200,000. Not all investments, however, have been confined to regional
market orientation. TRW-Reda Pump has committed itself to the
manufacture of oilfield submersible pumps and related components for
world markets with the establishment of an integrated feeder plant. See
Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1980/81, p.23; Economic
Development Board, "Singapores Key to Seed Rock Bit's US$100M World
Expansion Plan", Singapore Investment News, September 1981, p.1; and
Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1983/84, p.21.
508 
84. Dowell Schlernberger established its regional oilwell laboratory service
facility in Singapore in 1982. Norton-Christensen and Teleco, both
specialised technical service companies, have also introduced specialised
and sophisticated measurement-while-drilling (MWD) services, while Baker
Marine has formed a joint-venture with the Singapore-based Promet, called
Self-Elevating Platform Management (SEPM), to provide offshore
engineering equipment design services. See Economic Development Board,
Annual Report 1981/82, p.25, Economic Development Board, "First
Offshore-Design Company Formed", Singapore Investment News, 
September 1982, p.3. 
85. Nancy Cockerell, "Aerospace Firms Soar Upwards", Asian Business,
November 1984, p.68.
86. These included the establishment of: General Electric (USA) Aviation
Service Operations' blades and vanes facility; FAS-Orient's repair and
overhaul of hydraulic flight control systems and components; TRW
Incorporated's (USA) operation to repair and remanufacture aircraft
equipment; Dunlop Aviation's (Far East) service, repair and overhaul of
aircraft wheels, brakes and other engineering components; Hawker Pacific's
small engine repair operation; and Pratt & Whitney's Asian service and
support facility for heavy maintenance and after sales service for its PT6
and JTISD engines. See Economic Development Board, Annual Report
1983/84, p.25.
87. The US-based Rockwell International implemented a feeder plant to
manufacture universal joints after a similar project by Repco was
withdrawn. The UK-based Hunton and Japan-based NHK Gasket Company
also added automotive electronics components, truck axles and engine
gaskets to operations in Singapore. General Motors extended its product
lines in automotive electronic components, the Japan-based Sanden
invested in its first air-conditioner compressor plant outside Japan, and the
UK-based Motemtronic invested in automotive voltage regulators. See
"Why Repco Shut Down Its Factory", Business Times (Singapore), 29.10.81;
Economic Development Board, "GM Singapore Invests Another $8 Mil to
Make Additional Product Lines", Singapore Investment News, April 1980,
p.1; and Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1982/83, p.27.
88. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1982/83, p.35.
89. ibid., p.17.
90. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1983/84, p.37; Economic
Development Board, "Wild to Produce Higher Optical Product Range in
Local Facility", Singapore Investment News, November 1981, p.1.
91. Japan Trade Centre (JETRO), Singapore, Japanese Affiliated Firms in
Singapore, Singapore: Green Mount Publication Printing, 1983, p.165.
92. See Anne Koh and Lee Siew Hua, "New Wave of Hi-Tech Japanese
Investment", Straits Times, 4.1.85.
93. Japan Trade Centre (JETRO), Singapore, 1983.
94. ibid.
95. As quoted in Frieda Koh, "Singapore Policy on Wages is Seen Discouraging
Investors From Japan", Asian Wall Street Journal, 17.3.81.
509 
96. See Alan L. Offen, "Japan Firms Are Expanding Their Investments in
Europe-", Asian Wall Street Journal, 21.4.82; Akhiro Sato, "Production in
Autos in Europe Offers Way for Nissan to Circumvent Trade Barriers",
Asian Wall Street Journal, 8.3.80; Atsuko Chiba, "Direct Japanese
investment in the US Likely to Accelerate, Nikko Study Suggests", Asian
Wall Street Journal, 12.6.79; Gene Gregory, "Japan Finding a Toehold in
Europe", Far Eastern Economic Review, 6.12.74, pp.67-70.
97. Hsung Bee Hwa, "Big Jump in Japan's Investment in Singapore", Straits
Times, 31.8.82.
98. See Anne Koh and Lee Siew Hua, "New Wave of Hi-Tech Japanese
Investment", Straits Times, 4.1.85.
99. As calculated from Table 13 in Appendix.
100. Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1983/84, pp.41-42.
- - -------------- - - - - - ----------,-----�---� 
510 
CHAPTER 12 
THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE 
<SECOND Th1DUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
Introduction 
It was shown in the previous chapter that Singapore has experienced significant 
economic progress under the 'Second Industrial Revolution' but not quite of the 
order anticipated by the PAP. It was pointed out that this reflected both a 
misreading of the perceptions and interests of international capitals and the 
impact of the global recession. It is argued in this chapter, however, that 
domestic political problems for the PAP stem from a range of policies in support 
of the new industrial strategy, and not just the general failure of the 
manufacturing sector to realise the very ambitious objectives set by the 
government 
Apart from investigating the social and political problems which the new 
industrial strategy has posed for the PAP, this chapter considers whether 
Singapore's changing political economy might render the PAP's traditional style of 
government less effective in securing absolute political hegemony. In short, this 
chapter looks at the problems of political legitimacy associated with the 'Second 
Industrial Revolution'. 
Singapore's Economic Predicament 
Inevitably, Singapore's close integration with the markets of the advanced 
capitalist economies of the US and Europe has adversely affected its export of 
manufactures and economic growth with the onset of global recession. After an 
impressive but short-lived revival in 1984 in response to an upturn in the US, 
economic growth in Singapore plummeted dramatically. From an overall 
economic growth rate of 8.2% in 1984, for the first time in 20 years this fell to 
zero growth in the second quarter of 1985 .1 As a result, there was a sharp
- --- �--�-- - - - ---------�---=----� 
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increase in the number of retrenchments in Singapore in 1985.2 Needless to say,
continued retrenchments would, amongst other things, pose serious problems for 
the PAP's efforts to arrest the electoral swing against it. 
Important as the recession is to Singapore's ailing economic condition, it is 
not the complete explanation. Rather, Singapore's problems have been 
accentuated by the PAP's economic strategy which, in effect, put all of the eggs 
in one basket. Having placed so much store in the capacity of the government's 
policies to induce a rapid restructuring of the manufacturing sector to lead 
economic growth, the PAP has made two significant errors. First, it has over­
estimated the speed with which restructuring can occur. As we have seen, the 
government's willingness to push for more technologically advanced production 
through higher wages was ultimately moderated to accommodate the more 
cautious attitude of international capital. Moreover, in the case of Japanese­
based capital, we saw that despite the government's efforts to define Singapore's 
comparative advantage in higher value-added production, different capitals have 
their own specific needs and interests which influence their calculation of 
comparative advantage. Second, in the process of attempting to create the 
conditions for accelerated upgrading in the manufacturing sector, the PAP took 
for granted the development of the more traditional sectors of the economy. 
These sectors, however, have been subjected to severe strains which have been 
compounded by policies of the 'Second Industrial Revolution' or undermined by a 
depth of regional economic nationalism not anticipated by the PAP. 
The PAP's over-estimation of the pace of industrial restructuring has now 
been acknowledged by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. He has come to recognise 
that objective limits posed by Singapore's size, location, workforce and the 
interests of international capital cannot be easily resolved. Thus, whereas at first 
he was optimistic about the longer term possibilities for high technology in 
Singapore, in October 1984 he conceded that the republic could at best hope for 
servicing the peripherals of high technology developed by the West. 3 This
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realisation, coupled with an appreciation of the general growth problems caused 
by the recession, has seen the PAP place renewed emphasis on wage restraint in 
1985. A specially-appointed Economic Committee headed by the Prime Minister's 
son, Lee Hsien Loong, established to study long term solutions to the erosion of 
Singapore's competitiveness, placed special focus on wages. In its interim report, 
it was pointed out that total wage costs rose by an annual average of 10.1 % during 
1978-84, during which time there was a 4.6% average growth in productivity.4
Unit labour costs rose by 40% in US dollar terms after 1980, compared with 10% 
for Taiwan and negligible increases in Hong Kong and South Korea.5 These
economies are Singapore's competitors for middle-level technology investments. 
In addition, the high wage policy contributed to increased operating costs in a host 
of domestic service areas in which scope for labour replacement is either limited 
or inappropriate, such as tourism. 
The 1985 NWC thus recommended a 3-7% wage increase (4% group 
offsetting). However, by August, as many as 25 private and 25 public sector 
unions representing over 200,000 workers had undertaken to forego any increases 
at all for the year.6 Lee has subsequently called for a two-year halt to wage
increases to enable the restoration of competitiveness.7 Not only does this policy
reversal recognise that Singapore will not move up the technological ladder as 
quickly as was originally projected, it also admits to the problems posed by the 
high wage strategy for the non-EOI sectors of the economy. 
At the same time as the PAP has pursued its 'Second Industrial Revolution', 
some of the traditional foundations underlying Singapore's economic structure 
have been in serious decline. As we saw in the last chapter, Middle Eastern 
competition in petroleum refining and the establishment of large-scale refining 
capacity by traditional customers Malaysia and Indonesia represents a challenge 
which Singapore cannot match in the longer term. While the PAP did not take the 
development of this industry for granted, having made every effort to promote its 
competitiveness and upgrading, it did not bargain on the extent to which its 
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neighbours would give priority to their own petroleum industries. Thus, whilst 
theoretically Singapore may enjoy a comparative advantage over other regional 
refiners, this has not stopped the loss of business resulting from economic 
nationalism. The decline of the labour-intensive shipbuilding industry has also 
been hard hit by wage increases, thereby compounding its problems in surviving 
the global slowdown of the industry.8
The tourist industry has also slowed remarkably since 1981. From growth of 
10.4% in 1981, tourist arrivals expanded by just 4.5% in 1982 and actually fell by 
3.5%in 1983.9 Hotel occupancy rates have fallen to 75.5% in 1983 and retail shops
dependent upon tourism have suffered badly, many being forced to close in 
1984.10 Though the recession has slowed tourist trade, the lack of price
competitiveness of the industry has seen custom lost to Hong Kong. 
If the PAP operated on the assumption that these structurally declining 
industries would be compensated for by the emergence of Singapore as the 
regional financial headquarters it has little to be content with so far. A survey 
conducted in late 1985 which polled chief executives of banks in East and 
Southeast Asia found Singapore well behind Tokyo and Hong Kong, and just in 
front of Sydney, as the perceived site of most future business expansion.11 As a
strategy, then, the 'Second Industrial Revolution' may have been based on an 
overly optimistic estimation of international capital's perception of Singapore as 
an investment site - both in the manufacturing and service sectors. 
If there was any doubt that the depth of Singapore's economic problems went 
beyond the difficulties of foreign-based export-oriented industries in 
manufacturing, the unprecedented suspension of the Singapore Stock Exchange by 
the government in late 1985 must have dispelled it. This followed failed attempts 
to rescue the financially troubled Pan Electric Industries Ltd.12 Liquidity
problems, however, have been the downfall of an increasing number of local 
companies, including the government's most frequently-cited example of a local 
high-technology manufacturer, Lamipak Industries Pte Ltd.13 During the first
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eight months of 1985, the Singapore High Court declared 363 companies bankrupt, 
up by 20% on 1984. Meanwhile, registrations of new local companies during 1985 
declined by 49% from a year earlier to 171.14
In summary, then, it is evident that the economic problems confronting 
Singapore are complex and go further than the externally-imposed constraints on 
the export-dependent manufacturing sector, significant as they are. 
Domestic Political Contradictions: The Problem of Legitimisation 
Associated with, and in addition to, the economic problems emanating from the 
dynamics of the international economy, as well as those pertaining to the 
structural decline of Singapore's traditional non-manufacturing base, the PAP is 
now facing important long term political challenges. Chief among these is the 
task of political legitimisation amidst the new economic and social circumstances 
of modern Singapore. The PAP is encountering unprecedented difficulty in gaining 
acceptance for policies in support of its industrial strategy and reconciling the 
electorate to the most prolonged and serious economic downturn since the PAP 
took office. This legitimisation problem reflects more than the new objective 
pre-requisites of Singapore's industrial programme, it also reflects the different 
historical experiences and expectations of Singapore's younger generation of 
voters. There is evidence of growing electoral alienation with the government and 
even the beginnings of some form of limited parliamentary opposition in 
Singapore. For the time being the PAP retains its effective monopoly of state 
power, Unless the trend in electoral disaffection· is redressed in the longer run, 
however, the capacity of the state to act with haste and precision in support of a 
clearly defined industrial strategy exploiting opportunities availed by the dynamic 
new international division of labour may be weakened. Given that such problems 
have surfaced at a juncture when the PAP's Second Generation leaders are 
scheduled to take command of the Party, Singapore's political economy has 
obviously reached its most uncertain moment in decades. 
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Measures to Control Opposition 
The PAP has always shown a special interest in the perceptions of its constituency 
and the means by which these can be shaped. However, in the 1980s the Party is 
confronted with a new set of historical circumstances. The changing structure of 
Singapore's population is rapidly entrusting far more electoral responsibility in the 
hands of younger Singaporeans. Thus, whereas previously the rolls were dominated 
by people over 40 years of age, by the time of the 1984 election, voters who had 
not reached their 20s at the time of the 1964 race riots were expected to 
comprise 40% of the electorate and as much as 70% by the time of the 1989 
election.15
The changing structure of the electorate holds significance for the PAP and 
Singapore politics. Lee openly recognised this, contending that voters of his 
generation knew from historical experience how the PAP had weathered great 
turbulence to lead Singapore to stability and prosperity: "They were old enough to 
remember the riots and revolution, the intimidation and assassinations, the strikes 
and demonstrations, the disruption and destruction of the 1950s and 1960s" .16 Lee
associated much of this turbulence with the existence of strong opposition parties 
but accepted that younger Singaporeans who did not consciously experience these 
political events did not necessarily share his convictions. According to Lee, such 
voters "have no idea how destructive an opposition can be". He added: "They feel 
they are missing something" .17 Apart from the different historical experiences of
this generation within Singapore, many of the younger Singaporeans have also 
studied overseas in such countries as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the 
United States where they have observed that high material standards of living are 
not traded off against political liberty. To the considerable regret of Lee and his 
senior colleagues, the Party's own research led them to the conclusion that a more 
sizeable parliamentary opposition was something of an inevitability.18 Not only
was there the more sympathetic view of the younger voters to the notion of 
opposition per se as politically desirable, there was the spectre of difficult 
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economic times ahead and the implementation of various unpopular austerity 
measures which would provide scope for opposition gains. 
As we saw in Chapter 10, a change in PAP attitude towards the question of 
opposition was expressed in November 1982. This had been explained in terms of 
the need for sharpening up the skills of the PAP's own backbenchers. However, as 
time passed the PAP became more vocally committed to the idea and espoused 
more general positive gains from constructive political opposition. By April 1984, 
even First Deputy Prime Minister S. Rajaratnam, who had earlier claimed that 
oppositions ensured "bad government", was calling for a "sound, sane, rational 
J 
opposition in parliament ... to engage in intelligent debate ... to highlight policies 
... to expose shortcomings".19 Subsequently, in July, the government introduced
legislation providing for 'non-constituent' parliamentary seats which ensured that 
after the next election there would be at least three opposition MPs. Under the 
government's amendment to the constitution, if the opposition parties carry fewer 
than three constituencies, 'non-constituency' seats are offered to defeated 
opposition candidates in order of their vote tallies until the minimum quota of 
three opposition parliamentary seats is filled. However, as distinct from MPs 
elected in the normal way, these 'non-constituency' MPs are denied voting rights 
on all the important matters of parliamentary business - budgeting and financial 
bills, constitutional amendments and no-confidence motions.20 It was indeed
within very definite parameters that these MPs were expected to function. Lee's 
parliamentary speech introducing the proposed amendment made that abundantly 
clear. He ridiculed the systems of various parliamentary dem_ocracies elsewhere 
in which opposition parties played a prominent role, juxtaposing these against the 
more admired Chinese tradition, under which it was anathema 
... that the emperor's mandate should depend on the counting of 
heads. Rather it depend[ed] on the chopping of heads. And that 
mandate was exercised not through a rabble in a legislature but 
through a strictly quality-controlled mandarinate.21 
That Lee was not inviting any genuine opposition which might operate outside the 
government's narrow parameters was emphasised by his warning that any 
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constituency which made the mistake of voting in an opposition candidate would 
have to "learn to live" with its choice.22 As if to dispel the existing opposition
MP as a model, J.B. Jeyaretnam came in for a caustic and damning attack from 
Lee.23
The PAP's move amounts to recognition that the existence of an opposition 
might be both politically expedient and unavoidable. However, if it acts now to 
institutionally determine the form and function of opposition politics, it might 
ensure that the existence of an 'opposition' poses no threat to the PAP's long term 
hegemony. In other words, genuine opposition may be nipped in the bud. 
Lee's concern to safeguard the P AP's stranglehold on power well into the 
future was further underlined by suggestions in 1984 that other constitutional 
changes may be in line. Lee speculated that the currently ceremonial role of 
President might be upgraded so that there is a mechanism to curb the financial 
activities of future governments, if need be: 
As the constitution now stands, if there is a freak election and a 
coalition government is formed, all the reserves are available [to the 
government] ... you can go out on a spending s�ree for five years and
you can become a broken-backed government. 4 
Lee talked of a special Presidential Committee for the protection of the reserves, 
estimated to be in excess of $20 billion.25 Given such powers, the President
would need to be directly elected by the people rather than appointed by the 
government of the day. 
Amongst other things, the mooted constitutional change has opened up 
speculation that Lee himself, who had already indicated he did not want to 
continue as Prime Minister beyond 1988, might be interested in the position. This 
would afford Lee an opportunity to hand over the mantle of Prime Minister but 
still oversee the initial period of Second Generation rule.26 The more
fundamental importance of the proposal in terms of the Singapore political 
system, however, is that it opens up the theoretical possibility that a popularly­
elected non-PAP government can be blocked by a PAP President. So far there 
have been no concrete moves to affect the proposed constitutional amendment, 
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which may imply that Lee is still thinking through the timing of his own departure 
as Prime Minister.27
Unpopular Policy and the 'Great Marriage Debate' 
Whilst the changing age structure of the electorate is perceived by the PAP 
hierarchy as a possible avenue to be exploited by opposition parties, the PAP also 
did a good job itself of alienating the electorate in the build-up to the December 
1984 general elections by introducing several unpopular policies in support of the 
'Second Industrial Revolution'. The degree of protest and criticism which these 
measures aroused was new to modern Singapore. The government appeared to 
grossly under-estimate the likely opposition to its policies, raising questions about 
the effectiveness of the government's grassroots contacts. 
In early 1984, recommendations in the Blue Paper compiled by the 
Committee on the Problems of the Aged, headed by Health Minister How Yoon 
Chang, prompted a general concern and dismay amongst the electorate. Taking 
into account increased life expectancy and the country's labour shortage, it was 
recommended that the age of retirement, and therefore the age at which 
withdrawals from the CPF could be made, be raised from 55 to 60 years of age 
and later to 65 years. At the time, workers were paying 23% of their monthly 
wages in to the CPF. 28
It was a common practice for the government to float its proposals before 
enacting major legislation. Accordingly, through the local press the public was 
invited to comment on the Blue Paper recommendations, the Straits Times setting 
up special telephone hotlines in conjunction with coverage of written contributions 
from the public. Though this coverage had no doubt been officially encouraged, 
the uniform public outcry against the proposals led to an abrupt closing of hotlines 
just four days later with no explanation as to why. The government wished to hear 
no more.29 It had been caught out by the strength of the public's opposition.
Public concern was not allayed, however. This was reflected in the grilling NTUC 
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officials faced at a three-day ordinary delegates' conference during the May Day 
weekend from the rank-and-file over the CPF and retirement age proposals.30
There was genuine fear amongst workers that the government was about to put 
paid to life-long retirement plans and deny them access to their hard-earned 
savings which, in any case, received a comparatively poor interest rate of 6.5%. 
Although the PAP denied opposition charges that the government needed to 
hold on to CPF contributions longer to help finance the MRT rail system,31 it did
not provide any detail about the use to which the CPF contributions wer� being 
put, Hence, all the government managed to do was raise doubts in workers' minds 
as to whether they would ultimately receive their sum and when. The exercise did 
nothing to endear the trust of the Singapore electorate. 32
If the government had actually risked its popularity on the CPF issue out of 
concern to swell the ranks of Singapore labour required for the 'Second Industrial 
Revolution', the same motivation led the government to even greater unpopularity 
following Lee Kuan Yew's National Day rally speech in August 1984. Lee drew on 
data from the 1980 Census of Population showing that the trend amongst many 
women university graduates was to apparently foresake marriage and children in 
favour of professional careers. He pointed out that whereas women with no 
education produced an average of 3.5 children, the rate diminished in line with 
educational qualifications, university graduates averaging just 1.65 children.33
This variation in fecundity was perceived by Lee as a serious threat to the whole 
fabric of Singapore's economy and society. If this trend continued, "Levels of 
competence will decline", claimed Lee. "Our economy will falter, the adminis­
tration will suffer and the society will decline".34 Lee's pessimism was founded
on two assumptions. First, he viewed intelligence as a function of heredity.35
Second, it was assumed that in the 25 years of PAP rule all the intelligent people 
had risen to positions of power, authority and wealth owing to the meritocratic 
structures put in place. As a result, the middle class/working class split now coin­
cided with the division of intelligence in Singapore society. Thus, Lee called on 
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women university graduates to produce more babies. It was, Lee argued, their 
national duty to do so. 36
The problem, as Lee saw it, was being exacerbated by the demands of 
Singapore's changing economy. The higher technology content was generating 
demand for more skilled workers. These, however, were being increasingly 
recruited from abroad, not just because the rate of economic growth exceeded the 
growth in the workforce per se, but because sufficiently able and intelligent 
Singaporeans to fill these jobs could only come from the limited ranks of the 
highly educated themselves.37 This elitist assumption was not a new ideological
expression, remembering that in 1967 Lee had claimed that every society 
depended for its survival on the talents of a mere 5% of the population.38
Moreover, the obvious alternative solution to the demand for more skilled workers 
did not fit comfortably with Lee's current designs to wind-down the state's social 
welfare role. To reject the notion that intelligence is simply a function of genetic 
factors and accept that expanded opportunities for all sectors of society, 
particularly the most disadvantaged, will unearth the required talent implied a 
very different role for the state. Not only would this involve additional cost to 
the state in expanding infrastructure in specific areas of need, it would require 
the state accepting the responsibility to even up the inequalities in the 
distribution of resources in Singapore society. The PAP view, however, was that 
inequality was both just and functional since it reflected merit. As we have seen 
in Chapter 10, according to the PAP leadership, nothing could be more harmful for 
Singapore's economic and social future than for the state to expand its social 
welfare programmes. 
Lee's speech sparked considerable public discussion and criticism in what 
was quickly coined by the Straits Times as the "Great Marriage Debate". 
Following invitations by the Straits Times and Singapore's other English-language 
daily, the Singapore Monitor, readers flooded the press with assorted points of 
view but, significantly, of an overwhelmingly disapproving tone. In particular, the 
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targets of Lee's call (female graduates) appeared to be anything but receptive to 
the Prime Minister's plea, resenting both the elitist assumption behind Lee's 
argument and the social engineering implied in his proposed 'solution'. There was 
clear rejection of Lee's nature-nurture thesis for which, readers argued, there 
existed no scientific basis. 
Despite the government's recognition of public criticism,39 in January 1984
it announced that offspring of highly-educated mothers with three or more 
children would be given priority entry for their children to the top pre-primary 
and primary schools as from July. Previously, following the 'stop at two' 
campaign introduced in 1972 and the subsequent sterilisation programme 
introduced in 1974, subsequent children of all women were given lowest priority in 
school placement. Under the new rules, women who have not attained either 
university entrance level or secondary leaving level educational qualifications will 
still have to produce sterilisation certificates to ensure placement for third 
children.40 This policy initiated a new round of public criticisms, with special
condemnation of the discrimination this represented against children of 
underprivileged backgrounds who, as some people pointed out in letters to 
newspaper editors, were in far greater need of access to better schools than their 
counterparts from more wealthy families.41 Within just one week the National
University of Singapore Student Union (NUSSU) had gathered 2,100 signatures 
petitioning against the policy, attacking the notion that only the intelligent can 
breed intelligence as a genetic fallacy and condemning the elitism crystallised in 
the new rules. Within days the Nanyang Technological Institute Students' Union 
(NTISU) compiled its own petition, levelling similar criticisms, with its female 
signatories adding that they had no intention of taking advantage of the new 
school rules. 42
Whilst the government may have been surprised and disappointed in the 
public response it had aroused, it was certainly not about to be swayed by any of 
it. Instead, it stepped-up propaganda measures to lend support to Lee's thesis.43
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The state also assumed a direct role as matchmaker among its civil servants, 
having set up a special task force, the Social Development Unit (SDU), for the 
job.44 In March 1984, Finance Minister Dr Tony Tan announced in his budget
speech the introduction of a 30% tax relief for working mothers with a university 
degree and a third child.45 Subsequent to this, the government announced that
from 1 June it would pay $10,000 to less-educated and low-income mothers under 
30 years of age should they volunteer to be sterilised after their first or second 
child. The money would be paid into that person's CPF, only to be used for the 
purchase of a HDB flat.46 Thus, whilst trying to entice the educated on the one 
hand to breed more children, on the other the PAP was trying to dissuade 
Singapore's poorest, least-educated citizens from the same. 
Through the government's various initiatives and proposals to deal with 
problems arising out of the new industrial strategy, then, it managed to arouse the 
resentment of both the middle and working classes. Both were especially sensitive 
to endeavours tq resolve fiscal pressures associated with the 'Second Industrial 
Revolution' by tampering with the CPF. Moreover, even where the PAP's scheme 
to generate the required brain power favoured the middle class, it only served to 
highlight the widening gap between official ideology and the thinking of much of 
this class. 
1984 General Election 
Not surprisingly, the PAP's unexpected defeat in the 1981 Anson by-election 
prompted a sense of urgency about securing a strong mandate at the next general 
election. Thus, although an election was not necessary until 1985, signs of an 
early election surfaced by November 1983.47 As events unfolded, however, the
PAP sensed an early election inappropriate once the unpopularity of its selective 
breeding and education, early retirement and CPF policies became clear. As a 
result, the government actually delayed the election until December 1984. 
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Preparation for the election included the announcement of 26 new 
candidates in batches throughout 1984. Amongst the last batch was the Prime 
Minister's son, Lee Hsien Loong. So as to underline the extent to which the 1984 
election marked the further advance of the Second Generation leadership, Lee 
Kuan Yew pointed out that six of these new candidates were fit to be "more than 
MPs". Lee Hsien Loong, who had risen to Brigadier-General in the Singapore 
Army, was identified as one of the six. 48
Understandably, the raising of the age limit for CPF withdrawals, the elitist 
policy regarding graduate mothers, the Medicare Scheme, and the streaming of 
school children at early primary school were all defined as major issues in 
opposition party campaigns. The high cost of HDB flats was also a central issue. 
So too was the idea that parliamentary opposition was in itself desirable to check 
the execu;tive authority of government. The Workers' Party also devoted some 
attention to the stifling of labour independence, or 'neutering' of the labour 
movement as they called it, which had been consolidated under the 'Second 
Industrial Revolution'.49
The PAP never satisfactorily defused any of the fundamental issues raised 
by the opposition parties, choosing instead to almost exclusively push the theme of 
the PAP's record of stable government and economic achievement.50 As the
election results ·suggested, however, to many of the new generation of voters on 
the 1985 rolls, this theme evoked little sentiment. Instead, the PAP's failure to 
address the controversial issues focused on by its opponents underlined the Party's 
arrogant assumption that only it was capable of ascertaining and defining the 
perceptions and aspirations of the electorate. Thus, choosing largely to bypass or 
treat superficially a number of genuine electoral concerns, Lee called on voters to 
appreciate that above all, the purpose of the election result was to convey a signal 
to overseas investors that there would be a continuation of the sort of political 
stability and predictability which underpinned its economic success. Referring to 
the ushering in of Second Generation leaders to the helm, Lee commented that "I 
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have assembled a team", appealing to electors that "You have to give _a signal to 
investors that you can strike a rapport with this team".51
To the PAP's disappointment, the 1984 general election results showed that 
Jeyaretnam's Anson victory in 1981 was not an isolated expression of 
disillusionment with the PAP. Rather, the 1984 results accelerated an already 
nascent trend towards greater opposition support in general. Not only did the PAP 
fail to recapture the seat of Anson and lose another, the first losses in any general 
election since 1965, but it suffered a 13% swing against it in the share of total 
valid votes cast. Whereas the PAP polled 77.7% in 1980, its share dropped to 
64.8% in 1985. Meanwhile, the vote was raised from 22.3% to 35.2% for 
opposition parties. In the process, not only was the WP's Jeyaretnam returned 
with an increased majority but the SDP's Chiam See Tong improved his vote share 
from 40% in 1980 to 60.4% in 1984 to take th� seat of Potong Pasir. 52 In each
case, these candidates defeated capable young PAP candidates, Ng Pock Too and 
Mah Bow Tan, both of whom Lee Kuan Yew had earlier earmarked for big 
things.53 Neither could these PAP defeats easily be dismissed as the result of
problems specific to individual constituencies. After all, the WP improved its 
share of the total vote from 29.2% in 1980 to 41.9% in 15 seats in 1984. The BS 
too improved its share from 27% to 38.2% between the two elections for the seats 
it contested. As a result of this general swing towards opposition parties, there 
were at least another five constituencies in which opposition candidates came 
close to victory. In Jalan Kayu, the WP's M.P.D. Nair lost by just 571 votes. The 
WP subsequently rejected the government's offer of this seat under the new 
constitutional amendment.54
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Table 21: Election Results, 1984 
Party Number of Total Votes Percentage of votes 
constit- valid cast 1980* 
uencies votes in for Average Highest Lowest 
contested constit- Party 
uencies 
contested 
PAP 79 876,565 568,310 64.8 83.2 39.7 77.7% 
WP 15 264,721 110,868 41.9% 56.8% 33.2% 29.2% 
SUF 13 254,989 87,237 34.2% 47.8% 25.8% 19.0% 
UPF 8 136,411 27,217 20.0% 27.7% 0.8% 12.0% 
BS 4 63,378 24,212 38.2% 43.8% 34.8% 27.0% 
SDP 4 69,695 32,102 46.1% 60.3% 38.6% 30.7% 
SJP 2 44,701 10,906 24.4% 24.6% 24.3% 16.0% 
IM 1 15,697 359 2.3% 
SMNO 1 13,146 4,768 36.3% 19.5% 
* Party's percentage of valid votes in constituencies contested.
Source: "Mah: SDP Win a Nation-Wide Phenomenon", The Sunday Times 
(Singapore), 23.12.84. 
Whilst the loss of two seats by the PAP hardly presented any practical 
problems for government in a 79-member assembly, and certainly did not in itself 
constitute political instability, the P AP's leadership took the results very 
seriously. Indeed, the PAP's reaction was quite revealing, not only illuminating 
the leadership's intolerance of genuine parliamentary opposition but its disdain for 
the one-person one-vote system itself. Just six hours after the polls closed Lee 
threatened a revamping of this system to prevent the possibility of the PAP being 
toppled. Although he talked of such a revamping as a means of avoiding symbolic 
protest votes inadvertently bringing down a government, there is little doubt he 
was more concerned with limiting the constitutional possibility of any longer term 
preference for opposition parties and policies. 
It is necessary to try and put some safeguards into the way in which 
people use their votes to bargain, to coerce, to push, to jostle and 
get what they want without running the risk of losing the services of 
government, because one day, by mistake, they will lose the services 
of the government. 55
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Of course, there was no evidence that such a possibility of accidentally voting a 
government out of office existed. If Lee was not cynical in such a pronouncement 
then he was at least remarkably paternalistic in presuming that either he or the 
PAP could best decide what the electorate really wanted. Second Deputy Prime 
Minister Rajaratnam went so far as to interpret the voters exercising their right 
to vote for opposition candidates as a form of blackmail. He emphasised that the 
government would not be "strong-armed" into making policy changes in response 
to ballot pressure.56
Already we have examined some of the issues pursued by the opposition 
parties in the 1985 election campaign which help us understand the result. Apart 
from specific policy issues, however, letters subsequently invited by the Straits 
Times revealed that many readers resented what they perceived to be a 
paternalistic and authoritarian style on the part of the PAP leadership.57
The presence of Jeyaretnam in parliament has served to illustrate this 
style. The arrogant and dismissive treatment both of Jeyaretnam and of the 
issues he has raised in and out of parliament has been coupled with government 
threats that electorates not returning PAP candidates could receive inferior 
public services. This suggests an effective political opposition is a notion which 
clearly lays outside the political philosophy of the PAP. Such a view apparently 
fits less comfortably with today's increasingly middle class electorate. More than 
this, the election results also suggest that this class can no longer be easily 
persuaded to indefinitely continue to accept material sacrifice for long term 
goals. 
Though the PAP's political security in the immediate future is assured, the 
recent decline in support does raise a number of important questions about the 
longer term. First, it now appears that in spite of its comprehensive links with 
grassroots networks, the PAP is less effective than it once was in ascertaining the 
aspirations of the masses. The increasing concentration of power in the hands of 
professionals and technocrats may have contributed to this. Moreover, the various 
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structural links with grassroots organisations have, over time, become more 
exclusively channels of command rather than gauges of opinion. Second, the 
composition and experiences of the electorate have changed. Ironically, some of 
these circumstances arise out of the very success of the PAP's industrial strategy 
which generated a relatively affluent middle class accustomed until now only to 
rapid material improvements in living conditions. After all, Singapore's 550% 
increase in per capita income over the past 25 years is second only to the increase 
of Saudi Arabia.58 How adequately the Party responds to these new
circumstances will have a considerable bearing on both the PAP's future and 
Singapore's political culture. Arguably many of the irritations and disillusions of 
the electorate accounting for the swing to opposition parties could be allayed by 
mild reforms. After 25 years of supremacy, however, the PAP shows all the signs 
of being too rigid to accommodate such changes. Thus, faced with the option of 
either relaxing or intensifying authoritarianism to maintain social control, it is 
quite possible that the latter will be favoured by the PAP, even taking into 
account the assession to power of the Second Generation leadership.59
A major challenge confronting the PAP, then, is that of sustaining political 
legitimacy when the traditional basis for this, economic growth, is both taken for 
granted by the electorate and likely to be limited in the immediate future. The 
PAP has itself contributed to the potential legitimisation crisis by consistently 
portraying economic performance as the sole yardstick of good government. In its 
utilitarian and economistic theory of government, the PAP has never embraced 
non-economic values, especially those appealing to political liberalism. It now 
finds itself the victim of its own ideology, not matching up to its stated definition 
of good government and unable to comfortably justify its monopoly of power on 
more abstract grounds. This is not to suggest that we can expect a rapid political 
demise for the PAP. For one thing, the superstructure put in place by the PAP 
over the last two and a half decades ensures a certain degree of continuity. The 
comprehensive PAP control and influence in all spheres of Singapore society is 
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unlikely to be dismantled easily or quickly. Moreover, as we have seen above, the 
PAP is quite capable of further exploiting these existing social relations to repress 
the emergence of political opposition resulting from ;.he sharpening of domestic 
economic and political contradictions. 
Conclusion 
In summary, Singapore's particular strategy to exploit the new international 
division of labour has contained important economic contradictions which are now 
compounding the difficulty of the global recession. As if the threat to economic 
growth is not itself enough to pose political problems for the PAP, the strategy 
has also alienated the electorate with unpopular social policies in support of the 
new phase of industrialisation. Some of these policies derived from the 
contradiction between fiscal pressures on the state associated with the new 
economic strategy and the continuation of the state's welfare role which is being 
exacerbated, but not instigated, by the world recession. In short, Singapore 
appears to have reached a watershed in its political economy, one which has been 
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The primary focus of this thesis has been the state and its role in the 
industrialisation of Singapore. As argued in the first chapter, there is a 
conspicuous dearth of such analysis and the dominant accounts of NIC 
industrialisation have tended to ignore, downplay or misrepresent the role of the 
state. In short, treatment of the state has been theoretically inadequate. The 
fundamental assumption of this thesis has been that such inadequacy represents a 
serious flaw in the understanding of successful industrialisation through 
incorporation into the new international division of labour. 
Two broad views have therefore been challenged in this study. The first 
pertains to neo-classical and rational choice theories, which largely depict politics 
and economics as separate domains. These analyses steer us away from the state 
or encourage an interpretation of state policy as a technical rather than political 
process. The second view, most clearly but not exclusively represented in 
dependency theory, obscures the complexity of political forces which define and 
condition the state's industrial policy. In explaining the influence of the state 
over Singapore's pattern of industrialisation, together with the circumstances 
which have made this possible, this study has endeavoured to transcend these 
weaknesses. Through the development of six central propositions, this thesis has 
in effect argued that NIC industrialisation can best be explained in terms of two 
complementary theoretical approaches. It confirms the importance of theories 
depicting the evolution of a new international division of labour, but it also 
emphasises the primacy of the state in facilitating incorporation into this 
structure and the endogenous factors making this possible. 
According to the first proposition, and contrary to the rational choice 
argument, Singapore's incorporation into the new international division of labour, 
and its subsequent industrialisation, cannot be explained simply in terms of 'good' 
policies. Part II of the thesis demonstrated this point. Here it was explained that 
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after self-government, the PAP was firmly committed to an ISI strategy. The 
failure of political merger with Malaysia soon forced a reconsideration of 
strategy. Further, it happened that this crisis occurred at a particular juncture in 
the development of international capitalism which presented Singapore with a 
viable alternative. In other words, the feasibility of the EOI strategy is 
historically-specific rather than universally valid. Hence, Part II showed in 
particular how the internationalisation of production by electronics companies 
underscored Singapore's initial post-independence industrialisation. This is no 
insignificant point given that rational choice theory prescribes the adoption of 
policies without appreciation of historical opportunity. What I have shown in the 
case of Singapore is that certain objective conditions have made these policies 
conducive to rapid industrialisation. 
objective conditions can change, 
As I will also argue later, however, these 
thereby bringing into question the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of the same policies elsewhere. 
The second proposition outlined in the first chapter also related to historical 
specificity but focused on domestic rather than international factors. It asserted 
that, even in the context of favourable external conditions (the emergence of a 
new international division of labour), domestic socio-political factors determine 
the inclination and capacity to exploit them. This, it was argued, provided a more 
satisfactory explanation for why only certain developing countries have been 
successfully incorporated into the new international division of labour than the 
notion of 'good' or 'bad' policy choice being the decisive factor. Aside from the 
failure of merger, Singapore's incorporation had much to do with its specific class 
formations and the existence of a state which enjoyed a high degree of relative 
political autonomy. In particular, the early structure of the Singapore economy 
under British rule militated against the establishment of a significant industrial 
bourgeoisie. The small industrial bourgeoisie, which did exist in the mid-1960s, 
was also politically impotent and could pose no challenge to the PAP in the pursuit 
of its EOI strategy. This situation contrasts sharply with Indonesia, for instance, 
where the local bourgeoisie and bureaucrats successfully exerted political pressure 
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to resist, rather than facilitate, the EOI strategies advocated by technocrats. 
This study has maintained, however, that it is precisely the absence of close 
integration with the bourgeoisie, and labour, which has enabled the PAP state to 
act so decisively in implementing and supporting the EOI strategy. Corporatism in 
Singapore's case, however, was not subsequent to incorporation into the new 
international division of labour but a prerequisite for it. 
The fact of a relatively autonomous state capable of playing a leading role 
in implementing an EOI strategy is obviously important. How that role is guaged 
is equally important. This question is at the core of the third central proposition 
of the thesis which demonstrated that the PAP state has played a critical role in 
fostering extra-economic conditions favourable for EOI. In particular, the 
institutional control over organised labour and the general taming or elimination 
of political opponents has contributed to the availability of a disciplined labour 
force with reduced bargaining capacity. In this way, the state has contributed 
towards lower wage costs and the fullest exploitation of this resource. As many 
of the discussions of the P AP's relations with opposition groups indicated, often 
this influence is very indirect. It is nevertheless of great significance. Neo­
classical economics broadly defined, cannot accommodate such important 
influences since such factors as political repression do not fit comfortably with 
quantitative models of comparative advantage. This is not to deny, of course, 
that the effect of extra-economic factors is extremely difficult to assess. On the 
evidence presented in this thesis, however, it is not unreasonable to contend that, 
the state's circumscription of organised labour has made a major contribution to 
industrialisation. It has also been seen, though, that the speed and flexibility of 
the bureaucracy has also played its part in facilitating investment. There are 
historical and political factors accounting for this. The period of British colonial 
rule established a state apparatus which was potentially useful to PAP industrial 
plans. This included a civil service which was not just accustomed to a technical 
and supportive relationship with government, but one which was corruption-free. 
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The PAP never had to contend with any serious political forces whose power base 
was located within the civil service. Finally, the state has vigorously promoted 
ideological support for the activities of international capital. We can only ignore 
these functions of the state at the expense of understanding the totality of the 
context within which rapid industrialisation has occurred. 
The fourth central proposition of the thesis, that the state has, through 
various forms of intervention, helped shape Singapore's comparative advantage, is 
not unrelated to the above point. In effect, extra-economic intervention 
represents an indirect influence on comparative advantage. Simultaneously, the 
PAP state has consistently engaged in a host of more direct forms of influence. 
These have been detailed throughout the study and include direct investment, the 
provision of social and physical infrastructure, the provision of below-market or 
even interest-free finance, generous tax exemptions and other assorted forms of 
direct and indirect subsidisation of costs in preferred areas of production. The 
emphases and degrees of such intervention have changed over time, with finance 
packages and tax assistance assuming greater significance in the period of the 
'Second Industrial Revolution' due to the greater capital intensity and longer 
gestation periods associated with higher value-added production. The aim and 
effect of the intervention has however remained constant: to induce a pattern of 
investment which might otherwise not have taken place, or taken place at a later 
time. Certainly state intervention has rendered Singapore a more attractive 
investment site than it otherwise would have been. At the same time, it has been 
shown that, particularly in the period of the 'Second Industrial Revolution', the 
state has contributed to the difficulties of certain forms of production. Through 
the high wage policy, immigration policy and the Skills Development Fund levy, 
the demise of low-skill, labour-intensive production has been hastened. 
In short, then, this study confirms the view of those such as Lim that the 
PAP state has helped create Singapore's comparative advantage in the new 
international division of labour. This interpretation clearly rejects nee-classical 
understanding of comparative advantage as something 'outside' government. 
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Attention has been drawn to the ambiguity of the relationship between state and 
market. The evidence of the thesis suggests they are not neatly-divided entities 
but interrelated and mutually-defining. This is not the same as claiming that the 
Singapore state has mapped out the course of industrialisation, nor that its policy 
objectives have always achieved the intended results. For sure, government policy 
has taken into account market trends and operates within objective limits, but the 
market itself is nothing but concrete actors whose investment decisions are 
significantly influenced by state policy. This is particularly so in a society such as 
Singapore where the state's influence extends to all spheres of social, political and 
economic activity. To establish the degree of state influence over comparative 
advantage with greater precision than has been necessary in this thesis, a range of 
individual sector studies which investigate the bargaining power of the state would 
be helpful. Hopefully the macro analysis presented here may lay the groundwork 
for future sectoral studies which are compatible with the theoretical points of this 
thesis. Amongst other things, such studies would need to recognise that, owing to 
the socio-political and historical specificity of different economies, bargaining 
power, and indeed the political will to bargain with multinational corporations, 
cannot be explained solely and possibly not even primarily in terms of industry­
specific characteristics. 
The fifth proposition demonstrated in this thesis is the inseparability of the 
technical demands of participation in the new international division of labour from 
the domestic. political economy. In the early part of the thesis considerable 
attention was given to how institutionalised labour control was a functional 
requirement of entry into the new international division of labour. Not all states 
have been able to satisfy this requirement in a manner as proficient as that of the 
Singapore state. In recent times, however, the state's measures to secure 
participation in the new international division of labour, indeed at a higher rung in 
its technological ladder, have involved more complex ramifications. As explained 
in Part IV, the heavy state expenditure outlays required to implement the 'Second 
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Industrial Revolution' have resulted in attempts by the PAP state to reduce its 
traditional welfare commitments. I have been reluctant to identify this as a 
'fiscal crisis' because the government's considerable foreign reserves could 
provide, at the very least, a means of delaying the 'crisis' into the distant 
future.1 The government's management of these reserves does suggest, however,
that it will only call on them as a last resort. Thus, its first priority is to confront 
the political challenge of cutting welfare spending. The preliminary evidence 
shows, however, that this will not be easy and cautions us against making 
predictions about Singapore's future political economy based only on past 
performance and experience. The question which will need close attention in 
future research then is how the PAP resolves this problem and the degree to which 
domestic political conditions may, or may not, restrict the financial capacity of 
the state to underwrite economic development. 
Turning briefly to the final proposition of this thesis, it has been suggested 
that the pattern of investment by different international capitals further 
complicates the meaning of 'comparative advantage'. It was demonstrated in 
Chapter 11 that the patterns of investment by Japanese and US-based capitals 
contrasted significantly in response to the policies of the 'Second Industrial 
Revolution'. Comparative advantage is therefore not universally valid in its 
meaning and, at least in the case of Japanese-based capitals, is weighed against 
non-cost considerations such as perceived long-term market access. Amongst 
other things, such findings should encourage circumspection in the use not only of 
the concept of 'comparative advantage' but also the 'new international division of 
labour'. Neither are consistent, compelling and exclusive realities but helpful 
generalisations warranting specification. 
Finally, and somewhat more speculatively, the experience of Singapore in 
the period of the 'Second Industrial Revolution' does not seem to suggest that 
Singapore is about to achieve a dramatic qualitative leap in its industrial 
progress. On the evidence of Chapter 11, we could only say that there has been a 
significant, but not spectacular, increase in the value-added of investments. The 
- --�~--��---- - --------------,--------------,-----
539 
big boosts in R & D work which the government hoped to attract have not yet 
materialised. Whether Singapore proves an attractive alternative site for 
genuinely sophisticated high technology production remains to be seen. Thus one 
question which future research might fruitfully pursue is whether or not Singapore 
is beginning to exhaust the possibilities of EOI based on the attraction of lower 
labour costs. 
The question of the longer term possibilities of the Singapore model 
obviously belongs to a broader investigation of the new international division of 
labour itself. Recent structural and technological changes to the conditions 
underlaying international investment would need to be taken into account. In 
particular, the tendency towards increased market protection by the major 
economies of the world and the extension of automated production processes have 
the potential to affect qualitative changes to the development of international 
capitalism. Should such tendencies fully mature, the EOI models of development 
could be rendered historically obsolete. 
The first of these major threats to the EOI strategy, protectionism, is of 
course not new. We have seen how the PAP development plan for the 1980s was in 
part precipitated by the desire to minimise the effects of such a tendency by 
moving out of low value-added labour-intensive production. The new problem, 
however, is not just that unemployment in the centre has led to political pressure 
to retain some labour-intensive forms of production. Rather, there is increasing 
evidence that the world monetary system is incapable of coping with a genuinely 
liberal world trade order. This derives from the sharpening of contradictions 
between the different world economies and manifests itself in unstable 
international exchange rates. As Thurow points out, continued and expanded 
global economic integration requires the major industrial countries to co-ordinate 
their monetary and fiscal policies and to limit movements in exchange rates 
between major currencies.2 For the world's major economic actors, however, such
an approach would produce difficult economic and political pressures and 
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challenges. The US's relative decline in international manufacturing 
competitiveness, the seriousness of unemployment in Europe, and the structural 
interdependence of the Japanese economy which undermines its capacity to absorb 
imports would all appear at this stage more likely to be resolved by selective 
withdrawal from international competition than by mutual efforts to foster 
international trade and economic integration.3 Industry after industry is
progressively being affected by the protectionist trend - textiles, clothing, 
footwear, steel, cars, consumer electronics. In particular, the growing use of non­
tariff barriers (NTBs) threatens global economic integration. The extent of NTBs 
more than doubled in the US between 1980 and 1983 and increased by 38 % in the 
European Community.4 As Table 21 below indicates, a greater share of industrial
country imports from developing countries has been subject to NTBs than imports 
from other industrial countries. These figures do not take account of the 
tightening of existing NTBs so in all likelihood underestimate the increased resort 
to formal trade barriers to developing country exports.5 The point is that the end
of the world recession need not necessarily witness the return of export 
opportunities for developing countries, even if they have shifted their production 
emphasis to higher value-added manufactures. 
Table 22: Share of Imports Subject to Non-Tariff Barriers in 
Industrial-Country Markets, 1983 
Market Percentage of imports from: 
Industrial All developing 
countries countries 
EC 10.2 21.8 
Japan 9.3 10.5 
United States 7.7 12.9 







Note: Data are based on 1981 weighted averages for all world trade in all 
products except fuels. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1985, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985, p.40. 
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The second major threat to the EOI strategy, the tendency towards 
automation, is just beginning to take root. Up until now, automation of production 
processes has not reached such maturity as to cancel out the benefits of cheaper 
labour in developing countries. Now, in industries such as electronics and textiles, 
however, the process has in some cases reached that point. Cho, for example, 
points out that one analysis of the manufacturing cost per integrated circuit by 
electronics companies in Hong Kong and the US showed that the installation of 
automatic bonding machines with pattern recognition would virtually eliminate 
the offshore advantage.6 Already such companies as Motorola and Fairchild
Camera and Instrument Corporation have moved production lines from Hong Kong 
and South Korea back to the US where modern computer-controlled assembly of 
chips reduces costs to the same level as at the offshore sites.7 More recently,
Fairchild has returned its assembly operations from Singapore and Indonesia back 
to Portland in the US. Whereas a Southeast· Asian worker can wire up to 120 
integrated circuits to their frames in an hour, one of the 34 automated machines 
in Portland can wire 640 circuits per hour. Seeing as one person is able to monitor 
eight of the new machines, the output per person is therefore 5,120 circuits per 
hour.8
Clearly, the increased productivity of labour and the reduced portion of 
labour to total production costs brought about by automation threatens the 
competitive advantage of lower wage export bases. Whilst this tendency is as yet 
only in its infancy, its maturation would have profound implications for the EOI 
economies of the Third World. Aside from the consequent reduced economic 
growth, this would represent a serious obstacle to any further transfer of 
technology which is so important to the general industrial expertise of these 
countries. How far this tendency develops and how developing country 
governments respond is of course open to speculation. One possible pressure 
arising from increased automation though would be for even more active efforts 
by NI Cs to subsidise production both directly and indirectly in order to attract 
investment. 




The two points raised above should be taken into account in any assessment 
of the significance of the current world recession which has hit developing 
countries in general, and NICs in particular, quite hard. For developing countries 
as a whole, exports of manufactures grew at an impressive rate of 10.6% a year 
between 1973 and 1980, but for the period 1980-1983 the rate was only 6.9% a 
year.9 The Asian NICs, however, have suffered especially sharp reductions in
export earnings - a problem which at the time of writing is only intensifying. In 
1985, for the first time, the growth of exports of the NICs actually fell behind the 
growth of world trade.10 As a result, these heavily export-dependent economies
experienced significant declines in GNP growth. Having been accustomed to 
annual GNP growth rates of 8-10% for nearly two decades, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and South Korea had growth rates ranging from 4-6% for 1985. Singapore suffered 
the most severe downturn, its economy actually shrinking by 2%.11 Without
doubt, the severity of these declines has been fundamentally determined by the 
fall in demand from the advanced industrial economies. Owing to the rise in 
protectionism and the structural changes outlined above, it might be overly 
optimistic to expect another recovery of the sort which followed the 1973-1975 
recession. Further, the last decade in the advanced capitalist economies has seen 
capital succeed in reasserting greater control over labour and reductions in real 
wage levels. The wage gap between NICs and these economies has therefore 
narrowed to some extent. This could further arrest the tendency to move 
offshore.12 In short, a combination of historical circumstances could give rise to
a new phase in international capitalism which would make it extremely difficult 
for the experiences of the NICs to be duplicated by other developing countries and 
could limit the scope for further advances by the NICs themselves. What 
Singapore has achieved in the last two:--and-a-half decades is the product not just 
of a specific set of domestic but international circumstances. Both are dynamic 
and difficult to predict. 
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In conclusion, it is worth re-iterating that the primary contribution of this 
thesis has been an attempt to clarify the nature of the state's involvement in the 
industrialisation of Singapore and the uniqueness of the historical and socio­
political conditions facilitating this involvement. Because of the uniqueness of 
these conditions, it is not valid to extrapolate that incorporation into the 
emerging new international division of labour through an EOI strategy is the most 
appropriate path, or even a possible path for developing countries in general. 
Moreover, we should be particularly discerning in the use to which we make of 
studies of NICs, or indeed any economy, which uncritically employ the neo­
classical notion of comparative advantage. In demystifing the industrialisation 
process it can be seen that concrete actors in concrete conditions, and not 
abstract laws, determine development. As in the case of Singapore, the state has 
been a critical actor. As such, it has been a serious theoretical omission in the 
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Table 1: Selected Principal Economic Indicators, 1959-1983 
Man. Man. Man. Total Population 
Output Value- Employ- Unemploy- Growth 
Added ment ment (Per Cent) 
(Per Cent) 
398.9 142.8 25,606 13.2 4.0 
465.6 142.1 27,414 13.2 3.5 
510.8 171.0 26,481 15.0 3.0 
651.1 197.7 27,381 15.3 2.6 
828.9 245.4 34,622 14.0 2.5 
912.4 275.6 39,544 13.8 2.5 
1,070.5 341.4 45,535 8.7 2.5 
1,310.8 408.6 51,066 8.7 2.3 
1,672.2 472.4 56,625 8.1 2.0 
2,158.2 604.5 73,059 7.3 1.6 
3,194.0 848.5 98,921 6.7 1.5 
3,891.0 1,093.7 120,509 6.0 1.7 
4,699.2 1,366.5 140,552 4.8 1.8 
5,722.2 1,782.3 170,352 4.7 1.9 
7,938.1 2,540.6 198,574 4.5 1.8 
13,346.9 3,528.2 206,067 3.9 1.6 
12,610.1 3,411.1 191,528 4.6 1.4 
15,317.4 3,961.8 207,234 4.5 1.4 
17,518.2 4,475.5 219,112 3.9 1.3 
19,666.7 5,162.9 243,724 3.6 1.2 
25,133.7 6,412.9 269,334 3.4 1.3 
31,657.9 8,512.9 285,250 3.5 1.2 
36,787.1 9,720.5 281,675 3.9 1.2 
36,467.4 9,355.9 275,753 2.6 1.2 
37,221.5 9,822.1 271,106 3.3 1.1 
Department of Statistics, Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 
1983/84, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, n.d., Table 3.1, p.46; 
Nyaw Mee-kau, Industrial Growth and Export Expansion in Singapore, 
Hong Kong: Kingsway International, 1979, Appendix Table A-22, p.172; 
W.E. Chalmers and Pang Eng Fong, "Industrial Relations", in Ooi Jin-
Bee and Chiang Hai Ding (editors), Modern 
































Value Output Direct Direct 
Added Per Exports Exports 
Per Worker to Total to 
Worker Sales Output 
Dollars Per Cent 
5,600 15,600 
5,200 17,000 35.3 
6,100 42,906 58.1 58.6 
6,924 50,522 67.3 66.9 
6,900 38,258 52.5 52.5 
6,845 34,492 52.6 51.9 
7,207 33,295 51.6 51.4 
7,732 35,228 43.3 42.8 
8,192 36,422 41.1 40.7 
8,146 35,409 36.3 36.3 
8,600 40.522 45.7 46.2 
9,029 36,619 44.6 44.2 
9,705 36,137 44.1 44.7 
10,388 34,962 47.9 47.5 
12,856 42,945 54.9 54.9 
17,127 67,795 60.7 59.8 
17,763 67,679 58.6 57.7 
19,168 76,724 61.9 62.8 
20,417 82,277 62.8 62.4 
21,179 83,144 64.2 63.9 
23,992 96,835 64.1 64.2 
30,027 113,844 61.9 60.6 
34,681 132,488 61.1 60.7 
33,966 132,392 59.9 59.8 
36,230 137,295 60.5 60.8 
Department of Statistics, Singapore, Economic & Social Statistics 
Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, Singapore; 
Yearbook of Statistics Singa2ore 1983/84, Singapore: Singapore National 
Printers, n.d., Table 62., p.89. 
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1 . 3 
2. 3
10.5 








































































































Table 5: ( Continued) 
M:L 11 ion Dol.lnrs 
Indus-
trial Industry 1968 1969 1970 19 71 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Code 
311/2 Food 129.8 14 6. 1 185.7 183.4 158.5 228.6 376.5 317.6 
313 Beverage 13. 9 12. 7 1 3. 1 12.4 14.6 13. 6 21. 2 31.3 
314 Cigarettes & other tobacco products 4.8 3.4 4.0 6. 5 3.5 6.2 10.0 2.5 
321 Textiles & textile manufactures 16. 0 21. 7 40.8 66.4 118. 4 206.0 177. 4 141.5 
322 Wearing apparel except footwear 43.3 5 6. 1 55.5 82.8 151 . 1 226.7 19 7. 5 197.8 
323 Leather & leather products 10.2 11. 5 8.3 7. 8 18.6 18.6 18. 7 12. 1 
324 Footwear 2. 4 2. 7 4. 1 7. 4 9.4 8.2 11. 7 12.6 
331 Sawntimber & other wood products except 
furniture 52.4 72. 8 84.8 10 2. 1 138.7 283.0 210.9 195.8 
332 Furniture & fixtures except primarily 
of metal, stone & plastics 3.0 3. 1 2. 5 2.5 2.6 7. 3 13.8 12.9 
341 Paper & paper products 4. 6 6.4 5.9 6. 7 11. 7 11. 8 14. 9 11. 1 
342 Printing & publishing 6. 8 8. 5 l 3. 2 22.0 23.5 32.9 4 5. 5 4 5. 6 
351 Industrial chemicals & gases 
l 96. 7 ] 634.8 ] 607.4 
10.5 19. 9 27.8 39.0 Lil. 7 01 
352 Paints, pharmaceutical & other 01 
chemical products 2 6. 1 26.2 89.5 122.3 148.4 01 
353/4 Petroleum refineries & petroleum products 760.1 818.0 1,244.3 3,805.4 3,102.7 
355 Processing of Jelutong & gum demar 10.8 8. 7 9. 6 8.4 12.9 14. 7
356 Rubber products except rubber footwear 
& toys 9.7 20.8 25.6 25.2 24.7 13.5 14.8 18.4 
357 Plastic products - - 10.2 16. 5 15.3 25.4 32.4 28.2 
361/2 Pottery, china, earthenware & glass 
] }6. 6 ],5.3 
products 4.6 6. 1 8. 1 10.0 11. 4 
363 Bricks, tiles & other structural clay 
_products 23.4 . 4 . 8 . 3 .3 . 2
364 Cement . 9 3.2 3.6 13. 0 26.9 
365 Structural cement & concrete products 
369 Non-metallic mineral �roducts 
] 23. 3 ] 18.6 ] 15. 9 
11. 6 4. 3 21. 2 31. 0 40.5 
371 Iron & steel 2.9 l. 4 1. 9 26.4 16.2 
372 Non-ferrous metal 9.9 6. 7 14.4 1 7. 6 19.0 
381 Fabricated metal products except Machinery 
& equipment 72.5 114. 1 156.2 
382 Machinery except electrical & electronic 3.1 5. 9 17.0 34.6 63.5 19 9. 1 372.6 556.0 
383 Electrical machinery, apparatus, 
appliances & supplies 23.0 84.6 212.0 67.1 141. l 241.6 322.3 295.9 
384 Electronic products & components 251.7 487.4 892.4 1 ,258.0 1,122.3 
385 Transport equipment 41. 7 72.9 98.5 130.2 226.4 221.1 377. 2 421.6 
386 Instrumentation equipment, photographic 
& optical goods . 1 5. 9 16.0 6 2. 3 104.3 101: 6 153. 1 
390 Other manufacturing industries 11. 3 25.7 36.3 39.8 37.5 37.3 43.0 46.4 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING EXCLUDING RUBBER PROCESSING 059.5 1 , 2 6·5. 3 1,523.0 1,954.7 2,641.7 4,269.8 7,811.9 7,200.7 






































Cigarettes & other tobacco products 
Textiles & textile manufactures 
Wearing apparel except footwear 
Leather & leather products 
Footwear 
Sawntimber & other wood products except 
furniture 
Furniture & fixtures except primarily 
of metal, stone & plastics 
Paper & paper products 
Printing & publishing 
Industrial chemicals & gases 
Paints, pharmaceutical & other 
chemical products 
Petroleum refineries & petroleum products 
Processing of Jelutong & gum demar 
Rubber products ·except rubber footwear 
& toys 
Plastic products 
Pottery, china, earthenware & glass 
products 
Bricks, tiles -& other structural clay 
products 
Cement 
Structural cement & concrete Products 
Non-metallic mineral products 
Iron & steel 
Non-ferrous me�al 
Fabricated metal products except Machinery 
& equipment 
Machinery except electrical & electronic 
Electr·ical machinery, apparatus, 
applicances & supplies 
Electronic products & components 
Transport equipment 
Instrumentation equipment, photographic 
& optical goods 
Other manufacturing industries 







l 7 . 7
14.0
267.7 































2 5 6. 1 
29.9 
19 . 1 
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4 72. 9 
1,701.6 





































9,575.9 10,969.4 12,632.7 16,203.0 19,172.9 22,375.3 21,858.7 22,640.8 











































Cigarettes & other tobacco 
products 
Textile & textile manufactures 
Wearing apparel except footware 
Leather & leather products 
Footware 
Sawntimber & other wood products 
except furniture 
Furniture & Fixtures except 
primarily of metal , . 
Paper & paper products 
Printing & publishing 
Industrial chemicals & gases 
Paints, pharmaceurical & other 
chemical products 
Petroleum refineries & 
petroleum products 
Processing of jelutong & gum damar 
Rubber products except footwear 
Plastic products 
Pottery, china, earthenware & glass 
products 
Bricks, tiles & other structural 
clay products .. 







1 , 811 
1960 
3,664 







l · 421 }43, 
n.a n.a 





Asbestos, stone & 
mineral products 
Iron & steel 
other non-metallic 
Zinc & other non-ferrous metals 
Metal grills, �ans, pipes &"other 
fabricated products 
Calculators, refrigerators, air­
conditioners & industrial machinery 
Radios, televisions,semi-conductors 
& other electrical machinery 
Transport equipment & oil rigs 
Professional & scientific equipment 
& photographic & optical goods 
Other manufacturing industries 
(jewellery, toys, umbrellas, etc) 












1 , 7 2 4 






4 , 1 1 2 
























9 4 5 
1 , 5 4 2 


































I 9 6 J 
5,006 
1 , 8 2 0 

























































1 , 1 4 1 
39,544 
l 9 (1 5 
5,461 
1 , 9 4 4 
l , 24 7 






















1 , 39 3 
1 , 4 5 4 
3,153 
1 , 2 2 7 
45,535 


























1 , 7 9 1 









l, l 88 







l1, 9 9 2 
332 






























































Cigarettes & other tobacco 
products 
Te tile & textile manufactures 
Wearing apparel except footware 
Leather & leather products 
Footware 
Sawntimber & other wood products 
except furniture 
Furniture & Fixtures except 
primarily of metal 
Paper & �aper products 
Printing & publishing 
Industrial chemicals & gases 
Paints, pharmaceurical & other 
chemical products 
Petroleum refineries & 
petroleum products 
Processing of jelutong & gum <lamar 
Rubber products except footwear 
Plastic products 
Pottery, china, earthenware & glass 
products 
Bricks, tiles & other structural 
clay products 
Cement & cement additives 
Structural cement & concrete 
products 
Asbestos, stone & other non-metallic 
mineral products 
Iron & steel 
Zinc & other non-ferrous metals 
Metal grills, cans, pipes & other 
fabricated products 
Calculators, refrigerators, air­
conditioners & industrial machinery 
Radios, televisions, semi-conductors 
& other electrical machinery 
Electronic products & components 
Transport equipment. and oil rigs 
Professional & scientific equipment 
& photographic"& optical goods 
Other manufacturing industties 



















I , l 6 2 
890 




























2 9 ,, 
1,409 































2, I 86 
1,795 














































































2, 7 15 
















l, 04 3 
468 
681 































































1, 18 5 
1,700 





















































































Textiles & textile manufactures 
Wearing apparel except footware 
Leather & leather products 
Footware 
Sawntimber & other wood products 
except furniture 
Furniture & fixtures except 
primarily of metal 
Paper & paper products 
Printing & publishing 
Industrial chemicals & gases 
Paints, pharmaccuric:.11. & other 
chemical products 
Petroleum refineries & 
petroleum products 
Processing of jelutong & gum demar 
Rubber products except footwear 
Plastic products 
Pottery, china, earthenware & glass 
products 
Bricks, tiles & other structural 
clay products 
Cement & cement additives 
Structural cement & concrete 
products 
Asbestos, stone & other non-metallic 
mineral products 
Iron & steel 
Zinc & other non-ferrous metals 
Metal grills, cans, pipes & other 
fabricated products 
Calculators, refrigerators, air­
conditioners & industrial machinery 
Radios, televisions, semi-conductors 
& other electrical machinery 
Electronic products & components 
Transport equipment & oil rigs 
Professional & scientific equipment 
& �hotographic & optical .goods 
Other manufacturing industries 









l, 4 7 l 
8,859 
























l 9 7 8 
9,6:36 
2,596 
l, 2 6 3 
9,792 
28,983 
1 , J 5 1 




























































l 0, 05 3 
2,650
l, 2 77 
9,710
27,188 






2; 13 8 
4.300 



















19 8 1 
10,075 




1, l 8 6 
l, 4 2 8 





4 , 2 9 l 
J , J l l 
157 





l, 7 3 0 

















1 , 15 2 
l, 4 0 8 





4 , 5 1 l 
J, 7 8 !, 
160 

























































































Table 7: Value-Added Per Worker by Industry, 1959-19.83 
Industry Major Group 
Food 
Beverage 
Cigarettes & other tobacco products 
Textiles & textile manufactures
]Wearing apparel excepl [uutweur Leather & leather products 
Footwear 
Sawn timber & other wood products 
except furniture 
Furniture & fixtures except primartly 
of metal, stone & plastics 
Paper & paper products 
Printing & publishing 
Industrial Chemicals & 
Paints, pharmaceutical 
chemical products 
Petroleum refineries & 
products 
Processing of jelutong 
Rubber products except 






& gum demar 
rubber 
Pottery, china, earthenware & 
glass products 
"Bricks, tiles & other structural 
clay products 
Cement 
Structural cement & concrete products 
Non-metallic mineral products 
Iron & steel J Non-ferrous metal 
Fabricated metal products except 
machinery & equipment 
Machinery except electrical & 
electronic 
Electrical machinery, apparatus,
] appliances & supplies 
E\ectronic products & components 
Transport equipment 
Instrumentation equipment, 
photographic & optical goods 
Other manufacturing industries 





























































1 1 . 9
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Table 7: ( Continued) 
Thousand Dollars 
Indus-
trial 1968 1969 1970 19 71 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Code 
311 /2 Food 8. 9 8.3 8. 4 9.5 10.5 13.7 15. 9 1 7. 2 
313 Beverage 12. 7 13. 6 14. 9 14. 9 13.0 14.2 1 7. 1 21. 7 
314 Cigarettes & other tobacco products 18. 7 22.9 23.6 24.4 23.4 25.9 36.8 26.7 
321 Textiles & textile manufactures 
l 2. 6 ]3-1 ]2. 9 
4. 6 5. 2 8. 6 7.0 6.9 
322 Wearing apparel except footwear 2. 6 3. 3 3.9 4. 3 5. 1
323 Leather & leather products 3. 7 4. 7 7. 2 8.3 5.3 
324 Footwear 3. 9 4. 3 4.3 5. 0 6. l
331 Sawn timber & other wood products 
except furniture 6 .·2 6.4 6.6 6. l 6. 4 10.7 8 .  l 8. 6
332 Furniture & fixtures except primarily 
of metal, stone & plastics 5.0 . 5. 3 5. 9 6.0 5. 7 6.5 7. 3 8.2 
341 Paper & paper products 3. 7 3. 9 4. 9 5. 5 6. 9 9.4 10.9 9.4 
34 2 Printing & pub�ishing 7. 3 7. 3 7. J 8. 5 l l . 0 12.. 0 11, • G 1 ,, . 7 
351 Industrial chemicals & gases 
}5.
9 ] 32. 3 }2.8 20.3 25.0 36.4 33.l 28.8 
CJl 
352 Paints, pharmaceutical & other I-'-
chemical products 12.2 14.8 25.5 34.5 38.4 
353/4 Petroleum refineries & petroleum products 111. 3 105.5 118.3 278.6 181. 6
355 Processing of jelutong & gum damar 7. 6 5.6 8. 1 9. 7 12.2 
356 Rubber products except rubber footwear 
& toys - - - 13.6 13.0 14.3 15. 3 17.0 
357 Plastic products - - - 6. 1 6. 9 8.8 9. 7 8.4 
361/2 Pottery, china, earthenware & glass 
l 8. 3 l l 6 
.
9 
products 7.9 7. 9 11; 1 13.3 1 7. 2 
363 Bricks, tiles & other structural clay 
products 8. 4 9. 2 12.2 15. 7 12. 2
364 Cement 7 . 1 l 7. 2 28.8 4 7. 1 61. 2 79,0
365 Structural cement & concrete products 7. 4 8.6 10.9 16.3 15. 9
369 Non-metallic mineral products 13. 6 1 I . 0 20.4 20.4 21. 8 
371 Iron & steel ] 11. 9 J 15.3 ] 14. 9 12. 6 20.7 36.2 59.2 33.1 
372 Non-ferrous metal 10. 6 1 3 . l 21. 7 22.9 25.3 
381 Fabricated metal products except 
machinery & equlpmcnl 7.0 7. I B. J B.0 9.0 l 2 . l 1 3. 8 1 5. 4 
382 Machinery except electrical & electronic 6.4 6.4 7. 4 8.2. l O. 2. lJ. J 18. b l 9. 7 
383 Electrical mnchinci:y, a pp a rat 11 s , 
] Ju 1 "·' appliances & supplies 7. 6 6. 5 I. '.> B. B 9.8 I 'l.. J 3 84 Electronic products & components 10,8 12.5 11 . 9 13.3 16. 5
385 Transport equipment 8.2 8.3 9.8 l O. l 11. 9 13. 5 l 7 . 9 20.2
386 Instrumentation equipment, photographic 
& optical goods - - - 4. 5 7 . 1 7.4 4.4 12.6 
390 Other manufacturing industries 4. 4 4. 7 3,6 4. 2 4. 5 5.6 8.5 8.4 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING EXCL RUBBER PROCESSING 8.2 B. 5 9 . .I 9.7 l O. 5 12. 8 I 7 . l 1 7 • g-
-·-----



































Industry Major Gro�p 
Food 
Beverage 
Cigarettes & other tobacco products 
Textiles & textile manufactures 
Wearing apparel except footwear 
Leather & leather products 
Footwear 
Sawn timber & other wood products 
except furniture 
Furniture & fixtures except primarily 
of metal, .stone & plastics 
Paper & paper products 
Printing & publishing 
Industrial chemicals & gases 
Paints, pharmaceutical & other 
chemical products 
Petroleum refineries & petroleum products 
Processing of jelutong & gum damar 
Rubber products except rubber footwear 
& toys 
Plastic products 
Pottery, china, earthenware & glass 
products 
Bricks, tiles & other structural clay 
products 
Cement 
Structural cement & concrete products 
Non-metallic mineral products 
Iron & steel 
Non-ferrous metal 
Fabricated metal products except 
machinery & equipment 
Machinery except electrical & electronic 
Electrical machinery, apparatus, 
appliance� & supplies 
Electronic products & components 
Transport equipment 
Instrumentation equipment, photographic 
& optical goods 
Other manufacturing industries 














4 4. 4 
220.6 
12. 7


















21 . 6 




































7 . 1 



















1 7 . 7 
23.9 
1 6. 1 
l 7. 3
24.2






































4 l . 1 


































1 7 . l 
I I . l








L, 86. 3 












2 4 . l 
23.4 
4 1. 5 
20.4 
20.8 
















l1 2 7. 5 
19. 4 
2 7. 7 
20.4 
2 6. l 
31. 0 





























2 8. 2 
22.8 












2 3. 1 
22.4 
36.2 
Sources: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Report on the Census of Industrial Production 1983, Singapore: 
Singapore National Printers, Tabl� 18, pp.22-23; Department of Statistics, Singapore, 
Report on the Census of Industrial Production 1980, Singapore; Singapore Nationnl Printers, Table 18, 
pp.22-23; Calculations from the same Report cited in Nyaw Mee-kau, Industrial Growth and Export 
Expansion in Singapore, Hong Kong: Kingsway International, 1979, Appendix Table A-38, pp.200-201. 
01 
(J) 
Table 8: Gross Domestic Product by Industry, 1960-1983 
Million Dollars 
Industry 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 19 71 
At 1968 Market Prices 
TOTAL 2,304.5 2,497.4 2,671.6 2,938.0 2,835.6 3,048. 7 3,387.8 3,788.9 4 , J l .'.>. 0 l1, 9 0 6. l .'.>, 5 7 9. 3 (i, 2 7 G. 7 
Agriculture & Fishing 88.5 91. 4 9 6. l 95.7 93.3 93.8 110. 2 113 . 7 121. 3 126. 7 129. 8 111 3. 5 
Quarrying 7. 6 6. 7 7. 9 8. 6 10. 4 9. 4 11. 3 12.2 14 . 7 1 7. 3 19.4 22.8 
Manufacturing 294.4 311. 7 338.5 395.4 410.0 4 6 5. 1 531. 2 637.6 769.7 942.4 1,142.8 1,356.5 
Utilities 53.5 53.5 59.9 60.2 70.5 68.8 83.9 100.7 11 7. 2 127.5 145.9 160.2 
Construction 80.1 111. 2 12 2. 3 14 5. 8 16 7. J 192.9 191. 4 2 15. 7 256.2 288.8 J5J.6 l10 C,. 6 
Trade 720.0 797.5 854.4 9 77. 5 805.1 83 li. 3 962.0 1,141.2 1,286.4 1,436.7 1,568.9 1,722.9 
Transport & 
Communication 3 0 7. 1 326.3 335.3 342.2 322.0 338.7 3 60. 1 402.5 4 7 5. 1 544.8 627.9 7 21. 2 
Financial & Business 
Services 270.1 2 9 8. 1 332.4 358.9 384.4 419.6 453.7 498.3 578.2 680.2 77 4. 7 895.6 
Other Services 408.9 427.4 450.6 482.9 496.5 527.9 5 71. 1 600.2 646.4 688.7 756.9 818.3 
Less: Imputed Bank 
Service Charge 35.7 3 7. 3 42.6 45.4 45.9 49.0 52.5 62.2 71. 3 85.8 106.8 123.7 
Add: Import Duties 110. 0 110. 9 I 1 6. 8 I I 6. 2 I 22. 0 1 ,, 7. 2 1 65. 4 129.0 121. 1 138.8 16 6. 2 15 2. 8 
Table 8: (Continued) 
TOTAL 








Financial & Busin�ss 
Services 
Other Services 
Less: Imputed Bank 
Service Charge 
Add: Import Duties 
* Pieliminary figures.
Hillion Dollars 
1972 1973 19 7 4 1975 1976 19 77 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 19 83 * 
7,119.7 7,941.3 8,445.2 8,790.3 9,447.4 10,193.2 11,074.0 12,114.1 13,366.5 14,695.2 15,627.5 16,869.0 
153.9 145.8 135.5 139.9 154.9 156.5 155.4 160.7 163.9 165.4 159.8 156.3 
26.0 26.0 29.4 39.2 43.1 42.0 36.4 41.5 411.7 58.3 73.7 90.3 
1,583.9 1,841.2 1,910.6 1,879.5 2,084.6 2,261.4 2,507.1 2,873.3 3,215.9 3,531.5 3,358.3 3,437.2 
181. 0 200.0 208.5 223.3 244.4 2 7 6. 1 326.1 355.8 3 81. 1 407.6 422.8 456.9 
474.0 432.9 459.4 533.9 591.3 578.4 536.1 575.0 632.9 745.3 1,041.2 1,390.9 
1,896.0 2,117.9 2,342.5 2,372.6 2,450.8 2,642.9 2,827.5 3,035.6 3,261.0 3,458.6 3,664.2 3,816.7 
858.8 1,041.3 1,123.8 1,230.7 1,399.3 1,629.9 1,885.3 2,149.3 2,445.5 2,788.4 3,056.5 3,281.7 
1,024.1 1,184.5 1,328.1 1,491.4 1,573.2 1,651.9 1,769.7 1,988.7 2,408.4 2,852.5 3,168.8 3,656.0 
889.5 960.2 1,036.7 1,115.6 1,171.7 1,208.2 1,305.6 1,384.2 1,468.5 1,569.2 1,728.8 1,893.8 
147.4 197.8 288.2 387.4 429.5 435.7 471.3 660.9 893.6 1,110.3 1,299.0 1,556.4 
179. 9 189.3 158.9 151. 6 163.6 181 . 6 19 6. 1 210. 9 2 3 8. 2 228.7 252.4 245.6 
Sources: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Economic & Social Statistics Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore: Singapore National 
Printers, 1983, Table 4.3, pp.57-58; Department of Statistics, Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 1983/84, 



















Table 9: Manufacturing as a Percentage of 
Total Gross Domestic Product, 1960-1983 


























Sources: Calculated from the Department of Statistics, Singapore, Economic & 
Social Statistics Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore: Singapore National 
Printers, 1983, Table 4.3, pp.57-58 and Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 
1983/84, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, n.d., Table 4.3, p.72. 
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Source: Economic Development Board, various Annual Reports between 1965 
and 1983/84. 
Table 11: Cumulative Foreign Investment in Manufacturing by Industry Group, 
1970 - mid-1983 
Food, Beverage & Tobaco 
Textile 
Wearing Apparel, Made-up Textile,) 
Footwear ) 
Leather, Rubber, Processing of Natural 
Gums (except Rubber processing) 
Wood & Cork Products 
Paper & paper products 
Industrial Chemicals 
Other Chemical products 
(except plastics) 
Petroleum & petroleum products 
Plastic Products 
Non-Metallic Mineral products 
Basic Metal industries 
Fabricated Metal Products 
Except Machinery &. Equipment 
Machinery Except Electrical 
Electrical/Electronic machinery, 
Apparatus, Applicances & Supplies 
Transport Equipment 
Precision equipment, 





































l, 5 7 5 



































































































Table 11: (Continued) 
Food, Beverage & Tobaco 
Textile 
Wearing apparel, Made-up Textile, 
Footwear 
Leather, Rubber, Processing of Natural 
Gums (except Rubber processing) 
Wood & Cork products 
Paper & paper products 
Industrial Chemicals 
Other Chemical products (except plastics) 
Petroleum & petroleum products 
Plastic products 
Non-Metallic Mineral products 
Basic Metal industries 
Fabricated Metal products 
(except machinery & equipment) 
Machinery (except electrical) 
Electrical/Electronic machinery, 
Apparatus, Appliances & Supplies 
Transport equipment 
Precision equipment, 
Photographic & Optical goods 










I l J 



















































Data for 1974 to 1978 are not comparable with that of previous years on account 
according to the Singapore Industrial Classification, 1969. 
Date for 1979-mid-1983 are not comparable with that of previous years on account 
according to the Singapore Standard Industrial Classification (Revised 1978). 
*Sources of foreign investment were reclassified as from 1982.
Sources: Economic Development Board, Annual Reports, 1970-1983/84, 
* Mid
19 80 1981 19 82 1983 
241 301 363 394 
215 194 101 97 
.l 51 147 72 72 
62 4 7 37 37 
249 254 135 122 
IO 2 l J 1 1J2 1 2 '..i 
122 176 l 8 7 6 ,� 9 
I 7:l 2 (, 7 ;, 00 1, 1 :, 
3, lb 0 3,490 3,903 4,053 01 
98 180 l 5 7 159 (/) 
125 131 129 152 
60 74 88 78 
261 310 355 385 
562 702 923 980 
1,212 l, 4 5 2 1,822 l, 9 3 6 
339 421 492 531 
314 240 239 259 
74 76 72 70 
7,520 8,593 9,607 10,514 
of reclassification of companies 
of reclassification of companies 
'fable 12: Cumulative Foreign Investment in Manufacturing by Country of Origin7 
1970 - mid-1983 
** mld 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 19 77 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
USA 343 501 8l10 99:l 1, 08 :l 1 , I l H I ,LIJ I ,:l(ifi I , (,O I I , fl I 7 7., 2 I S 2,599 3,236 3, ,, 7 9 
JAPAN 68 108 137 2]7 3 St, 454 525 633 801 1, Ol1 9 l, 18 5 1,372 1,584 2,099 
EUROPE, of which 406 616 863 954 1,034 1,170 1,306 1,407 2,005 2,434 2,952 3,356 3,781 3, 9ld 
* EC l106 6 I 6 863 91 2 99n 1 , I I 0 l, 2 3 8 1,324 1,907 2,290 2,763 3,044 3,449 3,574 
Sweden - - - 6 3 22 26 30 30 35 40 105 124 128 
Switzerland - - - 31 27 29 30 38 54 94 120 176 1 77 203 
Other European countries - - - 5 8 9 12 15 14 15 29 31 31 36 
OTHERS 178 350 443 476 584 638 675 739 835 1,049 1,168 1,266 1,006 995 
TOTAL 995 1,575 2,283 2,659 3,054 3,380 3,739 4,145 5,242 6,349 7,520 8,593 9,607 10,514 
*EC, of which 406 616 863 912 996 l, 110 l, 2 3 8 l, 3 24 1,907 2,290 2,763 3,044 3,449 3,574 
UK 199 294 375 390 424 481 555 566 791 1,030 1,227 1, 412 1,581 1,652 
Netherlands 183 275 356 381 420 473 525 571 904 1 , 011 1,216 1,310 1,423 1'45 l1 
Germany 3 21 96 102 I 06 105 112 130 144 166 223 181 221 236 
France 8 10 15 1 7 21 22 18 21 23 36 41 74 91 90 
Italy 10 12 15 15 1 5 15 16 2 l 28 28 29 4 1 100 103 
Other EC countries 3 4 6 7 10 14 1 2 l 5 l 7 19 27 26 33 39 
**Sources of foreign investment were reclassified as from 19 8 2. 
Sources: Economic Development Board, Annual Reeort 1983/84, p. 11 and Economic Development Board, Annual Reeort 1974/75, p. 16. 
Table 13: Net Investment Commitments in Manufacturing by Industry, 1972-1984 
Industry 
Food & Beverages 
Textile 
Wearing Apparel 
Leather & Rubber 
Wood Products 
Paper Products & Printing 
Industrial Chemicals 
Plastic Products 




Fabricated Metal Products 
Machinery except 
Electrical 
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I B. I 
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1 6. 8 
161. 8 
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4 l . 9
9 'i. 7 
162.0 
5 5. (J 
1 6. 3 
96. l 
300.9 
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273.J 





























2 2. 1 
5 2. l 
2 7. 7 
1 IO. 2 
3 6 7. l 
J] (,. 0 
36.8 
I 6 7. 4
84.5 






















l . 6 
IJ.8 
194.5 295.9 291.9 306.3 303.3 396.4 812.4 943.6 1,421.6 1,882.8 1,722.2 1,792.3 1,815.5 
156.3 224.l 168.8 246.8 260.5 362.6 765.7 823.4 1,199.0 1,234.6 1,122.2 1,270.2 1,318.2 
38.2 71.8 123.1 59.5 42.8 33.8 46.7 120.2 222.6 648.2 600.0 522.l 497.3 
Note: Net investment commitments refer to gross commitments less projects withdrawn or uncertain as at 31 December 1984. 
Sources: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 1984/85, Singapore: Singapore National 
Printers, n.d., 'Table 6.11, p.112; Department of Statistics, Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 1978/79, 




Table 14: Net Investment Commitments in Manufacturing by Country of Origin,
1972-1984 
Year I 19 7 2 19 73 1974 1975 1976 19 77 1978 1979 19 80 1981 1982 
TOTAL I 19 4. 5 295.9 2 91. 9 306.3 303.3 396.4 812.4 943.6 1,1121.6 1,882.8 1,722.2 
Local I 38.2 71 . 8 12 3. 1 59.5 42.8 3 3. 8 4 6. 7 120.2 222.6 648.2 600.0 
Foreign 
I 
156.J 2 2 4. 1 168.8 211 6. 8 260.5 362.6 765.7 823.4 I , 19 9. 0 1,234.6 1,122.2 
United Stutcs 211. 7 8.8 6 /1. 5 4 S. 6 92.9 153. 5 1 ,, 6. 9 259.9 505.8 674.4 513. 3
Japan 7 9. 3 151. 4 44.6 23.6 7 6. 1 12 9 . ,, 158.4 31 9. 4 139.7 225.3 7 2. 1 
Europe 21. 6 43.9 28.0 16 7. 5 50.1 4 7. 7 418.6 161. J 360.4 228.7 402.7 
European Community (EC) 20.2 20.9 25.8 158.9 4 5. 7 3 6. 7 4 08. 1 13 2. 3 268.9 l 66. 3 367.7 
United Kingdom - 1 . 9 25.8 56.2 14 . 8 21. 4 156.2 91. 9 12 9. 5 8 3. l 263.9 
Netherlands - 0.6 - 8 1 . /1 20.0 - 200.0 4. 5 l. 0 l . 2 62.8 
Germany l J. 7 18. 4 - I 6. 6 7. I 8.9 J 8. J 2 5. J b9.2 11. '.> JI . l1 
France 1 . 0 - - 2.4 I . 8 1 . 1 11. I l1. 9 1 8. B I • 7 1. '.l 
Italy 5.0 - - 2. J 2.0 5.J I. I 2. '.> /1 5. ,, 6 7. 'i 2. ,,
Other EC Countries 0. le - - - - - 1. I, J. 2 5.0 (1 • 3 5. 9 
Switzerland 1 . 4 - 0.5 - 2. 4 6. 5 8. 4 l 2. 1 35.8 1 7. 0 2 2. 1 
Other European Countries - 2.0 1. 7 8. 6 2.0 4.5 2 . 1 16.9 55.7 45.4 12. 9
Others 30.7 20.0 3 1 . 7 1 0 . 1 4 1 . 4 32.0 41.8 82.8 193.1 106.2 134 . 1 
Sources: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 1984/85, Table 6.12, p.113; 
Economic Development Board, Annual Report 1982/83, p.12. 
Million Dollars 
19 83 1984 
1 , 7 9 2. 3 1 , 815. 5 
5 2 2. 1 497.3 
1,270.2 1,318.2 
5 7 0. 1 780.9 
1 66. 5 174. 8 Ol 
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Table 15: Selected Major Indicators of Pioneer Firms 
of Singapore, 1961-1973 
Output Value Direct Employ-
Added Exports ment 
(S$m.) (S$m.) (S$m.) No.) 
36.3 6.9 n.a. 241 
109.8 22.7 n.a. 968 
153.2 33.5 n.a. 2,654 
220.4 50.1 n.a. 5,416 
318.2 86.4 88.0 10,495 
490.3 119.4 185.0 10.881 
649.5 163.9 261.0 16,095 
1,072.5 249.5 344.0 20,800 
1,199.8 333.5 460.0 36,071 
1,749.0 593.0 997.0 50,504 
2,403.0 636.0 1,294.0 66,124 
3,380.0 901.0 1,964.0 86,464 
9,913.0 1,451.0 3,277.0 92,745 
9,479.0 1,451.0 6,421.0 97,562 
8,386.0 1,840.0 5,541.0 80,018 
10,388.0 2,165.0 7,520.-0 88,697 
11,686.0 2,421.0 .-8,;386.0 91,313 
12,837.0 2,785.0 9,867.0 97,732 
15,526.0 3,391.0 12,393.0 111,525 
19,242.0 4,733.0 14,054.0 118,837 
20,484.0 5,090.0 14,777.0 112,765 
19,888.0 4,847.0 13,992.0 105,480 



























Department of Statistics, Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics Singa2ore 1984/85, 
Singapore: Singapore National Printers, n.d., Table 6.13, p.114; Nyaw Mee-kau, 
Industrial Growth and Ex2ort Ex2ansion in Singa2ore, Hong Kong: Kingsway 
International, 1979, Appendix Table A-33, p.188. 
Table 16: Industrial Stoppages and Trade Disputes, 1960-1983 
Industrial Stoppages 
Han-days Lost 1 
Trade Disputes 
Year Number Workers Involved 
1960 45 5,939 152,005 
1 961 1 1 6 43,584 410,889 
1962
2 
88 6,647 165, 1 24 
1963 47 33,004 388,219 
1964 39 2,535 35,908 
1 965 30 3,374 45,800 
1 966 14 1 ,288 ,, ,, , 7 6 2 
1967 10 4,491 41,322 
1968 4 172 11,447 
1969 - - 8,512 
1970 5 1,749 2,514 
1 971 2 1,380 5,449 
1972 10 3,168 18,233 
1 973 5 1 , 312 2,295 
1 974 1 0 l, 901 5,380 
1 975 7 1,865 4,853 
1 976 4 1 , 5 7 6 3,193 
1 9 77 1 406 1,01 1 
19 7 8 - - -
1 979 - - -
1980 - - -
1981 - - -
1982 - - -
1983 - - -
No t e : l Fig u res re .1. a t e <l Lo · man - <lays l o s t w i th l n th l! pc r 1. o <l shown , i r r cs pl! c t i v e o [ w he t· h c r 
or not the stoppages began in that period or earlier. 
2 Figures inclu�e<l the two-day general strike in October involving approxlmatl!ly 
19,700 workers and 34,300 man-days lost. 
3. Figures from 1979 exclude dispute on refusal to negotiate and union recognition.
Sources: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Economic & Social Statistics Singapore 1960-1982, 
Singaporf: Singapore National Printers, 1983, Table 3.10, p,42; Department of 
Statistics, Singapore. YcurbotJk of Stut:ist..lcs S-l.ngnpt1rc! 1983/Hl,, S:lng11por1,': 































Table 17: Trade Unions and Membership, 1960-1983 
Employee Class 
Year Unions Members 
1960 · 130 144,770 
1961 124 164,462 
1962 122 189,032 
1963 112 142,936 
1964 106 157,050 
1965 108 154,052 
1966 108 141,925 
1967 106 130,053 
1968 110 125,518 
1969 110 120,053 
1970 102 112,488 
1971 100 124,350 
1972 97 166,988 
1973 92 191,481 
1974 90 203,561 
1975 89 208,561 
1976 91 221,936 
1977 90 229,056 
1978 89 236,907 
1979 85 249,710 
1980 83 243,841 
1981 86 224,362 
1982 89 214,337 
1983 90 205,155 
Sources: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Economic & Social Statistics 
Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1983, 
Table 3.9, p.41 and Department of Statistics, Singapore, Yearbook of 
Statistics Singapore 1983/84, Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 
















Table 18: Consumer Price Index, 1961-1983 
Annual Percentage Changes 

























Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Economic & Social Statistics 
Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore: Singapore National Printer, 1983, Table 
13.1 (ii), pp.215-216 and Department of Statistics, Singapore, Yearbook 
of Statistics Singapore 1983/84, Table 13.3, p.222. 
Table 19: Rate of Wage Increases7 Productivity Growth and CPI: 1972-81 
�i) ( ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (Vi) ( vii) (viii) (ix) WC Cumulative Actual Cumulative Product- Cumulative CPI Cumulative Sum of 
Wage Compound Wage Compound ivity Compound Growth Compound (Vi) 
Increases of ( i) Increases of (iii) Growth Rate of (v) Rate of (vii) (viii) 
1972 8% 8% 8% 8% 8-. 2% 8.2% 2. 1 % 2. 1 % 10.3% 
1973 9 1 7. 7 9.59 18.4 3. 6 12. 1 19.6 22.1 34.2 
1974 16.24 36.8 1 7. 81 39.5 3.4 15. 9 22.3 49.3 65.2 
1975 6.0 45.0 13.39 58.2. 2. 8 19. 2 2 . 6 53.2 72.4 
1976 7. 0 55.2 5.04 66.2 3.4 23.3 -1. 9 50.3 73.6 CJ) 
1977 6.0 64.5 6.88 7 7. 6 3. 2 27.2 3 . 2 55.1 82.3 
1978 8. 3 78.2 5.63 87.6 2. 1 29.9 4.8 62.5 92.4 
1979 12.6 100.7 8.75 104.0 2. 8 33.5 4.0 69.0 102.5 
1980 12.6 126.0 13.03 130.6 4. 6 3 9. 6 8.5 83.4 123.0 
1981 10.3-14.3 149.3- 14.05 163.0 4. 1 45.3 8. 2 98.4 143.7 
158.3 
* The actual rate of change of monthly earning for all industries is not available for 1972.
It is assumed to be 8%, using the NWC recommendations as a guide.
Source: Chew Soon Beng and Rosalind Chew, "Incomes Policy: The Singapore 
Experience", Mimeo, National University of Singapore, 1983, Table 11, 
p.38.
Table 20: Degree of Implementation of NWC in Each Sector/Industry 
By Percentage of �Benefited' Employees1 
Year 
Sector_/Industry 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 19 7 7 1978 1979 19 80 19 81 
L. Private Sector
1 . Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 30-39;� 40-491� 30-391� 50-59;� 40-49% 901� 60-69% 60-69% 70-79% 90%
2. Mining and Quarrying 50-59% 40-49% 60-69% 50-59% 60-69% 9 0 ;� 80-89% 70-79% 90% 90% 
3. Manufacturing 50-59% 50-59% 60-69% 60-69% 70-79% 9 0 /� 80-89% 80-89% 80-89% 90%
4. Construction 20-29% 20-29% 30-39% 30-39% 40-49% 90% 60-69% 60-69% 70-79% 90%
5 . Commerce 20-29% 20-29% 40-49% 40-49% 50-59% 90% 70-79% 70-79% 70-79% 90%
___ ,
6 . Transport, Storage 
& Communications 40-49% 50-59% 60-69% 60-69% 60-69% 80-89% 80-89% 70-79% 70-79% 90%
7. Finance,Insurance etc.20-29% 20-29% 60-69% 50-59% 60-69% 90% 80-89% 80-89% 90% 90% 
8. Community, Social
Personal Services 50-59% 50-59% 60-69% 50-59% 50-59% 80-89% 80-89% 70-79% 70-79% 90%
9 . Total Private Sector 40-49% 40---"49% 60-69% 50-59�� 6 0-'6 9 % ' 9 0 �� 80-89%· 70-79% 70-79% 90%
11.Public Sector 60-69%* 60-69% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 
Total (Private &
Public Sector) 50-59% 50-59% 70-79% 60-69�� 70-79% 90% 80-89% 80-89% 80-89% 90%
1. 'Benefited' employees refer to employees who benefited from the NWC
recommendations or received the equivalent.
Estimated ranges based on weighted average.
Source: Chew Soon Beng and Rosalind Chew, "Incomes Policy: The Singapore 
Experience", Mimeo, National University of Singapore, 1983, Table 2, 
...... ()Q 





Year (Beginning Consolidated Consolidated 
of Total Revenue Loan Other 
Financial Account Account 
Year) 
19 5 5 111. 8 27.3 20.0 - 7. 3 
1956 89.0 22.6 20.0 - 2.6
19 5 7 78.0 190.5 138.7 - 51. 8 
1958 84.4 24.3 20.0 - 4.3 
1959 4 3. 1 28.8 2 3. 1 2.3 3,4 
1960 4 7. 7 75.4 20.0 51. 8 3.6 
1961 87.4 13 9. 8 110.0 24.2 5.6 
1962 121. 0 141. 2 30.0 98.8 12. 4
1963 141. 7 310.3 230.0 64.5 15.8 
1964 312.6 102.4 16. 0 57.2 29.2
1965 247.0 11 7 . 1 20.0 64.5 32.6 
1966 179. 7 175. 7 30.0 99.3 46.4 
1967 141. 0 207.3 30.0 120.0 57,3 
1968 136.4 376.9 3 0. 1 218.2 128.6 
1969/701 286.9 416.7 3 7. 5 241.8 137.4 
1970/71 370.8 543.6 40.0 372.2 131.4 
1971/72 533.9 647.9 80.0 395.4 172.5 
1972/73 675.2 1,113.5 100.0 815.4 198.l
1973/74 1,112.2 1,289.9 272.5 716. 6 300.8
1974/75 1,295.6 1,762.5 480.0 842.0 440.5 
1975/76 1,917.3 2,292.0 4 4 3. 1 1,303.3 545.6 
1976/77 2,660.8 3,456.0 582.9 2,043.2 829.9 
1977/78 4,432.9 3,329.1 556.4 1,694.5 1,078.2 
1978/79 5,872.0 3,946.8 664.0 2,022.5 1,260.3 
1979/80 7,669.9 3,380.8 511. 3 1,698.5 1,171.0 
1980/81 8,747.5 4,142.0 94.0 2,221.1 1,826.9 
1981/82 9,235.0 3,241.0 1,703.8 13. 8 1,523.4 
1982/83 7,321.3 5,197.0 1,995.1 1,330.4 1,871.5 
1983/84 7,520.5 10,430.0 1,988.7 6,180.3 2,261.0 
Refers to financial year 1st January 69 to 31st March 70. From 1970, 
figures refer to financial year 1st April to 31st March. 
2 Based on Budget estimates. 
Uses 
Government Lo.'.lnS to St..-i-
Total Development tutory Boards 










168.0 57.6 108.4 
18 4. 4 68,3 114.0 
214.4 115.3 9 8. 7 
211. 9 119. 8 68.8 
226.4 131. 5 94.2 
332.8 154.6 178.1 
380.5 149.1 226.8 
506.6 214.5 292.1 
676.5 233.9 431.5 
1,106.5 208.9 897.6 
l,ll10.8 283.B 84 7. 8 
1,548.5 404.7 1,138.7 
1,683.9 618.5 1,065.4 
1,890.0 710.0 1,180.0 
2,148.9 790.6 1,358.3 
2,303.2 938.7 1,364.5 
3,654.5 1,385.9 2,268.6 
5,154.7 1,614.5 2,584.5 
4,997.8 1,951.0 3,046.8 
7,788.6 3,276.6 4,512.Q 
Sources: Department of Statistics, Singapore, Economic & Social Statistics Singapore 1960-1982, Singapore: 




































Table 22: Singapore Government Equity Participation 
in Companies 
Company's Percentage Unlisted 
Name of Company Paid Up of Govern- or 
Capital ment listed 
($'000) Share-
holding* 
I Holding Companies 
1 Te masek Holdings 
(Pte) Ltd (THL) 76,443 100.0 Unlisted 
2 Sheng-Li Holding 
Co Pte Ltd (SLH) 129,549 100.0 Unlisted 
3 MND Holdings 
(Pte) Ltd (MNDH) 31,000 100.0 Unlisted 
n Manufacturing 
1 Acma Electrical 
Industries Ltd 24,016 12.2 Listed 
2 Cerebos (S) Pte Ltd 8,800 45.0 Unlisted 
3 Chemical Industries 
(FE) Ltd 15,120 22.9 Listed 
4 Hitachi Electronic 
Devices (S) Pte Ltd 30,000 30.0 Unlisted 
5 National Iron & 
Steel Mills Ltd 42,565 19.7 Listed 
6 Singapore National 
Printers (Pte) Ltd 6,003 100.0 Unlisted 
7 Singapore Textiles 
Industries Ltd 28,000 6.7 Unlisted 
8 Sugar Industry of 
Singapore Ltd 8,000 40.0 Unlisted 
9 Tata Elxsi Pte Ltd 6,300 15.0 Unlisted 
10 United Industrial 
Corporation Ltd 70,875 16.5 Listed 
11 Allied Ordnance 
Company of 
Singapore (Pte) Ltd 4,000 60.0 Unlisted 
12 Chartered Industries 
of Singapore Pte Ltd 105,650 100.0 Unlisted 
13 Ordnance Develop-
ment & Engineering 
Co of Singapore Pte 
Ltd 9,068 100.0 Unlisted 
m Petrochemicals 
1 Denka (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd 10,000 20.0 Unlisted 
2 Ethylene Glycols 
(Singapore) Pte Ltd 96,500 50.0 Unlisted 
3 Petrochemical 
Corporation of 
Singapore (Pte) Ltd 182,520 47.5 Unlisted 
4 Phillips Petroleum 
Singapore Chemicals 
(Pte) Ltd 111,000 25.0 Unlisted 
580 
5 The Polyolefin 
Company (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd 94,900 25.0 Unlisted 
N Trading 
1 Fullerton (Pte) Ltd 330,000 100.0 Unlisted 
2 Intraco Ltd 40,000 26.7 Listed 
3 National Grain 
Elevator Ltd 5,000 37.0 Unlisted 
4 Singapore Airport 
Duty Free Emporium 
Pte Ltd 1,500 20.0 Unlisted 
5 Singapore National 
Oil Co Pte Ltd 1,000 100.0 Unlisted 
6 Singapore Offshore 
Petroleum Services 
Pte Ltd 900 33.3 Unlisted 
7 Singapore Pools (Pte) 
Ltd 1,000 100.0 Unlisted 
8 Van Ommeren 
Terminal (8) Pte Ltd 50,276 8.0 Unlisted 
9 Yaohan Singapore 
(Pte) Ltd 9,000 12.5 Unlisted 
10 SAF Enterprises (Pte) 
Ltd 2,000 100.0 Unlisted 
11 Singapore Food 
Industries Ltd 1,000 100.0 Unlisted 
12 Unicorn International 
Pte Ltd 1,700 100.0 Unlisted 
V Financial Services 
1 DBS Bank Ltd 228,567 48.7 Listed 
2 Export Credit 
Insurance Corporation 
of Singapore Ltd 63,795 49.2 Unlisted 
3 Singmanex (Pte) Ltd 1,820 100.0 Unlisted 
4 Government of 
Singapore Investment 
Corporation (Pte) Ltd 2,000 100.0 Unlisted 
VI Shiprepair & Shipbuildmg 
1 Jurong Holding Pte Ltd 35,763 44.5 Unlisted 
2 Jurong Shipyard Ltd 95,979 15.0 Unlisted 
3 Keppel Shipyard Ltd 150,641 71.3 Listed 
4 Mitsubishi Singapore 
Heavy Industries 
Pte Ltd 180,000 44.0 Unlisted 
5 Sembawang Holdings 
(Pte) Ltd 40,000 100.0 Unlisted 
6 Singapore Shipbuilding 
& Engineering Ltd 25,258 86.8 Unlisted 
V1I Shipping 
1 Neptune Orient Lines 
Ltd 130,000 67.7 Listed 
581 
VIII Aviation 
1 Singapore Airlines 
Ltd 240,808 90.5 Unlisted 
2 Singapore General 
Aviation Service 
Co Pte Ltd 2,000 20.0 Unlisted 
3 Singapore Aircraft 
Industries (Pte) Ltd 4,000 100.0 Unlisted 
IX Tourism & Leisure 
1 Hotel Premier (Pte) 
Ltd 2,821 100.0 Unlisted 
2 Jurong Bird Park 
(Pte) Ltd 5,000 100.0 Unlisted 
3 Singapore Zoological 
Gardens 9,257 100.0 Unlisted 
4 Parkland Golf Driving 
Range (Pte) Ltd 750 60.0 Unlisted 
X Properties 
1 Raffles Holdings (Pte) 
Ltd 110,000 49.0 Unlisted 
2 Singapore Treasury 
Building (Pte) Ltd 200,000 75.0 Unlisted 
3 Loyang Valley 
(Pte) Ltd 20,000 20.0 Unlisted 
XI Housing & Construction 
1 Construction Tech-
nology (Pte) Ltd 2,000 100.0 Unlisted 
2 Development & 
Construction Co 
(Pte) Ltd 15,000 100.0 Unlisted 
3 International Devel-
op men t & Consultancy 
Corporation (Pte) Ltd 1,500 100.0 Unlisted 
4 Resources Development 
Corporation (Pte) Ltd 9,000 100.0 Unlisted 
5 Urban Development 
& Management Co 
(Pte) Ltd 22,500 100.0 Unlisted 
XIl Farming 
1 Primary Industries 
Enterprises (Pte) Ltd 9,825 100.0 Unlisted 
* Government includes statutory bodies
- Source: Extract from Parliamentary Debates, 43(1), 30 August 1983 as cited in
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